ORDER : 1. Both these petitions, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, arise out of a common cause of action inasmuch as the advertisement issued by the Rajkot Municipal Corporation (for short 'the Corporation') for appointment of a Municipal Accountant. The qualification advertised for the post was that the candidate should possess a qualification in Accountant Technical Course from The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (for short 'the Institute'). 1.1 Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019 is by the petitioner who according to himself though is qualified as he has passed the Accountant Technical Course and was above respondent no.2, his case for appointment was ignored and the respondent no.2 was appointed. His petition being Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019, the court issued notice by an order dated 25.03.2019. It appears that when the court issued notice in the aforesaid matter, the respondent Corporation by an order dated 24.06.2019 terminated the services of the respondent no. 2 whose selection was challenged by the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019. The order of termination dated 24.06.2019 gave rise to a petition at the hands of respondent no.2 of Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019. Hence Special Civil Application No. 11941 of 2019 was filed. 1.2 In both these petitions therefore, the issue is of the interpretation of Regulation 37C of the Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1988 (for short 'the Regulations'). FACTS/SUBMISSIONS IN SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5852 OF 2019. 2. The Rajkot Municipal Corporation issued an advertisement inviting applications for the post of Municipal Accountant to be filled on a fixed pay of Rs.39,200/-. The advertisement specified that the applicant for the post should have passed the Accounting Technician Examination from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. The advertisement specified that the applicants should make an application online and the last date of the submission of the application was 26.09.2017. The case of the petitioner is that he passed his Accounting Technician Course in the year 2011. A mark-sheet dated 09.02.2012 is produced in support of his submission that the petitioner passed his examination in the year 2011 and the mark-sheet was issued on 09.02.2012. This was produced in order to substantiate that the applicant petitioner was qualified for the post. It was his case that since he had passed his examination on 09.02.2012 he was eligible. A mark-sheet dated 09.02.2012 is produced in support of his submission that the petitioner passed his examination in the year 2011 and the mark-sheet was issued on 09.02.2012. This was produced in order to substantiate that the applicant petitioner was qualified for the post. It was his case that since he had passed his examination on 09.02.2012 he was eligible. A written examination was held for the purposes of selection. 3. Mr. Anand Gogia, learned advocate for the petitioner invited the attention of this court to the result sheet issued by the Corporation and the merit list would indicate that the petitioner having secured 76 marks was at merit rank no. 1 whereas the respondent no. 2 having secured 66 marks was at merit rank no. 13. It is the case of the petitioner therefore that he being ranked no. 1 on the merit list, the respondent no. 2 who was much below in rank in merit at Sr. No. 13 could not have been appointed. 3.1 Mr. Gogia would further submit that the advertisement required that the candidate should have passed his Accounting Technical Certificate Course (ATC) which admittedly the petitioner had passed in the year 2011 and on making an application a certificate was issued by the Institute on 30.10.2017. The certificate though was issued on 30.10.2017, admittedly since the petitioner had already passed an examination in the year 2011 and had also undergone Articleship as is evident from letter dated 29.12.2010, the petitioner in accordance with Regulation 37C of the Regulations was eligible to be appointed. The non-selection of the petitioner therefore and the selection of respondent no. 2 was bad and therefore the petitioner ought to have been selected in preference of respondent no.2. 3.2 Regulation 37(C) of the Regulations, 1988 has been pressed into service inasmuch as in accordance with the Regulations, Mr. Gogia would submit that the petitioner had passed his Group I level, had completed the orientation course and also the practical work experience as required under Regulation 37C, sub regulation 3 thereof. He therefore submitted that the petitioner ought to have been appointed. 4. Mr. Gogia would submit that the petitioner had passed his Group I level, had completed the orientation course and also the practical work experience as required under Regulation 37C, sub regulation 3 thereof. He therefore submitted that the petitioner ought to have been appointed. 4. Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate appeared for the respondent Corporation and pointed out from the affidavit-in-reply that the basic and primary requirement considering the nature of work is that in order to be eligible for the post in question, the candidate should have obtained an ATC Certificate from the Institute. The cut-off date for applying for the post was 26.09.2017 and the certificate that was procured by the petitioner was dated 31.10.2017 much after the stipulated date and therefore the petitioner was not eligible. As far as the legality of appointing respondent no. 2 is concerned, a statement is made in the affidavit-in-reply that corrective measures are being taken on being found that even the respondent no. 2's certificate was post the cut-off date of 26.09.2017, i.e. 30.09.2017 and not 13.09.2017 as was misunderstood by the officers of the Corporation and action is initiated for rectifying the mistake. 5. In rejoinder, Mr. Gogia would submit that if the advertisement is read what is required is that the candidate should possess an educational qualification of Accountant Technical Course and should have passed such course. It does not provide for a condition to produce or enclose a certificate of having passed the ATC course and therefore the appointment cannot be denied merely on the ground that there is no ATC certificate on the last date of the application for the post. 5.1 In support of his submissions, Mr. Gogia, learned advocate for the petitioner would rely on the decision in the case of Ramkumar Gijroya vs. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board and another reported in (2016) 4 SCC 754 . Reliance was placed on para 15 thereof. The same reads as under: “15. In the case of Pushpa (supra), relevant paragraphs from the case of Tej Pal Singh (supra) have also been extracted, which read thus :- “11…… xxx xxx xxx 17. The matter can be looked into from another angle also. As per the advertisement dated 11th June, 1999 issued by the Board, vacancies are reserved for various categories including 'SC' category. In the case of Pushpa (supra), relevant paragraphs from the case of Tej Pal Singh (supra) have also been extracted, which read thus :- “11…… xxx xxx xxx 17. The matter can be looked into from another angle also. As per the advertisement dated 11th June, 1999 issued by the Board, vacancies are reserved for various categories including 'SC' category. Thus in order to be considered for the post reserved for 'SC' category, the requirement is that a person should belong to 'SC' category. If a person is SC his is so by birth and not by acquisition of this category because of any other event happening at a later stage. A certificate issued by competent authority to this effect is only an affirmation of fact which is already in existence. The purpose of such certificate is to enable the authorities to believe in the assertion of the candidate that he belongs to 'SC' category and act thereon by giving the benefit to such candidate for his belonging to 'SC' category. It is not that petitioners did not belong to 'SC' category prior to 30th June, 1998 or that acquired the status of being 'SC' only on the date of issuance of the certificate. In view of this position, necessitating upon a certificate dated prior to 30th June, 1998 would be clearly arbitrary and it has no rationale objective sought to be achieved. 18. While taking a particular view in such matters one has to keep in mind the objectives behind the post of SC and ST categories as per constitutional mandate prescribed in Articles 15(4) and 16(4) which are enabling provisions authorising the Government to make special provisions for the persons of SC and ST categories. Articles 14(4) and 16(4), therefore, intend to remove social and economic inequality to make equal opportunities available in reality. Social and economic justice is a right enshrined for protection of society. The right in social and economic justice envisaged in the Preamble and elongated in the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of the Constitution, in particular Arts. 14, 15, 16, 21, 38, 39 and 46 are to make the quality of the life of the poor, disadvantaged and disabled citizens of the society meaningful.” Further, in the case of Pushpa (supra), relevant portion from the judgment of Valsamma Paul’s case (supra) has also been extracted, which reads as under:- “21. 14, 15, 16, 21, 38, 39 and 46 are to make the quality of the life of the poor, disadvantaged and disabled citizens of the society meaningful.” Further, in the case of Pushpa (supra), relevant portion from the judgment of Valsamma Paul’s case (supra) has also been extracted, which reads as under:- “21. The Constitution through its Preamble, Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles created a secular State based on the principle of equality and non-discrimination, striking a balance between the rights of the individuals and the duty and commitment of the State to establish an egalitarian social order.” 5.2 Mr. Gogia also relied on a decision in the case of Food Corporation of India vs. Rimjhim [ (2019) 6 SCALE 129 ]. Paras 7.1 to 9 thereof were relied in support of his submission that when the advertisement did not specifically stipulate asking for a certificate to be produced, that stand now taken by the respondent Corporation is bad. The relevant paras are reproduced hereinbelow: “7.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the original writ petitioner was denied the appointment on the post of Assistant Grade-II (Hindi) on the ground that the original writ petitioner did not produce the certificate of one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa along with the application and/or even at the time of verification of documents. According to the FCI, one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa was essential to become a candidate eligible for the post in question. It is required to be noted that the aforesaid stand was taken by the FCI for the first time before the learned Single Judge in a writ petition filed by the original writ petitioner. Therefore, the original writ petitioner produced the certificates dated 14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016 issued by her erstwhile employer, in support of her case that she was having one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa. 8. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition solely relying upon and/or considering the document produced by the original writ petitioner as relieving-cum-experience letter dated 27.08.2014 and opined that from the said letter, it cannot be said that the original writ petitioner had one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa, which was the essential requirement to become a candidate eligible. However, the learned Single Judge did not consider the certificates dated 14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016 issued by the erstwhile employer of the original writ petitioner. If the aforesaid two certificates are considered, in that case, it can safely be said that the original writ petitioner was having one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa and therefore fulfilled all the essential requirements/eligibility criteria. As observed hereinabove, and it can be seen from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the FCI, filed before the High Court, the FCI have not doubted the aforesaid two certificates. Their only contention seems to be that as the original writ petitioner did not produce the certificate of one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa either along with the application or even at the time of verification of documents, the aforesaid certificates cannot be considered at all and therefore in absence of those certificates and/or any certificate of having one year’s experience in translation from English to Hindi and vice versa, which was the essential requirement, the original writ petitioner cannot be said to have fulfilled the eligibility criteria/essential requirement of having one year’s experience. 9. So far as the case on behalf of the FCI that as the original writ petitioner did not produce the certificate of one year’s experience along with the application is concerned, it is required to be noted that in the advertisement there was no such requirement. What is provided in the advertisement is that a candidate must have one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa along with the other qualifications. The advertisement does not provide specifically and/or provide that a candidate shall produce the certificate of experience along with the application. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court has rightly observed that non production of one year’s experience certificate along with the application cannot be said to be fatal to the case of the original writ petitioner and on that ground the original writ petitioner could not have been denied the appointment, if otherwise she is found to be meritorious. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court.” FACTS/SUBMISSIONS IN SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11941 OF 2019 6. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court.” FACTS/SUBMISSIONS IN SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11941 OF 2019 6. Apropos the rectification of error promised by the respondent Corporation in the case of the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019 wherein he challenged the selection of respondent no. 2 therein – present petitioner, it appears that the respondent Corporation rectified the mistake by issuing an order of termination against the respondent no. 2 i.e. the petitioner of present petition being Special Civil Application No. 11941 of 2019. 7. Mr. Zubin Bharda, learned advocate appearing for Ms. Dixa Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner drew the attention of this court to the termination order dated 24.06.2019. He would submit that reading the order of termination it would indicate that the last date of the application form was 26.09.2017 and on that date a candidate should have possessed the requisite qualification. He would submit that the stand of the Corporation is that since the certificate of the petitioner was of 30.09.2017 which is post 26.09.2017 which was the last date of the application, the services of the petitioner herein were terminated. 7.1 Mr. Bharda invited the attention of this court to a letter dated 04.11.2018 written by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India to the Corporation when the Corporation sought the opinion of the Institute on the eligibility of a candidate on completion of the Accounting Technician Course. He would submit that an unequivocal opinion was given by the Institute that on the date of the application made by a candidate to the Institute the incumbent is eligible. Since the petitioner applied on 14.09.2017, he should be considered eligible. Mr. Bharda would further submit that the order of termination violates principles of natural justice and therefore also the order needs to be quashed and set aside. 8. Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate for the respondent Corporation would reiterate the submissions made when supporting the case of the Corporation in the case of the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019 and submit that even in the case of the petitioner on hand, the certificate was obtained post 30.09.2017 and therefore the termination was justified. 9. 8. Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate for the respondent Corporation would reiterate the submissions made when supporting the case of the Corporation in the case of the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019 and submit that even in the case of the petitioner on hand, the certificate was obtained post 30.09.2017 and therefore the termination was justified. 9. In both these petitions therefore the question that is arising for consideration is the date on which the incumbent should be treated to have qualified for the post of the Municipal Accountant i.e. as to when can such an incumbent be treated to have completed his accounting technician level course. 9.1 The case of the petitioners – the petitioner who was not selected i.e. the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019 and the petitioner who was terminated because of Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019 i.e. the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 11941 of 2019 is that they had passed the examination in the year 2011 and 2016 respectively and that is the date they were possessing qualification of Accounting Technicians and therefore merely because the application was made later or a certificate was given on a date subsequent to the closing date of the application cannot be considered as a disqualification. It is in this context that Regulation 37C of the Regulations needs to be reproduced. “37C. Requirements for passing [Intermediate (Integrated Professional Competence) Examination] [Applicable to candidates appearing in [Intermediate (Integrated Professional Competence) Examination] under the syllabus as may be specified by the Council under sub regulation (3) of regulation 28E] (1) A candidate may appear in Group I or Group II level(s), separately or simultaneously or in a Unit comprising of a set of papers of Group-I and/or Group-II. (2) A candidate, other than a candidate who has opted for Accounting Technician level, shall ordinarily be declared to have passed the [Intermediate (Integrated Professional Competence) Examination], if he – [(a)] Omitted (b) passes in both Group I and Group II levels. (2) A candidate, other than a candidate who has opted for Accounting Technician level, shall ordinarily be declared to have passed the [Intermediate (Integrated Professional Competence) Examination], if he – [(a)] Omitted (b) passes in both Group I and Group II levels. (3) A candidate, who has opted for the Accounting Technician level, shall be declared to have passed in that level, if he - (a) passes in Group I level; (b) completes the Orientation Course for such period and in such manner and within such time as may be specified by the Council from time to time; and (c) completes the practical work experience in accounting and related fields for a period not less than twelve months in such manner as may be specified by the Council from time to time. PROVIDED that a candidate, who has passed either the [Intermediate (Professional Competence) Examination] under the syllabus as per the sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 28C or Professional (Education-II) under the syllabus as per sub-regulation (5) of Regulation 28B of these regulations or Intermediate Examination under these regulations or the Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1964 or Intermediate or the first examination under the Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1949 or was exempted from passing the first examination under that regulation and has completed the prescribed period of practical training as was required for admission as a member, shall be eligible for grant of Accounting Technician Certificate on making an application to this effect and on compliance with such other conditions as may be specified by the Council from time to time.” 9.2 What is evident from reading the title of the Regulation is that the Regulation says that requirement for passing Integrated Professional Competence Examination. The contention of the Corporation by emphasising on the proviso is that when the regulation is read in its entirety in accordance with the proviso, unless a certificate of Accounting Technician Course is obtained, the qualification is not established in the eyes of the Corporation. Reading Regulation 37C would indicate that even if an incumbent completes the course, as the title of the regulation would suggest, the requirement of having completed such course would also include possession of a certificate of such a course. 9.3 Mr. Reading Regulation 37C would indicate that even if an incumbent completes the course, as the title of the regulation would suggest, the requirement of having completed such course would also include possession of a certificate of such a course. 9.3 Mr. Gogia's submission therefore that he would have complied with sub regulation 3 sub clause (a)(b)(c) would not be a complete satisfaction of the regulation in order to be an Accounting Technician as in accordance with Regulation 37C the requirement was a certificate. In the case of both the petitioners, the certificates were acquired post 26.09.2017 i.e. the last date for which an application for the post in question was to be made. They therefore squarely did not fall within the eligibility criteria and therefore non-selection of petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019 and termination of the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 11941 of 2019 cannot be faulted with. 10. Reliance placed on the decisions in the cases of Rimjhim (supra) and Ramkumar Gijroya (supra) is misplaced by Mr. Gogia. The context of possession of a certificate in those cases was for the purposes of experience and not the basic qualification as is required in accordance with the Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1988 in the facts of the present case. The judgments are therefore clearly distinguishable. 11. Having held that Regulation 37C required that the petitioners possess a certificate on 26.09.2017 which they admittedly did not, the action of the respondent Corporation in not selecting the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5852 of 2019 and in terminating the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 11941 of 2019 cannot be faulted with. 12. For the foregoing reasons, both the petitions are dismissed.