JUDGMENT : Anil Satyavijay Kilor, J. 1. The respondent Municipal Commissioner, vide his order dated 5th June, 2020 terminated the services of the petitioners as 'Library Assistant', by treating their appointments as backdoor entry. The said order of termination is under challenge in the present petition. There is a chequered history to the present matter, narrative of which is as follows: 2. The respondent-Municipal Corporation issued an advertisement on 1st September, 1993, calling applications from the interested persons for 161 posts of 32 different cadres. In response to same, the Corporation received about 4090 applications. 3. The selection committee constituted by the Corporation interviewed the candidates and published the select list of 152 candidates and a wait list of 207 candidates on 8th February, 1994. 4. This Court stayed the entire Selection process vide its order dated 17th December 1993, passed in a Writ Petition No. 3493 of 1993, filed by one Shri Balchandra Joshi, espousing a grievance as regards illegalities and irregularities committed by the Respondent-Corporation in selection of the candidates. 5. On 7th June, 1996, this Court modified the order dated 17th December, 1993, permitting the respondent Corporation to fill in all the posts subject to the decision of the petition. 6. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3498 of 1993 brought to the notice of this Court that after the stay order dated 17th December, 1993 was vacated, the Corporation made about 450 appointments through backdoor. He therefore, sought inquiry into the illegal appointments. This Court on 7th March, 2001, passed the following order. "We therefore, direct the Municipal Commissioner to examine these appointments which are not made in regular manner by calling application through advertisements conduction of examinations, interviews and if he is prima facie satisfied identify such appointments and take appropriate steps. We made it clear that the respondent Municipal Corporation shall not regularise any such appointment made illegally and through back door procedure. The Municipal Commissioner to place his report on affidavit before this Court on or before 30th June, 2001." 7. Successive to the order of this Court on 7th March, 2001, the Municipal Commissioner directed the Deputy Municipal Commissioner Shri Adtani to examine the legality of the appointments. Accordingly, the Adtani Committee submitted its report on 18th June, 2001 pointing out numerous illegalities and irregularities committed in the process of selection and appointment of the candidates including the petitioners. 8. Successive to the order of this Court on 7th March, 2001, the Municipal Commissioner directed the Deputy Municipal Commissioner Shri Adtani to examine the legality of the appointments. Accordingly, the Adtani Committee submitted its report on 18th June, 2001 pointing out numerous illegalities and irregularities committed in the process of selection and appointment of the candidates including the petitioners. 8. The Annexures F, G and H of the Adtani Committee Report and the comments made with regard to the petitioners, in the report would be relevant to refer to, which are as follows Bogus Selection:- As seen from the attendance sheet, list of rejected applications and application forms, it is observed that Further, the Councillors Shri Krushna Khopde and Shri Nana Shamkule (and such other members of the Selection Committee whose relatives may be subsequently detected to have been interviewed and appointed) are also responsible for acting as Members of the Selection Committee even though their near relatives were candidates. 9. The Annexure 'F' speaks about the petitioner Nos. 1,2,10 and 12 who did not apply for the employment and also did not appear for the interview, but were selected. 10. The Annexure 'G' relates to the petitioner Nos. 3,4 and 11 who had applied for the post in terms of advertisement, but never appeared for personal interview, still selected. 11. The Annexure 'H' states that the applications of the petitioners Nos. 5,6 and 9 were rejected, however, they were allowed to appear for interview and consequently selected. 12. As far as petitioner nos. 7 and 8 are concerned, they were found to be relatives of members of Selection Committee. 13. This Court on 30th January, 2002 accepted the said Adtani committee report and passed the following order "The grievances of the petitioner were sought to be remedied by directing an enquiry into the allegations by the Commissioner. The enquiry report has been received and accepted. All the irregularities are noted and the Commissioner shall in accordance with the report, take appropriate action as per the conclusions mentioned in the report. Action to be taken within 3 months from the date of this order. Nothing survives in the petition. The same is accordingly disposed of." 14. The Municipal Commissioner, thus terminated the services of 106 employees including petitioners, in compliance of the order of this court, dated 30th January 2002. 15. Action to be taken within 3 months from the date of this order. Nothing survives in the petition. The same is accordingly disposed of." 14. The Municipal Commissioner, thus terminated the services of 106 employees including petitioners, in compliance of the order of this court, dated 30th January 2002. 15. In the meantime four review applications had been filed, seeking review of the order dated 30th January, 2002. 16. This Court vide order dated 14th March, 2002 dismissed all the four review applications. The relevant observations made by this Court in the said order, read thus: "What we have done therefore is to dispose of the writ petition filed in public interest after accepting the report as made by the Municipal Commissioner, Nagpur and directed implementation of the report by Municipal Commissioner, Nagpur. The report did not pertain only irregularity in appointments made but also certain other aspects and malpractices complained of in main writ petition. Action was directed to be taken in respect of all aspects as mentioned in the report of the Municipal Commissioner, Nagpur. It appears that as consequences of this direction and in obedience of the writ issued by this Court to implement this report services of 116 Municipal employees came to be terminated." "We firmly are of the opinion that what we have done is a conscious act of judicial adjudication and is not erroneous assumption of jurisdiction with disregard to the record or the law on the point. We had ordered the Municipal Commissioner to enquire and Municipal Commissioner had inquired and therefore we accepted the report….. 17. At the same time 89 employees out of 106 terminated employees, preferred a writ petition no. 1420 of 2002, challenging their termination. Whereas remaining 17 candidates including the petitioners preferred a complaint before the Labour Court. 18. This Court while partly allowing Writ Petition No. 1420 of 2002 directed the Municipal Commissioner to grant personal hearing and issue fresh orders as deemed fit. The relevant para of the judgment dated 18th December, 2002 is as follows: "9. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, petitioners deserve atleast a right of hearing by the Municipal Commissioner. Therefore, we quash and set aside the impugned orders of termination, we direct the Municipal Commissioner to grant opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and other similarly situated candidates. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, petitioners deserve atleast a right of hearing by the Municipal Commissioner. Therefore, we quash and set aside the impugned orders of termination, we direct the Municipal Commissioner to grant opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and other similarly situated candidates. The petitioners and such other candidates are free to make written representation to the Municipal Commissioner, if so advised. The Municipal Commissioner shall consider the representations and submissions on their own merits and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within a period of 3 months. It is made clear that till the enquiry is complete and final decision is taken the Municipal Commissioner, petitioners need not be reinstated in service. In case of the Commissioner decides to retain the services of the petitioners or any of them, they would be forthwith reinstated and would be entitled to continuity of service." 19. Consequently the Municipal Commissioner heard the employees and passed the order dated 23rd April, 2003, canceling thereby the appointments of 89 candidates who were petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1420 of 2002. The relevant portion of the order of cancellation of appointments, read thus: "14. In view of the aforesaid rules and the various decisions of the Supreme Court of India, it is clear that the appointments cannot be made in excess of number of posts advertised and that a wait listed candidate has right to be appointed only if the selected candidate does not joint and waiting list is still operative. One more reason for taking this view is that the recruitment is required to be made on the basis of merit following rules of reservation applicable to different categories. The advertisement is therefore required to indicate the break-up of vacancies category wise, that is to say if 5 posts are advertised, it will have to be indicated in the advertisement, how many are meant for open category and how many are meant for reserved category with sub classifications, such as SC, ST, NT, OBC etc. Suppose 5 posts are advertised, one for OBC, one for ST, one for SC and two for general category, only 5 appointments can be made that too category wise as stated in the advertisement. Suppose 5 posts are advertised, one for OBC, one for ST, one for SC and two for general category, only 5 appointments can be made that too category wise as stated in the advertisement. The clause in the advertisement that the number of posts can vary is therefore of no consequence because posts in excess of advertisement cannot be filled in. Further, the practice, if any in the Corporation to make appointment in excess of the number of posts advertised does not confer any right on the representations in as much as such practice is clearly illegally and unconstitutional and there can not be any equality in illegality. In the light of the legal position it is clear that the 89 appointments made in excess of number of posts advertised, can not be regularised. Hence, I pass the following order. ORDER The selection and appointment of 89 excess appointees is cancelled. 20. The legality and correctness of the said order was questioned by 89 terminated employees by filing writ petition no. 1785 of 2003. However, the said petition came to be withdrawn with liberty to approach the State Government. 21. On the other hand the complaints filed by the petitioners were dismissed by the Labour Court on 29th September, 2008. 22. Subsequently in the appeal filed by 89 employees, the State of Maharashtra passed the following order on 19th March, 2010, which reads thus. 23. Thus on the presentation of the Adtani committee report before the General Body on 12th April, 2010, it was resolved to appoint an all party committee of five members, to examine the correctness of the Adtani Report, under the chairmanship of one Shri Datke. 24. Accordingly, the said Datke Committee submitted its report on 7th July, 2010. The relevant portion of the said report is reproduced here under as follows:- "The said report was prepared with malicious and ulterior motive. Many incorrect statement which are false even to their own knowledge & hence the committee recommends unanimously to set aside the Adtani's Report and to reinstate these employees i.e. 1) 89 employees (Excess Ground) which who are not factually excess (still these posts are lying vacant in N.M.C.) 2) 17 on (Different Ground) charges are not proved (still these posts are vacant in N.M.C. Above 89+17 = 106 candidates deserves to be reinstated in service with retrospective effect & continuity in service." 25. On 16th July, 2010, vide resolution no. 133 the General Body of the Respondent Corporation accepted the report of Dakte Committee and resolved to re-instate all 106 employees with continuity in service and consequential benefits. 26. However, the Municipal Commissioner sent a proposal to the State Government to rescind the resolution no. 133 under the provisions of Section 64-A of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act. Nevertheless, the State Government approved the appointments of 89 employees subject to availability of posts and roster point. 27. In view of the approval granted by the State Government to the appointments of 89 employees, 17 employees including the petitioners who were waiting for decision of the Industrial Court in Revision Petition filed challenging the dismissal of complaint by the Labour Court, sought withdrawal of the Revision Petition. 28. The same was allowed by the Labour Court, vide order dated 20th January, 2012. 29. Thereafter 13 employees including the petitioners made a representation before the State Government on 17th November, 2012 for reinstatement in service. However, no decision was taken on the same till the year 2014, which constrained the petitioners to file Writ Petition No. 1510 of 2014 which came to be disposed of on 8th July, 2015 with direction to the State Government to consider and decided the representation of the petitioners within three months. 30. As such on 12th February, 2018, the State Government issued letter to the Municipal Commissioner in respect of 17 employees including the petitioners, which read thus: 31. Consequently, on 20th April, 2018, the General Body resolved to re-appoint the 17 employees including the petitioner as a special case. The relevant portion of the Resolution No. 223 dated 20th April, 2018 of the General Body is as follows: 32. Suitably, on 23rd May, 2018, the Municipal Commissioner forwarded the proposal to the State Government for scrapping the resolution no. 223 dated 20th April, 2018, on the ground that there is no provision for absorption and for direct recruitment the petitioners have crossed the minimum age for appointment. 33. On 21st June, 2019, the State Government informed the Corporation to take decision in terms of letter dated 12th February, 2018. Consequently, on 3rd August, 2019 the orders of appointment were issued to the petitioners. 34. 33. On 21st June, 2019, the State Government informed the Corporation to take decision in terms of letter dated 12th February, 2018. Consequently, on 3rd August, 2019 the orders of appointment were issued to the petitioners. 34. The petitioners after joining the services, made representations to the Municipal Commissioner, seeking regularisation w.e.f. initial date of appointment and for grant of other benefits such as seniority and fixation of pay scale. 35. Nevertheless on 12th May, 2020, show cause notices were issued to the petitioners by the Corporation, calling explanation as to why their services should not be discontinued. The said show cause notice reads thus. 36. The petitioners jointly submitted their reply to the show cause notice, firstly on 18th May, 2020 and thereafter on 25th May, 2020. 37. Considering the reply submitted by the petitioners and also other relevant factors, the Municipal Commissioner vide its order dated 5th June, 2020 terminated the services of the petitioners with immediate effect. The said impugned order of termination is under challenge in the present petition. 38. Heard Shri Anand Parchure, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Senior Advocate Shri C.S. Kaptan assisted by learned advocate Shri Sharad Bhattad for the Respondent No. 2 Municipal Corporation and Shri S.P. Deshpande, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent no. 1. 39. Shri Parchure, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that, issuance of order of termination by the Municipal Commissioner is without authority and jurisdiction as the Municipal Corporation has no authority to overrule the decision of the General Body and also the decision of the State Government to absorb the petitioners in service. 40. He further submits that in absence of any challenge made to resolution dated 20th April, 2018 and the directions issued by the State Government vide communication dated 12th February, 2018, the Municipal Commissioner on his own has no authority whatsoever to overrule the said resolution dated 20th April, 2018 or the order issued by the State Government on 12th February, 2018. 41. He submits that the petitioners were absorbed without granting continuity and consequential monetary benefits. Moreover, the petitioners were out of employment for about two decades and therefore now termination of petitioners amounts to punishing the petitioners thrice for the mistake not committed by the petitioners. 42. 41. He submits that the petitioners were absorbed without granting continuity and consequential monetary benefits. Moreover, the petitioners were out of employment for about two decades and therefore now termination of petitioners amounts to punishing the petitioners thrice for the mistake not committed by the petitioners. 42. Shri Parchure, learned counsel for the petitioner argues that out of 106 employees, 89 employees have already been reinstated long back and the case of the petitioners is similar to the case of those 89 employees and as such denial to absorb or to appoint the petitioners amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India. 43. He also opposes the order of termination on the ground that no opportunity of being heard was granted to the petitioner in violation of principal of natural justice. 44. Per contra, Shri C.S. Kaptan, learned Senior Advocate points out that after termination of the petitioners, they had approached the Labour Court by filing a complaint, challenging the order of termination dated 4th February 2002, which came to be dismissed vide judgment and order dated 29th September, 2008. 45. He points out that the petitioners went in Revision against the judgment of the Labour Court and the same was withdrawn, as such the order of termination dated 4th February, 2002 has attained finality and therefore, the petitioners have no right in employment. 46. Shri C.S. Kaptan, learned Senior Advocate draws attention of this Court to the Adtani Report more particularly to the clause having title "Bogus Appointment" which deals with the appointments of the petitioners. He pointed out that the appointments of the petitioners were illegal and as per the Adtani Report the appointments of the petitioners amount to backdoor entry in the employment i.e., without following due procedure. He thus submits that in view of the illegality committed while appointing the petitioners, the petitioners have no right over any posts. To fortify his argument, Shri C.S. Kaptan, learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vrs. Umadevi (3) and others reported in : 2006(4) SCC 1 . 47. To fortify his argument, Shri C.S. Kaptan, learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vrs. Umadevi (3) and others reported in : 2006(4) SCC 1 . 47. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Kaptan argues that the State Government in its communication dated 12th February, 2018, observed that as per the rules re-appointment is not permissible but at the same time also directed to take steps to absorb the petitioners, though in reality there is no provision to absorb any employee in the employment. 48. He submits that there are only two modes of employment one is direct recruitment and another by way of promotion. He points out that for appointment, the petitioners have already crossed the minimum age bar and therefore they cannot be appointed by direct recruitment and by reason that there is no provision for absorption, the petitioners cannot be absorbed too. 49. To consider the rival contentions of the parties, we have gone through the record, the relevant provisions and the judgment cited. 50. In the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vrs. Umadevi (3) and others (supra), the Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India, has held thus: "43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates." 51. The said judgment in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vrs. Umadevi and others (supra) laid down that there should not be backdoor entry and every post should be filled in by regular employment. The said judgment in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vrs. Umadevi and others (supra) laid down that there should not be backdoor entry and every post should be filled in by regular employment. It further says that unless the appointment is in terms of relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. 52. Thus it is pertinent at this juncture to first consider, whether the petitioners are having any right to be absorbed or re-appointed in the light of law laid down by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vrs. Umadevi and others (supra). 53. In the instant case, it is undisputable that the petitioner nos. 1, 2, 10 and 12 did not apply for employment pursuant to the advertisement dated 1st September, 1993 issued by the Respondent Corporation and even they did not appear for interview. 54. Similarly, the petitioner nos. 3, 4 and 11 though applied for the post in terms of the advertisement, they did not appear for personal interview. 55. As far as the petitioner nos. 5, 6 and 9 are concerned, though their applications were rejected, they appeared for the interview and the petitioner nos. 7 and 8 are the relatives of the members of Selection Committee. Thus, inspite of the aforesaid serious irregularities, the petitioners were selected and appointed. 56. The above referred illegalities in the appointment of petitioners have been considered by the Adtani Committee as bogus selection and in Annexure F, G, H of the said report, there was a specific mention as regards to the aforesaid illegalities. The vital fact which needs to be considered is that the said report was consciously accepted in its totality, by this Court to which no challenge was raised in the higher Court. 57. Furthermore the petitioners never denied the said facts before the Labour Court while challenging their termination w.e.f. 4th February 2002 or in the revision application preferred by the petitioners challenging the dismissal of the complaint by the Labour Court or in the present writ petition. 58. It is pertinent to note here that there are no pleadings in the present writ petition pointing out that the petitioner nos. 58. It is pertinent to note here that there are no pleadings in the present writ petition pointing out that the petitioner nos. 1, 2, 10 and 12 had applied in terms of the advertisement and also appeared in the interview. 59. There are no pleadings in the petition that the petitioner nos. 3, 4 and 11 appeared for the personal interview. 60. Similarly, there are no pleadings made in respect of petitioner nos. 5, 6 and 9 that their applications made in terms of advertisement, had been accepted and accordingly they appeared for personal interview. And further there are no pleadings denying that the petitioner nos. 7 and 8 are the relatives of members of Selection Committee. 61. Since beginning, that is right from the first Writ Petition No. 3498 of 1993 filed by Shri Balchandra Joshi, raising a question in relation to validity of selection process, it is the case of the Corporation that numerous irregularities and illegalities have been committed in the selection process. As pointed above, there is a specific mention in the Adtani Report, about the illegality committed in the appointment of the petitioners. Similarly, there was a specific mention of said illegalities in the show cause notice dated 11th May, 2020 served upon the petitioners. However, inspite of the said fact no pleadings were made by the petitioners before any Court including Labour Court, Industrial Court or before this Court in the present petition. Even in the reply to the show cause notice dated 11th May, 2020, there is no such mention that the appointments of the petitioners were made after following due process of law. 62. The petitioners instead of pointing out how the petitioners were appointed after following due process, stressed upon grant of concession on humanitarian consideration and on compassionate basis. 63. In view of the above observations, we are of the considered opinion that due process of selection as per Rules had not been followed while selecting and re-appointing the petitioners in the year 1997 and appointing them vide order dated 3rd August 2019 on the post of 'Library Assistant'. Therefore the petitioners are not entitled to any right in employment. Thus we have no hesitation to observe and hold that the respondent Commissioner is right in treating the appointments of the petitioners as illegal and as a back door entry in the employment. 64. Therefore the petitioners are not entitled to any right in employment. Thus we have no hesitation to observe and hold that the respondent Commissioner is right in treating the appointments of the petitioners as illegal and as a back door entry in the employment. 64. The another important and relevant aspect of the matter which needs to be dealt with, is that this Court vide its order dated 7th March, 2001 in Writ Petition No. 3498 of 1993 directed the Municipal Commissioner to examine the appointments which were not made in regular manner. 65. In compliance with the said directions, the Municipal Commissioner conducted the inquiry and submitted his report which is called as 'Adtani Committee Report', before this Court. 66. This Court on 30th January, 2002 while disposing of writ petition no. 3498 of 1993 had categorically observed that "the enquiry report has been received and accepted" and further directed, the Municipal Commissioner to take appropriate action as per the conclusion mentioned in the report. 67. The said order was unsuccessfully sought to be reviewed. This Court while rejecting the review applications, has observed that "We firmly are of the opinion that what we have done is a conscious act of judicial adjudication and is not erroneous assumption of jurisdiction with disregard to the record or the law on the point. We had ordered the Municipal Commissioner to enquire and Municipal Commissioner had inquired and therefore we accepted the report." 68. This Court has also observed in the said judgment that "we have consciously accepted the report as it was according to the order dated 7th March, 2001. It was made by the Municipal Commissioner after due inquiry and diligent scrutiny of record and thereafter we have directed the Municipal Commissioner to take appropriate action in accordance with the acceptance of the report." 69. The judgment of this Court dated 14th March, 2002 delivered on review application, has never been challenged and thus attained finality in the eyes of law. 70. However, the Datke Committee consisting of five members set aside the Adtani Committee Report in highly derogatory manner, ignoring the order dated 30th January, 2002 and judgment dated 14th March, 2002 of this Court, accepting the Adtani Committee Report, consciously and in totality. 70. However, the Datke Committee consisting of five members set aside the Adtani Committee Report in highly derogatory manner, ignoring the order dated 30th January, 2002 and judgment dated 14th March, 2002 of this Court, accepting the Adtani Committee Report, consciously and in totality. As a matter of fact and law, the Adtani Committee Report being on the directions of this Court and not at the behest of Municipal Corporation and having been submitted to this Court and not to the Corporation, neither the Datke Committee nor the Municipal Corporation nor anybody else other than this Court or any Superior Court had any authority to set aside the Adtani Committee Report. Yet, the Datke Committee did it, as if it was some Superior Court over this Court. Clearly, the said Committee acted without jurisdiction by undoing an act of this Court, which had attained finality. 71. Moreover, the State Government in the order dated 19th Mach, 2010 passed in the appeal preferred by the 89 employees, challenging their termination vide order dated 23rd April, 2003, issued by the Municipal Commissioner, set aside the said order of termination and directed the Municipal Commissioner to place the report of the Adtani Committee before the General Body of the Corporation to take decision by the General body as per the provisions of law. 72. On bare perusal of the order of the State Government dated 19th March, 2010, we find no ambiguity or difficulty to understand the tenor of the same. The language of the said order is clear which permits the General Body to take decision as per the law after considering the Adtani Committee Report. But it does not speak about further appointment of Committee to examine the legality and validity of the Adtani Report. 73. However, in total disrespect to the order of this Court dated 7th March, 2001 and order dated 30th January, 2002 and also without considering the purport of the order of the State Government dated 19th March, 2010, the Corporation appointed Five Members Committee and the said Committee without any authority and power declared the report of Adtani Committee as malicious and thereby set aside the same with recommendations to reinstate all the 106 employees. 74. It has come on the record that on acceptance of the report of Datke Committee, 89 employees had been reinstated vide resolution no. 74. It has come on the record that on acceptance of the report of Datke Committee, 89 employees had been reinstated vide resolution no. 133 passed on 16th July, 2010 which was sought to be rescinded by the Municipal Commissioner vide a proposal dated 21st August, 2010 under the provisions of Section 64-A of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1949. However, the State Government approved appointments of 89 employees. 75. Now we will consider the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of reinstatement of 89 employees and denial to re-appoint the petitioners who are similarly situated as those 89 employees, the whole action of the Commissioner is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 76. After considering the record, we are of the firm view that the case of the petitioners cannot be equated with the said 89 candidates as the case of the petitioners as pointed out above is based on different footing than those 89 employees. It is not the case of the petitioners that those 89 employees did not apply in terms of the advertisement or they did not appear for interview or their applications were rejected like in the case of the petitioners or some of them were relatives of a member of Selection Committee. Thus, the case of the petitioners cannot be considered as similar to the case of those 89 employees. 77. However, while appointing the petitioners by direct recruitment the Corporation has equated the petitioners with the reinstated 89 employees who were unequals to petitioners and resolved to appoint the petitioners as a special case and on humanitarian ground, in its General Body meeting dated 20th April 2018, which was something not permissible in law. 78. Now, we would deal with the submission made by the learned senior advocate Shri Kaptan that the directions of the State Government were to absorb the petitioners as per their qualifications and not to re-appoint as the Government has vide its communication dated 12th February, 2018 has clearly held that the petitioner cannot be re-appointed as per the rules. 79. Now, we would deal with the submission made by the learned senior advocate Shri Kaptan that the directions of the State Government were to absorb the petitioners as per their qualifications and not to re-appoint as the Government has vide its communication dated 12th February, 2018 has clearly held that the petitioner cannot be re-appointed as per the rules. 79. We are of the view that such a clear communication should have made the Corporation to apply its mind and find out as to how the absorption to be made would fit into the legal frame work, particularly in the perspective of the opinion of the State Government that re-appointment was beyond law and in the teeth of the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vrs. Umadevi (3) and others (Supra) that only entry made into public employment by not following recruitment rules and without open competition is backdoor and hence illegal. So, the Corporation, while considering the case of the petitioners for absorption might have considered relevant rules in this regard. But, it did not. 80. Moreover, the resolution dated 20th April, 2018 does not speak about absorption of the petitioners but it speaks about the re-appointment by direct recruitment, which had already been held by the State Government as not permissible as per the rules. 81. The learned counsel for the petitioners failed to point out any provision for absorption or any provision permitting re-appointment after crossing the age bar. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the resolution dated 20th April, 2018 is illegal on the ground that firstly Corporation equated the case of the petitioners with those 89 employees without mentioning in the resolution how the case of the petitioners is similar with 89 employees. Secondly, there is no mention of any provision which permits direct recruitment by way of re-appointment after crossing the age limit prescribed under the rules and thirdly the re-appointment of the petitioners was contrary to the direction of the State Government which speaks about absorption and not re-appointment. 82. On 23rd May, 2018, the Municipal Commissioner rightly approached the State Government for cancellation of the resolution no. 223 dated 20th April, 2018 of the Corporation for the reasons mentioned in the said proposal. 82. On 23rd May, 2018, the Municipal Commissioner rightly approached the State Government for cancellation of the resolution no. 223 dated 20th April, 2018 of the Corporation for the reasons mentioned in the said proposal. However, without considering the grounds raised in the said proposal the State Government directed the Corporation vide communication dated 21st June, 2019 to take decision in terms of letter dated 12th February, 2018. 83. In the said backdrop we find substance in the submission of learned Shri Kaptan, Senior Advocate, that the re-appointment of the petitioners is illegal. 84. Now moving to the last point that whether in this matter the Commissioner can overrule the direction of the State Government to absorb the petitioners. There is no doubt that the directions of the State Government vide communication dated 21st June 2019, to take decision in terms of letter dated 12th February, 2018 or the direction of the State Government vide communication dated 12th February, 2018 to absorb the petitioners, are binding on the Commissioner unless it is set aside by the competent authority or the Court. Thus to that extent we find substance in the argument of Shri Parchure that the Commissioner cannot overrule the decision of the State Government. 85. However, the Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in : (1999) 8 SCC, 16, has held that, where setting aside an order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction would result in the revival of an illegal order, then refusal to interfere even with the order lacking jurisdiction would be justified. 86. For us there is no doubt that showing any indulgence in the present matter or any interference in the impugned order by us, even if the impugned order is issued without jurisdiction or without hearing the petitioners, would virtually amount to revival of illegal orders appointing the petitioners. We have already held that the petitioners are not entitled to any right to re-appointment or absorption. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we therefore, refrain ourselves from interfering with the impugned order and find that for the reasons stated herein above, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 87. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.