JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has put in issue an award of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Allahabad dated 16.02.1995 (published on 20.06.1995) passed in Adjudication Case No. 4 of 1989 between Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (CORDET), Phulpur, Allahabad through its Principal and Santlal. 2. Admittedly, Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (CORDET), Phulpur, Allahabad through its Principal are the Employers whereas Santlal is their workman between whom an industrial dispute has arisen. The former are the petitioners before this Court and shall hereinafter be referred to as ‘the Employers’. The latter, that is to say, Santlal, is arrayed as respondent no. 3 to this petition. He will henceforth be called ‘the workman’. 3. At the instance of the workman, an industrial dispute under Section 4-K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the Act’) was referred by the State Government to the adjudication of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Allahabad in the following terms: ^^D;k lsok;kstd }kjk vius Jfed lar yky Jh esok yy in ^^etnwj^^ dh lsok,a fnukad 21-03-1988 ls lekIr fd;k tkuk mfpr rFkk@vFkok oS/kkfud gS\ ;fn ugh] rks lEcf/kr Jfed D;k ykHk@vuqrks"k ¼fjyhQ½ ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS rFkk vU; fdu fooj.k lfgr\ 4. The Labour Court, Allahabad found for the workman and made an award holding that termination of services of the workman with effect from 21.03.1988 was one in breach of the provisions of Section 6-N of the Act, and, therefore, unlawful. It was ordered that the respondent-workman be reinstated with continuity in service and full back-wages. Cost of Rs.100/-were also awarded. The award aforesaid, details of which have been indicated hereinbefore, shall hereinafter be called ‘the impugned award’. 5. This petition was filed on 05.09.1995. It was admitted to hearing on 12.09.1995 and by a separate order passed on the stay application, it was ordered that operation of the award, insofar as it directs payment of back wages, shall remain stayed, provided the respondent-workman is reinstated forthwith and paid wages from 16.02.1995 till the date of reinstatement. In addition, it was directed that future wages post-reinstatement would be paid as and when they fall due. 6. A stay vacation application along with a counter affidavit was filed on 12th October, 1995 on behalf of the workman. The Employers filed a rejoinder affidavit on 11.08.1997. In addition, it was directed that future wages post-reinstatement would be paid as and when they fall due. 6. A stay vacation application along with a counter affidavit was filed on 12th October, 1995 on behalf of the workman. The Employers filed a rejoinder affidavit on 11.08.1997. The stay matter along with the workman’s stay vacation application came up before this Court for orders on 15.11.2008. By an order of the last mentioned date, the stay order dated 12.09.1995 was confirmed and the stay vacation application was rejected. This petition was ordered to be listed for hearing on 08.12.2008. A supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the Employers on 13th April, 2012. In the midst of hearing, on the request of learned counsel for the Employer, a second supplementary affidavit was permitted to be filed on 14.05.2019 after withdrawing the case from hearing. A supplementary counter affidavit in answer to the second supplementary affidavit on behalf of the Employer, was filed on the behalf of the workman on 15.05.2019. A supplementary rejoinder affidavit was filed on behalf of the Employer on 20.05.2019. This makes for the entire pleadings of the parties before this Court. 7. It appears that the workman moved the Conciliation Officer, Allahabad under Section 2-A of the Act seeking conciliation of the industrial dispute between the Employers and the workman, set out in his application dated 08.04.1988. The case before the Conciliation Officer that was registered on his file as C.P. Case No. 46 of 1988, was to the effect that the workman was employed in the Employers establishment since the month of December, 1976. He was retained on the post of a labourer on a permanent basis. The workman’s services were terminated with effect from 21.03.1988 by the Employers without any prior notice and without compliance with the provisions of the Act relating to retrenchment, embodied in Section 6-N, 6-P and 6-Q. It was also claimed that a demand was made by the workman on 30.03.1988 in writing, asking the Employers to settle the matter amicably but the Employers did not respond. It was requested that through conciliation proceedings the workman be extended relief of reinstatement with continuity in service, together with back wages since 31.03.1988 till his reinstatement. It was requested that through conciliation proceedings the workman be extended relief of reinstatement with continuity in service, together with back wages since 31.03.1988 till his reinstatement. The Employers appear to have put in their written statement dated 05.05.1988 before the Conciliation Officer, in substance, taking a categorical stand that they never terminated the services of the workman. Rather, it was the workman who absented from his duties with effect from 21st March, 1988. Dilating on this stand of theirs, the Employers asserted that due to losses in the Fisheries Department where the workman was engaged at the relevant time, the workman was asked to render service in the crop fields which he refused. It was the Employers further stand in their written statement that the workman, in case he wanted to work, could join duties in the crop files right away. 8. The conciliation proceedings failed and a reference was made to the adjudication of the Labour Court, in terms already set out hereinbefore. Before the Labour Court, the case was registered as Adjudication Case No. 4 of 1989 and notice was issued to parties. The workman put in his written statement dated 2nd May, 1989 where he asserted that he was appointed in the capacity of a labourer (Mazdoor) on a permanent post in the month of December, 1976 by the Employers. He continued in uninterrupted service of the Employers from December, 1976 to 20.02.1988. The workman had worked for more than 240 days in the Employers’ harness. His services were terminated by the Employers, with effect from 21.03.1988, illegally. There has been no complaint against him and he had an unblemished service record to his credit. It was further averred that the workman’s services were terminated without the service of a charge sheet or affording him opportunity of being heard. No domestic inquiry was ever held and that his services have been terminated in violation of principles of natural justice. It was more particularly averred that the workman has not been served with a month’s notice in writing, indicating the reasons for his retrenchment. Also, the workman has not been paid wages in lieu of notice or has he been paid retrenchment compensation. The termination was claimed by the workman to be in breach of the provisions of Section 6-N, 6P and 6-Q of the Act, besides Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Also, the workman has not been paid wages in lieu of notice or has he been paid retrenchment compensation. The termination was claimed by the workman to be in breach of the provisions of Section 6-N, 6P and 6-Q of the Act, besides Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was also specifically averred that the work that afforded employment to the workman was still available and juniors to the workman have been retained by the Employers. 9. The Employers filed a written statement and a rejoinder statement. The written statement of the Employers is not on record. Nevertheless, from a perusal of the impugned award, it appears that the written statement of the Employers was filed before the Labour Court, bearing Paper No. 4A. There, the Employers have disputed the fact that the workman was retained in the month of December, 1976. Instead it appears to be their case that the workman was employed from time to time according to the exigencies of work. There is then that specific case of the Employers that they never terminated the workman’s services but the workman, of his volition, stopped reporting to duty with effect from 21.03.1988. It is also their case noticed in the impugned award that the workman was taken off roster from the Fisheries Department and detailed to work in the crop fields; but, he refused to work there and ceased to report for duty since 21.03.1988. 10. The workman in his rejoinder statement has said that he was appointed in the establishment of the IFFCO, Phulpur Farm Project in the month of December, 1976. This project was transferred to the Employers by IFFCO. It was in the aforesaid manner that the workman continued in the services of the Employers. The workman was appointed on a permanent post, and that he never refused to work in the fields. The Employers in the rejoinder statement dated 29th June, 1988, which is on record as Annexure-6 to the writ petition, have reiterated their substantial case in paragraph-4 thereof; it is quoted in extenso: “4. That the contents of paragraph 3 are wrong and denied. The employer never terminated the services of the concerned workman, but he is himself absenting in his duties from 21-3-88. The concerned workman was asked to work in crop fields instead of fisheries but the concerned workman refused to work there.” 11. That the contents of paragraph 3 are wrong and denied. The employer never terminated the services of the concerned workman, but he is himself absenting in his duties from 21-3-88. The concerned workman was asked to work in crop fields instead of fisheries but the concerned workman refused to work there.” 11. The workman applied to the Labour Court to summon certain documents through his application numbered Paper No. 6D which included the attendance register from the month of December, 1976 to March, 1988 and the annual report of the Employers’ establishment from the month of December, 1976 to March, 1988. A further application was made to summon the records of C.P. Case No. 46 of 1988 from the Conciliation Officer. The Labour Court allowed the petitioner’s application bearing Paper No. 6D, ordering the Employers to produce documents sought to be summoned, vide order dated 07.09.1990. The Employers filed four documents through a list bearing Paper No. 11/B-1. This list carried at serial No. 1, 2 and 3 the monthly progress report relating to the Employers’ establishment and at serial no. 4, the muster roll from the month of December, 1986 to 31.06.1988. The Presiding Officer passed an order on the list of documents submitted by the Employers to the effect that the required documents have not been produced and, therefore, the workman was at liberty to produce secondary evidence. The workman, availing that opportunity, filed eight documents through a list bearing Paper No. 12B-2. The documents produced by the workman were marked as Exhibit Nos. WW/2 to WW10. The parties also led oral evidence. The workman supported his case by entering the witness box and deposed before the Labour Court as WW1. Likewise, the Employers also supported their case by oral evidence with the Principal of the Employers’ establishment at the relevant time, Laxman Singh, entering the witness box to testify as EW-1. 12. This Court has carefully perused the impugned award and the evidence of parties brought on record through affidavits. 13. Heard Sri Piyush Bhargava, learned counsel for the Employer (petitioner) and Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the workman (respondent no.2). 14. 12. This Court has carefully perused the impugned award and the evidence of parties brought on record through affidavits. 13. Heard Sri Piyush Bhargava, learned counsel for the Employer (petitioner) and Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the workman (respondent no.2). 14. It appears on a perusal of the impugned award that before the Labour Court, the Employers’ plea, that consistently figures in the conciliation proceedings and in the written statement filed before the Labour Court to the effect that the Employers never terminated the workman’s services but the workman of his own accord absented from work, was taken note of. The Labour Court has pointedly noticed the Employers’ case that the reference made by the State Government is fallacious and that no industrial dispute exists between parties, requiring adjudication. In order to decide the industrial dispute, the Labour Court has posed unto itself the following question that, in its perception, fell to be decided (translated into English from Hindi vernacular): “Whether the claimant workman, Santlal’s services have been terminated with effect from 21.03.88 without any justifiable cause or the workman has of his volition stopped reporting for work with effect from 21.03.88.” 15. The Labour Court has proceeded to answer the aforesaid question, in substance, holding that the Employers’ case about the workman not reporting to duty cannot be said to be established. A case of unlawful termination from service has been held in favour of the workman on account of breach of the provisions of Section 6-N of the Act. It has also been remarked as one of the foundations for these findings that the fact that the workman is a casual labourer, has not been proved by the Employers. It is on the basis of these findings that the impugned award has been entered. 16. Sri Piyush Bhargava, learned counsel for the Employer submits that the impugned award is without jurisdiction inasmuch as it is founded on a reference that does not encapsulate the substance of the dispute between parties. It is emphasised by him that the Labour Court, in considering evidence, could not have travelled beyond the reference which in this case it has decidedly done. It is his submission that the terms of reference being limited to a question about termination of the workman’s services, the Labour Court could not have gone into the issue about the workman’s voluntarily not reporting to duty. It is his submission that the terms of reference being limited to a question about termination of the workman’s services, the Labour Court could not have gone into the issue about the workman’s voluntarily not reporting to duty. He submits that, in fact, the reference is bad because it thrusts upon the Labour Court a case of termination from service whereas on the parties’ case that was well disclosed in conciliation proceedings, it is evident that the Employers’ stand was that they never terminated the workman’s services. The Employers had disclosed their stand before the Conciliation Officer that it was the workman who had refrained from reporting for duty with effect from 21.03.88. Therefore, according to learned Counsel for the Employers, the dispute between the parties is whether the workman voluntarily refrained from reporting to work on and after 21.03.88 and not whether his services were terminated. In the event, on the evidence led by parties in an adjudication founded on a reference about the workman abstaining from joining duties, the answer went in favour of workman, the dispute would be competently decided, entitling the workman to relief. In that event, according to learned counsel that question about the Employer preventing the workman from joining duties, as he claims, could well be gone into. This, according to learned counsel, is particularly so as the Employers case is that they never terminated the workman’s services. He emphasises that there being no acknowledgment of the fact by the Employer that the workman’s services were ever terminated, a reference about the legality of the workman’s termination from service is manifestly illegal. The order of reference, according to Sri Bhargava, has been made without application of mind by the State Government to the substance of the dispute between parties. No valid adjudication, according to learned counsel, could, therefore, be founded on it. 17. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Sitaram Vishnu Shirodkar vs. The Administrator, Government of Goa and others, reported in 1985 (1) LLJ 480. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to paragraph 8 of the report in Shirodkar (supra) where M.R.Waikar, J. speaking for the Division Bench held: “8. We are in respectful agreement with the above observations of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to paragraph 8 of the report in Shirodkar (supra) where M.R.Waikar, J. speaking for the Division Bench held: “8. We are in respectful agreement with the above observations of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court. In the instant case also the real dispute was whether the services of the respondent No. 4 were terminated or he had voluntarily abandoned the services and the reference that was made to this effect. “Whether the action of the Management of M/s. Hotel Cafe Real, Panaji in terminating the services of Shri Shanu Mango Kunkolienkar, with effect from 1st March, 1978 is legal and justified. If the answer be in the negative, to what relief, if any, is the aforementioned workman entitled to?” The Tribunal could not travel beyond the reference and decide the question whether the respondent No. 4 had abandoned his services. That the petitioner had terminated the services of the respondent No. 4 was an act fastened on the petitioner by this reference and the only question left open for decision was whether the termination was legal and proper. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the reference itself was bad and has to be quashed…….” (emphasis by Court) 18. Sri Bhargava has further placed reliance upon the decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Eagle Fashions vs. Secretary (Labour) & Others reported in 1999 (1) LLJ 232 Delhi. In Eagle Fashions (supra) it has been held: “….The principal ground on which challenge has been laid on the order of reference is that the terms of reference presume employment of Respondents 2 to 8 having been terminated and seeks adjudication on whether such termination was illegal or unjustified on the part of the Management. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that there was no material available with the appropriate Government for arriving at a finding of the employment of Respondents 2 to 8 having been terminated and as such the question of seeking adjudication on the legality or the justness thereof did not arise. 2. The learned counsel for Respondents 2 to 8 has supported the order of reference including the terms thereof. 3. 2. The learned counsel for Respondents 2 to 8 has supported the order of reference including the terms thereof. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material brought on record, we are satisfied that the terms of reference have not been properly drawn up and therefore the order of reference is vitiated. The Full Bench decision of this Court in India Tourism Development Corporation v. Delhi Administration, 1982 LIC 1309 is an authority for the proposition that the terms of reference should clearly spell out the real dispute between the parties and if that be not so, the order of reference would be liable to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court as the Labour Court would not travel beyond the reference and decide the real question in dispute. 4. When the factum of employment and termination itself were in dispute, the terms of reference could not have been so framed as to presume the employment and its termination and confining the reference merely to adjudication of illegality or unjustness thereof. We are of the opinion that the order of reference has been drawn up without application of mind and hence is vitiated. (emphasis by Court) 19. Learned counsel for the Employer has also to the same end reposed faith in a decision of this Court in Malloys India Agra vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court Agra and Another, Writ -C No. -14416 of 1998, decided on 14th March, 2019. In Malloys India Agra (supra), it has been held by B. Amit Sthalekar, J.: “In my opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is absolutely misconceived. When a reference is made by the State Government to the Labour Court, the Labour Court is bound to decide only that dispute which is referred to it and it cannot travel beyond the scope of the reference. The Labour Court itself is a creature of the reference and cannot adjudicate matters not within the purview of the dispute actually referred to it by the order of the reference. The law in this regard is well settled.” 20. Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the workman submits, repelling the petitioners contention on this count, that the reference is appropriately made so as to carry the substance of the industrial dispute between parties. The law in this regard is well settled.” 20. Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the workman submits, repelling the petitioners contention on this count, that the reference is appropriately made so as to carry the substance of the industrial dispute between parties. She submits that the petitioner’s case that the services of the workman were never terminated but that he abstained of his volition, is no more than the Employers’ defence. The factum of termination claimed by the workman, according to Ms. Gupta, is the substance of dispute. In judging the validity of the Employers’ action in terminating the workman’s services, their case about non termination, could well be determined. According to the learned counsel for the workman, what substantially has to be decided by the Labour Court is whether the workman’s services have been illegally dispensed with by the Employers. The Labour Court while going into this question, would be competent to examine the Employer’s case which is no more than their defence that the workman has abandoned employment. In judging the validity of the termination, it is implicit that the Labour Court would have to go into to the question whether, in fact, the workman’s services have been determined by the Employers. It is only in the event that the Labour Court finds it for a fact that the workman’s services have been terminated that it would go into its validity. In case, the Labour Court were to find that the Employers never terminated the workman’s services, the reference would have to be answered that way entitling the workman to continue. In short, according to learned Counsel for the workman, the terms of reference are appositely framed and empower the Labour Court to well examine the Employers case that they never terminated the workman’s services. It cannot, therefore, be said, according to learned Counsel for the workman, that the reference does not clothe the Labour Court with jurisdiction to examine the industrial dispute involved. 21. Away from the point of jurisdiction on the reference made, learned Counsel for the workman submits that the Labour Court has appreciated relevant evidence and come to the categorical conclusion that the workman has been illegally retrenched, in violation of Section 6-N of the Act. 21. Away from the point of jurisdiction on the reference made, learned Counsel for the workman submits that the Labour Court has appreciated relevant evidence and come to the categorical conclusion that the workman has been illegally retrenched, in violation of Section 6-N of the Act. It is submitted further that this Court cannot look into the correctness of findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court unless they are manifestly illegal, without jurisdiction or based on irrelevant evidence. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. Hindalco Industries Limited, (2014) 11 SCC 85 . On this score, she has drawn the attention of the Court to paragraph 22 of the report in Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi (supra), where it has been held by their Lordships thus: 22. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court shall interfere with factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or have made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court grating contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer Point (I) in favour of the appellant.” 22. There is little doubt about the principle that the Labour Court is a Court of referred jurisdiction. It derives its jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute from the terms of the order of reference, under Section 4-K of the Act. There can be little quarrel, again for a principle, that the Labour Court cannot venture into questions that are not part of the reference or the necessary incidents of it. Issues or questions that are concomitant of the substantial dispute referred, can well be gone into. But matters that would give rise to a different issue or question altogether cannot be examined by a Labour Court, unless referred. An intrinsically different dispute, though very proximate to the one referred, cannot be adjudicated upon by the Labour Court, in the absence of a reference clearly incorporating or carrying that dispute. But matters that would give rise to a different issue or question altogether cannot be examined by a Labour Court, unless referred. An intrinsically different dispute, though very proximate to the one referred, cannot be adjudicated upon by the Labour Court, in the absence of a reference clearly incorporating or carrying that dispute. 23. The question that then arises here is, whether the order of reference postulates a dispute about abandonment of or forsaking his employment by the workman. Learned Counsel for the workman submits that it is implicit in the idea of termination and is to be examined on the basis of evidence with the Employer urging it for a defence. This Court does not think so. The order of reference once it speaks about the validity of termination from service with effect from 21.03.88 binds the Labour Court to assume that the services of the workman were terminated. The Labour Court is left only to adjudge whether that termination is lawful or not; and if not, to what relief the workman is entitled. Nothing more or nothing less has been referred to the Labour Court. Here is a case where the State Government have for themselves determined the fact that it is a case of termination, leaving it to the Labour Court to determine the validity. The State Government is not at all empowered to decide or determine that it is a case of termination of services. Apparently, the reference has been made with little or no application of mind by the Authority competent to act for the State Government under Section 4-K. An appropriately drawn up reference would have clearly referred the dispute about the workman having abandoned services voluntarily and further the dispute that if it be not abandonment, termination from service is lawful or not. Then, of course, there would be a specific reference to the relief, if any. 24. The order of reference here, as already said, proceeds on a premise that the workman’s services have been terminated. This being the scope and content of the reference made to the Labour Court, the fact of termination becomes a jurisdictional fact. The Labour Court cannot go behind that jurisdictional fact to hold that in fact it is a case where the workman has voluntarily forsaken or abandoned employment or he has not done so. This being the scope and content of the reference made to the Labour Court, the fact of termination becomes a jurisdictional fact. The Labour Court cannot go behind that jurisdictional fact to hold that in fact it is a case where the workman has voluntarily forsaken or abandoned employment or he has not done so. The Labour Court has gone into the question of the workman voluntarily staying away from work after 21.03.88 and held for a fact on the basis of evidence that he did not do so. He has then proceeded to record a finding with reference to evidence that it is a case where the services of the workman have been terminated in breach of Section 6-N of the Act. Clearly, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the emergent industrial dispute, in the absence of the order of reference carrying clear terms, asking it to examine the issue whether the workman had voluntarily stayed away from work or abandoned employment with effect from 21.03.88. 25. The view that this Court takes finds particular support in the decision of the Bombay High Court in Sitaram Vishnu Shirodkar (supra), where the Division Bench held to like effect on principle in a case with very similar facts. The principle on which this Court has proceeded also has endorsement of the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Eagle Fashions (supra) besides this Court in Malloys India Agra (supra). 26. Learned counsel for the Employer and workman have exchanged further pleadings by way of supplementary affidavits, including a supplementary counter and a supplementary rejoinder, where the Employer has tried to demonstrate that the workman was reinstated in service in compliance with the interim order passed by this Court and paid wages as directed. Later on, he again abandoned employment and took up work with the Employers as a contractor. Learned counsel for the Employer has pointed out, on the basis of some of the contracts annexed, that the workman found opting out of employment and to work as a contractor for the Employer more lucrative. Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta has asserted that the contracts have been forced upon the workman in order to get rid of obligations that the Employers would owe him, if he were to continue as their employee. Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta has asserted that the contracts have been forced upon the workman in order to get rid of obligations that the Employers would owe him, if he were to continue as their employee. It is also emphasised on the basis of facts and figures disclosed in the supplementary counter affidavit that the contracts yield lesser advantage to the workman that what he would get in remuneration as an employee. It is not for this Court to go into this post award event. It does not arise either on the reference made or on the terms of the impugned award. In the event, the workman post reinstatement in terms of the award passed by this Court, has left employment and has some grievance about it, it would be a fresh transaction that may give rise to a fresh industrial dispute. It has nothing to do with the industrial dispute that is subject matter of the impugned award. 27. In view of what has been said above, the impugned award is held to be without jurisdiction and, therefore, manifestly illegal. The State Government shall, however, make a fresh reference of the industrial dispute between the Employer and the workman, appropriately drawn up bearing in mind what has been said in this judgment. This reference shall be made by the State Government on the basis of existing material, particularly the record of the conciliation proceedings between the workman and the Employer. The reference, as above indicated, shall be made within three months next to the competent Labour Court for adjudication in accordance with law. Any sum of money that the workman has received under interim orders of this Court, shall not be recovered from him bearing in mind the fact that the workman has rendered service for a substantial period of time in terms of the award impugned, the interim order passed here and also the totality of circumstances obtaining. 28. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned award dated 16.02.1995 (published on 20.06.1995) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Allahabad in Adjudication Case No. 4 of 1989, is hereby quashed. The State Government shall make reference afresh, within three months next, to the competent Labour Court bearing in mind what has been said in this judgment. The impugned award dated 16.02.1995 (published on 20.06.1995) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Allahabad in Adjudication Case No. 4 of 1989, is hereby quashed. The State Government shall make reference afresh, within three months next, to the competent Labour Court bearing in mind what has been said in this judgment. All monies received by the workman in terms of the interim order of this Court, passed in this petition, shall, however, not be recovered from him. Costs easy.