ORDER : These petitions arise out of common order dated 10.02.2011 in R.R.P.Nos.15/2010 and 16/2010 passed by the I Additional District Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangaluru. By the impugned order, the learned District Judge has dismissed the revision petitions of the petitioner and confirmed the order dated 01.03.2010 in HRC Nos.89/2003 and 92/2003 passed by the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dn), Mangaluru D.K. 2. By the said orders, the trial court purportedly acting under Section 43 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (‘the Act’ for short) dropped the eviction proceedings initiated by the petitioner against the respondents herein and directed the petitioner to approach the Civil Court for declaration of her rights. 3. The subject matter of the above cases were shown in the eviction petition as schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ properties. Schedule A property in both the cases was the nonagricultural land bearing Sy No.67, TS No.1137 measuring 38 cents. In the said land several buildings existed and they were let out to several tenants. 4. Out of them, the petitioner initiated eviction proceedings before the trial Court against 8 tenants. They were registered as HRC Nos.85 to 92 of 2003. The petitioner mentioned the number of the building/property in occupation of the tenants as B schedule property in all those petitions. Out of them the premises related to these petitions were as follows: CASE NUMBER PROPERTY NUMBER HRC NO.89/2003 Door No.8-14-1277 HRC NO.92/2003 Door No.8-14-1301 5. The petitioner issued notices (Exs.P31 and 42) dated 29.03.2003 to the first respondent in the above cases respectively claiming that they were the tenants under her on monthly rent of Rs.250/- and Rs.500/- respectively. She further claimed that the first respondent in HRC Nos.89/2003 and 92/2003 were in arrears of rent for the period from September 2002 to June 2003 and August 2002 to February 2003 respectively and called upon them to pay the rent. She further stated that, if they fail to pay the rent, she initiates legal action against them. 6. The first respondent in HRC No.89/2003 issued reply notice dated 03.05.2003 as per Ex.P32 claiming that he has purchased the property from the Mulagar (owner) on 19.12.2002, thereby he himself has become the owner. However, he tendered a cheque for Rs.1,000/- towards the rent. 7. The respondents in HRC No.92/2003 did not issue any reply. 6. The first respondent in HRC No.89/2003 issued reply notice dated 03.05.2003 as per Ex.P32 claiming that he has purchased the property from the Mulagar (owner) on 19.12.2002, thereby he himself has become the owner. However, he tendered a cheque for Rs.1,000/- towards the rent. 7. The respondents in HRC No.92/2003 did not issue any reply. However, the petitioner claimed that on service of notice the first respondent paid the arrears of rent demanded in the notice, but committed default in payment of further rents. Therefore, she filed HRC Nos.89/2003 and 92/2003 against the respondents seeking eviction under Section 27(2)(a)(h)(o)(r) read with Section 16 of the Act. 8. In the above cases, she claimed that respondent No.1 was the tenant and the other respondents were his family members and to avoid any technical issue she has impleaded them as co respondents. She claimed the ejectment of the respondents on the ground of default in payment of rent, denial of title, personal requirement etc. 9. The respondents on their appearance contested the petitions denying the jural relationship. The respondents in HRC No.92/2003 claimed that first respondent’s daughter and daughter-in-law have purchased the petition property under the sale deed dated 12.05.2003. As already pointed out, the respondents in HRC No.89/2003 claimed that the first respondent has purchased the property under the registered sale deed dated 19.12.2002. They also disputed the other grounds of petitions. 10. The respondents/tenants in HRC No.85/03 and 86/2003 filed eviction petitions against the present petitioner and one Chandrashekar in HRC Nos.17 and 18 of 2004 on the ground that on purchasing the property they have become the landlords and sought eviction on the ground of non payment of rent. The trial Court consolidated HRC Nos.85-92 of 2003 and 17 and 18 of 2004, recorded the common evidence. 11. The respondents in the present cases did not lead evidence. The trial Court on hearing the parties by the common order in HRC No.85-92/2003 and 17 and 18 of 2004 purportedly acting under Section 43 of the Act dropped the proceedings in all the petitions and directed the parties to approach the civil Court for declaration of their rights on the following grounds: i) The respondent relying on the registered sale deeds executed by one Smt P.M. Ponnu Umma denied the title of the petitioner. (ii) Previous ownership of the petitioner on the basis of the sale deed relied upon by her is immaterial. (iii) The question of title over the schedule property cannot be decided by the Rent Court. (iv) Though petitioner denies the ownership of the respondents, the registered sale deeds produced by them have presumptive value. 12. The petitioner challenged the said orders before the I Additional District Judge in RRP Nos.13 to 20 of 2010. The learned District Judge by the common order dated 10.02.2011 dismissed the petitions holding that the issue of the title of the parties cannot be adjudicated in summary proceedings. 13. Sri U.P.Muliya, learned counsel appeared for the second respondent in HRRP No.50/2011. In HRRP No.51/2011 the respondents did not appear to contest the petition. Heard the advocates on record. 14. This Court in exercise of its revisional power under Section 115 CPC, can interfere with the impugned orders, if it is shown that the said orders suffer the vice of illegality or failure of the exercise jurisdiction vested in them by the trial Court & District Court. 15. Basically the impugned orders are passed exercising the power under Section 43 of the Act. The said section reads as follows : “43. Dispute of relationship of landlord and tenant: (1) where in any proceeding before the Court, a contention is raised denying the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant as between the parties it shall be lawful for the Court to accept the document of lease or where there is no document of lease, a receipt of acknowledgement of payment of rent purported to be signed by the landlord a prima-facie evidence of relationship and proceed to hear the case. (2) Where: (a) the lease pleaded is oral and either party denies relationship, and no receipt or acknowledgment of payment of rent as referred to in subsection (1) above is produced; or (b) in the opinion of the Court there is reason to suspect the genuine existence of the document of lease or the receipt or acknowledgement of payment of rent the Court shall at once stop all further proceedings before it and direct the parties to approach a competent Court of civil jurisdiction for declaration of their rights.” 16. Thus Section 43 clearly shows that the dispute raised should be about the existence of the landlord and tenant relationship and not about the title. Thus Section 43 clearly shows that the dispute raised should be about the existence of the landlord and tenant relationship and not about the title. The section further indicates that such dispute should be genuine. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Joseph Kantharaj and another vs. Attarunnissa Begum, (2010)2 SCC 619 while holding that the dispute raised shall be genuine, in para 10 of the judgment held as follows: “10. We may however clarify that a mere assertion by a tenant that he is in possession in part-performance of an agreement of sale, or the mere filing of a suit for a specific performance, by itself will not lead to deferment of the eviction proceedings under Section 43 of the new Act. But where the respondent in an eviction proceeding under the Rent Act denies the relationship of landlord and tenant contending that he is not in possession as a tenant and produces and relies upon an agreement of sale in his favour which confirms delivery of possession in part-performance, and a specific performance suit is pending and there is no lease deed, or payment of rent from the date of such agreement of sale, or no acknowledgement of attornment of tenancy, Section 43 of the new Act may apply. But a word of caution, Courts dealing with summary proceedings against tenants under the Rent Acts for eviction, should be wary of the defendants coming forward with defences of agreement of sale, lest that becomes a stock defence in such petitions. Unless the court is satisfied prima facie that the agreement is genuine and defence is bona fide, it should not defer the proceedings for eviction under the Rent Acts.” (emphasis supplied) 17. Thus it is clear that to invoke Section 43 of the Act the dispute raised should be with regard to the relationship of the landlord and tenant and secondly such dispute should be genuine. Whether those two conditions were satisfied is the point to be considered in these cases. For that purpose, we have to examine the definitions of the ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ under Section 3(e) and 3(n) the Act which read as follows: 3(e). Whether those two conditions were satisfied is the point to be considered in these cases. For that purpose, we have to examine the definitions of the ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ under Section 3(e) and 3(n) the Act which read as follows: 3(e). “landlord” means a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or to be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant; 3(n). “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises, is or but for a special contract would be, payable, and includes: (i) a sub-tenant; (ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, but does not include any person to whom a licence as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (Central Act 5 of 1882) has been granted : 18. From the above provisions, it becomes clear that the requisites of tenant and landlord relationship are the payment and receipt of the rent. For that the title of the person receiving the rent is not sine qua none. 19. In these cases, relying on Ex.P45 the perpetual lease deed dated 05.11.1897 and Ex.P46 the registered deed of transfer of perpetual lease hold rights, the petitioner contended that her father was the Moolgenidar/permanent lessee of the petition properties. Relying on Ex.P2 the registered WILL dated 26.04.1972, she contended that by virtue of the bequest made under the said document, she acquired the rights of her father over the property, let out the properties and was collecting the rents. 20. None of the heirs of Doggu Kottary questioned the WILL relied upon by the petitioner. It is the settled proposition of law that the tenant being the stranger is not competent to question the WILL of the landlord. Further, the respondents themselves admitted that they were the tenants of the property and they had paid the rent to the petitioner till the period stated in the notices. 21. Respondents admitted that they were the tenants under the petitioner and they were paying rent to her all along. Further, the respondents themselves admitted that they were the tenants of the property and they had paid the rent to the petitioner till the period stated in the notices. 21. Respondents admitted that they were the tenants under the petitioner and they were paying rent to her all along. Their only contention was that they have purchased the rights of the Mulagar (ownership) himself from his heirs, therefore, there is a merger of their right of sub tenant with the right of the owner/original lessor. Therefore they claim that they are not liable to pay the rent or vacate the premises. Section 109 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states that when the question is whether persons are landlord and tenant and it has been shown that they have been acting as such, the burden of proving that they do not stand, or have ceased to stand to each other in those relationships respectively, he is on the person who affirms it. Therefore, once the jural relationship was admitted the presumption of such relationship was in favour of the petitioner. The burden was on the respondents to prove that such relationship was ceased. Therefore, the Court has to see whether the respondent discharged such burden. 22. Though the petitioner in her evidence deny the suggestion that the respondents have purchased the property from the Mulagar and the relationship of the executants of those sale deeds with Mulagar, tenants did not produce the said sale deeds relied upon by them. They did not enter the witness box to substantiate their case. In HRC No.92/2003 the first respondent did not set up any sale deed in his favour, but contended that his daughter and daughter in law have purchased the property. When the respondents did not have the seriousness of proving their case at least by producing the relevant documents and leading evidence, it becomes hard to accept that the dispute raised by them is genuine one. 23. Then the next question is whether the question of merger of the rights of the lessee and the owner of the property is a complicated question which cannot be examined by the Court under Section 27 of the Act. The question of merger was examined by this Court in Monnappa Kottari and others vs. David Pinto and another, ILR 2006 KAR 3936 which was a similar case. The question of merger was examined by this Court in Monnappa Kottari and others vs. David Pinto and another, ILR 2006 KAR 3936 which was a similar case. In that case it was held that in view of the intervening rights of Moolagenidar (Permanent lessee), on the Chalagar (sub-tenant/ordinary monthly tenant) purchasing the moolagar’s right there will be no merger and the sub-tenant’s right is subject to the rights of moolagenidar. Para 17 and 18 of the said judgment, in that regard read as follows. “17. In view of the above, it is clear that the right of the mulgenidar or submulgenidar cannot be extinguished except in case of violation of the conditions of mulgeni relating to payment of rent. Thus, if anybody purchases the right of mulgar, the same will always be subject to the right of mulgenidar or submulgenidar. The rights of mulgenidar of submulgendenidar are the intervening rights, in the case on hand, between the rights of mulgar and defendant No.1 (ordinary tenantiturned Mulgar). 18. …………………………………… If the sub-tenant acquires the entire interest of the owner in the whole of the estate, the sub-tenancy merges into ownership and the estate of Sub-tenant stands enlarged into that of a full owner. It has further observed that, the situation would have been different if the sub-tenant would not have acquired the entire estate of the owner or the ownership interest in the entire estate forming subject matter of sublease. A merger is prevented if there is an intermediate estate outstanding with another at the relevant time.…………………………….” (Emphasis supplied) 24. Thus it is clear that the law on the point of merger was well settled by this Court in Monappa Kottari’s case and there was no complicated question of law which could not be decided by the Court in the proceedings under the Rent Act. Even assuming for the arguments sake that the respondents have purchased the property from the moolagar or his heirs as alleged, and petitioner committed breach of Moolageni agreements, respondents had to work out their remedy in appropriate proceedings for possession or recovery of rent etc. The failure of the trial Court and the District Court in appreciating these aspects while driving the petitioner to the Civil Court by invoking Section 43 of the Act was therefore wholly erroneous under law and the facts of the case. 25. The failure of the trial Court and the District Court in appreciating these aspects while driving the petitioner to the Civil Court by invoking Section 43 of the Act was therefore wholly erroneous under law and the facts of the case. 25. Then the next question is whether the petitioner was entitled for eviction of the respondents under Section 27(2)(a)(h)(o) and (r) of the Act. Admittedly the respondents did not pay the rent denying the jural relationship and failed to prove the ground of denial. Therefore, they clearly incurred the liability of eviction under Section 27(2)(a) and (o) of the Act. 26. Section 27(2)(h) deals with the requirement of the premises by the landlord for the purpose of building, rebuilding or making any substantial addition or alterations to the same. Section 27(2)(r) deals with the requirement of the premises by the landlord for his own use and occupation either in the same form or in the reconstructed form. 27. Though the petition is filed under section 27(2)(h) and (r) of the Act, in the petitions it is only said that the premises are required for making substantial alterations to the same. In the affidavits filed by way of chief examination, absolutely there is no whisper about the requirement of the premises for reconstruction/substantial alteration. Therefore these are not the fit cases to grant eviction on the grounds under Section 27(2)(h) and (r) of the Act. 28. For the aforesaid reasons, the petitions are partly allowed with costs throughout. The impugned judgment and decree dated 01.03.2010 in HRC Nos.89/2003 and 92/2003 passed by the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dn), Mangaluru D.K confirmed by the I Additional District Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangaluru on 10.02.2011 in R.R.P.Nos.15/2010 and 16/2010 are hereby set aside. 29. The petitions in HRC Nos.89 and 92 of 2003 are hereby allowed on the grounds under Section 27(2)(a) and (o) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. The prayer for ejectment under Section 27(2)(h) and (r) of the Act is hereby rejected. The respondents shall handover the vacant possession of the petition premises to the petitioner within 60 days from the date of this order.