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2020 DIGILAW 807 (JHR)

Sarat Chandra Das, son of Late Chandra Mohan Das v. State of Jharkhand

2020-08-26

ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY

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JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the parties through video conferencing. 2. This criminal miscellaneous petition has been filed invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer to quash the F.I.R. dated 14.09.2016 along with all the proceeding of A.C.B. No. 09 of 2016 which has been registered against the petitioner vide Vigilance Dhanbad P.S. Case No. 09 of 2016, under Section 420/467/468/471/409/ 120B/109 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) and Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 3. The brief facts of the case is that the F.I.R. of the instant case has been registered against the petitioner on the allegation that the petitioner in capacity of the Chairman of the Purchase Committee, purchased C.T. Scan Machine for Patliputra Medical College & Hospital, Dhanbad and in purchase of the said machine worth Rs.1,80,00,000/-, the petitioner in criminal conspiracy with the co-accused persons committed the offence of cheating, forgery, criminal breach of trust by public servant by obtaining for himself pecuniary advantage. It is alleged that though the head of the department of Radiology gave the proposal for purchase of C.T. Scan Machine of Siemens Make yet decision was taken at the level of the petitioner to purchase the C.T. Scan Machine of Shimadzu Empire, Original made in Japan on the condition to make the payment after installation and satisfactory functioning of the said machine. It is further alleged that the petitioner made the payment of 90% of the amount in respect of the purchase of the machine in violation of the D.G.S & D rules for such purchase. It is also alleged that the said payment of 90% of the amount was made before the said machine reached India. There is also allegation against the petitioner that the notice of the tender was not approved by the competent authority and in the said notice, estimated cost, bill of quantity amount and earnest money was not mentioned in violation of the financial rules. It is further alleged that though it is contended that there was a meeting of the Purchase Committee on 03.03.2004 but the copy of the decision taken after obtaining the technical bid is not in the file so it cannot be ascertained as to how many firms/agencies has submitted the tender documents. It is further alleged that though it is contended that there was a meeting of the Purchase Committee on 03.03.2004 but the copy of the decision taken after obtaining the technical bid is not in the file so it cannot be ascertained as to how many firms/agencies has submitted the tender documents. It is also alleged that though the date of installation of the machine has been shown on 16.11.2005 but the fact that by letter dated 21.10.2005, the successor Superintendent of the petitioner in the said Medical College & Hospital requested the Chief Minister of Jharkhand to inaugurate the said machine on 24.10.2005 shows that there is manipulation also. It is also alleged that though notice was invited by two bid process but in the file there is no proof of any technical evaluation and accordingly the decision in the tender and issuance of work order without technical evaluation is not in accordance with the rule. It is further alleged that the C.T. Scan Machine was not purchased as per the D.G.S & D rule. 4. It is submitted by Mr. Niraj Kishore, the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is innocent and has not committed any wrong. It is next submitted that there is an inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. as though the alleged occurrence is of 03.03.2004 but the F.I.R. was registered only on 14.09.2016. It is further submitted that there is no violation of any rule or procedure in the purchase of the said machine and out of the 17 bidders Shimadzu Empire was found the lowest rate bidder and accordingly the order of purchase was passed and was placed with the said company. It is next submitted that the petitioner was the Superintendent of P.M.C.H., Dhanbad w.e.f. 17.12.2003 to 04.10.2004 and Dr. Geeta Verma took over the charge from the petitioner from 05.10.2004 and thereafter the petitioner continued as the Principal of the said college. It is further submitted that Dr. Geeta Verma received the consignment of C.T. Scan Machine with good packing condition on 27.11.2004. Geeta Verma took over the charge from the petitioner from 05.10.2004 and thereafter the petitioner continued as the Principal of the said college. It is further submitted that Dr. Geeta Verma received the consignment of C.T. Scan Machine with good packing condition on 27.11.2004. It is also submitted that the petitioner never ordered release of payment of 90% of the Letter of Credit amount rather he wrote a letter to the Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, Dhanbad and advised not to release the payment till the discrepancies are rectified as the authorized agent of Shimadzu (Asia Pacific Pvt. Ltd.), Singapore has not fulfilled any of the conditions. It is next submitted that though there is allegation of criminal conspiracy, only the petitioner has been named in the F.I.R. It is next submitted that though departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner for the same set of allegations but the charges could not be proved against the petitioner in the said departmental proceeding. It is next submitted by Mr. Niraj Kishore, the learned counsel for the petitioner that no offence is made out against the petitioner. In support of his contention, Mr. Kishore relied upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vakil Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar, reported in [ 2009 (1) JLJR 277 SC] wherein in paragraph nos. 9 & 16, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as under:- “9.Before adverting to the core issue, viz. whether under the given circumstances the appellant was entitled to approach the High Court for getting the entire criminal proceedings against him quashed, it would be appropriate to notice the circumstances and the parameters enunciated and reiterated by this Court in a series of decisions under which the High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Sections 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is undoubtedly very wide but it has to be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. It is trite to state that the said powers have to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only where the court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. [See: Kurukshetra University & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr.1, Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors.2, and State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors.3] 16. Tested on the touchstone of the broad principles enumerated above, we are convinced that in the present case appellant's constitutional right recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution stands violated. It is manifest from the facts narrated above that in the first instance investigations were conducted by an officer, who had no jurisdiction to do so and the appellant cannot be accused of delaying the trial merely because he successfully exercised his right to challenge an illegal investigation. Be that as it may, admittedly the High Court vide its order dated 7th September, 1990 had directed the prosecution to complete the investigation within a period of three months from the date of the said order but nothing happened till 27th February, 2007 when, after receipt of notice in the second petition preferred by the appellant complaining about delay in investigation, the Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarpur directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police to complete the investigation. It was only thereafter that a fresh chargesheet is stated to have been filed on 1st May, 2007. It is also pertinent to note that even till date, learned counsel for the State is not sure whether a sanction for prosecuting the appellant is required and if so, whether it has been granted or not. We have no hesitation in holding that at least for the period from 7th December, 1990 till 28th February, 2007 there is no explanation whatsoever for the delay in investigation. Even the direction issued by the High Court seems to have had no effect on the prosecution and they slept over the matter for almost seventeen years. We have no hesitation in holding that at least for the period from 7th December, 1990 till 28th February, 2007 there is no explanation whatsoever for the delay in investigation. Even the direction issued by the High Court seems to have had no effect on the prosecution and they slept over the matter for almost seventeen years. Nothing could be pointed out by the State, far from being established to show that the delay in investigation or trial was in any way attributable to the appellant. The prosecution has failed to show any exceptional circumstance which could possibly be taken into consideration for condoning a callous and inordinate delay of more than two decades in investigations and the trial. The said delay cannot, in any way, be said to be arising from any default on the part of the appellant. Thus, on facts in hand, in our opinion, the stated delay clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. We feel that under these circumstances, further continuance of criminal proceedings, pending against the appellant in the court of Special Judge, Muzaffarpur, is unwarranted and despite the fact that allegations against him are quite serious, they deserve to be quashed.” (Emphasise Supplied) Hence, it is submitted that the F.I.R. and the entire criminal proceeding against the petitioner be quashed. 5. Mr. T.N. Verma, learned counsel for the Anti-Corruption Bureau on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer and submits that there is serious allegation against the petitioner and though warrant of arrest has been issued against the petitioner yet he is absconding, hence the investigation though going on against the petitioner, the same could not progress much. It is next submitted by Mr. Verma that this F.I.R. has been registered upon the Technical Examination Cell of the Cabinet (Vigilance Department) conducting an enquiry and hence there is considerable delay in lodging the F.I.R. It is further submitted by Mr. Verma that it is a settled principle of law that if delay in lodging the F.I.R. is suitably explained, the same will not be fatal for the prosecution case and as in this case, considerable time was consumed in collecting materials regarding the involvement of the petitioner in the offence, hence the delay has suitably been explained. It is therefore submitted by Mr. It is therefore submitted by Mr. Verma that in view of the serious nature of allegation and the ample materials available against the petitioner, the F.I.R. registered against the petitioner ought not be quashed and accordingly, this petition being without any merit be dismissed. 6. Having heard the submissions made at the bar and after going through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that it is settled principle of law that the delay in filing the F.I.R. by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and to discard it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sahib Rao vs. State reported in 2006 (9) SCC 794 reiterated the settled principle of law in this respect by observing thus in paragraph – 6 as under:- “The settled principle of law of this Court is that delay in filing FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and discard it. The delay in lodging the FIR would put the court on its guard to search if any plausible explanation has been offered and if offered whether it is satisfactory.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Kishan Singh v. Gurpal Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 775 held that FIR should not be quashed merely because the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured version of events in paragraph-22 which reads as under: “22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR, the court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In the absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. Xxxxxxxxx” This is a case of corruption. It is alleged that documents relating to technical bid is missing from the file. The Technical Examination Cell of the Cabinet (Vigilance Department) conducting an enquiry took considerable time obviously trying its best to extract maximum possible evidence before registering the FIR. The facts of this case are different from the facts of Vakil Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar (supra) as unlike that case in this case the petitioner is responsible for delay in investigation of the case as he is absconding and thus not cooperating with the investigation of the case. The facts of this case are different from the facts of Vakil Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar (supra) as unlike that case in this case the petitioner is responsible for delay in investigation of the case as he is absconding and thus not cooperating with the investigation of the case. There is specific and serious allegation against the petitioner of indulging in serious offences like being a public servant committed criminal breach of trust, cheating as also the offences punishable under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for which offences no period of limitation for taking cognizance has been prescribed by the legislature in section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India gave the categories of cases by way of illustration wherein the power of quashing FIR could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, delay in lodging of FIR has not been cited a ground for quashing the same. 7. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that this is not a fit case where the F.I.R. along with all the proceeding of the instant is to be quashed. 8. Accordingly, this criminal miscellaneous petition being without any merit is dismissed.