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2020 DIGILAW 82 (TRI)

Atikul Islam v. State of Tripura

2020-06-23

AKIL ABDUL HAMID KURESHI, ARINDAM LODH

body2020
JUDGMENT : Arindam Lodh, J. 1. In impugnment, is the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 26.09.2018 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sepahijala District, Sonamura in Case No. ST (T-I) 20 of 2016 whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC, for short) and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with default stipulation. 2. The prosecution case was set on motion with the registration of the FIR No. 079 dated 02.07.2016 at 20.24 hours on the basis of a complaint lodged by one Safi Ulla, inter alia, stating that about eight years back his sister Sumi Akter was given marriage with the appellant. After a considerable period, he started to torture Sumi Akter suspecting her to be involved in an extramarital relationship. There was a compromise meeting in the village where the appellant promised that he would not assault her in future. Thereafter, he went abroad. After four months, he came back and again started to assault her deceased sister on different pretexts. It was further stated in the complaint (Ejahar) that after receipt of the information that her sister was severely assaulted about 20 days back, her mother Manowara Begam went to Sumi Akter's in-laws' house and settled the issue with the appellant's uncle but on 02.07.2016 A.D, at about 3.30 a.m. the appellant had killed Sumi Akter by way of strangulation. 3. Being endorsed, the investigation was started. The Investigating Officer visited the place of occurrence and also recorded the statements of the available witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., seized various articles related to the crime, sent the body for postmortem examination and prepared the inquest report. Also sent some seized articles to the State Forensic Science Laboratory and collected report. After completion of the investigation the Investigating Officer prima facie satisfied with the evidence he gathered in course of investigation, submitted the charge sheet. 4. Being committed the learned Sessions Judge framed charge against the appellant under Sections 498-A and 302 of IPC. The prosecution had examined as many as 22 witnesses and introduced 14 documents. Some excerpts from the statement of Manowara Begam under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were also brought on record at Exbt. A/1. 5. 4. Being committed the learned Sessions Judge framed charge against the appellant under Sections 498-A and 302 of IPC. The prosecution had examined as many as 22 witnesses and introduced 14 documents. Some excerpts from the statement of Manowara Begam under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were also brought on record at Exbt. A/1. 5. After perusal of the evidence on record and having considered the rival submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the parties to the lis, the learned Sessions Judge held that the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellant that he alone had committed murder of his wife. Finally, the learned Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforestated. 6. We have heard learned counsel Mr. Raju Datta appearing for the appellant accused and Mr. Ratan Datta, learned Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent. Mr. Datta, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the prosecution witnesses have developed the story at every stage starting from investigation up till their depositions before the trial Court. Many statements are found to be made for the first time in the course of trial which they did not state at the time of investigation. He further contended that in the instant case, there was no eye-witness to the incident and the case was totally based on circumstantial evidence. The learned counsel further contended that the essential requirements of Section 498-A were absent in the present case. Therefore, there was no motive to kill the wife by the appellant. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Ratan Datta, learned Public Prosecutor argued that the appellant was always suspicious towards his deceased wife. He also used to demand money. The torture upon the deceased wife was fully established in course of trial as adduced by the prosecution witnesses. He strenuously argued that at the time of incident the appellant and the deceased wife were under the same roof and in that circumstance, the appellant could not come out with a satisfactory explanation as to how his wife was strangulated. The wife of the appellant was brought dead to the hospital. 8. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, we have perused the evidence laid down by the prosecution witnesses to establish the charges levelled against the appellant and also have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the appellant as well as the State-respondent. 9. The wife of the appellant was brought dead to the hospital. 8. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, we have perused the evidence laid down by the prosecution witnesses to establish the charges levelled against the appellant and also have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the appellant as well as the State-respondent. 9. P. W. 1, Safi Ullah, is the informant-brother of the deceased wife of the appellant. He deposed that her sister died on 02.07.2016. Her marriage was solemnized with the appellant about eight years prior to her death. A sum of Rs. 50,000/-, gold ornaments and other household articles were given to her. She led her peaceful conjugal life for about one and half years. Thereafter, the appellant started torturing upon her physically and mentally on the pretext that she had an illicit relationship with another person. His sister informed the matter to her mother when her mother took up that issue with her in-laws. Out of the amicable settlement his sister led a peaceful life for only about 7/10 days. Thereafter, again her deceased sister was subjected to torture by the appellant on the same issue when her mother brought her deceased sister to their own house. Thereafter, a salishi meeting was held in presence of the Pradhan of the village panchayat and in that meeting the appellant admitted that he committed torture to his wife and gave an assurance that he would not repeat the same in future. The informant was also present in that meeting. 9.1. Proceeding further, P.W. 1 deposed that after about one year the appellant demanded an amount of Rs. 50,000/- to go abroad in search of his livelihood. In that meanwhile, his sister gave birth to a male child. Having received an amount of Rs. 50,000/- the appellant went abroad and stayed there for about 4 years. He further deposed that the appellant returned back to his house for about 4 months prior to the date of death of his sister. After coming over here, the appellant again started torture upon her sister on the same issue of an illicit relationship with another man. This incident was reported to her mother. Again the mother was brought to the notice of the uncle of the appellant and the matter was again settled with an assurance that there would be no torture upon the deceased in future. This incident was reported to her mother. Again the mother was brought to the notice of the uncle of the appellant and the matter was again settled with an assurance that there would be no torture upon the deceased in future. The informant further deposed that due to such torture his sister also sustained injury on her ear and subsequently, she was treated at Sonamura hospital with the help of his mother and her aunt-in-law and the incident of torture causing the said injury had occurred for about 20 days prior to her death. 9.2. P.W. 1 went on to depose that on 02.07.2016 he had to admit his father to Melaghar hospital. On that night at about 03:00 a.m. the appellant told him over the phone that his sister became senseless after hearing the news of the illness of his father. P.W. 1 advised him to bring her to the hospital. Thereafter, he talked with his mother over phone asking her who informed his sister about the illness of his father. When her mother replied that she talked with her aunt-in-law, Jyotsna Aktar at about 1:30 a.m. and requested her to give the mobile to the deceased but she gave the mobile phone to the appellant. At that time, P.W. 1 informed his mother that his sister became senseless and he advised the appellant to bring her to Sonamura hospital and also requested his mother to go to Sonamura hospital. 9.3. Deposing further P.W. 1 stated that his mother and Motaleb Hossain went to Sonamura hospital and informed him over phone to come to Sonamura hospital as his sister was brought to the Sonamura hospital. After hearing such news he himself went to Sonamura hospital and after reaching there, found the dead body of his sister in the emergency block. P.W. 1 further deposed that he himself found some mark of injury on the face of the appellant. He presumed that his sister was killed by the appellant and as such he lodged the written complaint against the appellant narrating the entire incident which was scribed by one Rajesh Miah according to his dictation. He identified the signature on the said written complaint (Ejahar) Exbt. 1/1. From his deposition it is revealed that the police personnel also prepared a surathal report of the dead body in his presence. He identified his signature in the said inquest report(surathal report) Exbt. He identified the signature on the said written complaint (Ejahar) Exbt. 1/1. From his deposition it is revealed that the police personnel also prepared a surathal report of the dead body in his presence. He identified his signature in the said inquest report(surathal report) Exbt. 2/1. After a post-mortem examination the dead body of his sister was handed over to him by the police. Being confronted with the cross-examination he did not specifically mention before the Investigating Officer that the amount of Rs. 50,000/- was paid to the appellant at the time of marriage. In his cross-examination, he stated that he did not state to darogababu about convening of any salishi meeting and that he talked with his mother over phone informing the illness of his sister. In the similar way many statements which he made in his chief examination he admitted that those statements were not made before the Investigating Officer. However, he denied the suggestion made by the defence that he himself found. some mark of injury on the face of the appellant. He also denied the suggestion that he did not talk with his cousin brother Motaleb Hossain over phone and requested him to go to Sonamura hospital and accordingly his mother and Motaleb Hossain went to Sonamura hospital. 10. P.W. 2, Mst. Manowara Khatun is the mother of the deceased. Her deposition is the repetition of the statement made by P.W. 1 in his examination-in-chief. She admitted that she did not make many statements before the Investigating Officer which she made in her chief examination. 11. P.W. 3, Delowar Hossain, was the witness to the seizure memo wherein the police seized samples of liver, kidney, spleen of the deceased. 12. P.W. 4, Keshab Saha was the professional photographer who photographed the dead body of the deceased. 13. P.W. 5, Abu Taher who held various posts of the village panchayat deposed that due to dispute between the appellant and his deceased wife salichi meeting was held. The parents of the deceased as well as the appellant and other family members were also present in that meeting. He further deposed that they settled their disputes amicably. Thereafter, the appellant left for abroad where he stayed for a few years. After a few months of his return to the house, the deceased died in the house of the appellant. He further deposed that they settled their disputes amicably. Thereafter, the appellant left for abroad where he stayed for a few years. After a few months of his return to the house, the deceased died in the house of the appellant. In his cross-examination on behalf of the accused he stated that the appellant was his distant relative. In his cross-examination he further stated that a salichi meeting was held at the instance of the appellant. He further stated that after his return, both the appellant and the deceased led a peaceful life. 14. P.W. 6, Saha Alam Maishan, being a member of the village panchayat deposed that due to marital dispute between the appellant and his deceased wife a village meeting was held in the house of the grandfather of the deceased wherein pradhan and other important members of the panchayat were at present. In that meeting the family members of both sides were also present. The main dispute arose between them was that the appellant used to suspect the deceased that she had an illicit relationship with another man. He further deposed that during that meeting such a fact was not proved. Thereafter, the dispute was settled and the deceased was sent to her in-laws' house. He came to learn that the sister of the informant died about 11 months back. In his cross-examination he stated that "At this stage I cannot tell the exact date and time of salichi meeting. I also cannot tell the exact date of their marriage" 15. P.W. 7, Rajesh Miah deposed that he wrote the Ejahar as per the version of P.W. 1. 16. P.W. 8, Mohamad Rafik is not a material witness. 17. P.W. 9, Anowara Begam deposed that the appellant was his next door neighbour and nephew by relation. In her deposition she stated that about one year back at about 3:30/3:45 am the appellant called her and also informed her that his wife became unconscious. Accordingly, she went to their house and after touching the body of the wife of the appellant she found that the wife of the appellant was unconscious. Thereafter, she called one Jyotsna Begam who came there and subsequently she herself, Jyotsna Begam and the appellant shifted the deceased to Sonamura hospital by the vehicle of Alamgir Hossain. She further deposed that at Sonamura hospital Sumi Aktar, the wife of the appellant, was declared dead. Thereafter, she called one Jyotsna Begam who came there and subsequently she herself, Jyotsna Begam and the appellant shifted the deceased to Sonamura hospital by the vehicle of Alamgir Hossain. She further deposed that at Sonamura hospital Sumi Aktar, the wife of the appellant, was declared dead. She further deposed that on that night the appellant, his wife Sumi Akter and their three years old son were sleeping in that hut. In her cross-examination she stated that the deceased used to talk with her always prior to her death but she never complained to her that the appellant ever tortured her on any issue either physically or mentally. In her further cross-examination she stated that the deceased had an ailment due to which she frequently used to become unconscious and she was under the treatment of Ayurvedic medicine: 18. P.W. 10, Jyotsna Aktar was also the next door neighbour and she deposed that on that night at about 3:30/04:00 a.m. the appellant called her and informed her that Sumi Akter became unconscious. Accordingly, she rushed to their house and found Sumi Akter was unconscious. At that time her sister-in-law Anowara Begam (P.W. 9) was also present. They shifted Sumi Akter to Sonamura hospital by the vehicle of Alamgir Hossain. She further deposed that the mother of the deceased Manowara Khatun (P.W. 2) did not contact her over mobile phone, a prayer was made by the prosecution to declare her hostile. The prayer was allowed. Her attention was drawn to her earlier statement recorded by the Investigating Officer to the effect that "on 02.07.2017 at about 2:30 a.m. the mother of Sumana Akter, namely Manowara Khatun called me on mobile phone and told me that to hand over the mobile phone to her daughter who only to inquire about whether Sumana woke up for the purpose of eating rice during the time of 'Roja'. At that time myself gave my mobile phone to my son Kowsher Ahamed and also told him to hand over the same to Sumana while my son reached in front of the hut of Atikul and called Sumana at that time Atikul Islam came out of his hut and talked with his mother-in-law over mobile phone and he also told his mother-in-law that Sumana was sleeping and as such he could give the mobile phone to her. Thereafter, my son returned back to my house along with my mobile phone." In her cross-examination she stated that she never witnessed any quarrel between the appellant and the deceased. 19. P.W. 11, Md. Alamgir Hossain was the driver of the vehicle. He deposed that through his vehicle the body of Sumi Akter was taken to Sonamura hospital. 20. P.W. 12, Abdul Mamin was a witness to the disclosure statement. He deposed that he was requested by the Investigating Officer to remain present while he was recording the statement of the appellant. He deposed that at the time another person was also present there. He deposed that in front of him the appellant voluntarily confessed that he killed his wife by pressing her mouth by a pillow and at that time his wife had passed urine to her apparels. The appellant also confessed that he killed his wife due to suspicion that his wife had an illicit relationship with someone else. In his cross-examination nothing was averred in this respect. 21. P.W. 13, Habil Miah also was the witness of the confessional statement made by the appellant in the custody of police. 22. P.W. 14, Sri Sailesh Majumder being an ex-pradhan of the panchayat deposed that he was present in the salichi meeting to resolve the dispute between the appellant and his deceased wife. The issue was out of suspicion of an illicit relationship the appellant used to torture his deceased wife. 23. P.W. 15, Mst. Jahanara Begam, being a neighbour of the appellant deposed that prior to her death Sumana Akter told her that her husband after returning from abroad suspected her that she had an illicit relation with someone else as a result of which quarrel took place in between them and the appellant also assaulted his wife physically. On the date of the incident in the morning she came to learn that Sumana died in the house of the appellant. 24. P.W. 16, Dr. Gopal Krishna Debnath conducted the post-mortem examination. He opined that the deceased Sumana Akter died about 6 to 12 hours before the PM examination and she died due to asphyxia and the death was homicidal in nature, post-mortem report was exhibited as Exbt. 7 as a whole. 25. P.W. 17, Dr. Ashim Roy assisted P.W. 16 to conduct the post-mortem examination upon the dead body of the victim. 26. P.W. 18, Md. 7 as a whole. 25. P.W. 17, Dr. Ashim Roy assisted P.W. 16 to conduct the post-mortem examination upon the dead body of the victim. 26. P.W. 18, Md. Dulal Miah deposed that about 5/6 years prior to such an incident a meeting was held to resolve the dispute between the appellant and the deceased. The appellant alleged that his wife had an illicit relation with another man. However, the matter was amicably settled. 27. P.W. 19, Md. Abdul Mannan being a neighbour of the appellant was witnessed to the seizure memo by which three numbers of pillows were seized by the police. The same were exhibited as Exbt. M.O.2. 28. P.W. 20, Sri Suman Kumar Chakraborty was the scientific expert at the relevant point of time. He did not detect any poison. 29. P.W. 21, Kowchar Ahammed was declared hostile by the prosecution. 30. P.W. 22, Sri Srikanta Chakraborty made G.D. entry of the death of the deceased. In his cross-examination he stated that during investigation he himself visited the place of occurrence on several occasions. He stated in his cross-examination that the place of occurrence was a densely populated area and Md. Raffiand Siraj Miah was the next door neighbour of the appellant. He also stated that he did not record their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He further deposed that the appellant had confessed his guilt that he committed the murder of his wife by way of pressing her mouth by a pillow. 31. On cumulative reading and appreciation of the depositions of the witnesses as reproduced hereinabove, first circumstance that has been raised by P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 the brother and mother of the deceased that the appellant used to suspect his deceased wife on the pretext that she had an illicit relationship with another man, is proved substantially when this plea of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 has been corroborated by other independent witnesses such as the pradhan, ex-pradhan and members etc. Secondly, the circumstance that on this issue there was a salichi meeting where the panchayat members were present including the pradhan, all these witnesses have deposed that the appellant used to suspect his deceased wife and they also corroborated the statements of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 that in that meeting the appellant admitted the factum of torture upon his wife on the issue of an illicit relationship with another man but he assured the members that it would not happen in future. The third circumstance is that P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 have categorically stated that they were informed that the appellant did not stop the torture upon her. The fourth which is the most crucial circumstance is that from the evidence of closed door neighbours particularly, Anowara Begam (P.W. 9) and Jyotsna Aktar (P.W. 10) and also the relatives of the appellant are very specific to their statements that at 3:30/4.00 a.m. the appellant called them that his wife was found to be unconscious and on his request they rushed to his hut and found the deceased unconscious and Anowara Begam, Jyotsna Aktar and the appellant together with the help of Md. Alamgir Hossain (P.W. 11) the driver of the vehicle the deceased was taken to Sonamura hospital where she was declared dead by doctors. 32. So, the fact that the appellant and his wife were under one hut has been proved and the prosecution has been able to establish this circumstance beyond reasonable doubt. At this stage, in our considered view, the burden shifted upon the appellant to give an explanation which would be satisfactory to the Court as to how his wife got unconscious and died. 33. The appellant has not adduced any evidence in his defence. This leads us to take notice of his examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. We find that he only said that he has been falsely implicated. Thus the appellant had taken a position of total denial. Of the questions put to the appellant, we may notice the following question and the answer given by the appellant: Q No. 101. PW-16 further deposed that after completion of post-mortem examination of deceased Sumana Aktar they opined that deceased died about 6 to 12 hours before the PM examination. The deceased died due to asphyxia and the death was homicidal in nature. The instant post-mortem report was prepared by Dr. PW-16 further deposed that after completion of post-mortem examination of deceased Sumana Aktar they opined that deceased died about 6 to 12 hours before the PM examination. The deceased died due to asphyxia and the death was homicidal in nature. The instant post-mortem report was prepared by Dr. Ashim Roy, he know the hand writing of Dr. Ashim Roy and the post-mortem report of deceased Sumana Aktar prepared by Dr. Ashim Roy wherein he and Dr. Sanjoy Kr. Saha also put their signatures. What do you say about this? Ans: I have nothing to say. 34. The following questions and answers as are revealed in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., according to us, are relevant to the context of the case which read as under: "Q No. 62. PW-9 Anowara Begam in her deposition stated that about one year back from today one day at about 03:30/03:45 a.m. Atikul called him and also informed him that your wife Sumana Aktar became unconscious. What do you say about this? Ans: Yes Q No. 63. PW-9 also stated that he went to your house and after touching her body he also found that she was unconscious and thereafter, on call one Jyotsna Begam also came there. What do you say about this? Ans: Yes Q No. 64. PW-9 further deposed that subsequently he, Jyotsna Begam and you Atikul Islam shifted Sumana Aktar to Sonamura Hospital by the vehicle of Alamgir Hossain. What do you say about this? Ans: Yes Q No. 65. PW-9 also stated that at Sonamura Hospital the attending Doctor declared her dead and on that night you Atikul, your wife Sumana Aktar and their 3 years old son were sleeping in that hut. What do you say about this? Ans: Yes Q No. 66. PW-10 Jyotsna Aktar in her deposition stated that about one year one month back during the time of 'Roja' and one night at about 03:30/04:00 a.m. Atikul Islam called her and also informed her that Sumana Aktar became unconscious. What do you say about this? Ans: Yes Q No. 67. PW-10 further stated that accordingly she rushed to your house and found that Sumana was lying unconscious and at that time her sister-in-law Anowara Begam was also present there. What do you say about this? Ans: Yes. 35. What do you say about this? Ans: Yes Q No. 67. PW-10 further stated that accordingly she rushed to your house and found that Sumana was lying unconscious and at that time her sister-in-law Anowara Begam was also present there. What do you say about this? Ans: Yes. 35. We have given our conscious consideration whether the accused-appellant was given opportunity to explain the circumstances under which his wife was found dead in the same hut where they resided and on that night of the incident, were stated to be together. The defence in the cross-examination of the wit-, nesses has put no suggestion that on the night of the incident the appellant was not at his house. Question No. 101, as reproduced hereinabove, is a direct question notifying the appellant that his wife died due to asphyxia and the death was homicidal in nature. According to us, it was, at that stage the appellant could have explained the circumstances under which his wife died. He offered no explanation. 36. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in case of Vikramjit Singh alias Vicky v. State of Punjab, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 306 : (2007 Cri LJ 1000 (SC)) and has tried to persuade this Court that the appellant was not given opportunity to explain under what circumstances his wife was found dead in the hut. As we have said earlier that question No. 101 wherein the appellant was noticed of the fact that the doctor opined that the deceased died due to asphyxia and the death was homicidal in nature. He simply replied that he had nothing to say. In the present case the prosecution had discharged its burden and had, through cogent evidence, brought relevant circumstances on record. It was proved that the appellant was in the same night when his wife died a homicidal death due to asphyxia. All these circumstances unerringly point to the involvement of the accused. If he had a plausible explanation, he ought to have offered the same. Instead, he chose the line of total denial. It is in this context we must appreciate the law discussed by the Supreme Court in Vikramjit Singh (supra) the Supreme Court where referring to 106 of the Evidence Act it was observed as under: "In the instant case, there are two versions. Instead, he chose the line of total denial. It is in this context we must appreciate the law discussed by the Supreme Court in Vikramjit Singh (supra) the Supreme Court where referring to 106 of the Evidence Act it was observed as under: "In the instant case, there are two versions. The learned Sessions Judge proceeded to weigh the probability of both of them and opined that the appellant having riot been able to prove its case, the prosecution case should be accepted. In our opinion, the approach of the learned Sessions Judge was not correct. The High Court also appeared to have fallen into the same error. It invoked Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act although opining: "The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference." Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Only when the prosecution case has been proved the burden in regard to such facts which was within the special knowledge of the accused may be shifted to the accused for explaining the same. Of course, there are certain exceptions to the said rule, e.g., where burden of proof may be imposed upon the accused by reason of a statute." 37. After careful reading of the aforesaid principle as delineated by the Supreme Court if we give our bird's eye view to the evidence led on by the prosecution witnesses, according to us, the prosecution has succeeded in proving the facts and circumstances beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant and his deceased wife were inside the same hut under one roof when the deceased wife was found unconscious, and when she was taken to hospital she was declared dead. Furthermore, in that circumstance the doctor opined that the death of the deceased was caused due to asphyxia and it was homicidal in nature. Furthermore, in that circumstance the doctor opined that the death of the deceased was caused due to asphyxia and it was homicidal in nature. In these circumstances, in our considered view, the prosecution has been able to discharge their burden which would lead us to draw a reasonable inference that it was none but the appellant who killed his wife for the reason that the appellant despite being afforded opportunity to explain the circumstances failed to offer any plausible explanation in his examination under Section 313of Cr.P.C. which may drive the Court to draw a different inference. There was none else but only the appellant who called PW-9, Anowara Begam and PW-10 Jyotsna Aktar having found his wife unconscious on that fateful time and date, which fact and circumstance, the appellant has also admitted in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. We are, therefore, of the view that prosecution has successfully established the theory of last seen together beyond any reasonable doubt against the accused. 38. In the aforesaid established circumstances, in our opinion, the failure of the appellant to explain these adverse circumstances is an additional factor which convinced us of his involvement. The appellant has nowhere stated or we have not noticed any suggestion to the effect that the appellant has taken the plea in course of trial that there had been an intruder or trespasser in their hut where they slept at that night. 39. In Kalu alias Laxminarayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 211 : (AIR Online 2019 SC 1453) the Supreme Court while dealing with similar situation made reference to various of its earlier decisions commencing from Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in : AIR 1952 SC 343 :' 1952 Cri LJ 129 (AIR pp. 345-46, para 10) observed thus: "13. In the circumstances, the onus clearly shifted on the appellant to explain the circumstances and the manner in which the deceased met a homicidal death in the matrimonial home as it was a fact specifically and exclusive to his knowledge. It is not the case of the appellant that there had been an intruder in the house at night. In Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343 , it was observed "10. It is not the case of the appellant that there had been an intruder in the house at night. In Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343 , it was observed "10. .....It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused...." 14. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 10 SCC 373 , this Court observed: "23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it clear that this section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar, reported in (2000) SCC 382 (SCC p. 393, para 38). "38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: (AIR) p. 406, parall. "11. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word "especially" stresses that. It means facts that are pre- eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge." 15. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 , this Court was considering a similar case of homicidal death in the confines of the house. The following observations are considered relevant in the facts of the present case: (SCC pp 690-and 694 paras 14, 15 and 22). "14. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 , this Court was considering a similar case of homicidal death in the confines of the house. The following observations are considered relevant in the facts of the present case: (SCC pp 690-and 694 paras 14, 15 and 22). "14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions - quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh). The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: "(b) Ais charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him." 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. Xxxxxxxx 22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime." 16. In view of our conclusion that the prosecution has clearly established a prima facie case, the precedents cited on behalf of the appellant are not considered relevant in the facts of the present case. Once the prosecution established a prima facie case, the appellant was obliged to furnish some explanation under Section 313, Cr.P.C. with regard to the circumstances under which the deceased met an unnatural death inside the house. His failure to offer any explanation whatsoever therefore leaves no doubt for the conclusion of his being the assailant of the deceased." 40. We already have observed in this judgment that the prosecution has been able to establish that the appellant and his wife were inside the same hut on that fateful night and in that circumstance, the appellant has failed to discharge his obligation to furnish even some explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with regard to the circumstances under which his wife met an unnatural/homicidal death inside the same hut where they slept together. His failure to offer any explanation whatsoever, therefore, leaves no doubt to fortify our conclusion of his being the assailant of his deceased wife. His failure to offer any explanation whatsoever, therefore, leaves no doubt to fortify our conclusion of his being the assailant of his deceased wife. As argued by the learned counsel for the appellant with vehemence about the suspicious circumstances, we find no substance in the submission for the reason that there is no room left for us to suspect the circumstance that the appellant and his deceased wife were exclusively at the same hut has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. As such, we do not want to burden this judgment with the authoritative pronouncements by the Supreme Court as relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant that suspicious howsoever grave cannot take the place of proof. Having viewed thus, we find no merit in the instant appeal filed by the accused- appellant. 41. Accordingly, the judgment and order of conviction and sentence imposed upon the accused-appellant by the learned Sessions Judge, Sepahijala District, Sonamura do not call for any interference. The instant appeal filed by the accused-appellant is dismissed. The judgment of conviction and sentence as returned by the learned Sessions Judge, Sepahijala District, Sonamura dated 26.09.2018 is hereby upheld and affirmed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.