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Telangana High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 826 (TS)

K. Kondal Rao v. Manish Kumar Malpani

2020-12-02

M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO

body2020
ORDER : 1. Heard Sri. A. Sudersan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri. G. Madhusudhan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri. Shyam S. Agrawal for respondents 1 to 6. 2. This Revision is preferred against the order dated 08.06.2020 in I.A. No. 429 of 2020 in O.S. No. 40 of 2020 of the III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad. 3. The petitioner herein is the 3rd defendant in the said suit. The plea in the suit 4. The said suit was filed by respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs against the petitioner/defendant No. 3 and respondents 7 and 8/defendant No. 1 and 2 for specific performance of the Agreement of sale dated 20.12.2007 executed in favour of respondents 1 to 6 by respondents 7 and 8, alternatively for refund of Rs. 1,25,00,000/- with interest at 24% per annum from the date of the said Agreement till the date of making payment; to declare the sale deed dated 01.12.2016 executed by respondents 7 and 8 in favour of the petitioner as null and void and not binding on them and to cancel it and for a perpetual injunction restraining respondents 7 and 8 and the petitioner from transferring, alienating, mortgaging or creating any third party interest or charge or changing nature of the suit schedule property. 5. The suit schedule property is premises bearing Municipal No. 8-2-293/82/G/C admeasuring 2,238 square yards in T.S. No. 2, Block-A, Ward No. 9 of Shaikpet Village situated at Road No. 34, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. The plea of the respondents 1-6 in the plaint 6. It is the case of respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs that respondents 7 and 8 had approached them in 2007 stating that they are owners of the plaint schedule property which had been allotted to them by the then Government of Andhra Pradesh vide G.O.Ms. No. 678 dated 17.10.2001 in view of the acquisition of their property in another part of the city, that possession was delivered to them on 10.09.2004, that they obtained permission from the then Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and raised a compound wall and also constructed a room in the said property. 7. No. 678 dated 17.10.2001 in view of the acquisition of their property in another part of the city, that possession was delivered to them on 10.09.2004, that they obtained permission from the then Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and raised a compound wall and also constructed a room in the said property. 7. Respondents 1 to 6 contended that respondents 7 and 8 had stated that they also obtained clearance from the competent authority under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 on 14.07.2005, that the suit schedule property was within ceiling limits, and they also obtained ‘no objection certificate’ from the Collector on 18.02.2005 that the State Government had no claim over the property. 8. Respondents 1 to 6 urged that respondents 7 and 8 offered to sell this property to respondents 1 to 6 for Rs. 10.50 Crores, that a Sale Agreement dated 20.12.2007 was executed between respondents 1 to 6 and respondents 7 and 8 and respondents 1 to 6 also paid Rs. 1 crore to respondents 7 and 8. They contended that the balance consideration was to be paid by respondents 1 to 6 to respondents 7 and 8 within two months. 9. Respondents 1 to 6 then stated that a civil suit O.S. No. 191 of 2005 was pending before the IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against respondents 7 and 8 regarding the suit schedule property; that they also came to know that respondents 7 and 8 informed about the claim by one Smt. A. Indira who had filed W.P. No. 17498 of 2005 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh; that these two cases were pending; and respondents 1 to 6 agreed that parties will proceed to complete the sale transaction under the Agreement of sale dated 20.12.2007 irrespective of the pendency of these cases. They contended that subsequently it came to light that the sale was prohibited on account of certain orders of the Court and it was agreed that both respondents 1 to 6 and respondents 7 and 8 would wait till disposal of the cases. 10. They contended that subsequently it came to light that the sale was prohibited on account of certain orders of the Court and it was agreed that both respondents 1 to 6 and respondents 7 and 8 would wait till disposal of the cases. 10. They stated that suit O.S. No. 191 of 2005 was dismissed on 16.12.2008 and Appeal A.S. No. 81 of 2009 against the judgment therein was also dismissed on 23.06.2011 by the XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad; and that Second Appeal S.A. No. 1714 of 2011 by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 191 of 2005 got dismissed on 03.02.2012 and the SLP against it was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 05.09.2014. 11. Respondents 1 to 6 contended that W.P. No. 17498 of 2005 filed by Smt. A. Indira was also dismissed on 16.08.2011 and though she later filed O.S. No. 657 of 2011 against respondents 7 and 8 for declaration of title and injunction, the plaint in the said suit was rejected on 18.09.2015 and that CCCA No. 152 of 2015 was still pending. 12. Respondents 1 to 6 contended that even after expiry of the time fixed for performance of the Agreement of sale dated 20.12.2007 and the grace period of 15 days with penalty which expired on 05.03.2018, the said Agreement of sale was not terminated and was allowed to remain in force; and that respondents 7 and 8 received from respondents 1 to 6 Rs. 7,00,000/- on 02.04.2008, Rs. 8,00,000/- on 02.05.2008 and Rs. 10,00,000/- on 10.07.2008. They alleged that respondents 7 and 8 were unwilling to get the suit property transferred in the name of respondents 1 to 6 and were avoiding them. 13. They alleged that they issued legal notice dated 16.08.2019 to respondents 7 and 8 and in the reply notice dated 13.09.2009 issued by respondents 7 and 8, they stated that they had sold the suit schedule property to the petitioner under a sale deed dated 01.12.2016. 14. Respondents 1 to 7 therefore contended that the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner by respondents 7 and 8 is a sham document, that it was illegal and void and it indicates collusion between respondents 7 and 8 and the petitioner. Therefore, they filed the above suit for the reliefs mentioned above. 14. Respondents 1 to 7 therefore contended that the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner by respondents 7 and 8 is a sham document, that it was illegal and void and it indicates collusion between respondents 7 and 8 and the petitioner. Therefore, they filed the above suit for the reliefs mentioned above. I.A. No. 429 of 2020 filed by petitioner/defendant No. 3 under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC 15. The petitioner filed I.A. No. 429 of 2020 in the suit under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the plaint was barred by limitation. 16. The petitioner relied on Clauses 4, 5, 8 and 11 of the Agreement of sale dated 20.12.2007 and contended that time was made essence of the contract under Clause 8, and in view of Clauses 4, 5, 8 and 11 and the admitted position of respondents 1 to 6 that balance sale consideration amount remained unpaid within the stipulated period of two months of the Agreement, the default clause mentioned in Clause 5 came into operation and the suit Agreement stood terminated as on 07.03.2008 (incorrectly mentioned as 07.03.2017) and consequently the suit filed on 30.01.2020 for specific performance of the Agreement of sale dated 20.12.2007 was hopelessly barred by limitation and so the plaint was liable to be rejected. The stand of respondents 1 to 6 17. Respondents 1 to 6 filed counter affidavit in I.A. No. 429 of 2020 stating that the said Application itself was not maintainable and that the petitioner had suppressed and misrepresented the facts. 18. They contended that the aspect of limitation in civil proceedings is a mixed question of fact and law as per settled principles of law laid down in judicial precedents and the same cannot be decided in an Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, 1908. 19. They contended that the petitioner had relied upon Clauses in the Agreement of sale dated 20.12.2007 executed between respondents 1 to 6 and respondents 7 and 8 in the suit and the petitioner was not a party to the said Agreement. 20. According to them, the contents of the plaint can be looked into and the contents of the documents cannot be looked into while considering the Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 21. 20. According to them, the contents of the plaint can be looked into and the contents of the documents cannot be looked into while considering the Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 21. According to them, the terms and conditions of the Agreement of sale dated 20.12.2007 cannot be read in isolation ignoring the subsequent events that occurred between the parties and the acts done by the parties in furtherance of the Agreement and the understanding between them. According to them, the default clause in the Agreement did not come into operation and the suit Agreement did not get terminated as on 21.02.2017 (07.03.2008) because respondents 7 and 8 received money from the petitioner subsequent to the said date. The order of the Court below 22. By order dated 08.06.2020, the Court below dismissed I.A. No. 429 of 2020. 23. It held that the violation of the terms and conditions of the Agreement and its binding nature are subject matter for decision in the main suit; that the plaint averments prima-facie disclosed that the cause of action existed in the suit based on the Agreement of sale; in addition to that, there is a sale transaction in 2016 in favour of the petitioner by respondents 7 and 8, which is also sought to be cancelled; that certain payments of part sale consideration occurred even after expiry of the term of the Agreement in the Agreement of sale; whether the suit transaction is hit by conditions and terms in the Agreement and whether the Agreement stood terminated as contended by the petitioner, are facts in issue during the trial. 24. It also observed that though the suit Agreement is of the year 2007, there appeared to be receipt of subsequent payments by respondents 7 and 8 and so the intention of the parties have to be gathered from the circumstances of the case. 25. It also observed that whether time is essence of the contract has to be looked into in the trial; that there are questions of law and fact involved in the suit for determination of the dispute and the maintainability of the suit on the point of limitation cannot be decided at that stage. 26. 25. It also observed that whether time is essence of the contract has to be looked into in the trial; that there are questions of law and fact involved in the suit for determination of the dispute and the maintainability of the suit on the point of limitation cannot be decided at that stage. 26. It also observed that the averments in the plaint have to be looked into to see whether prima-facie case is made out or not and not the merits and demerits and it is also well settled that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. 27. It therefore dismissed the Application for rejection of the plaint filed by the petitioner. The present Revision 28. Challenging the same, this Revision is filed by the petitioner. 29. Sri. A. Sudersan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that while considering the Application for rejection of plaint, not only the plaint, but also the documents filed along with the plaint can be considered; and the plea of respondents 1 to 6 that the documents filed along with the plaint cannot be looked into, is illegally untenable. He then referred to Clause 5 of the Agreement of sale dated 20.12.2007 and contended that the balance sale consideration was agreed to be paid within two months from 20.12.2007, i.e. on or before 19.02.2008; only 15 days grace period was given to respondents 1 to 6 on payment of penalty of Rs. 10,00,000/- which ends on 5.3.2008; and in the event of default by respondents 1 to 6, the advance of Rs. 1.00 Crore paid by them would stand forfeited and respondents 7 and 8 would be free to deal with the property as they like. He also referred to Clause 8 of the Agreement of sale which stated that time would be essence of the contract. According to him, the time fixed for performance of the agreement was 05.03.2008 and it was obligatory on the part of respondents 1 to 6 to make the entire payment of balance sale consideration by that date and on failure of respondents 1 to 6 to do so, the Agreement of sale ceases to operate after 05.03.2008. Consequently, the payments referred to in para-17 of the plaint amounting to Rs. 25,00,000/- in three instalments on 02.04.2008, 02.05.2008 and 10.07.2008 would be of no avail. Consequently, the payments referred to in para-17 of the plaint amounting to Rs. 25,00,000/- in three instalments on 02.04.2008, 02.05.2008 and 10.07.2008 would be of no avail. He also contended that between 05.03.2008 and 16.08.2019 when legal notice was sent, there was silence of 12 long years from the side of respondents 1 to 6; that respondents 1 to 6 were fully aware of the litigation which was pending in respect of the plaint schedule property even in 2007 prior to execution of the Agreement dated 20.12.2007; that Clause 11 of the Agreement indicated the same i.e. that they had agreed to purchase the suit schedule property with such knowledge and agreed that respondents 7 and 8 were not responsible in the event of any adverse result in the litigation and would not have to refund the sale consideration under any circumstances. He also placed reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through Legal Representatives and Others, (2020) 7 SCC 366 . 30. Sri. D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 6 refuted the said contentions and supported the order passed by the Court below: According to him, the Application of rejection of plaint having filed only by the petitioner/3rd defendant and not by respondents 7 and 8/defendants 1 and 2 could not have been entertained by the Court below at all. 31. He also referred to para-17 of the plaint which referred to payments made by respondents 1 to 6 after 5-3-2008 and contended that the payments made after 05.03.2008 extended the period of limitation and there was no need to nip the litigation in the bud. 32. He also reiterated that the plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and on that basis, the plaint cannot be rejected. Consideration by the Court 33. Order VII Rule 11 CPC to the extent relevant for our purpose states: “ORDER VII 11. Rejection of plaint - The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (a) to (c).......... (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.” 34. It is settled law that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 are the averments in the plaint. (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.” 34. It is settled law that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 are the averments in the plaint. The trial Court can exercise such power at any stage of the suit-before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purpose of deciding an application under Clause (a) to (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; and the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. [Saleem Bhai and Others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2003) 1 SCC 557 ] 35. The Court has to read the entire plaint as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action and if it does, the plaint cannot be rejected by the Court exercising the powers under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. [Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and Others vs. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and Others, (2006) 3 SCC 100 ] 36. In T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467 , the Supreme Court declared: “5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and un-repentently resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful - not formal - reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10, CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10, CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Cr. XI) and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.” (Emphasis supplied) 37. Recently in Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through Legal Representatives and Others (supra), the Supreme Court stated that the remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in the said provision; that the underlying object of Order VII Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit and in such a case it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted; such power is a drastic one and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to. It stated that under Order VII Rule 11 a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by law. It stated that under Order VII Rule 11 a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by law. It emphasised that the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature and if the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint; and if by clever drafting of the plaint, a party had created the illusion of a cause of action, it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. According to it, the Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the Court. Dealing with the contention whether documents filed along with the plaint can be looked into, the Supreme Court referred to Order VV Rule 14(1) CPC and held that documents filed along with the plaint are also required to be taken into consideration for deciding application under Order VII Rule 11. 38. Similar view has also been expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Gadiyaram Padmavathi and Others vs. Addepalli Hanumantha Rao and Others in the following terms: “9. It is also well settled law that rejection of a suit can be sought for at any time during the pendency of the suit and no material except the plaint averments and the supporting documents can be gone into while exercising the power under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. Hence, it is equally necessary while exercising such drastic and exceptional power the Court should also be cautious in scrutinizing the facts and circumstances culled out only from the plaint and the documents annexed thereto.” 39. So the plea of the respondents 1 to 6 that contents of documents cannot be gone into, while considering an application under Or. VII Rule 11 CPC, is not tenable. 40. So the plea of the respondents 1 to 6 that contents of documents cannot be gone into, while considering an application under Or. VII Rule 11 CPC, is not tenable. 40. Coming to the instant case, the suit O.S. No. 40 of 2020 has been filed by the respondents 1 to 6 against the petitioner and respondents 7 and 8 on 30.01.2020 for specific performance of an Agreement of sale dated 02.12.2007 executed by respondents 7 and 8 in favour of the respondents 1 to 6, alternatively for refund of the advance amount, to declare the sale deed dated 01.12.2016 registered as Document No. 6232/2016 executed by respondents 7 and 8 in favour of the petitioner in respect of the suit property as null and void and not binding on the respondents 1 to 6 and to cancel it and also for perpetual injunction restraining the petitioner and respondents 7 and 8 from transferring, alienating, mortgaging, creating any third party interest or charge or changing the nature of the plaint schedule property. 41. The petitioner had filed the Application under Order VII Rule 11(d) to reject the plaint in February, 2020 contending that in the suit Agreement, time was made essence of the contract, that full payment of consideration should be made by 07.03.2008 (incorrectly mentioned as 07.03.2017 in the Application), that the default clause contained in Clause 5 of the Agreement came into operation from 07.03.2008 and so the suit filed on 31.01.2020 is hopelessly barred by limitation since it is filed 12 years from the date of the Agreement. 42. Since the respondents 1 to 6 have referred to the Agreement dated 20.12.2007 in the plaint and have also filed it along with the plaint as per Order VII Rule 14(1) CPC, the said Agreement forms part of the plaint and recitals therein can also be looked into. 43. Clauses 4, 5, 8 and 11 of the said Agreement dated 20.12.2007 state as under: “Clause 4. WHEREAS the sellers offered to sell the said property to the purchasers for a total sale consideration of Rs. 10,50,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Crores and Fifty Lakhs only) and the purchasers have agreed to purchase the said property for the said consideration. In pursuance of the said agreement the purchasers have on this day paid an advance sale consideration of Rs. WHEREAS the sellers offered to sell the said property to the purchasers for a total sale consideration of Rs. 10,50,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Crores and Fifty Lakhs only) and the purchasers have agreed to purchase the said property for the said consideration. In pursuance of the said agreement the purchasers have on this day paid an advance sale consideration of Rs. 1 crore only (Rupees One Crores only) vide Cheque No. 844744 dated 20.12.2007 drawn on City Union Bank Ltd, Himayat Nagar Branch, Hyderabad in favour of the Seller No. 1 as part sale consideration and the balance sale consideration of Rs. 9,50,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Crores and Fifty Lakhs Only) shall be paid within a period of 2 months from this day with a grace period of 15 days. Time is the essence of the contract. Clause 5. WEHEREAS the Purchaser shall pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 9,50,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Crores and fifty Lakhs only) within the agreed period of 2 months. If the grace period of 15 days is availed by the Purchasers, they shall pay additional amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) to the Sellers. In the event of default by the Purchasers the advance of Rs. One Crore shall stand forfeited and the Sellers shall be free to deal with the said property as they like and the GPAs shall also stand terminated forthwith and there will be not further claims whatsoever. Clause 8. And time shall be essence of contract. Clause 11. WHEREAS the Purchasers with the knowledge of the said litigation have agreed to purchase the said property after being fully satisfied that, the said property is not part of the Jubilee Hills Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. and therefore the Sellers shall not be responsible in the event of any adverse result in the said litigation and the Sellers shall not be liable to refund the sale consideration under any circumstances.” 44. As per the above terms, the total sale consideration was fixed at Rs. 10.50 Crores and Rs. 1.00 Crore was paid on 20.12.2007, and it was agreed that the balance sale consideration of Rs. 9.50 Crores should be paid within 2 months from 20.12.2007 with a grace period of 15 days. An extra Rs. As per the above terms, the total sale consideration was fixed at Rs. 10.50 Crores and Rs. 1.00 Crore was paid on 20.12.2007, and it was agreed that the balance sale consideration of Rs. 9.50 Crores should be paid within 2 months from 20.12.2007 with a grace period of 15 days. An extra Rs. 10.00 lakhs is to be paid as penalty if the grace period is availed of by the respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs for payment of the balance sale consideration. Time was made essence of the contract. Clause 5 stated that in the event of default by the purchasers, the advance of Rs. 1.00 Crore would stand forfeited and the sellers shall be free to deal with the property as they like and the GPAs shall also stand terminated forthwith. 45. So if the balance sale consideration of Rs. 9.50 Crores was not paid before 07.03.2008 by respondents 1 to 6, the default clause would operate and the Agreement. This was admittedly not paid by 7.3.2008. 46. As per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for filing a suit for specific performance is 3 years from (a) the date fixed for the performance, or (b) if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused. 47. Having regard to Article 54, the time for filing the suit for specific performance of the Agreement dated 20.12.2007 by respondents 1 to 6 is 3 years from 05.03.2008, the date fixed for the performance. Admittedly the suit is filed on 30.01.2020. 48. No doubt in para 17 of the plaint, respondents 1 to 6 have pleaded that Rs. 7,00,000/- was paid on 02.04.2008, Rs. 8,00,000/- was paid on 02.05.2008 and Rs. 10,00,000/- was paid on 10.07.2008 to respondents 7 and 8 after 05.03.2008 and it is alleged that the Sale Agreement dated 20.12.2007 was not terminated and was allowed to remain in force. 49. It is not the case of the respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs that they did anything after the last payment was made on 10.07.2008 till the issuance of the suit legal notice on 16.08.2019 to respondents 7 and 8/defendants 1 and 2. 49. It is not the case of the respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs that they did anything after the last payment was made on 10.07.2008 till the issuance of the suit legal notice on 16.08.2019 to respondents 7 and 8/defendants 1 and 2. It is also not stated anywhere in the plaint that there was any agreement between the parties for postponing the performance of the suit Agreement to a future date without fixing any further date of performance. 50. The statement in para-17 of the plaint that the Sale Agreement dated 20.12.2007 was not terminated and was allowed to remain in force is vague and cannot be construed as an extension of time for performance of the Suit Agreement of Sale, which was also agreed to by the respondents 7 and 8/defendants 1 and 2. 51. In the absence of any pleading by respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs in the plaint that the respondents 7 and 8/defendants 1 and 2 did something to extend the time for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 20.12.2007, no cause of action can possibly accrue to respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs to sue on 30.01.2020 and plead that the suit is within limitation. 52. I may refer to para-46 of the plaint where the aspect of “limitation” is dealt with by respondents 1 to 6. It states: “46. LIMITATION: The suit is being filed within a period of limitation from 13-09-2019 the date of reply notice, under which the defendants No. 1 and 2 refused to execute and get registered the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of suit property as per the sale agreement dated 20-12-2007 and hence it is within the period prescribed by law and is not barred by limitation.” 53. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that the period of limitation for filing the suit can be counted from 13.09.2019, the date when the reply notice sent by respondents 7 and 8/defendants 1 and 2 refusing to execute and register the sale-deed. 54. It was the duty of the respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs to plead in the plaint explaining how the suit filed on 30.01.2020 on the basis of the Agreement of Sale dated 20.12.2007 can be said to be within time. 55. 54. It was the duty of the respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs to plead in the plaint explaining how the suit filed on 30.01.2020 on the basis of the Agreement of Sale dated 20.12.2007 can be said to be within time. 55. While it is no doubt true that issue of limitation could be a mixed question of law and fact as held by the Court below, and in some cases it has been held that the point of limitation cannot be decided in an Application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, the Supreme Court itself held in Fatehji and Company and Another vs. L.M. Nagpal and Others, (2015) 8 SCC 390 and N.V. Srinivasa Murthy and Others vs. Mariyamma (dead) and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 548 , that plaint can be rejected in exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11(d) if the suit is barred by law, i.e. law of limitation, as well. 56. I am of the opinion that by clever drafting of the plaint, the respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs had created the illusion of a cause of action, that the plaint appears to be manifestly vexatious and meritless, filed only with an intention to harass the petitioner and respondents 7 and 8, particularly when it is admitted in the plaint itself in paragraph 30 that respondents 7 and 8/defendants 1 and 2 had sold the suit schedule property to the petitioner/3rd defendant under sale deed dated 01.12.2016, registered as Document No. 6232/2016 in the office of the Joint Sub-Registrar-I, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad. 57. It is not the case of the respondents 1 to 6/plaintiffs that they had no knowledge about this document. 58. Admittedly registration of the said sale deed on 01.12.2016 in favour of the petitioner by respondents 7 and 8/defendants 1 and 2 is constructive notice as per Explanation 1 to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Bina Murlidhar Hemdev vs. Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev, (1999) 5 SCC 222 and Janardhanam Prasad vs. Ramdev, (2007) 15 SCC 174 ) and the suit for relief for cancellation of the said document ought to be filed as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 within 3 years from the knowledge of the said transaction, i.e. before 30.11.2019. 59. The suit, having been filed on 30.01.2020, is thus barred by limitation on this count as well. 60. 59. The suit, having been filed on 30.01.2020, is thus barred by limitation on this count as well. 60. Merely because some payments are made by respondents 1 to 6 to the respondents 7 and 8 after 05.03.2008 up to 10.07.2008, the Court below erred in presuming that there could be some intention, though unexpressed, on the part of the parties, for extension of time indefinitely for filing the suit for specific performance. It also erred in holding that at this stage, maintainability of the suit on the point of limitation cannot be gone into. 61. Therefore, the order dated 08.06.2020 in I.A. No. 429 of 2020 in O.S. No. 40 of 2020 of the III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad is set aside; the said I.A. is allowed and the plaint in O.S. No. 40 of 2020 on the file of the said Court is rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. 62. The CRP is allowed accordingly. No costs. 63. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this Revision shall stand closed.