JUDGMENT : The appellant who was the sole accused in S.C.No.150/2013 before the II Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Tumkur, (for short ‘the trial court’) was the husband of one Suma daughter of Mylaraiah who died on 13.06.2013. Before the trial court, the appellant was charged with offences punishable Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (for short the ‘D.P.Act’) as well as under Section 302 IPC and in the alternative under Section 304-B IPC towards the death of his wife Suma. 2. By the impugned judgment, the trial court convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act. 3. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced the appellant to undergo R.I. for a period of two years and to pay fine of Rs.20,000/-and upon default, to undergo R.I. for a further period of two months for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of I.P.C. So also, the trial court sentenced the appellant to undergo R.I. for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-and upon default, to undergo R.I. for a further period of two months for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the D.P. Act. Further, trial Court also sentenced appellant to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay fine of Rs. 1 Lakh and upon default, to undergo R.I. for a period of two years for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 4. Before the trial court, the case of the prosecution was that the appellant and the deceased Suma were related to each other and wanted to get married. When they approached the parents of the appellant, his father demanded a sum of Rs.8 lakhs which was not paid by her family. Subsequently, appellant and Suma having got married against the wishes of their respective parents, the appellant’s parents did not allow them to stay in their house, on account of which, appellant and the deceased started residing in the house of Suma’s father, Mylaraiah. 5. The appellant was a tempo driver and after sometime, the appellant and the deceased constructed a shed in his land and started residing there. 5. The appellant was a tempo driver and after sometime, the appellant and the deceased constructed a shed in his land and started residing there. It was alleged that even thereafter, the appellant repeatedly pressurized the deceased to bring money from her father and upon requests made by her, her father told her that he would arrange the funds next year after selling mango fruits. Since the deceased did not comply with the repeated demands of dowry made by the appellant, he started ill-treating her and subjected her to physical and mental cruelty. The prosecution also alleged that about four days prior to her death, the deceased approached her father and asked him for money stating that the appellant was demanding dowry from her, but was sent back stating that he had no money and that he would pay later after selling mango fruits. 6. It was also alleged that at about 3 p.m. on 14.06.2013, the father of the deceased lodged a report to the police, inter-alia stating that at about 8 a.m., on the same day, he was informed by someone that a crowd had gathered near his daughter’s house. Immediately, he rushed to the house where he saw his daughter’s dead body which had a ligature mark on the neck. Pursuant to the said complaint, the jurisdictional police authorities registered a case in Crime No.88/2013 for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304 and 302 IPC r/w Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. After investigation, filing of charge sheet, and committal of the case, the Sessions Court registered the same in the aforesaid S.C.No.153/2013. The appellant who was arrested on 15.06.2013, i.e., one day after the complaint was lodged, has been in judicial custody since then. 7. The trial court framed charges against the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 498-(A) I.P.C. r/w Section 4 of the D.P.Act. So also, charges for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and in the alternative, Section 304-B IPC were framed by the Sessions Court. 8. The appellant having pleaded ‘not guilty’, trial was conducted by the trial court during which the prosecution examined 15 witnesses as PWs 1 to 15 and documentary evidence at Exs.P-1 to P-11 were marked on behalf of the prosecution. Only one material object i.e., the plastic rope was marked as MO-1 on behalf of the prosecution. 8. The appellant having pleaded ‘not guilty’, trial was conducted by the trial court during which the prosecution examined 15 witnesses as PWs 1 to 15 and documentary evidence at Exs.P-1 to P-11 were marked on behalf of the prosecution. Only one material object i.e., the plastic rope was marked as MO-1 on behalf of the prosecution. The statement of the appellant having been recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C, the appellant did not adduce any oral or documentary evidence on his behalf. 9. As stated supra, by the impugned judgment, the trial court convicted and sentenced the appellant who is before this Court by way of the present appeal. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned HCGP for the respondent-State. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the trial court committed an error in convicting the appellant for offences under Sections 498-A and 302 of IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act. In this context, learned counsel submits that except the interested testimonies of the complainant PW-1, father of the deceased and her relatives who were examined as PWs 2, 3, 4 and 8, the prosecution had failed to adduce evidence of any independent witnesses to establish that the appellant had committed the aforesaid offences. It was also contended that the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses viz., PWs 1 to 4 and PW-8 contained several admissions, discrepancies, contradictions and inconsistencies which clearly establish that prosecution had failed to establish guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 12. The learned counsel also submitted that in the light of the undisputed fact that there was no direct evidence to establish the guilt of the appellant, the entire case of the prosecution rested on circumstantial evidence which was not sufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant. It was contended that having regard to the fact that the two important independent witnesses PW-5 and PW-10 had turned hostile, coupled with the admissions in the evidence of the Doctor (PW-6) who conducted the post mortem, the circumstantial evidence obtained in the instant case did not conclusively point towards the guilt of the appellant and as such, the prosecution had failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 13. 13. It was also contended that the trial court committed an error in placing reliance upon Ex.P11, the alleged voluntary statement of the appellant without appreciating that the same was inadmissible in law and could not have been used against the appellant even for the purpose of recovery of the plastic/nylon rope at his instance particularly when PW-10, the panch witness to the recovery mahazar Ex.P6 had turned hostile and his evidence did not support the case of the prosecution. It was further contended that many of the charge sheet witnesses had not been examined by the prosecution during trial which necessitated drawing of adverse inference against the prosecution in this regard. Under these circumstances, it was contended that the trial court committed an error in passing the impugned judgment of conviction which deserves to be set aside by this Court in the present appeal. 14. Per contra, learned HCGP would support the impugned judgment passed by the trial court and sought for dismissal of the appeal. 15. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the entire material on record including the impugned judgment passed by trial court. 16. At the outset, it is relevant to state that the material on record indicates that the entire case of the prosecution revolves around circumstantial evidence and that there is no direct evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of its allegations. In this context, there is no gain saying that the law relating to circumstantial evidence is well settled that while deciding matters resting on circumstantial evidence, the Court should always tread cautiously so as to not to allow conjectures or suspicion, however strong, to take the place of proof. In this context, there is no gain saying that the law relating to circumstantial evidence is well settled that while deciding matters resting on circumstantial evidence, the Court should always tread cautiously so as to not to allow conjectures or suspicion, however strong, to take the place of proof. The five golden principles which constitute the ‘panch sheel’ of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been reiterated by the Apex Court in several judgments including its recent decisions in the case of Pattu Rajan vs. State of T.N. - 2019 (4) SCC 771 and in the case of Gargi vs. State of Haryana - 2019 (9) SCC 738 , wherein it is held as under: “(a) The circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established; (b) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (c) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (d) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; (e) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused”. 17. We have considered as well as re-evaluated and re-appreciated the evidence on record in its entirety keeping in mind the aforementioned principles. However, as we do not wish to burden this judgment by reiterating the depositions of all the witnesses on record in their entirety, we deem it fit to discuss only the important aspects highlighted by the prosecution witnesses in their testimonies and the documentary evidence on record. With this background, we will now deal with the offences alleged against the appellant in the instant case. Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of D.P.Act 18. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the appellant and the deceased having got married in the year 2011, the appellant repeatedly harassed and demanded dowry from the deceased right from the beginning. Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of D.P.Act 18. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the appellant and the deceased having got married in the year 2011, the appellant repeatedly harassed and demanded dowry from the deceased right from the beginning. It is alleged that the appellant subjected the deceased to cruelty with an intention to cause grave injury and danger to her life, limb and health by repeated unlawful demands for dowry by harassing her and coercing her to bring money from her father. It is therefore alleged that the appellant was guilty of offences punishable under Section 498-A and Section 4 of the D.P. Act. 19. In order to establish its allegations, the prosecution placed reliance on the evidence of PW-1 to PW-4 as well as PW-8. Before we deal with the said evidence, it is essential to state in view of the fact that the appellant was prosecuted for offences under Section 3 and 4 of the D.P.Act, the burden of proving that he did not commit the said offences rested on the appellant in view of the presumptive provision contained in Section 8-A of the D.P.Act. With this background, we now proceed to discuss the evidence adduced by the prosecution in this regard. 20. PW-1, the complainant is the father of the deceased and the complaint lodged by him is marked as Ex. P1. In his complaint, he has stated that the appellant was a driver and was repeatedly harassing the deceased for dowry right from the time of her marriage. It is alleged that the deceased used to inform PW-1 about the dowry demands as well as the appellant subjecting her to cruelty in this regard. In the complaint, PW-1 has also stated that despite repeated assurances given by the deceased to the appellant that PW-1 would sell mangoes and meet the dowry demand of the accused, the said harassment, cruelty and illegal demand by the appellant did not cease. It is also alleged that about one week prior to 13/14.06.2013 when the incident took place, the deceased met PW-1 and informed him about the said demand. 21. The aforesaid facts stated in Ex.P-1 have been reiterated by PW-1 in his evidence, especially the demand for dowry made by the appellant as well as the cruelty meted out by him to the deceased. 21. The aforesaid facts stated in Ex.P-1 have been reiterated by PW-1 in his evidence, especially the demand for dowry made by the appellant as well as the cruelty meted out by him to the deceased. PW-1 has also deposed that the appellant continuously harassed the deceased and coerced her to meet his unlawful demand for dowry even four days prior to her death. A perusal of the evidence of PW-1 including the cross-examination by the counsel for the appellant will indicate that nothing has been elicited in the same so as to impeach or discredit the testimony of PW-1. The various suggestions given to PW-1 in his cross-examination have been emphatically denied by him and even the admission made in the cross-examination that the appellant and the deceased were cordial for a period of two years after marriage is not sufficient to lead to an inference that the evidence of PW-1 was liable to be disbelieved or that he was deposing falsely before the court. 22. In order to corroborate the evidence of PW-1, the prosecution has examined Smt.Girijamma – PW-2 who is a common relative of the appellant and the deceased. In addition to speaking about the dowry demand and cruelty by the appellant, PW-2 has also stated that on one occasion, the deceased took refuge in the house of PW-2 on account of being subjected to cruelty and dowry demand by the appellant. It is relevant to state that nothing is elicited in the cross-examination of PW-2 which discredits or impeaches her testimony. 23. The prosecution has also examined PW-3 who is the paternal uncle of the deceased as well as PW-4 who is her maternal uncle. Both these witnesses have categorically stated that the accused was not only harassing the deceased with demands for dowry but also subjected her to cruelty and upon the deceased expressing the same to them, they pacified her and asked her to go back to the appellant. In this context also, except giving suggestions to PW-3 and PW-4 which have been clearly denied by them, the appellant has not elicited anything in their cross-examination so as to impeach or discredit their testimonies. 24. In this context also, except giving suggestions to PW-3 and PW-4 which have been clearly denied by them, the appellant has not elicited anything in their cross-examination so as to impeach or discredit their testimonies. 24. PW-8 is none other than the brother of the deceased who has also corroborated the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 with regard to all material aspects including the harassment and dowry demand made by the appellant as well as the fact that he had continuously subjected her to cruelty. Insofar as the evidence of PW-8 is also concerned, nothing is elicited in his testimony by the defence so as to falsify the same or persuade this Court to disbelieve his evidence. 25. As stated supra, despite the provisions contained in Section 8-A of the D.P. Act which casts the burden of proof on the appellant, he did not even by means of preponderance of probabilities disprove the case of the prosecution during the course of cross examination of prosecution, nor did he choose to adduce any evidence whatsoever to discharge the said burden. So also, the appellant failed to impeach the evidence adduced by the prosecution with regard to the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. 26. A perusal of the material on record, especially the cumulative effect of the testimonies of PWs 1 to 4 and PW-8 clearly establishes that the appellant is not only guilty of harassment and dowry demand so as to attract Section 498-A(b) IPC r/w Section 4 of D.P.Act, but that he is also guilty of subjecting the deceased to cruelty which clearly attracts Section 498-A(a) IPC. In this context, it is relevant to advert to the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the aforesaid witnesses are interested witnesses since they were related to the deceased and that consequently, their evidence cannot be relied upon by the prosecution. It is necessary to state that the mere fact that PWs-1 to 4 and PW-8 are related to the deceased, in the absence of anything else coupled with the fact that the defence has failed to impeach their evidence, their relationship with the deceased cannot by itself be made the basis to come to the conclusion that the appellant was not guilty of the said offences. Further, it is extremely significant to note that the said witnesses were not only related to the deceased but they were also undisputedly related to the appellant also since both the appellant and the deceased were cousins and as such, they can not be characterized or described as interested witnessed. Moreover, the misconduct of the accused could only be known to the said witnesses who were relatives, as it is an internal affair that takes place normally secretly inside the house, which would be known to the husband and wife and to the close kith and kin and the Court cannot expect any third party evidence in this regard and consequently, the said contention urged on behalf of the appellant is liable to be rejected. 27. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the trial court was fully justified in coming to the correct conclusion that the prosecution has successfully established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of offences punishable under Section 498-A IPC r/w Section 4 of the D.P. Act. Upon re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the entire material on record, we do not find any illegality or perversity in the said finding which warrants interference by this Court. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of D.P. Act is hereby affirmed. Section 302 IPC 28. As stated supra, the entire case of the prosecution in relation to all alleged offences including the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC is based on circumstantial evidence. It is not in dispute that there is no eyewitness insofar as the commission of the alleged offence under Section 302 I.P.C. It is the specific case of the prosecution that during the night of 13.06.2013, there was a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased on account of the dowry demand and cruelty by the appellant leading to the appellant strangulating the deceased with a MO-1, the plastic rope in their house. 29. The prosecution examined one Smt. Sooramma as PW-5 alleging that she was the neighbor of the appellant and the deceased and that her evidence is relevant for the purpose of establishing the aforesaid offence. 29. The prosecution examined one Smt. Sooramma as PW-5 alleging that she was the neighbor of the appellant and the deceased and that her evidence is relevant for the purpose of establishing the aforesaid offence. However, unfortunately for the prosecution, PW-5 turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution and as such, no reliance can be placed on her evidence to prove the offence under Section 302 IPC, particularly when the prosecution has not been able to elicit anything in her cross-examination to accept her testimony in support of prosecution in any manner. In her cross-examination by the prosecution, an attempt was made to confront her alleged statement recorded by PW-14, one of the investigating officers under Section 162 Cr.P.C and the same was marked as Ex. P-2. However, PW-5 has completely disowned not only Ex. P-2 but also the fact that the police had recorded her statement. Under these circumstances, the evidence of PW-5 clearly did not support the case of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant. 30. The Doctor who conducted the post mortem was examined as PW-6 and his report and opinion are marked as Exs.P-3 & P-4 respectively. In his report and opinion, PW-6 has stated that the death of the victim was due to asphyxia as result of hanging and that plastic rope(ligature) which was marked as MO-1 had been used. The P.M report also indicates that except a ligature mark, the hyoid bone and the thyroid cartilages were intact and had not been fractured or broken. In his evidence, PW-6 also states that the death was due to hanging by asphyxia. In his cross-examination, PW-6 admits that the ligature marks noticed in Ex.P-3 could have occurred if the deceased had committed hanging by herself by using MO-1. The aforesaid evidence of PW-6 is also not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the appellant has strangulated the deceased by using MO-1 and was guilty of offences punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. particularly when death by strangulation is different from death by hanging. As such, no reliance can be placed upon the evidence of PW-6 by the prosecution in support of its allegation that the appellant was guilty of offences under Section 302 IPC. 31. PW-7 examined by the prosecution turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution. As such, no reliance can be placed upon the evidence of PW-6 by the prosecution in support of its allegation that the appellant was guilty of offences under Section 302 IPC. 31. PW-7 examined by the prosecution turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution. Though his alleged statement recorded under Section 162 Cr.P.C. was marked as Ex. P-5, PW-7 has clearly denied the same and Ex. P-5 has not been proved by the evidence of any of the 3 investigating officers, PW-12, PW-14 and PW-15. Under these circumstances, no reliance can be placed upon the evidence of PW-7 to come to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty. So also, the evidence of PW-11 who prepared the spot sketch at Ex.P-9, the evidence of PW-9, one of the witnesses to the inquest mahazar, Ex.P-6 and the evidence of PW-13 who registered the FIR at Ex.P-10 after receipt of Ex.P-1 is also not sufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant. 32. It is also relevant to state that investigation in the instant case was conducted by three persons viz., PW-15 on 14-6-2013 including the seizure mahazar at Ex. P-7, PW-14 from 15-6-2013 to 14-7-2013 and PW-12 from 15-7-2013 onwards till he filed the charge sheet at Ex.P-9. A perusal of the evidence of all these 3 witnesses will also clearly indicate that the same does not measure up to the standard of proof required to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt for the offences punishable under Section 302 IPC. 33. The prosecution has also placed reliance upon the motive on the part of the appellant as well as the fact that the appellant and the deceased were residing in their house where the dead body was recovered in order to come to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC. The trial court has accepted both the circumstances urged by the prosecution and held that the appellant was guilty of the aforesaid offence. 34. In this context, it is relevant to state that except the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 and PW-8, the prosecution has not adduced any other evidence in support of the said allegation. The trial court has accepted both the circumstances urged by the prosecution and held that the appellant was guilty of the aforesaid offence. 34. In this context, it is relevant to state that except the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 and PW-8, the prosecution has not adduced any other evidence in support of the said allegation. A perusal of the evidence of these witnesses will also indicate that the same is not sufficient to establish motive on the part of the appellant to commit murder of the deceased. In fact, none of these witnesses state anything with regard to the motive on the part of the appellant to commit murder on the ground that the deceased had not complied with the demand for dowry. Under these circumstances, the prosecution was not entitled to rely upon the evidence of these witnesses to bring home the guilt of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. 35. Insofar as the appellant and deceased being the only inmates of the shed where the dead body of the deceased was found is concerned, the only witness relied upon by the prosecution is PW-5 who has turned hostile. It is needless to state that the mere fact that the appellant and the deceased were husband and wife and were residing in the shed prior to the date of the incident, it cannot be said that even on 13/14-06-2013, the appellant was found in the said shed at the time of the incident. It is also relevant to state that when the complainant (PW-1) went to the shed at 8 a.m. in the morning and found the dead body of the deceased, the appellant was not at the spot and he was arrested much later in the evening by the police. It is well settled that the mere presumption of appellant and the deceased were living together as husband and wife in the shed prior to 13.06.2013, the same cannot be a substitute for proof that the appellant actually resided there on the night of 13.06.2013. 36. It is also significant to note that many of the charge sheet witnesses whose statements were recorded by the prosecution have not been examined as witnesses. 36. It is also significant to note that many of the charge sheet witnesses whose statements were recorded by the prosecution have not been examined as witnesses. Under these circumstances, the trial court clearly committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of offence under section 302 IPC and the said finding is clearly based on surmises and conjectures which is not sustainable in law. 37. The prosecution has also placed reliance on recovery of the plastic rope MO-1 from the shed wherein the appellant and deceased were residing. In this context, Ex. P7 is the seizure mahazar which has been signed by PW-10 who is one of the panch witness. Despite noticing that PW-10 had turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution, the trial court proceeded to place reliance upon his admission in cross-examination to hold that MO-1 was recovered from the shed at the instance of the appellant who had produced the same. 38. A perusal of the evidence of PW-10 will clearly indicate that apart from the said witness turning hostile, in his cross-examination by the counsel for the appellant, PW-10 has categorically admitted that he had seen MO-1 in the police station. The admissions, ambiguities, discrepancies and contradictions in the evidence of PW-10 and the investigating officer examined as PW-15 with regard to the recovery of MO1 clearly indicate that the said evidence was not sufficient to prove the recovery of MO-1 was at the instance of the appellant and that he produced the same. It is also relevant to state that neither the other mahazar witness to Ex. P-7 nor any other witness is examined by the prosecution on this aspect of the matter and as such, adverse inference would have to be drawn against prosecution in this regard. 39. It is well settled that in order to place reliance upon the recovery of a material object pursuant to information provided by the accused as contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it is necessary that the Courts are required to be vigilant about application the said provision. The Court must ensure the credibility of evidence adduced by the police because this provision is vulnerable to misuse. The Court must ensure the credibility of evidence adduced by the police because this provision is vulnerable to misuse. Further, the court has to be cautious that no effort is made by the prosecution to make out a statement of the accused with a simple case of recovery as a case of discovery of fact in order to attract the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act as held by several judgments of the Apex Court including the case of Geejaganda Somaiah vs. State of Karnataka – (2007) 9 SCC 315 . 40. In view of the aforesaid principles of law and the evidence on record discussed supra, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish that MO-1 was recovered from the shed where the appellant and the deceased were residing and that the same was recovered at the instance of the appellant who produced the same. Under these circumstances, even this circumstance of recovery of MO-1 is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 IPC. 41. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the trial court committed an error in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under section 302 IPC. Accordingly, the conviction and the sentencing of the appellant for the said offence is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the offence punishable under section 302 IPC. Section 304-B IPC 42. As stated supra, the second charge framed by the trial court against the appellant was for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. In the alternative, the trial court also charged the appellant for the offence of Dowry Death punishable under Section 304-B IPC. In this context, it is the specific case of the prosecution that the appellant was guilty of demanding dowry from the deceased and that her death had occurred on account of being subjected to cruelty and harassment within seven years of their marriage. It is also the specific contention urged on behalf of the prosecution that the evidence on record satisfies the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC and in the light of the presumption arising under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, which had not been rebutted by the appellant, he was clearly guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. 43. 43. In order to appreciate the said allegations, put forth by the prosecution, it is necessary to advert to the ingredients required to prove an offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC viz.; (i) The death of a woman should have been caused by burns or bodily injury or should have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) Such death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (iii) The deceased should have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her husband; (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry; (v) The deceased should have been subjected to such cruelty or harassment soon before her death. 44. It is well settled that once the prosecution is able to establish the aforesaid ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, there arises a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act in favour of the prosecution, which reads as under:- “113-B-presumption as to dowry death – When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death, such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation: For the purpose of this Section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B Indian Penal Code”. 45. The aforesaid principles underlying Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act have been reiterated by the Apex Court in several decisions including Vijay Pal Singh vs. State of Uttarkhand – (2014) 15 SCC 163 . 46. Coming to the facts of the instant case, we have already come to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of offences punishable under Sections 498-A of IPC r/w Section 4 of the D.P. Act. As stated supra, the material on record including the evidence of the Doctor (PW-6) clearly indicates that the death of the deceased was caused by a bodily injury and that the same had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. So also, the appellant having got married to the deceased in the year 2011, the death that occurred in 2013, was clearly within seven years of her marriage. So also, the appellant having got married to the deceased in the year 2011, the death that occurred in 2013, was clearly within seven years of her marriage. The material on record also established that deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellant for and in connection with demand of dowry. 47. It is also borne out from the material on record that the deceased was subjected to such cruelty and harassment by the appellant soon before her death. In this context, it is relevant to state that the unimpeached evidence of complainant PW-1 indicates that cruelty and harassment as contemplated under Section 304-(B) IPC and Section 113-B of Evidence Act had occurred continuously from the time of marriage till a few days before the death of the deceased. It is well settled that the expression “soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time limit. These words imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of cruelty or harassment and date of death and what is contemplated is a reasonable time which can be spread over a period of time. It is also well settled that if the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon before death” in the absence of any rebuttal evidence to the contrary. 48. The material on record, in particular the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 and PW-8 and the evidence of the Doctor PW-6 coupled with the other material on record clearly establishes that the prosecution had successfully proved the necessary ingredients of dowry death as contemplated under Section 304-B IPC. Further, the appellant has not been able to impeach the evidence adduced by the prosecution nor has he adduced any evidence whatsoever to rebut the presumption arising against him under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant is guilty of the offence of dowry death punishable under Section 304-B IPC. 49. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we pass the following: ORDER (i) The appeal is partly allowed. (ii) The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court in S.C.No.150/2013 dated 13.02.2014 is hereby modified. 49. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we pass the following: ORDER (i) The appeal is partly allowed. (ii) The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court in S.C.No.150/2013 dated 13.02.2014 is hereby modified. (iii) The conviction and sentence of the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 498-A IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act are hereby confirmed. (iv) The conviction and sentence of the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 302 IPC is hereby set aside and appellant is acquitted of the said charges. (v) The appellant is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC & he is sentenced to undergo R.I. for a period of 8(Eight) years and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-and upon default, to undergo R.I. for a further period of one year. (vi) The entire fine amount is directed to be paid to PW1 Mylaraiah-father of the deceased Suma. (vii) All the aforesaid sentences are directed to run concurrently. (viii) The appellant is in judicial custody from 15.06.2013 onwards and he is entitled to the benefit of set off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C.