JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Gautam Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. Heard Mr. Tarun Kumar, the learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party- State. 3. The present criminal revision application is directed against the judgment dated 20.07.2013 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Pakur in Criminal (Juvenile) Appeal No. 20 of 2013 whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the judgment of conviction dated 14.03.2013 and order of disposition dated 14.03.2013 passed by learned Juvenile Justice Board, Pakur convicting the petitioner under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, has been upheld. The present case arises out of G.R. Case No. 321 of 2009/T.R. No. 06/2013 which was registered under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Argument on behalf of the petitioner 4. This learned counsel for the petitioner had advanced his arguments on 11.08.2020 and confined his argument on the point of sentence. It was submitted that the petitioner has already remained in custody for a period of two years eight months and sixteen days out of conviction of three years. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to para 63 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Salil Bali v. Union of India” reported in (2013) 7 SCC 705 and submitted that it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the essence of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and Rules framed thereunder is restorative not retributive, providing for rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict with law into mainstream society. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the present age of the petitioner is 23 years and 7 months and he has already been reintegrated with the society. He submitted that the occurrence relates to the year 2009 and the petitioner has faced the rigorous of the criminal case for a long time. It was submitted that much of the disposition period has already been served by the petitioner, and therefore some sympathetic view may be taken and the disposition of the petitioner be confined to the period already undergone. 7. It was submitted that much of the disposition period has already been served by the petitioner, and therefore some sympathetic view may be taken and the disposition of the petitioner be confined to the period already undergone. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has also submitted that the learned Juvenile Justice Board while passing the order of disposition under Juvenile Justice Act, though has mentioned about the report of the probation officer, but there is no consideration of the report. He has submitted that the said Board was under legal obligation to consider the report and then pass appropriate order. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the matter may be disposed of after considering the probation officer’s report which must be in the records of the case. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of “Salil Bali v. Union of India” reported in (2013) 7 SCC 705 , paragraph 63. Argument on behalf of the opposite party- State 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party- State has opposed the prayer and has submitted that the offence which has been proved in the present case is a heinous offence and the judgement passed by the Juvenile Justice Board as well as the appellate authority are well reasoned judgements having consistent findings. He submits that under such circumstances, no interference is called for in this revisional jurisdiction. He submits that considering the nature of offence, no lenient view be taken in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner should regret for his acts and should be adequately punished so that such crime is never repeated by him. Findings of this Court 10. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his arguments on the point of order of disposition, but it would be useful to give the essential features of the case at hand in order to appreciate the arguments of the petitioner on the said point. 11. Findings of this Court 10. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his arguments on the point of order of disposition, but it would be useful to give the essential features of the case at hand in order to appreciate the arguments of the petitioner on the said point. 11. As per the prosecution story, which is based on a typed report dated 12.09.2009 lodged by the prosecutrix (hereinafter referred to as “victim”) wherein it was stated that on 09.06.2009 at about 10 a.m., when she was going to the house of her neighbour, her co-villager Khurshed Ansari (petitioner) all of a sudden caught hold of her, took her inside his house and he bolted the gate. While she tried to raise an alarm, he gagged her mouth with his hand and forcibly made her lie down on a couch. Thereafter, he committed rape upon her. She came back to her house. At that time her father had gone out of the village for doing work and her mother had gone out to serve meal to her father. When the mother came back and found her weeping, she asked the reason for her weeping and thereafter she narrated the entire occurrence to her. She also showed the blood-stained Pajama to her. Thereafter, when the father was informed regarding the occurrence and he came back at about 3 p.m., he convened a panchayat at the village in the evening in which the petitioner and his family members also came, but they did not obey the decision of the panchayat. It was also alleged that marriage of the victim was finalized, but as a result of the aforesaid occurrence, her would-be husband refused to marry her. 12. It is not in dispute that the age of the petitioner on the date of occurrence was 17 years and the age of the victim was about 16 to 17 years. 13. This Court finds that altogether 14 prosecution witnesses were examined. P.W. 1 is the mother of the victim and P.W. 2 is the father. P.W. 3 is the victim herself. P.W. 4 is the person who has deposed that after the incident, a panchayat was held and the petitioner refused to marry the victim, but offered Rs. 10,000/-. However, father of the victim refused to receive money. He had identified the juvenile before the Board. P.W. 3 is the victim herself. P.W. 4 is the person who has deposed that after the incident, a panchayat was held and the petitioner refused to marry the victim, but offered Rs. 10,000/-. However, father of the victim refused to receive money. He had identified the juvenile before the Board. During his cross-examination, he stated that in his presence no paper was prepared in the Panchayat. So far as P.W. 5 , 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13 are concerned, they have turned hostile and they have not supported the prosecution case at all. 14. P.W. 11 is the doctor, who had examined the victim on 12.06.2009 when she was posted at Sadar Hospital, Pakur. She has proved the medical examination report of the victim and marked as Exhibit-1 and has supported the prosecution case. On 13.10.2009, on the request of the investigating officer, she again prepared another report on the basis of previous examination of the victim and opined that as the hymen was torn, it indicated sexual intercourse. She further proved that report and the same was marked as Exhibit- 1/1. 15. P.W. 14 is the Investigating Officer of the case. 16. The P.W- 1, 2, 3, 4, 11 and 14 have fully supported the prosecution case and the learned Juvenile Justice Board found the testimony of the victim reliable. 17. In para 9 of the judgment of the Juvenile Justice Board, the statement of the victim has been recorded which reads as under: “9. P.W. – 3 Prosecutrix (name withheld by us) deposed that the occurrence took place about two and a half years ago in the year, 2009. On that day at about 10.00 a.m. she was going to the house of her grand father. On the way Khurshed took her in side his house and bolted the door from inside. He made her lie down on the couch. Thereafter, he opened her Pajama and committed rape upon her. At that time the brother of Khurshed came back from the school. When she tried to open the gate, Khurshed did not allow her to open the gate. Later on, he opened the gate and pushed her out of his house. Then she came to her house and she was weeping. When her mother came to the house, she narrated regarding the occurrence to her. When she tried to open the gate, Khurshed did not allow her to open the gate. Later on, he opened the gate and pushed her out of his house. Then she came to her house and she was weeping. When her mother came to the house, she narrated regarding the occurrence to her. At 3.00 p.m. her father came back and her mother stated to him regarding the occurrence. Thereafter, a panchayat was convened in which her parents made proposal for marriage, which was refused by the parents of Khurshed. She went to Hiranpur P.S. from there she went to Mahila P.S. and there she lodged an F.I.R. On the application she affixed her thumb impression. She identified the juvenile before the Board. In her cross examination by Ld. defence counsel, she stated that her house was situated in front of mosque and house of Khurshed was situated in the right side of mosque. No quarrel took place between Hasina Bibi and her near the well. When Khurshed was forcibly taking her, she cried. At that time no one was on the road. She denied the suggestion that Khurshed had not committed rape upon her or when he refused to marry her she falsely implicated him in this case.” 18. The learned Juvenile Justice Board examined the evidences on record and came to a specific finding in para 19 and 20 as under: “19. In state of U.P. v/s Chhotevlal, 2011 (3) JLJR (SC) 106, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the testimony of the prosecutrix, if found to be reliable, by itself, may be sufficient to convict the culprit and no corroboration of her evidence is necessary. In prosecutions of rape, the law does not require corroboration. 20. From analysis of the prosecution evidence, we are of the opinion that the evidence of the prosecutrix (P.W. -3) is entirely reliable and the same has been corroborated by P.W. 1, P.W. - 2, P.W.- 4 and P.W. -11 (doctor). P.W.- 14 is the initial I.O. and he has established the P.O. Ld. Defence counsel has not been able to make a dent in their deposition. They have stood the test of cross examination. P.W.- 14 is the initial I.O. and he has established the P.O. Ld. Defence counsel has not been able to make a dent in their deposition. They have stood the test of cross examination. By adducing evidence the prosecution has fully proved the fact that on 09.06.09 at about 10.00 a.m. while the prosecutrix came out of her house, Khurshed Ansari all of a sudden caught her on the road and forcibly took her in his house. There he committed rape upon her. The prosecution has proved its case beyond the shaow of reasonable doubt against the juvenile in conflict with law.” After recording the aforesaid findings, the Board held that the petitioner who was in conflict with law, has committed the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 19. It further appears that while considering the disposition order under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 the learned Juvenile Justice Board had perused the report of the probation officer and considering the nature of offence, the Board refused to release the petitioner on probation of good conduct and ordered that the petitioner, who was found to be in conflict with law, be sent to Special Home, Dhanbad for his detention for a period of three years for committing offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 20. The learned lower appellate court again considered the materials on record and also considered the arguments of the respective parties and held that the learned Juvenile Justice Board had meticulously considered the evidence on record in proper perspective and rightly came to the guilt of the petitioner and accordingly, confirmed the order of his detention for a period of three years. 21. This Court finds that the order of disposition clearly mentions that the learned Juvenile Justice Board had perused the report of the probation officer and considering the nature of offence on the one hand, refused to release the petitioner on probation of good conduct and on the other hand, passed an order of detention against the petitioner for a period of three years for committing the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 22. 22. So far as the learned lower appellate court is concerned, upon perusal of the impugned judgment, it appears that no such argument on the point of sentence or on the point of alleged non consideration of report of the probation officer was made and the learned lower appellate court upheld the order of learned Juvenile Justice Board by a well-reasoned order after considering the materials on record as well as the nature of offence. 23. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of “Salil Bali v. Union of India” reported in (2013) 7 SCC 705 and by referring to para 63 thereof he has submitted that it has been held that the essence of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and the Rules framed thereunder in 2007, is restorative and not retributive, providing for rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict with law into mainstream society. Para 61, 62 and 63 of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “61. One misunderstanding of the law relating to the sentencing of the juveniles, needs to be corrected. The general understanding of a sentence that can be awarded to a juvenile under Section 15(1)(g) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, prior to its amendment in 2006, is that after attaining the age of eighteen years, a juvenile who is found guilty of a heinous offence is allowed to go free. Section 15(1)(g), as it stood before the amendment came into effect from 22-8-2006, reads as follows: “15. (1)(g) make an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a special home for a period of three years: (i) in the case of juvenile, over seventeen years but less than eighteen years of age for a period of not less than two years; (ii) in case of any other juvenile for the period until he ceases to be a juvenile: Provided that the Board may, if it is satisfied that having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the case it is expedient so to do, for reason to be recorded, reduce the period of stay to such period as it thinks fit.” 62. It was generally perceived that a juvenile was free to go, even if he had committed a heinous crime, when he ceased to be a juvenile. The said understanding needs to be clarified on account of the amendment which came into force with effect from 22-8-2006, as a result whereof Section 15(1)(g) now reads as follows: “15. (1)(g) make an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a special home for a period of three years: Provided that the Board may, if it is satisfied that having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the case, it is expedient so to do, for reasons to be recorded, reduce the period of stay to such period as it thinks fit.” The aforesaid amendment now makes it clear that even if a juvenile attains the age of eighteen years within a period of one year he would still have to undergo a sentence of three years, which could spill beyond the period of one year when he attained majority. 63. There is yet another consideration which appears to have weighed with the worldwide community, including India, to retain eighteen as the upper limit to which persons could be treated as children. In the Bill brought in Parliament for enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act of 2000, it has been indicated that the same was being introduced to provide for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent juveniles and for the adjudication of certain matters relating to and disposition of delinquent juveniles. The essence of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and the Rules framed thereunder in 2007, is restorative and not retributive, providing for rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict with law into mainstream society. The age of eighteen has been fixed on account of the understanding of the experts in child psychology and behavioural patterns that till such an age the children in conflict with law could still be redeemed and restored to mainstream society, instead of becoming hardened criminals in future. The age of eighteen has been fixed on account of the understanding of the experts in child psychology and behavioural patterns that till such an age the children in conflict with law could still be redeemed and restored to mainstream society, instead of becoming hardened criminals in future. There are, of course, exceptions where a child in the age group of sixteen to eighteen may have developed criminal propensities, which would make it virtually impossible for him/her to be reintegrated into mainstream society, but such examples are not of such proportions as to warrant any change in thinking, since it is probably better to try and reintegrate children with criminal propensities into mainstream society, rather than to allow them to develop into hardened criminals, which does not augur well for the future.” 24. There is no doubt that the essence of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and the rules framed thereunder, is restorative and not retributive, as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the judgement of Salil Bali (supra) , but at the same time, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (Supra) that correctional treatment with a rehabilitative orientation may be an imperative of modern penology so far as the treatment of juvenile in conflict with law is concerned under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. It has also been held that such values may find their roots under Article 19 of the Constitution which itself sanctions deprivation of freedoms provided they render a reasonable service to social defence, public order and security of the State. 25. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, though the petitioner is said to have remained in detention for a period of two years eight months and sixteen days out of total detention period of three years and that the present age of the petitioner is 23 years and 7 months, this Court is of the considered view that reducing the punishment to the period already served by the petitioner will not serve the ends of justice. It has also to be kept in mind that the victim in the instant case was also about 16 to 17 years of age and the petitioner was 17 years old at the time of occurrence. It has also to be kept in mind that the victim in the instant case was also about 16 to 17 years of age and the petitioner was 17 years old at the time of occurrence. This court cannot lose sight of the manner in which the offence under section 376 of IPC has been committed by the petitioner while the victim was going to the house of her neighbour and the petitioner being her co-villager, committed the crime due to which the victim , apart from suffering the offence also suffered social stigma and consequences of the offence. 26. This Court is of the considered view that one of the prime concerns of the juvenile justice system is to ensure that the delinquent juvenile is also prevented from reoffending. In fact the punishment of disposition of three years itself is a part of reintegration of the petitioner with the society and for that purpose, the petitioner has to take responsibility of his act being illegal. 27. This Court finds that the learned Juvenile Justice Board, while passing the order of disposition, has recorded that the court had perused the report of the probation officer and upon consideration of the same, ordered that the petitioner in conflict with law be sent to the special home for his detention for a period of three years for committing offence under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code and also directed that the period of detention already undergone by him during the course of enquiry etc. shall be set off. This Court is of the considered view that the Juvenile Justice Board has rightly exercised its jurisdiction while passing the order of disposition under the facts and circumstances of this case with particular reference to the nature of offence. 28. This Court finds that considering the nature of offence which is involved in the present case and the manner in which it has been forcefully committed, the petitioner does not deserve any modification of punishment in his favour. Although the petitioner has served a substantial portion of the punishment imposed by Juvenile Justice Board, this Court is not inclined to take any sympathetic view and modify the punishment. 29. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is hereby dismissed. 30. Bail bond furnished by the petitioner is hereby cancelled. 31. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed. 32. 29. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is hereby dismissed. 30. Bail bond furnished by the petitioner is hereby cancelled. 31. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed. 32. Let the Lower Court’s Records be sent back to the learned Juvenile Justice Board/court concerned. 33. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the learned court below through “email/FAX”.