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2020 DIGILAW 813 (GAU)

State Of Arunachal Pradesh v. Cholingso Kora

2020-12-14

NANI TAGIA

body2020
JUDGMENT Nani Tagia, J. - Heard Mr. Ojing Pada, learned Special Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the applicant-State of Arunachal Pradesh. Also heard Mr. M. K. Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent/accused. 2. This is an application filed by the State under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for cancellation of the impugned bail order, dated 04.06.2020, passed in B.A. No. 78(ANJ)/2020 (Shri Kajomso Kora v. State of A.P.) by the learned District and Session Judge, Eastern Division-cum-Special Judge at Tezu, Lohit, Arunachal Pradesh, arising out of SIC(Vig) Case No. 10/2020, under Sections 409/468/120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 3. The facts leading to filing of this application may briefly, be stated, as follows: (i). A complaint, dated 20.08.2019, was filed by one Smti. Toko Sheetal Nabam, President and Sri Nabam Tagam, Gen. Secretary, Social Vigilance Team (an NGO) regarding the discrepancies in the land compensation/property survey of the BRTF Road from Chaglagam to Rocham(6.500 Km to 16.500 km) in Chaglagam Circle and other land acquisition process in Anjaw District. The said complaint, however, was withdraw, later on. (ii). Though the complaint, as stated above, was withdrawn, upon the approval from the competent authority for initiation of a case vide SIC(Vig) Enquiry No. 09/2020, a preliminary enquiry was made in respect of discrepancies in the land compensation/property survey of the BRTF Road from Chaglagam to Rocham (6.500 Km to 16.500 km) in Chaglagam Circle and other land acquisition process in Anjaw District, vis- -vis, Shri Sode Potom, the then Additional Deputy Commissioner, Hayuliang and one Shri Cholingso Kora. (iii). On completion of the enquiry, enquiry report dated 06.03.2020 was submitted which was treated as an F.I.R. of the case upon due approval from the competent authority (the Government of Arunachal Pradesh), vide letter No. VIG-190/2019/598, dated 24.04.2020 and consequently, SIC(Vig) Case No. 10/2020, under Sections 409/468/120(B) IPC read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988, was registered against the accused persons and the case was endorsed for investigation. (iv). During the course of investigation, it was revealed that an amount of Rs. (iv). During the course of investigation, it was revealed that an amount of Rs. 24,68,28,965/- was found to have been sanctioned as compensation amount for 49 beneficiaries in respect of BRTF road from Chaglagam to Rocham (6.500 Km to 16.500 km) in Chaglagam Circle which was deposited in the local fund account of the ADC, Hayuliang, in three instalments. (v). The investigation further reveals that following discrepancies have come to light in the course of investigation, which is, as under: "The discrepancies found during the course of investigation are as follows:- (i) That on 27.05.2019, the day when the first instalment of Rs. 21,75,85,933/- (Rupees Twenty One Crores Seventy Five Lakhs Eighty Five Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Three) only was paid to the beneficiaries an amount of Rs. 7,75,00,000.00/- (Rupees Seven Crores Seventy Five Lakhs) only was credited to the account No. 32971905463, hold by M/s C. K. Enterprise (proprietor one Sri Cholingso Kora, who is not a beneficiary) vide Cheque No. 678702, 678703, 678704 & 678705. (ii) That on the same day an amount of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- (Rupees One Crores Fifty Lakhs) only was credited into the Local Fund Account No. 11874092779, ADC, Hayuliang from the account of M/S C. K. Enterprise owned by Sri Cholingso Kora (Co-accused) vide Cheque No. 013021, 013020 & 013018 and another amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) only was credited into the Account No. 0011874116077 of Sri Lobinso Malo, UDC, Office of the ADC, Hayuliang through Cheque on 29.05.2019, who was a member of the compensation disbursement board. (iii) That it is submitted that the accused person is the master mind behind all the illegal activities carried out in the disbursement of the compensation amount. In this regard, it may be stated that the modus-operandi of the accused persons was that the compensation amount was paid to the beneficiaries and from the amount so paid, the beneficiaries credited back huge amount to the account of M/s. C. K. Enterprise, a proprietorship firm owned by the accused Sri Cholingso Kora and from there the accused person transfer back the amount to the account of the ADC's local fund. And thereafter the ADC, credits various amount into the accounts of non-beneficiaries, who were mostly the members of the compensation disbursement committee/board. (iv) That since the accused person was not a Govt. And thereafter the ADC, credits various amount into the accounts of non-beneficiaries, who were mostly the members of the compensation disbursement committee/board. (iv) That since the accused person was not a Govt. Servant, he acted as the middle man who would receive amount from the beneficiaries and thereafter credit the same to the ADC's account from where again the money was credited to the accounts of the members of the compensation disbursement committee/board. In fact, the money which the accused person credited to the account of the ADC was the commission/gratification meant for the members of the compensation disbursement committee/board. (v) That despite transferring huge amounts to the tune of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Fifty Lakhs) only to the Local Fund Account No. 11874092779, ADC, Hayuliang, as commission/gratification, the whereabouts of the remaining amount of Rs. 6,13,00,000/- (Rupees Six Crores Thirteen Lakhs) only is still unknown. It is presumably apprehended that the said amounts may be used as the commission/gratification for the property assessment committee. (vi) That it is stated herein that the rate at which the compensation amount was sanctioned is surprisingly exorbitant, vis-a-vis Rs. 24,68,28,965/-(Rupees Twenty Four Crores Sixty Eight Lakhs Twenty Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Five) only for a road with a short distance of 10 kms. The investigating authority is investigating into the enormous discrepancies carried out by the property assessment committee, wherein it had been revealed that imaginary buildings, agricultural and horticulture properties may be used to inflate the rate of compensation in lieu of illegal gratification. (vii) That the investigating agency presumes that without the connivance of the BRTF official, the inflate rate/amount of compensation could not be prepared, however, since the investigation is in its initial stage and the accused persons being released on bail, the proper investigation of the case is hampered. (viii) That from the local fund account of the ADC, Hayuliang, numerous amounts were transferred/credited to the accounts of various non-beneficiaries, who were mostly the members of the disbursement committee/board, which as follows:- A. In the account of Smti. Karpek Hai, Wife of Shri T. T. Hai, HDO, A/C No. 0030439251602 Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs), dated 29.05.2019. B. In the account of Sri Tana Tahi & Tours, DLR&SO, A/C No. 36522657423, Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Two Lakhs) only, dated 08.07.2019 and 06.07.2019. C. In the account of Sri Lobinso Malo, UDC, A/C No. 11874116077, Rs. Karpek Hai, Wife of Shri T. T. Hai, HDO, A/C No. 0030439251602 Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs), dated 29.05.2019. B. In the account of Sri Tana Tahi & Tours, DLR&SO, A/C No. 36522657423, Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Two Lakhs) only, dated 08.07.2019 and 06.07.2019. C. In the account of Sri Lobinso Malo, UDC, A/C No. 11874116077, Rs. 44,99,000/- (Rupees Forty Four Lakhs Ninety Nine Thousand) only, dated 08.07.2019, 10.07.2019 and 17.07.2019. D. To the account of M/s. A. G. Enterprise, Tezu, A/C No. 33998276175, Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs) only, dated 05.07.2019. E. To the account of Sri Syondaria Mai & Mamamso Mai, A/C No. 31571130857, Rs. 2,40,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Forty Thousand) only, dated 04.07.2019. F. To the account of Sri Muskan Choudary, A/c No. 32388941994, Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) only, dated 07.11.2019. G. To the account of Sri Dangjuilu Tulang, A/c No. 11874115405, Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakhs Fifty Thousand) only. H. To the Joint Account of Sri Margam Bam and Marge Basar, A/c No. 31898219702, Rs. 6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs) only. I. To the account of M/s. Hotel Yumi Ragi through RTGS, A/c No. 259301501477, ICICI Bank, and Rs. 12,00,000/- (Rupees Twelve Lakhs) only, dated 09.07.2019 & 08.07.2019. M/S Yumi Ragi is purportedly owned by Sri Dagbom Riba, DC, Anjaw. J. To the account of Sri Dagbom Riba, DC, Anjaw, A/c No. 1187583939, Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs), dated 08.07.2019. K. That during the further investigation it had been found that an amount of Rs. 45,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Five Lakhs) only has been transferred to the account of M/s. M. T. Enterprise, which has been misappropriated by the accused person Sri Sode Potom, the then ADC, and the Chairman of the compensation disbursement committee/board in the gist of office and miscellaneous expenses. L. That an amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- (Rupees Twelve Lakhs) only was also transferred to the personal account of Sri Sode Potom (Accused Person), the then ADC, Hayuliang and the Chairman of compensation disbursement committee/board." (vi). In furtherance of the investigation of the case, the respondent/ accused Cholingso Kora was arrested on 30.05.2020 from Hayuliang and was produced before the learned Special Judge at Tezu on 31.05.2020, on which date, the learned Special Judge, Tezu, remanded the accused to 3 days police custody and directed the accused to be produced again on 03.06.2020. In furtherance of the investigation of the case, the respondent/ accused Cholingso Kora was arrested on 30.05.2020 from Hayuliang and was produced before the learned Special Judge at Tezu on 31.05.2020, on which date, the learned Special Judge, Tezu, remanded the accused to 3 days police custody and directed the accused to be produced again on 03.06.2020. When the accused was produced on 03.06.2020, the learned Special Judge, Tezu, had further remanded the accused to another 1 day in police custody and directed to be produced on 04.06.2020, on the ground that bail application being BA No. 78(ANJ)/2020 had been filed for grant of bail to the accused. On 04.06.2020, when the accused was produced before the learned Special Judge, Tezu, the bail application of the accused being BA No. 78(ANJ)/2020 was heard, wherein, the learned Special Judge, Tezu, granted bail to the accused Cholingso Kora in connection with SIC(Vig) Case No.10/2020, by order, dated 04.06.2020. 4. The State is before this Court, under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking cancellation of the aforesaid bail order primarily on the ground that the learned Special Judge, Tezu, has failed to take into consideration the prima-facie evidence on record against the accused Shri Sode Potom which was a relevant consideration to be taken into account by the learned Special Judge and that considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the learned Special Judge, Tezu, failed to take into account the fact that though the accused was altogether remanded to 4 days police custody but out of the 4 days, 2 days were spent in taking back the accused from Tezu to Itanagar and vice versa. Therefore, the accused practically spent only 2(two) days in the custody of the investigating agency, which was quite inadequate to properly investigate in a case of this nature. 5. The respondent/accused has filed an objection, wherein, apart from claiming innocence of the offence alleged, the respondent/accused, in essence, contended that the respondent/accused was interrogated for 3(three) days in the police custody before he was produced before the learned Special Judge, Tezu. 5. The respondent/accused has filed an objection, wherein, apart from claiming innocence of the offence alleged, the respondent/accused, in essence, contended that the respondent/accused was interrogated for 3(three) days in the police custody before he was produced before the learned Special Judge, Tezu. The respondent accused also having not violated any of the terms and conditions imposed in the bail order, dated 04.06.2020, and also in view of the fact that the respondent/accused is cooperating in investigation of the case, no case for cancellation of the bail granted to the respondent/accused, have been made out by the State. It has been further stated that the respondent/accused is an established businessman in Tezu. He has a huge set of stone crusher and deals in stone business and also owns a gas agency apart from other business. Many people in Tezu area including some of the beneficiaries of the land compensation have business transaction with him and some of them had borrowed money from him, promising to repay the money after receiving the compensation amount. The money transaction between him and some of the beneficiaries of the land compensation was on account of money lent by him to the beneficiaries of the land compensation including Sri Sode Potom, the then Additional Deputy Commissioner, Hayuliang. 6. Mr. Pada, learned Special P.P. representing the State, has argued that the learned Special Judge, Tezu, while granting bail to the accused, has failed to take into account the prima-facie evidence on record available against the respondent/accused which is a relevant consideration to be taken into account. The learned Special Judge, Tezu, according to Mr. Pada, learned Special P.P., has also failed to take into account, the nature and gravity of the offence involved, namely, the offence alleged being in the domain of economic offence, which is committed with deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community is an offence of grave nature having wide ramification in the society. And in that context, the learned Special Judge, Tezu, ought to have opined that 4(four) days police custody of the accused out of, which 2(two) days were spent in taking back the accused from Tezu to Itanagar and vice versa, was inadequate for investigation of offence of this magnitude. Mr. And in that context, the learned Special Judge, Tezu, ought to have opined that 4(four) days police custody of the accused out of, which 2(two) days were spent in taking back the accused from Tezu to Itanagar and vice versa, was inadequate for investigation of offence of this magnitude. Mr. Pada, learned Special P.P., therefore, submits that the learned Special Judge, Tezu, having not taken into account, the above two relevant considerations, this is a fit case where this Court in exercise of powers conferred under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, may cancel the bail order passed in favour of the respondent/accused by the learned Special Judge, Tezu. In support of his contention, Mr. Pada, learned Special P.P., has relied on a decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Kanwar Singh Meena v State of Rajasthan & anr., (2012) 12 SCC 180 and the attention of this Court has been drawn to paragraph Nos. 5 to 10 which have been reproduced, hereinbelow: "5. Cancellation of bail is a serious matter. Bail once granted can be cancelled only in the circumstances and for the reasons which have been clearly stated by this court in a catena of judgments. It would be appropriate to refer to a few of them before dealing with the rival contentions. 6. In Gurcharan Singh and others v. State (Delhi Administration), the appellant Gurcharan, who was Superintendent of Police, was charged along with other police personnel under Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC. During the preliminary enquiry six alleged eye-witnesses, who were police personnel, did not support the prosecution case. However, after the FIR was lodged during the course of investigation, seven witnesses including the said six police personnel gave statements implicating appellant Gurcharan Singh. One eyewitness ASI Gopal Das made a statement under Section 164 of the Code in favour of the prosecution. Learned Sessions Judge released appellant Gurcharan Singh on bail after observing that there was little to gain by him by tampering with the witnesses who had, themselves, already tampered with their evidence by making contradictory statements. Learned Sessions Judge further observed that after reviewing the entire material he was of the opinion that there was little probability of appellant Gurcharan Singh fleeing from justice or tampering with the witnesses. He noted that having regard to the character of evidence he was inclined to grant bail. Learned Sessions Judge further observed that after reviewing the entire material he was of the opinion that there was little probability of appellant Gurcharan Singh fleeing from justice or tampering with the witnesses. He noted that having regard to the character of evidence he was inclined to grant bail. The prosecution moved the High Court under Section 439 (2) of the Code for cancellation of the said order. The High Court inter alia observed that considering the nature of the offence and the character of the evidence, the reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with and all other relevant factors, it had no option but to cancel the bail. The High Court observed that learned Sessions Judge did not exercise his judicial discretion on relevant well-recognized principles. An appeal was carried from the said order to this court. 7. This court in Gurcharan Singh observed that the powers of the High Court and the Sessions Court under Section 439(1) of the Code are much wider than those conferred on a court other than the High Court and the Sessions Court in respect of bail. However, certain considerations which have to be taken into account are common to all courts. This court noted that gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardizing his own life being faced with a grim prospect of a possible conviction in the case; of tampering witnesses; the history of the case as well as its investigation and such other relevant grounds will have to be taken into account. To ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the accused, character of the evidence will have to be considered. While confirming the High Court's interference with the discretion exercised by the Sessions Court, this court expressed its displeasure about the unwarranted premature comments made by the Sessions Court on the merits of the case when at that stage it was only called upon to consider whether prima facie case was made out against the accused or not. While confirming the High Court's interference with the discretion exercised by the Sessions Court, this court expressed its displeasure about the unwarranted premature comments made by the Sessions Court on the merits of the case when at that stage it was only called upon to consider whether prima facie case was made out against the accused or not. This court particularly referred to statement of ASI Gopal Das, recorded under Section 164 of the Code and observed that this witness had made no earlier contradictory statement and the taint of unreliability could not be attached to his statement at that stage as was done by the Sessions Court. This court found that the Sessions Court was not alive to legal position that there was no substantive evidence recorded against the accused until the eyewitnesses were examined in the trial. Serious note was taken of the fact that the Sessions Court had not focused its attention on relevant considerations. The approach of the Sessions Judge was viewed as suffering from serious infirmity and cancellation of bail was endorsed. 8. In Puran v. Rambilas, the appellant therein was charged under Sections 498-A and 304- B of the IPC. The Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, released the appellant therein, on bail. The High Court cancelled the bail granted to the appellant. The said order was under challenge before this court. It was argued that rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail already granted have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of bail already granted. It was argued that generally speaking the grounds for cancellation of bail broadly are interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. Reliance was placed on Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana in support of this submission. This court observed that in Dolat Ram, it was clarified that the above instances are merely illustrative and not exhaustive and one such ground for cancellation of bail would be where ignoring material and evidence on record a perverse order granting bail is passed in a heinous crime and that too without giving any reasons. This court observed that in Dolat Ram, it was clarified that the above instances are merely illustrative and not exhaustive and one such ground for cancellation of bail would be where ignoring material and evidence on record a perverse order granting bail is passed in a heinous crime and that too without giving any reasons. This court observed that such an order would be against the principles of law and interest of justice would require that such a perverse order be set aside and bail be cancelled. This court found that inasmuch as the Sessions Court had ignored vital materials while granting the bail, the High Court had rightly cancelled the bail. It was further observed that such orders passed in heinous crimes would have serious impact on the society and an arbitrary and wrong exercise of discretion by the trial court has to be corrected. 9. In Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) v. State of Gujarat, the appellant therein, a police officer was involved in a case of fake encounter. The learned Sessions Judge released him on bail. It was evident from the bail order that learned Sessions Judge was influenced by the fact that the deceased was a dreaded criminal, against whom as many as 25 FIRs were lodged. An application for cancellation of bail was moved before the High Court under Section 439(2) of the Code. The High Court cancelled the bail holding that learned Sessions Judge had not kept in view the seriousness of the offence in which the high ranking police officer was involved. It was observed that past conduct or antecedents of the deceased could not have been a ground for grant of bail to the accused. This court while dealing with the challenge to the said order held that though it is true that parameters for grant of bail and cancellation of bail are different, if the trial court while granting bail acts on irrelevant materials, bail can be cancelled. It was observed that perversity of a bail order can flow from the fact that irrelevant materials have been taken into consideration adding vulnerability to the order granting bail. On the facts of the case, this court held that that the deceased had a shady reputation and criminal antecedents, was certainly not a factor which should have been taken into consideration while granting bail to the accused. On the facts of the case, this court held that that the deceased had a shady reputation and criminal antecedents, was certainly not a factor which should have been taken into consideration while granting bail to the accused. It was the nature of the act committed by the accused which ought to have been taken into consideration. The order of the High Court was confirmed on the ground that the bail was granted on untenable grounds. The argument that supervening circumstances such as attempt to tamper with the evidence and interference with the investigation were absent and, therefore, bail could not have been cancelled by reappreciating evidence, was rejected by this court. 10. Thus, Section 439 of the Code confers very wide powers on the High Court and the Court of Session regarding bail. But, while granting bail, the High Court and the Sessions Court are guided by the same considerations as other courts. That is to say, the gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds are required to be taken into consideration. Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual scenario and, therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. The court has to only opine as to whether there is prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police and comment on the same. Such assessment of evidence and premature comments are likely to deprive the accused of a fair trial. While cancelling bail under Section 439(2) of the Code, the primary considerations which weigh with the court are whether the accused is likely to tamper with the evidence or interfere or attempt to interfere with the due course of justice or evade the due course of justice. But, that is not all. The High Court or the Sessions Court can cancel bail even in cases where the order granting bail suffers from serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice. But, that is not all. The High Court or the Sessions Court can cancel bail even in cases where the order granting bail suffers from serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice. If the court granting bail ignores relevant materials indicating prima facie involvement of the accused or takes into account irrelevant material, which has no relevance to the question of grant of bail to the accused, the High Court or the Sessions Court would be justified in cancelling the bail. Such orders are against the well recognized principles underlying the power to grant bail. Such orders are legally infirm and vulnerable leading to miscarriage of justice and absence of supervening circumstances such as the propensity of the accused to tamper with the evidence, to flee from justice, etc. would not deter the court from cancelling the bail. The High Court or the Sessions Court is bound to cancel such bail orders particularly when they are passed releasing accused involved in heinous crimes because they ultimately result in weakening the prosecution case and have adverse impact on the society. Needless to say that though the powers of this court are much wider, this court is equally guided by the above principles in the matter of grant or cancellation of bail." 7. Mr. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the respondent/accused, on the other hand, submits that bail once granted by the Court, should not ordinarily be cancelled unless the terms and conditions imposed in the bail order has been violated by the accused. Mr. Choudhury, learned senior counsel, further submits that the respondent/accused, in the instant case, has not violated any of the terms and conditions imposed by the learned Court below while granting bail to the respondent/accused. Accordingly, no case for cancellation of the bail granted to the accused under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, have been made out by the applicant-State, and the instant criminal misc. application be dismissed at the threshold. 8. Mr. Choudhury, learned senior counsel, further submits that cancellation of bail is generally examined on the ambit of the existence of supervening circumstances or violation of the terms and conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. application be dismissed at the threshold. 8. Mr. Choudhury, learned senior counsel, further submits that cancellation of bail is generally examined on the ambit of the existence of supervening circumstances or violation of the terms and conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. In the instant case, as has been stated above that the respondent/accused apart from not violating any of the terms and conditions imposed in the bail order, there exists no supervening circumstances requiring cancellation of the bail granted to the respondent/accused, inasmuch as, the respondent/accused has been, all along, cooperating with the investigation. 9. In support of his contention, Mr. Choudhury, learned senior counsel has referred to the following decisions of the Apex Court which have been quoted, hereinbelow, along with the relevant paragraphs, the attention of which was invited to: (i). Aslam Babalal Desai v State of Maharashtra, (1992) 4 SCC 272 "11. ......... Once the order of release is by fiction of law an order passed under Section 437(1) or (2) or 439(1) it follows as a natural consequence that the said order can be cancelled under Sub-section (5) of Section 437 or Sub-section (2) of Section 439 on considerations relevant for cancellation of an order thereunder. As stated in Raghubir Singh case the grounds for cancellation under Sections 437(5) and 439(2) are identical, namely, bail granted under Sections 437(1) or (2) or 439(1) can be cancelled where (i) the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity, (ii) interferes with the course of investigation, (iii) attempts to tamper with evidence or witnesses, (iv) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation, (v) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country, (vi) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency, (vii) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, etc. These grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive. It must also be remembered that rejection of bail stands on one footing but cancellation of bail is a harsh order because it interferes with the liberty of the individual and hence it must not be lightly resorted to." (ii). Dolat Ram and Ors. v State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 "4. These grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive. It must also be remembered that rejection of bail stands on one footing but cancellation of bail is a harsh order because it interferes with the liberty of the individual and hence it must not be lightly resorted to." (ii). Dolat Ram and Ors. v State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 "4. Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. These principles, it appears, were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High Court it appears to us overlooked the distinction of the factors relevant for rejecting bail in a non-bailable case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail already granted. (iii). Mahipal v Rajesh Kumar @ Polia & anr, (2020) 2 SCC 118 "16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. In Neeru Yadav v State of Uttar Pradesh, the accused was granted bail by the High Court. In an appeal against the order of the High Court, a two judge Bench of this Court surveyed the precedent on the principles that guide the grant of bail. Dipak Misra J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) held(Neeru Yadav Case, SCC p.513, Para 12): 12. ...... It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors which should have been taken into consideration while dealing with the application for bail and have not been taken note of bail or it is founded on irrelevant considerations, indisputably the superior court can set aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case belongs to a different category and is in a separate realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the Court does not dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently. It, on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of the order passed by the Court. 17. Where a court considering an application for bail fails to consider relevant factors, an appellate court may justifiably set aside the order granting bail. An appellate court is thus required to consider whether the order granting bail suffers from a non-application of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of the evidence on record. 17. Where a court considering an application for bail fails to consider relevant factors, an appellate court may justifiably set aside the order granting bail. An appellate court is thus required to consider whether the order granting bail suffers from a non-application of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of the evidence on record. It is thus necessary for this Court to assess whether, on the basis of the evidentiary record, there existed a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the crime, also taking into account the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the punishment." 10. Rival submissions advanced at the Bar, have received due consideration of this Court. 11. Since this is an application under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for consideration of bail; it would be apposite to set out the scope and width of Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which provides that the High Court, or, Court of Sessions, may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter, be arrested, and commit him to custody. 12. From the decision cited at the Bar by the rival contesting parties; it is noticed that cancellation of bail is a serious matter, and bail, once granted, can be cancelled only, where: (i) the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity; (ii) interferes with the course of investigation; (iii) attempts to tamper with evidence of witnesses; (iv) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation; (v) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country; (vi) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency; (vii) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, etc.. These grounds, however, are stated to be illustrative and not exhaustive. 13. These grounds, however, are stated to be illustrative and not exhaustive. 13. Though a distinction is sought to be made between the rejection of bail in a non-bailable case in initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted by holding that while cancelling the bail; very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of bail already granted, such as likely to tamper with the investigation or interference or attempt to interfere with the course of justice or evade the due course of justice, yet, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the High Court or the Court of Sessions, in a given case, can still cancel the bail even in cases where the order granting bail suffers from serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice, if the Court granting bail, ignores the relevant material indicating prima facie involvement of the accused or take into consideration, the irrelevant materials which would have no relevance to the grant of bail to the accused. 14. Thus, though the High Court, or, the Court of Sessions, in exercise of power conferred under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, should ordinarily cancel the bail already granted in the event, the accused misuses his liberty; interferes with the course of investigation; attempt to tamper with the evidence or witnesses; threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activity which would hamper smooth investigation; there is a likelihood of fleeing to another county; attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency; attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, and such other supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail, by a person to whom bail has been granted; the High Court, or, the Court of Sessions, in addition, thereto, while considering an application under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can further examine as to whether the Court granting bail, had taken into account, the relevant materials indicating prima-facie involvement of the accused, or, had taken into account, the irrelevant material, which has no relevance to the question of grant of bail to the accused. In other words; the High Court, or, the Court of Sessions, in an application under Section 439(2) of the Code; while considering the application for cancellation of bail, in addition to examining the existence of any supervening circumstances such as violations of the conditions imposed in the bail order, can also examine the legality of the bail granted to the extent, whether the Court while granting the bail, had actually taken into account, the relevant materials available on record so as to form an opinion about the prima-facie involvement of the accused. If the trial Court while granting bail, acts on irrelevant material, bail can be cancelled by the High Court, or, the Court of Sessions, under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 15. Having set out the contours of Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as above, in the light thereof; it is noticed that the offence alleged, in the instant case, is with regard to mismanagement of an amount of Rs. 24,68,28,695/-, sanctioned as compensation amount, for 49 beneficiaries in respect of BRTF Road from Chaglagam to Rocham(6.500KM to 16.500KM) in Chaglagam Circle, in the District of Anjaw, by the respondent/accused, herein. 16. The respondent/accused Cholingso Kora was arrested on 30.05.2020 in connection with the above anomalies which was registered as SIC(Vig.) P.S. Case No. 10/2020 u/ss. 409/468/120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and on 04.06.2020, he was granted bail, by the learned Special Judge, Tezu. For ready reference, the bail order, dated 04.06.2020, passed by the learned Special Judge, Tezu, in BA No. 78(ANJ)/2020, is reproduced hereinbelow: "ORDERSHEET FOR JUDGES RECORDS IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL JUDGE TEZU : LOHIT DISTRICT: ARUNACHAL PRADESH Dist-Lohit Bail application No 78(ANJ)/2020 SIC(Vig) Case No. 10/2020 Kajamso Kora -vs- State U/s 409/468/120(B) IPC, r/w Sec. 13(2) of PC Act 1988 04.06.2020 This is a bail application filed by Kajamso Kora through his counsel Mr. S. Maw for granting bail to the accused Cholingso Kora who is arrested in connection with SIC VIG Case No. 10/20. Counsel for the applicant submits that the said accused is a permanent resident of Tezu Lohit Dist. A.P. having a well established business. S. Maw for granting bail to the accused Cholingso Kora who is arrested in connection with SIC VIG Case No. 10/20. Counsel for the applicant submits that the said accused is a permanent resident of Tezu Lohit Dist. A.P. having a well established business. The counsel submits that the present accused is arrested on Saturday dated 30.05.2020 when he was coming back to Tezu from Anjaw and produced before this Court on Sunday dated 31.05.2020. He submits that a complaint was filed by an unregistered NGO as they found some discrepancies in disbursement of land compensation amount but later the said NGO has withdrawn the complaint as the allegation against the accused was found not correct. The SIC, though the said complaint has been withdrawn, made an enquiry and has stated in his enquiry report that there is no major discrepancies in the present case except some procedure lapses are said to have been found during the enquiry. The IO of the present case has considered this enquiry report as an FIR to investigate the case further. The counsel for the accused therefore, submits that this is how the present accused is arrested after 9 months from the date of complaint filed by the Social Vigilance Team(NGO) which has been withdrawn at later stage. It is further submitted by the counsel for the accused that the offence under Section 409/468 IPC are not attracted against the accused in present case and even if these sections are attracted, the IO who has not given his reason to arrest the accused in written ought to have issued notice to the accused person as provision given under Section 41(A) CrPC before they are arrested because the said offences are not punishable for more than 7 years. The counsel has also submitted that the detention of the accused person either in police custody or judicial custody is necessary when there is a possibility of absconding by the accused person and when there are possibilities of tampering with the evidences. He thus, submits that when such possibilities are not there and when the accused is ready to cooperate the IO, the accused ought to be enlarged on bail instead of detaining him in the custody. He thus, submits that when such possibilities are not there and when the accused is ready to cooperate the IO, the accused ought to be enlarged on bail instead of detaining him in the custody. He submits that the incident took place more than 9 months before the arrest and allegation made against the accused is under Section 409/468 IPC which are of the records hence, the present accused who is not a official person doesnt have the official record in his custody. With this, counsel for the accused submits that the Honble Supreme Court has directed to release the accused persons who are alleged to have committed offences punishable below 7 years on bail or interim bail at the present situation where the world is fighting against the Covid-19 pandemic and accordingly, the same has been complied with by all the States of the country. The counsel thus, submits that at present and in present case, the bail should be the law and the jail should be an exception. The counsel therefore, submitted rulings in support of his submission and has also submitted that the accused is ready to furnish a suitable bailor. Further, counsel for the applicant submits that the accused is having health problem and needs proper medication. The counsel for the accused further submits that as per the approval of concerned authorities, the amount of Rs. 24,00,00,000/- was deposited in the local fund account of ADC Hayuliang but not in the personal account of the then ADC Hayuliang. The present accused as ADC has disbursed the said compensation amount by crediting the required amount in the account of each beneficiary from the said local fund account of ADC. These beneficiaries has again deposited an amount of Rs. 8 crore in the account of co-accused Sri Cholingso Kora, he being the attorney holder of those beneficiaries and thus, he again deposited an amount of Rs. 1.5 crore in the local fund account of ADC. The defence counsel therefore submits that the amount deposited by the beneficiaries in the account of co-accused who again deposited Rs. 1.5 crore in the local fund account of ADC cannot be considered as a gratification since none of the beneficiaries have stated before the IO that these accused persons demanded money from them. He further submits that the complaint filed by the unregistered NGO against the accused persons has been withdrawn. 1.5 crore in the local fund account of ADC cannot be considered as a gratification since none of the beneficiaries have stated before the IO that these accused persons demanded money from them. He further submits that the complaint filed by the unregistered NGO against the accused persons has been withdrawn. Further, counsel for the applicant submits that the accused is having health problem and needs proper medication. Therefore, prays that when the investigation of the IO is not disturbed, accused be allowed to go on bail. IO is present. Both ld SPP Mr. T. Uli and Mr. O. Pada are present. They are heard. They submits that Honble Supreme Court has not directed the State Govt. to release the accused persons who are said to have committed offence punishable for not more than 7 years on bail or interim bail, rather a guideline has only been made which each and every State shall follow. It is also submitted by the PPs that when the offence is cognizable, it is not necessary to comply with Section 41 Cr.PC. Both the PPs admits that these said amounts of Rs. 8 crore have been deposited in the account of Accused Cholingso Kora by all the beneficiaries after having received the said compensation amount. They have also admitted that the amount of Rs. 1.5 crore deposited from the account of accused Choingso Kora in the local fund account of ADC Hayuliang is a matter of record. They submit that cash amount of Rs. Twelve Lakh has been deposited in the personal account of ADC after the disbursement of the compensation amount. Thus, they pray that bail may not be granted to the accused person because the IO needs to do further interrogation to this accused person and since almost all the amounts deposited in the account of accused Cholingso Kora have been withdrawn. More so, the said ADC who is accused in this case has deposited Rs. 44,99,000/- in the account of one of his staff and an amount of Rs. 15,00,000/- and another amount of Rs. 45,00,000/- in the account of other two non beneficiaries. Therefore, the bail application has been opposed by them but they could not convince this court that granting bail to this accused person is likely to disturb the smooth investigation of this case. 15,00,000/- and another amount of Rs. 45,00,000/- in the account of other two non beneficiaries. Therefore, the bail application has been opposed by them but they could not convince this court that granting bail to this accused person is likely to disturb the smooth investigation of this case. This Court therefore, opines that accused person can be always interrogated without detaining them either in police custody or judicial custody if and when required. Now, at this stage, what this Court has to see is whether the smooth investigation of the case is disturbed or not if the accused is allowed to go on bail. In this regard, this Court finds that the alleged amount are deposited in the account of the accused person after the compensation amount to the beneficiaries are disbursed and credited the required amount of each beneficiaries in their bank account from the local fund account of ADC Hayuliang after having obtained the approval from the concerned authority by the present accused the then ADC Hayuliang. Apart from this, this Court finds that the incident took place 9 months back and the initial complaint lodged to the SIC was withdrawn. This Court has also found that the present accused Sri Sode Potom, who was the then ADC Hayuliang is now posted out from the said place since last six months and now he has joined Lower Siang District as ADC and the accused Cholingso Kora is a resident of Tezu. Thus, the possibilities of tampering with the documentary and other evidences are bleak. The PP has also submits that there is no chance of absconding by the accused but they have an apprehension that the accused person may tamper with the prosecution evidences. With regard to tampering of prosecution evidences, this Court has already opined hereinbefore and has ruled out the possibility of tampering because the offence under section 409/468 IPC are all matter of record and the documents are neither in their custody nor they are resident of Anjaw, the PO. Therefore, this Court opines that fair investigation can always be done by keeping this accused who is considered as an innocent person at this stage under the custody of a suitable bailor and also having seen the documents annexed in the application, this Court presumes that the accused is in need of proper medical attention. Therefore, this Court opines that fair investigation can always be done by keeping this accused who is considered as an innocent person at this stage under the custody of a suitable bailor and also having seen the documents annexed in the application, this Court presumes that the accused is in need of proper medical attention. Counsel for the accused submits that the accused will furnish a suitable bailor who is a permanent resident of AP and a responsible person in the society. And therefore, the concerned authority is directed to release the accused Cholingso Kora forthwith if not required in any other case or cases on below conditions; 1. The accused shall execute a bail bond of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand) with local surety of like amount before this Court. 2. The accused shall not directly or indirectly make an inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the fact of the instant case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such fact to the Court or to police officer concerned. 3. That the accused shall appear before the Police Station and Court as and when he is required to do so and co-operate with investigation. 4. The IO shall summon the accused before him for interrogation by giving reasonable time to the accused. With the above direction, this bail application stands allowed and disposed of." Sd/- (Yomge Ado)" 17. On perusal of the bail order, dated 04.06.2020, quoted hereinabove; it is noticed that the learned Special Judge, Tezu, Lohit District, granted bail to the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora on the ground that the accused person can always be interrogated without detaining him, either, in police custody, or, judicial custody; that the incident took place 9 months back, and the initial complaint lodged to the SIC(Vig.) was withdrawn; that the other accused in the case, Sode Potom, who was the then Additional Deputy Commissioner, Hayuliang, was posted out from the said place, and that the present respondent/accused Cholingso Kora is a resident of Tezu and therefore, the possibilities of tampering with the documentary and other witnesses are bleak; that there is no chance of absconding by the accused; etc.. On the grounds mentioned hereinabove; the learned Special Judge, Tezu, granted bail to the respondent/accused vide order, dated 04.06.2020, with the following terms and conditions, that : (i) the accused shall execute a bail bond of Rs. On the grounds mentioned hereinabove; the learned Special Judge, Tezu, granted bail to the respondent/accused vide order, dated 04.06.2020, with the following terms and conditions, that : (i) the accused shall execute a bail bond of Rs. 1,50,000/- with local surety of like amount before the Court of the learned Special Judge, Tezu, Lohit District; (ii) the accused shall not directly or indirectly make an inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the fact of the instant case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such fact to the Court or to police officer concerned; (iii) the accused shall appear before the Police Station and Court as and when he is required to do so and co-operate with investigation; and (iv) the IO shall summon the accused before him for interrogation by giving reasonable time to appear. 18. Though the conditions imposed by the learned Special Judge, Tezu, in the bail order, dated 04.06.2020, have not been stated to have been violated by the respondent/accused; this criminal misc. application for cancellation of the bail granted to the respondent/accused, have been filed by the State on the ground that relevant consideration for grant of bail in a case of this nature, had not been taken into account by the learned Special Judge, Tezu, while granting the bail to the respondent/accused. Accordingly, for the purpose of adjudicating this application on merit, as contended by the learned Special P.P., on behalf of the State; it is necessary to look into the CD so produced by the State. 19. As the respondent/accused was arrested on 30.05.2020 and granted bail on 04.06.2020 by the learned Special Judge, Tezu, this Court would now look into the materials collected by the investigating agency and made available on record, as on 04.06.2020. 20. From the related CD produced by the State; it appears that the statement of the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora recorded by the I.O. u/s. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on 01.06.2020, was made available on record at the time of considering the bail application of the respondent/accused. In his statement; the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora who was arrested on 30.05.2020, had stated that he was a businessman by profession and to get the compensation amount of Rs. In his statement; the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora who was arrested on 30.05.2020, had stated that he was a businessman by profession and to get the compensation amount of Rs. 24,68,28,695/-, sanctioned from the Central Government, he had gone to Delhi many times and to meet up the expenditure for sanctioning of the compensation amount at Delhi, he had taken loan from Sri Sode Potom, the then Additional Deputy Commissioner, Hayuliang, in the year 2018, without any agreement and after the compensation amount was sanctioned by the Central Government and disbursed to the beneficiaries, he had given 3 different cheques of Rs. 50,00,000/-, each, to Sri Sode Potom. He had further stated that on receipt of payment of compensation, 4(four) beneficiaries had credited the following amount in the account of M/s. C. K. Enterprises being A/C No. 32971905463, which Firm belonged to him: (1) Manakso Talap & Choki Taflap = Rs. 5,93,00,000/- (2) Chaikulum Mai = Rs. 25,00,000/- (3) Bagi Mai = Rs. 35,00,000/- (4) Milan Bellain = Rs. 70,00,000/- Along with the aforesaid amount, and also from many others, the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora stated to have received Rs. 7 crores from the beneficiaries of the land compensation and on receipt of an amount of Rs. 7 crores, the said amount was credited to the incumbents mentioned hereinbelow: (1) ADC, Hayuliang = Rs. 1.5 crore (2) Khuje Drai = Rs. 1 crore (3) M/s. S.S. Polo[Delhi] = Rs. 80 lacs (4) Advocate Sabha Rabha = Rs. 21 lacs (5) Keganso Kora = Rs. 10 lacs (6) M/s R. T. Enterprise & Purchased one Scorpio SUV = 16,15,771/- (7) Lobinso Malo = Rs. 2 lacs (8) Manakso Taflap = Rs. 18 lacs (9) Alelum Tega = Rs. 18 lacs (10) Dr. Tajum Ete, Nlg = Rs. 1 lacs (11) Nantu Deb = Rs 1.12 crore (12) M/s Guruji Exchange, Delhi = Rs. 40 lacs (13) M/s. S. S. Industry, Delhi = Rs. 20 lacs 21. From the statement made by the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora, it is evident that soon after the compensation amount was disbursed, Rs. 1,50,00,000/- was deposited back in the account of the ADC Local Fund Account through the account of M/s. C.K. Enterprises which belonged to the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora. The statement of Sri Sode Potom who is the other co-accused and respondent in Crl. Misc. Appl. 1,50,00,000/- was deposited back in the account of the ADC Local Fund Account through the account of M/s. C.K. Enterprises which belonged to the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora. The statement of Sri Sode Potom who is the other co-accused and respondent in Crl. Misc. Appl. No. 01(AP)2020, be now, noticed: The respondent/accused Sri Sode Potom who was arrested on 30.05.2020, was also examined by the I.O. on 01.06.2020, in connection with SIC(Vig.) Case No. 10/2020, u/ss. 409/468/120(B) IPC, read with Section 13 (2) of the PC Act, 1988, which was available on record at the time, his bail application being BA No. 77(ANJ)/2020 was considered by the learned Special Judge, Tezu, Lohit District. In his statement; the respondent/accused Sode Potom had stated that during his tenure as Additional Deputy Commissioner, an amount of Rs. 24,68,28,695/-, was sanctioned from the Central Government being the compensation amount for the beneficiaries of construction of BRTF Road from Chaglagam to Rocham(6.500KM to 16.500KM) in Chaglagam Circle, in the District of Anjaw and the amount was credited at his ADC Local Fund Account being Account No. 11874092779 and thereafter, he had released the amount in three phases to distribute the amount to the beneficiaries through SBI Hayuliang and the first phase of payment was made on 27.05.2019 through SBI Hayuliang by DBT. He had further stated that on 28.05.2019, an amount of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- was credited in favour of the ADC Local Fund Account No. 11874092779 from the Account No. 32971905463 of M/s. C. K. Enterprises which is the account operated by one Sri Cholingso Kora, the other accused. 22. Thus, from the statement of the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora, it is evident that he had taken active part in getting the compensation amount sanctioned from the Central Government, by investing huge amount of money taken from Sri Sode Potom, the then Additional Deputy Commissioner, Hayuliang. The land of the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora has not been stated to have been acquired in the land acquisition made for construction of BRTF Road from Chaglagam to Rocham(6.500KM to 16.500KM) in Chaglagam Circle, in the District of Anjaw and therefore, Cholingso Kora, was not, in any way, affected by the land acquisition proceeding. The land of the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora has not been stated to have been acquired in the land acquisition made for construction of BRTF Road from Chaglagam to Rocham(6.500KM to 16.500KM) in Chaglagam Circle, in the District of Anjaw and therefore, Cholingso Kora, was not, in any way, affected by the land acquisition proceeding. In a land acquisition proceeding, whenever a land is proposed to be acquired by the authority, what is generally done, is that the authority concerned, makes an assessment and valuation of the land and property sought to be acquired from the persons concerned after duly notifying and on such correct assessment of the valuation of the land as well as the property being made, the compensation amount is disbursed to the affected parties. After the entire compensation amount is handed-over to the affected parties; the land or the property of the affected party, as the case may be, is taken over by the authority acquiring the land and there is, as such, no question of involvement of any third-party does arise in a land acquisition process, such as getting the compensation amount sanctioned from the Central Government, by investing a huge amount of money. Such involvement of any third-party approaching the Central Government for sanctioning the compensation amount for the land acquisition process to be made, is unknown to the law relating to the acquisition of land for public purposes. 23. In the light of the above, if we examine the statement of the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora recorded by the I.O. on 01.06.2020, it is evident that he had received an amount of Rs. 7 crores from the beneficiaries whose lands had been acquired and on receipt of an amount of Rs. 7 crores, the same was disbursed by him to as many as 13 persons mentioned above, which includes the then Additional Deputy Commissioner, Hayuliang(1.5 crore); M/s. S.S. Polo, Delhi(80 lakhs); Advocate Sabha Rabha(21 lakhs); Nantu Deb(1.12 crore); M/s. Guruji Exchange, Delhi(40 lakhs); M/s S.S. Industry, Delhi(20 lakhs), etc.. The above are the persons/Firms, who are, in no way, connected with the acquisition of land for the construction of BRTF Road from Chaglagam to Rocham(6.500KM to 16.500KM) in Chaglagam Circle, in the District of Anjaw. 24. The above are the persons/Firms, who are, in no way, connected with the acquisition of land for the construction of BRTF Road from Chaglagam to Rocham(6.500KM to 16.500KM) in Chaglagam Circle, in the District of Anjaw. 24. Out of the compensation amount meant for payment to the persons whose lands had been acquired for construction of the BRTF Road from Chaglagam to Rocham(6.500KM to 16.500KM) in Chaglagam Circle, in the District of Anjaw; no occasion could have arisen to make payment of Rs. 7 crores to Sri Cholingso Kora, who, in turn, had disbursed the amount not only to Sri Sode Potom, the then Additional Deputy Commissioner, Hayuliang, and Advocate Sabha Rabha, but even to Firms located at Delhi. There cannot be any link, or any nexus, whatsoever, between the Firms located at Delhi which apparently appears to be private Firms with the land acquisition proceeding, made in a remote district as Anjaw in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 25. The statements of the respondent/accused persons, namely, Cholingso Kora and Sode Potom; recorded by the I.O. of the case, on 01.06.2020, in connection with SIC(Vig) Case No. 10/2020, under Sections 409/468/120(B) of the IPC, read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988, indicates primafacie involvement of the respondent/accused persons i.e. Cholingso Kora and Sode Potom, in the offences alleged which was available on record at the time when the bail applications of the aforesaid accused persons were considered by the learned Special Judge, Tezu, Lohit District. Therefore, abundant materials indicating prima-facie involvement of the respondent/accused persons in connection with SIC(Vig) Case No. 10/2020, u/ss. 409/468/120(B) of the IPC, read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988, was readily available on record at the time of consideration of the bail applications filed by the respondent/accused persons, namely, Cholingso Kora, and Sode Potom, by the learned Special Judge, Tezu. The learned Special Judge, Tezu, while passing the bail order, dated 04.06.2020, granting bail to the respondent/accused persons viz. The learned Special Judge, Tezu, while passing the bail order, dated 04.06.2020, granting bail to the respondent/accused persons viz. Cholingso Kora and Sode Potom, have not only failed to take into account, the relevant materials indicating prima-facie involvement of the respondent/accused persons in the commission of the offences alleged but have also failed to take note of the fact that the respondent/accused persons were arrested on 30.05.2020 which was only 4 days prior to grant of bail to the respondent/accused persons, which, in a case of this nature, may be inadequate for the investigating agency to effectively investigate the case. 26. Having held that the learned Special Judge, Tezu, Lohit District, in passing the bail order, dated 04.06.2020, have failed to take into account, the relevant materials available on record indicating prima-facie involvement of the respondent/ accused persons Cholingso Kora as well as Sode Potom; the gravity of the offence alleged, may also be noticed by making a reference to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2019 9 SCC 24 , wherein, in Paragraphs No. 80 and 81, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed, as under: "80. Observing that economic offence is committed with deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless to the consequence to the community, in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and others, (1987) 2 SCC 364 , it was held as under:- "5. ......The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest." 81. Observing that economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with different approach in the matter of bail, in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439 , the Supreme Court held as under:- "34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country. 35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations." 27. For the reasons and discussions made hereinabove; I am of the considered view that the bail order, dated 04.06.2020, passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Eastern Division-cumSpecial Judge at Tezu, Lohit District, in B.A. No. 78(ANJ)/2020, arising out of SIC(Vig) Case No. 10/2020, under Sections 409/468/120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, requires to be interfered with, and the same is accordingly hereby interfered with. 28. Resultantly, the bail granted to the respondent/accused Cholingso Kora by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Eastern Division-cum-Special Judge at Tezu, Lohit District, arising out of SIC(Vig) Case No. 10/2020, under Sections 409/468/120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in B.A. No. 78(ANJ)/2020, stands cancelled. 29. The criminal misc. application stands allowed and disposed in terms above.