ORDER : 1. Present petition has been preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the Judgment and Award passed by the Labour Court, Rajkot in Reference (LCR) No.64 of 2007 dated 30/4/2018, whereby the Labour Court directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent No.1 in service with continuity of service but without back-wages. 2. As per the petitioner, the respondent No.1 was offered work as a part-timer w.e.f. 12/4/1988 for miscellaneous work and his wages was paid by the petitioner Gram Panchayat from its fund. He was not appointed after following due procedure of recruitment. According to the petitioner, the respondent No.1 was offering his services as a Gramya Helper (Vijgar) and various miscellaneous work but he was remaining irregular and absent resulting into complaints from local villagers and hence, he was repeatedly instructed to improve his conduct, however, he did not improve his conduct and hence the petitioner terminated the services of the respondent No.1 in the interest of administration and public at large through a resolution dated 17/2/2007. The respondent No.1 challenged the termination by way of Reference before the Labour Court, Rajkot being Reference (LCR) No.64 of 2007. The Labour Court found that the termination of the respondent No.1 is without issuing notice, notice pay or retrenchment compensation by the petitioner to the respondent No.1 and ultimately the Labour Court, vide Judgment and Award dated 30/4/2018 directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent No.1 in service with continuity of service but without backwages. 3. Heard Mr.Munshaw, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr.Dipak Dave, learned advocate for the respondent No.2. When called out, Mr.Sunil Patel, learned advocate for the respondent No.1 – workman is not present. 4. It is urged by Mr.Munshaw, learned advocate for the petitioner that the respondent No.1 was part-timer and it was expected that all the miscellaneous works for which he was engaged, he should perform diligently and without absenteeism. However, considering his conduct and various complaints of the villagers, his services came to be terminated. He further urged that the Labour Court did not appreciate that the termination is for the larger cause. 5. Mr.Dave, learned advocate for the respondent No.2 has supported the impugned Award by saying that the respondent No.1 is not the workman of the respondent No.2. He has relied on the decision rendered in Special Civil Application No.1217 of 2016 dated 16/3/2016. 5. Mr.Dave, learned advocate for the respondent No.2 has supported the impugned Award by saying that the respondent No.1 is not the workman of the respondent No.2. He has relied on the decision rendered in Special Civil Application No.1217 of 2016 dated 16/3/2016. He submitted that there is no employer and employee relationship between the respondent Nos.1 and 2. According to him, for maintenance and supply of continuous electricity in the rural area, the Scheme which had been floated, was required to be looked after and maintained by the Gram Panchayat. Vijgar was appointed initially for the better implementation of such Scheme and the payment of wages etc. are to be looked after by the petitioner Panchayat and there was no relationship of employee and employer between the respondent Nos.1 and 2. 6. Having heard Mr.Munshaw, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr.Dipak Dave, learned advocate for the respondent No.2 and after considering the Statement of Claim, Written Statement as well as documentary evidence, oral so also documentary, this Court noticed that at the time of termination, neither notice nor notice pay nor retrenchment compensation was paid to the respondent No.1 workman. The Labour Court has found that the said conduct on the part of the petitioner is in breach of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. The Labour court also held that those who had been engaged for the similar work have continued, and same is in breach of Section 25G and 25H of the I.D. Act. The Labour Court noticed that despite the best of the endeavours, the workman has not got any other employment from which he could earn his livelihood. Ultimately, the Labour court found him entitled to be reinstated on the post he was working with continuity of service but without back-wages. 7. It is a well settled law that while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court shall need to interfere in the order to keep the tribunal and courts “within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors and to ensure that they follow the law while exercising jurisdiction vested to them." 8. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil in reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 , in paragraph Nos. 26, 31,32,33, 39, 49 and 62 has held as under :- “26. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil in reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 , in paragraph Nos. 26, 31,32,33, 39, 49 and 62 has held as under :- “26. In paragraph 4 of Jhaman Karamsingh Dadlani Vs. Ramanlal Maneklal Kantawala (AIR 1975 Bombay 182), the High Court further distinguished the nature of proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution to which, depending upon the situs of the cause of action, Rule 623 of Bombay High Court original Side Rules will apply. The said rule is set out below: "623. Every application for the issue of a direction, order or writ under Article 226 of the Constitution other than an application for a writ of Habeas Corpus shall, if the matter in dispute is or has arisen substantially within Greater Bombay, be heard and disposed of by such one of the Judges sitting on the Original Side or any specially constituted Bench as the Chief Justice may appoint. The application shall be by petition setting out therein the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought. The petition shall be supported by an affidavit. In every such petition the petitioner shall state whether he has made any other application to the Supreme Court or the High Court in respect of the same matter and how that application has been disposed of. The petitioner shall move for a Rule Nisi in open Court. If the Petitioner makes an application to the Supreme Court in respect of the same matter during the pendency of the petition in the High Court, he shall forthwith bring this fact to the notice of the High Court by filing an affidavit in the case and shall furnish a copy of such affidavit to the other side. The Court may adjourn the hearing of the application made to it pending the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter." 31. The power to issue writs underwent a seachange with the coming of the Constitution from 26th January, 1950. Now writs can be issued by High Courts only under Article 226 of the Constitution and by the Supreme Court only under Article 32 of the Constitution. 32. No writ petition can be moved under Article 227 of the Constitution nor can a writ be issued under Article 227 of the Constitution. Now writs can be issued by High Courts only under Article 226 of the Constitution and by the Supreme Court only under Article 32 of the Constitution. 32. No writ petition can be moved under Article 227 of the Constitution nor can a writ be issued under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be called a writ petition. This is clearly the Constitutional position. No rule of any High Court can amend or alter this clear Constitutional scheme. In fact the rules of Bombay High Court have not done that and proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 have been separately dealt with under the said rules. 33. The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution has its origin as early as in Indian High Courts Act of 1861. This concept of superintendence has been borrowed from English Law. 39. The history of Article 227 has also been traced by this Court in its Constitutional Bench judgment in Waryam Singh and another vs. Amarnath and another [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ]. In paragraph 13 at page 217 of the report this Court observed: "...The only question raised is as to the nature of the power of superintendence conferred by the article". 49. So the same expression namely to keep the Courts and Tribunals subordinate to the High Court `within the bounds of their authority' used in Manmatha Nath Biswas Vs. Emperor, AIR 1933 Cal 132, to indicate the ambit of High Court's power of superintendence has been repeated over again and again by this Court in its Constitution Bench decisions. 62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 9. The power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and to be exercised in equitable manner. The wide powers of the High Court under Article 227 is to keep administrative and judicial control on the administration of justice for maintaining efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice. 10. Noticing the factual matrix of the instant case and on the strength of the submissions made today before this Court, it is quite clear that there is complete absence of any record indicating issuance of the notice or notice pay or retrenchment compensation at the time of terminating the services of the respondent No.1 workman. Absenteeism of the respondent No.1 or any complaint received from the villagers against the respondent No.1 was required to be dealt with by the petitioner in accordance with law. There are recourses open for the petitioner. However, the same does not give license to the petitioner to overreach the process of law and to terminate the services, as has been done by the petitioner in the instant case without following due process of law. 11. Resultantly, this Court finds no error much less any requirement for interference in the impugned Judgment and Award passed by the Labour Court, impugned in the present petition. The Labour Court committed no error when directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent No.1 on his original post with continuity of service. 12. In the result, present petition fails and the same is hereby rejected. Notice is discharged. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.