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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 822 (MP)

Virendra Jatav v. State of M. P.

2020-08-20

SUJOY PAUL

body2020
ORDER 1. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, calls in question the legality, validity and propriety of the order dated 26.10.2018 (Annexure-P/5) whereby the respondent No.5 declared the petitioner as “unsuitable” for employment in the Police Department. 2. The relevant facts are in narrow compass. The petitioner submitted his candidature pursuant to an advertisement issued for the post of Constable (GD). After cracking the physical test, written test etc., the petitioner was selected. He was required to fill up a verification form. In Col. 12 of the verification form (Annexure-P/2), the petitioner clearly disclosed that he was facing a criminal case for allegedly committing offences under sections 363, 366, 376 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sehore decided the said case (ST No.43/2008) by judgment dated 20.10.2008. The Court acquitted the petitioner from all the charges. Copy of the judgment aforesaid is filed as Annexure-P/3. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner criticized the impugned order dated 26.10.2018 (Annexure-P/5) and urged that since petitioner’s acquittal by judgment dated 20.08.2008 is an “acquittal on merits”, the Scrutiny Committee and the respondent No.5 have committed an error in treating the petitioner as “unsuitable”. The reason assigned in the operative para of the impugned order dated 26.10.2018 is liable to be interfered with in view of judgment of Supreme Court report in 2013 (1) SCC 598 (Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram). 4. Shri Ghildiyal urged that the expression “honourable acquittal” has a different meaning. In case of mere acquittal, an employee is not entitled to be reinstated whereas in case of “honourable acquittal” he is entitled to. Reliance is placed on the judgment of R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 , which was considered in the case of S. Samuthiram (supra) wherein it was held that if a person is acquitted fully and completely, then it can be said that he is “honourably acquitted”. It is argued that if the judgment dated 20.10.2008 is examined with sufficient care, there will be no doubt that the petitioner’s acquittal amounts to “honourable acquittal”. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on 2016 (8) SCC 471 (Avtar Singh vs. Union of India). Much emphasis is placed on Para 38.4.3 and 38.5. It is argued that if the judgment dated 20.10.2008 is examined with sufficient care, there will be no doubt that the petitioner’s acquittal amounts to “honourable acquittal”. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on 2016 (8) SCC 471 (Avtar Singh vs. Union of India). Much emphasis is placed on Para 38.4.3 and 38.5. It is urged that in cases of “honourable acquittal”, it is no more open to the employer to treat the candidate as “unsuitable”. The “antecedents”, in the opinion of Shri Ghildiyal, relates to larger incidents which have taken place prior to the relevant crime, which was disclosed in the verification form (Col. 12). For this purpose, he placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Gwalior Bench in W.A. No.46/2018 (Bhupendra Yadav Vs. State of M.P. and others) decided on 24.01.2018. 6. By placing reliance on 2009 (13) SCC 758 (Swaran Singh Chand v. Punjab SEB), he further submits that in a case of this nature where respondents have acted contrary to the governing circular dated 24.07.2018 (filed as Annexure-P/11 with I.A. No.7028/2020) coupled with the aforesaid paragraphs of judgment of Avtar Singh (supra), rejection order amounts to ‘malice in law’. Whether or not there are specific pleadings alleging malice by the petitioner and whether or not the person concerned is impleaded eo nomine, this Court can interfere because such act falls within the ambit of “malice in law”. 7. The next reliance is on the judgment of Supreme Court reported in 2013 (7) SCC 150 (G. Jayalal v. Union of India). It is urged that in view of this judgment also, the impugned order falls within the four corners of “malice in law”. Shri Ghildiyal placed reliance on the judgment of Gwalior Bench passed in A. No.1954/19 (Devendra Singh Gurjar v. State of M.P.) to submit that after clean acquittal of petitioner from criminal case, department has committed an error in rejecting the candidature by declaring the petitioner as ‘unsuitable’. Lastly, Shri Ghildiyal, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ashutosh Pawar v. High Court of M.P. 2018 (1) JLJ 169 (FB) = 2018 (2) MPLJ 419 . It is argued that this Court can examine the correctness of the decision of the employer and when it is palpably wrong, this Court can interfere with the decision. It is argued that this Court can examine the correctness of the decision of the employer and when it is palpably wrong, this Court can interfere with the decision. Shri Ghildiyal has taken pains to contend that if in a case of this nature where candidate is exonerated on merits, discretion is left with the employer to decide the “suitability”, it may be misused and in fact there exists no such unfettered discretion with the employer If discretion is improperly exercised, the order will not be beyond judicial review by this Court. 8. Sounding a contra note, Shri Akshay Pawar, learned P.L. for the State took preliminary objection regarding maintainability of this petition. He submits that the petitioner although is resident of Sehore, the impugned order dated 26.10.2018 (Annexure-P/5) was served on him at Guna itself, which is evident from Annexure-R/4 wherein he has appended his signature as a token of acknowledgment. The document dated 26.10.2018 (AnnexureR/4) could not have travelled from Guna to Sehore on the same date. Since the petitioner put his signature on the same date (Annexure-R/4), it is clear that it must have been served on him at Guna itself. Thus, the impugned order dated 26.10.2018 is issued from Guna and served at the same station. Hence, no part of cause of action has arisen within the territory of this Bench. Hence, this petition is not maintainable. 9. Faced with this, Shri Ghildiyal urged that the order impugned was served at Sehore because the said address of the petitioner is mentioned in the order. There is no pleading in the return that it was served on the petitioner at Guna otherwise the petitioner would have filed rejoinder and rebutted the same. By placing reliance on Full Bench judgment reported in 1987 JLJ 341 (FB) = 1987 MPLJ 396 (K.P. Govil v. J.N.K. Vishwavidayalaya), Shri Ghildiyal submitted that even if the order is issued from Guna, evil consequences of the same has fallen on the petitioner at Sehore, a District situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench, therefore this Court could have jurisdiction. 10. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties on merits, in the fitness of things, I deem it proper to decide the question of maintainability first. This Court on 27.11.18 ignored objection of Registry regarding territorial jurisdiction. 10. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties on merits, in the fitness of things, I deem it proper to decide the question of maintainability first. This Court on 27.11.18 ignored objection of Registry regarding territorial jurisdiction. Apart from this, I find substance in the argument of Shri Ghildiyal that the impugned order dated 26.10.18 contains address of petitioner i.e. Village Jharkheda, Tehsil Shyampur, District Sehore, which is indisputably situated within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat. The Full Bench in K.P. Govil (supra) opined that cause of action would arise at a place where impugned order is made and also at a place where its consequence fall on the person concerned. In my opinion, the petitioner’s case is covered by later portion of the said finding because the consequences of impugned order has fallen on the petitioner at Sehore. As per Article 226 (2) of the Constitution, even if a part of cause of action has arisen within the territory of this Bench, the petition can be entertained. For these cumulative reasons, I am not inclined to dismiss this petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. 11. The next contention of Shri Pawar is that the Screening Committee is an ‘expert body’. The decision of respondent No.5 regarding ‘suitability’ of petitioner is founded upon the decision of an ‘expert body’. The scope of judicial review by this Court on the decision of an ‘expert body’ is limited. By placing reliance on (2018) 15 SCC 796 (UPSC v. M. Sathiya Priya), Shri Pawar urged that this Court cannot sit in an appeal over the decision of Screening Committee. In absence of bias, malafide or arbitrariness, interference is unwarranted. 12. Shri Pawar placed reliance on (2018) 1 SCC 797 (State (UT of Chandigarh) v. Pradeep Kumar) to buttress his contention that judicial review on the decision of Screening Committee is further limited. It is confined to examine whether the decision so taken is malafide in nature or not? The correctness of decision is beyond the purview of the judicial review. Shri Pawar by placing reliance on 2006 (1) JLJ 91 = (2004) 8 SCC 788 (M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of M.P.) and (2013) 14 SCC 304 (Mutha Associates v. State of Maharashtra) urged that it is necessary to plead with accuracy and precision regarding allegations of ‘malice’ for both namely ‘malice in fact’ or ‘malice in law’. Shri Pawar by placing reliance on 2006 (1) JLJ 91 = (2004) 8 SCC 788 (M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of M.P.) and (2013) 14 SCC 304 (Mutha Associates v. State of Maharashtra) urged that it is necessary to plead with accuracy and precision regarding allegations of ‘malice’ for both namely ‘malice in fact’ or ‘malice in law’. In absence thereof, the allegations of malafide cannot be entertained. In the instant petition, the petitioner has neither impleaded anybody eo nomine nor devoted any sufficient pleadings relating to ‘malice in law/fact’. Hence, the aspect of malice cannot be gone into. 13. Interestingly, Shri Pawar also placed reliance on the same Full bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ashutosh Pawar (supra). By placing reliance on certain other paragraphs of same judgment, Shri Pawar reiterated that the final decision regarding suitability is not the subject matter of judicial review. The ‘eligibility’ and ‘suitability’ are two different facets. The aspect of ‘eligibility’ can become subject matter of judicial review whereas wide discretion is there with the employer to decide whether a candidate is ‘suitable’ or not. 14. Learned Panel Lawyer also cited the judgments reported in 2015 (1) JLJ 79 = (2015) 2 SCC 591 (State of M.P. v. Parvez Khan), (2013) 7 SCC 685 (Commissioner of Police v. Mehar Singh) and the aforesaid judgments of Avtar Singh (supra). To combat the argument of Shri Ghildiyal on the aspect of ‘antecedents’, the reliance is placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1994 JLJ 795 = 1994 MPLJ 792 (Gangacharan Baijnath Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh). It is argued that as per ratio of this decision, the employer is competent to see the nature of offence, which was subject matter of aforesaid judgment dated 20.10.2008 and other relevant material for the purpose of deciding the suitability. 15. Parties confined their arguments to the extent indicated above. 16. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 17. In the case of Avtar Singh (supra), the apex Court considered almost 21 previous judgments on the point. As noticed, reliance is placed on two paragraphs by Shri Ghildiyal. It is apposite to quote the same which reads as under:- “38.4. ……... 38.4.1………….. 38.4.2……….. 38.4.3. 16. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 17. In the case of Avtar Singh (supra), the apex Court considered almost 21 previous judgments on the point. As noticed, reliance is placed on two paragraphs by Shri Ghildiyal. It is apposite to quote the same which reads as under:- “38.4. ……... 38.4.1………….. 38.4.2……….. 38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. 38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.” (Emphasis Supplied) 18. Apart from this, if different clauses of Para 38 are read minutely, it will be clear like noonday that the Supreme Court has nowhere held that in the event a selected candidate is ‘honourably acquitted’ or ‘acquitted on merits’, it is obligatory on the employer to appoint him. On the contrary, a conjoint reading of different paras of Avtar Singh (supra) makes it clear that the apex Court has held that it depends on the nature of duty/employment, the job nomenclature, the sensitivity of post/department and other relevant factors on the basis of which it is prerogative/discretion of the employer to take a decision regarding ‘suitability’ of a candidate. No judgment is brought to the notice of this Court wherein the apex Court directed that in case of ‘honourable acquittal’ of candidate, the employer has no authority and discretion to examine the ‘suitability’ of a candidate. 19. As per judgment of the Supreme Court in Mehar Singh and Avtar Singh (supra), the Screening Committee considered the case of the petitioner. No procedural impropriety in decision making process adopted by committee is pointed out to this Court. The whole argument is focused on the last para of impugned order dated 26.10.18 (Annexure P/5). 19. As per judgment of the Supreme Court in Mehar Singh and Avtar Singh (supra), the Screening Committee considered the case of the petitioner. No procedural impropriety in decision making process adopted by committee is pointed out to this Court. The whole argument is focused on the last para of impugned order dated 26.10.18 (Annexure P/5). It is apt to quote the same which reads as under:- ^^vr% mijksDr leLr Áfrikfnr fl}karks@rF;ksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, vkids fo:} iathc} vijk/k esa uSfrd v/kksiru ds vk;ke gksus ds dkj.k ;|fi mDr Ádj.k esa vkidks nks"keqDr fd;k x;k gS] ,slh nks"keqfDr Clean/Honourable Acquittal dh Js.kh esa u vkus ds dkj.k vkidks bl iqfyl lsok ds v;ksX; ik;k tkrk gSA^^ A plain reading of this para shows that respondent No.5 treated the petitioner as ‘unsuitable’ because the allegations mentioned against him related to ‘moral turpitude’. Indisputably, the allegations relating to section 376 of IPC falls within the ambit of ‘moral turpitude’. 20. The acquittal of a candidate, as a rule of thumb, does not give him any right to be appointed even if he is selected. The employer needs to examine the ‘suitability’ on various facets including (i) the nature of job needs to be performed by him; (ii) the nature of department in which he will be performing the duties; (iii) the status of post and other attendant circumstances; and (iv) the nature of accusation & his acquittal etc. A candidate, after acquittal in one department which is only doing ministerial job may be treated to be ‘suitable’ whereas for another department/post considering the nature of work, may be treated as ‘unsuitable’. Thus, no strict parameters regarding judging such suitability can be reduced in writing with the accuracy and precision. It varies from post to post and from department to department. Perhaps for this reason, the apex Court has not held that after clean acquittal, the candidate has an indefeasible right of appointment and much discretion is left with the employer to decide his ‘suitability’. 21. This Court after considering the judgment of Full Bench in Ashutosh Pawar (supra) in WP. 21231/17 (Madhur v. State of M.P.) decided on 17.4.18 opined that ‘suitability’ cannot be confused with ‘eligibility’. No doubt the eligibility is subjected to judicial review but ‘suitability’ is not. The relevant portion reads as under:- “The “suitability” cannot be confused with eligibility”. 21. This Court after considering the judgment of Full Bench in Ashutosh Pawar (supra) in WP. 21231/17 (Madhur v. State of M.P.) decided on 17.4.18 opined that ‘suitability’ cannot be confused with ‘eligibility’. No doubt the eligibility is subjected to judicial review but ‘suitability’ is not. The relevant portion reads as under:- “The “suitability” cannot be confused with eligibility”. In the ‘Major Law Laxicon’ by P. Ramanatha Iyer about the word following view is expressed-”the word ‘suitable’ does not require a definition because any man of experience would know who is suitable. However, each case has to be viewed in the context in which the word “suitability” or “suitable” is used, the object of the enactment and the purpose sought to be achieved.” A constitution Bench of Supreme Court in State of J & K v. Trilokinath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19 and another Bench in State of Orissa vs. N.N. Swami (1977) 2 SCC 508 opined that eligibility must not be confused with the suitability of the candidate for appointment. These judgments were considered by Calcutta High Court in 2013 SCC Online 22909 (All b. Ed. Degree Holders Welfare Association v. State of West Bengal ). In (2009) 8 SCC 273 (Mahesh Chandra Gupta vs. Union of India) it was again held that suitability of a recommendee and the consultation are not subject to judicial review but the issue of lack of eligibility or an effective consultation can be scrutinized.. The Supreme Court in (2014) 11 SCC 547 (High Court of Madras v. R. Gandhi) while dealing with appointment on a constitutional post opined that ‘eligibility’ is an objective factor. When ‘eligibility’ is put in question, it could fall within the scope of judicial review. The aspect of ‘suitability’ stands excluded from the purview of judicial review. At the cost of repetition, the Apex Court opined that ‘eligibility’ is a matter of fact whereas ‘suitability’ is a matter of opinion.” (Emphasis Supplied) 22. In Ashutosh Pawar (supra), the Full Bench considered following question:- “2. The aspect of ‘suitability’ stands excluded from the purview of judicial review. At the cost of repetition, the Apex Court opined that ‘eligibility’ is a matter of fact whereas ‘suitability’ is a matter of opinion.” (Emphasis Supplied) 22. In Ashutosh Pawar (supra), the Full Bench considered following question:- “2. Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can step into the shoes of the Appointing Authority and determine as to whether the person concerned is fit for appointment or whether the High Court on finding that the Authority concerned has wrongly exercised its discretion in holding the candidate to be ineligible should, after quashing the order, remit the matter back to the authority concerned for reconsideration or for fresh consideration as to the eligibility of the person?” It was answered as under:- “40. In view of the law laid down in above said judgments, there is no doubt that in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court only examines the decision-making process and does not substitute itself as a Court of appeal over the reasons recorded by the State Government. We find that the decision of the State Government holding that the petitioner is not suitable, is just, fair and reasonable keeping in view the nature of the post and the duties to be discharged.” 23. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the petitioner has not pointed out any flaw in the decision making process. As held in catena of judgments of Supreme Court, which were considered in Ashutosh Pawar (supra), it is clear like cloudless sky that ultimate decision which is an ‘opinion’ of employer is beyond the scope of judicial review. More so, on considering the nature of job of police/discipline force, it cannot be said that decision to treat the petitioner as ‘unsuitable’ is malicious in nature. In the case of Pradeep Kumar (Supra), the apex Court considered the judgment of Parvez Khan and Avtar Singh (Supra) and opined that the scope of judicial review of decision of screening committee is very limited. It was poignantly held that acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of suitability of the candidate in the post concerned. In the case of Pradeep Kumar (Supra), the apex Court considered the judgment of Parvez Khan and Avtar Singh (Supra) and opined that the scope of judicial review of decision of screening committee is very limited. It was poignantly held that acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of suitability of the candidate in the post concerned. If a person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved or he had no criminal antecedents. It was further held that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitled the candidate for appointment to the post. It is still open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether he is ‘suitable’ for appointment to the post. It is pertinent to mention that in the same judgment, Supreme Court came to hold that the Court should not dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created to ensure that person who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with an even hand. “The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be malafide”. Thus, the decision of Screening Committee can be examined only on the anvil of malafides. 24. Pausing here for a moment, petitioner in the writ petition, on more than one occasion has termed the rejection order Annexure P/5 as ‘arbitrary’ and ‘malafide’. However, it is not described with necessary clarity as to how the impugned order can be termed as ‘malafide’. The mere allegation of malafide is not sufficient unless there is sufficient foundation on the strength of which the order/action is termed as ‘malafide’. In 1986 (4) SCC 566 (State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal), the apex Court held that “it is true that in the writ petitions the petitioners used words such as ‘mala fide’, ‘corruption’ and ‘corrupt practice’ but the use of such words is not enough. What is necessary is to give full particulars of such allegations and to set out the material facts specifying the particular person against whom such allegations are made so that he may have an opportunity of controverting such allegations. What is necessary is to give full particulars of such allegations and to set out the material facts specifying the particular person against whom such allegations are made so that he may have an opportunity of controverting such allegations. The requirement of law is not satisfied in so far as the pleadings in the present case are concerned and in the absence of necessary particulars and material facts, we fail to see how the learned Judge could come to a finding that the State Government was guilty of factual malafides, corruption and underhand dealing”. 25. The aspect of ‘legal malice’ was considered by Supreme Court in 2010 (9) SCC 437 (Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania). The apex Court opined that if an act is taken with an oblique or indirect object/motive and runs contrary to the purpose for which statutory power was required to be exercised, action falls within the ambit of ‘legal malice’. The petitioner could not point out the necessary ingredients which can establish ‘malice in fact’ or ‘malice in law’. It is equally settled that whenever allegations as to malafides have been levelled, sufficient particulars and cogent materials making out prima facie case must be set out in the pleadings. Vague allegation or bald assertion that the action taken was malafide and malicious is not enough. In the absence of material particulars, the court is not expected to make ‘fishing’ inquiry into the matter. [See (2009) 13 SCC 758 Swaran Singh Chand v. Punjab SEB]. In view of this legal position, I am unable to hold that petitioner could make out a case of judicial review on the decision taken by Screening Committee/department. 26. I will be failing in my duty, if the argument of Shri Ghildiyal relating to ‘antecedents’ is not considered. A careful reading of order of Gwalior Bench in Bhupendra Yadav (supra) makes it clear that it does not support the argument of Shri Ghildiyal that while considering the ‘antecedents’, it was not open to the employer to consider the judgment of criminal trial dated 20.10.2008 (Annexure P/3). In the teeth of Full Bench decision reported in Gangacharan Baijnath Prasad (supra) also this argument cannot cut any ice. 27. In the teeth of Full Bench decision reported in Gangacharan Baijnath Prasad (supra) also this argument cannot cut any ice. 27. It is noteworthy that while examining the scope of judicial review on decision of expert bodies like Selection Committee, [See M. Sathia Priya (supra)] the scope of judicial review was extended to examine existence of bias, malafide and arbitrariness whereas while determining the scope of judicial review in case of Screening Committee, the Apex Court in Pradeep Kumar (supra) confined it to the aspect of existence of ‘malafide’ only. 28. So far the order of Gwalior Bench in Devendra Singh Gurjar (supra) is concerned, the judgment of Full Bench in the case of Ashutosh Pawar (supra) was not brought to the notice of Division Bench. Thus, the Division had no occasion to consider the aspect of distinction between the judicial review of ‘decision making process’ and the ultimate ‘decision’. Similarly, difference between ‘eligibility’ and ‘suitability’ was also not the subject matter of discussion in the case of Devendra Singh Gurjar (supra). Gwalior Bench in the case of Devendra Singh Gurjar (supra) took note of a relevant fact of the said case that the material witnesses in their entire depositions denied the prosecution story in their examination-in-chief itself. A clear finding was given by Division Bench that the prosecution case collapsed before cross examination could take place. During cross examination also, all the four injured witnesses have reiterated their stand which was taken in examination-in-chief. However, in the instant case, the allegation of rape was made by the lady, who had an affair with the petitioner. As per prosecution story, the petitioner pressurized and forced her to solemnize marriage with him. Thereafter, the petitioner committed rape on her on more than one occasion. Pertinently, the prosecutrix/victim firmly supported the prosecution story before the Court below. However, for the reasons stated therein, the Court below opined that the petitioner is not guilty. It may be argued that Screening Committee cannot sit over the judgment of the trial Court and took a different view. Similar contention was raised in the case of Mehar Singh (supra). In Para 24 of the said judgment, the Apex Court opined that there is no substance in the contention that by cancelling respondent’s candidature the Screening Committee has overreached the judgment of criminal Court. It was further observed as under:- “24. Similar contention was raised in the case of Mehar Singh (supra). In Para 24 of the said judgment, the Apex Court opined that there is no substance in the contention that by cancelling respondent’s candidature the Screening Committee has overreached the judgment of criminal Court. It was further observed as under:- “24. We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the respondents' candidature, the Screening Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal Court. We are aware that the question of co-relation between a criminal case and a departmental enquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in connection with it because the issue involved is somewhat identical, namely, whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.” While examining antecedents, as held in Mehar Singh (supra), experience officers/Screening Committee need to examine various factors. Experienced Officers of Screening Committee will be the best judge to decide whether acquittal or discharge of candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed in police force. The committee needs to examine the nature and extent of person’s involvement in the crime and propensity of becoming a cause for worsening law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In the backdrop of aforesaid judgment of Mehar Singh (supra), which was followed in Pradeep Kumar (supra), it can be safely concluded that even if a candidate is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that in every case he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be malafide. At the cost of repetition, subject matter of judicial review in a case of this nature is very limited. This Court cannot sit in appeal and examine the ‘suitability’ of candidate. Thus, this order in Devendra Singh Gurjar’s case (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner. 29. In view of forgoing analysis, I am unable to hold that decision of department in declaring the petitioner as 'unsuitable' is malicious in nature. The petitioner has also failed to point out any manifest, procedural impropriety in the decision making process. Thus, this order in Devendra Singh Gurjar’s case (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner. 29. In view of forgoing analysis, I am unable to hold that decision of department in declaring the petitioner as 'unsuitable' is malicious in nature. The petitioner has also failed to point out any manifest, procedural impropriety in the decision making process. Similarly, no breach of circular/rules etc. could be established. The decision of 'unsuitability' of petitioner is an ‘opinion’ of Screening Committee/department. This Court cannot sit in appeal to disturb the same. More so, when it is not palpably wrong and shocks the conscience of the Court. 30. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost. ...............