JUDGMENT : 1. Civil Application No. 1 of 2020 for vacating of interim relief was filed by applicant who is the respondent in the original petition and had been adjourned from time to time. By an order dated 13.08.2020 on the Civil Application, the Registry was requested to notify the main matter together with the Civil Application which was understood and agreed to by the parties to the petition that since the Civil Application for vacating of stay would require the court to go through the main proceedings, it would be in the fitness of things that the main petition is taken up for hearing and it was in this context that the main petition is heard today i.e. 25.09.2020. 2. The petitioners, two in number, have approached this court praying for an appropriate writ, order or direction declaring that the impugned communication dated 17.01.2019 by which decision to discontinue the petitioners from 31.03.2019 is wholly illegal, unjust, arbitrary and irrational and therefore the same be quashed and set aside and to direct the respondents to continue the petitioners up to the age of superannuation. 3. The case of the petitioners is that the respondent no. 2 - Gujarat Ecology Commission was established in 1992 by the Forest And Environment Department of the Government of Gujarat with a purpose for implementation of a comprehensive policy encompassing aspects of pollution control, environmental upgrade and improve ecological management. The case of the petitioners is that the Commission engages employees for fulfillment of many schemes of the Central Government and the State Government and the work of such schemes is constant, regular and perennial in nature. The petitioners state that they were directly appointed by the respondent for such regular, constant and perennial nature of work under the ICZM (Integrated Coastal Zone Management) project. The case of the petitioners is that they are aggrieved by the renewal of their contractual appointments by an order dated 17.01.2019 only upto 31.03.2019. 4. Mr. Harsh Raval, learned advocate appearing with Mr. Amresh Patel, learned advocate for the petitioners has taken this court through various orders of appointments in case of the petitioners and he would submit that as far as petitioner no. 2 is concerned, he has been in service initially as a Field Worker and thereafter as a Project Coordinator since 2006. In the case of the petitioner no. Amresh Patel, learned advocate for the petitioners has taken this court through various orders of appointments in case of the petitioners and he would submit that as far as petitioner no. 2 is concerned, he has been in service initially as a Field Worker and thereafter as a Project Coordinator since 2006. In the case of the petitioner no. 1, his first appointment was as a Field Worker on 02.12.2010 and since then he has been continuously working with the respondent Gujarat Ecology Commission. The curtailment of their tenure of appointment by communication dated 17.01.2019 only upto 31.03.2019 is bad. Mr. Harsh Raval, learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that the project is an artificial, false paper arrangement to evade the direct liability of the respondent no. 2 - Gujarat Ecology Commission. As stated hereinabove, Mr. Raval submitted that the petitioners were appointed in 2010 and 2006 respectively and their appointments were in accordance with prevalent rules and regulations against permanent posts. 4.1 Taking the court through the various appointment letters issued from time to time, Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that reading such orders it is apparently clear that the appointment of the petitioners was not for a specific project. Their appointments have been extended from time to time as is evident from the orders produced on record. He would submit that even when the undertaking so relied upon by the respondents is read, it is evident that their appointment was with the respondent no. 2 Commission and it belies the stand of the respondent that the petitioners' appointment was for a project mainly ICZM. He would submit that regular increments were also released in favour of the petitioners. 4.2 Inviting the attention of the court that though a decision was taken by the Commission on 15.10.2018 to discontinue the services of the petitioners on closure of the ICZM project from 29.12.2018, the fact that thereafter their services have been extended from time to time upto 31.03.2019 would substantiate the contention of the petitioners that their appointment was not for a specific project namely ICZM. 4.3 Mr. Raval would further submit by drawing the attention of the court to the advertisement issued by the respondents (page 100 of the paper book) to submit that the advertisement is issued by the respondent Commission for various posts under the Smart City Project on 30th January 2019. 4.3 Mr. Raval would further submit by drawing the attention of the court to the advertisement issued by the respondents (page 100 of the paper book) to submit that the advertisement is issued by the respondent Commission for various posts under the Smart City Project on 30th January 2019. The Smart City project is also one of the projects under the Commission and therefore without disturbing their service conditions, the petitioners could have been continued on such posts. 4.4 By placing extensive reliance on the communications annexed to the Civil Application and the reply filed by the petitioners to the Civil Application for vacating of stay, Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that the stand of the respondent that now that the World Bank has withdrawn funding of the scheme and therefore the scheme needs to be closed resulting in the winding of the project and the consequential termination, is misconceived. Reading the letter dated 31.03.2020 issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, with regard to the guidelines of the ICZM Phase I project, Mr. Raval would submit that what is closed or wound up is the phase I of the ICZM, however, the existing staff engaged for the ICZM can be continued with the preparatory activities of ENCORE project and therefore the petitioners ought to be continued even otherwise and their termination therefore is bad. Extensive reliance was placed on the downloaded brochure of the volume regarding ENCORE (Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Programme). Mr. Raval would submit that reading the volume on the ENCORE project would indicate that in the three coastal states of Gujarat, Orissa and West Bengal projects for coastal pollution prevention etc would be continued. Attention of the court was invited to page 140 of the paper book with regard to the volume to contend that based on the success of ICZM phase I project, SICOM is interested to extend and implement the project under phase II in various states including Gujarat and the preparatory activities for the Phase II (ENCORE), is in progress. There is no reason therefore that the petitioners ought to be terminated. 4.5 In support of his submissions, Mr. There is no reason therefore that the petitioners ought to be terminated. 4.5 In support of his submissions, Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the petitioners relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.M. Nilajkar vs. Telecom District Manager [ (2003) 4 SCC 27 , paras 11, 13] to submit that the government would undertake projects and provide employment and livelihood to persons and therefore the government has the onerous obligation that while extending such benefits of livelihood, care must be taken under the Industrial Disputes Act. He would rely on para 13 of the decision on the ground that when the employment order does not in effect show that the petitioner has been engaged in a particular scheme, it will not be open for the respondent to contend that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) under the Industrial Disputes Act will apply. 4.6 He would further rely on the decision in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Om Pal Singh [ (2016) 16 SCC 584 ] to submit that by not regularizing the services of the petitioners, and extending them from time to time as observed in para 3 of the decision would tantamount to unfair labour practice and therefore a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is also maintainable. In addition, he would also rely on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Limited vs. Petroleum Coal Labour Union and Others [ (2015) 6 SCC 494 ] in support of his submission that it is the duty of public utility corporations and state owned corporation not to indulge in unfair practices and deny the statutory benefits of regularization. 5. Mr. K.M. Patel, learned Senior Counsel has appeared with Mr. Hamesh Naidu, learned advocate for the respondent Commission and the applicant in the Civil Application for vacating stay. Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel would raise a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition. He would submit that if the grounds raised in the petition are perused, particularly, ground (A) thereof, admittedly the case is one where the petitioners, rather than invoking the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought to have approached the Labour Court. Patel, learned Senior Counsel would raise a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition. He would submit that if the grounds raised in the petition are perused, particularly, ground (A) thereof, admittedly the case is one where the petitioners, rather than invoking the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought to have approached the Labour Court. It is only in exceptional cases that this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would permit the petitioners invocation of a remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Patel would secondly draw the attention of this court to the orders passed by the Industrial Tribunal which are annexed by the petitioners themselves and support his stand on the maintainability of the petition. He submitted that before the Tribunal, their reference for regularization is pending. He would submit that when an application for interim relief was made in the pending reference before the Tribunal, their application was rejected. He would take the court to the reasonings for which the Tribunal refused to grant interim relief and a specific observation that since the appointments of the petitioners were on a project and for the purposes of the scheme the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) applied and therefore the petitioners were not entitled to interim relief. These orders of the Tribunal have attained finality inasmuch as that they have not been challenged by the petitioners before the appropriate forum i.e. the High Court. It is now not open for the petitioners therefore to pursue their claim for regularization and for such other benefits by way of a main industrial reference pending before the Tribunal and for an interim arrangement, pending that reference, to approach the court by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5.1 The contention of the petitioners that they are engaged after appointment through regular procedure on sanctioned posts is also disputed by the respondents. Mr. Patel would take the court to the affidavit-in-reply, particularly para 8 thereof, to substantiate the stand. He would submit that the sanctioned vacancy in the respondent Commission is 18 posts. Nowhere do the names of the posts of the petitioners figure so as to support their stand that they were appointed on a permanent vacancy. Mr. Patel would take the court to the affidavit-in-reply, particularly para 8 thereof, to substantiate the stand. He would submit that the sanctioned vacancy in the respondent Commission is 18 posts. Nowhere do the names of the posts of the petitioners figure so as to support their stand that they were appointed on a permanent vacancy. In fact, a specific undertaking was given by the petitioners that they are aware that their appointments are purely contractual and therefore it is now not open for them to submit that they are appointed through a regular process of selection. 5.2 As far as the advertisement of the Smart City is concerned, Mr. Patel would submit that the said project was a separate project, the petitioners did not possess the requisite qualifications for participating in the recruitment and that the posts were separate than the posts on which the petitioners are working. 5.3 As far as the argument that the ENCORE project is a phase-II project and it continues by relying on clause(v) as submitted by Mr. Raval, Mr. Patel would submit that at that relevant point of time in the year 2018, since the World Bank extended the funding, the services of the petitioners were not terminated. However, it is now evident from the letter of the World Bank dated 31.03.2020 that they no longer want to fund the project and had a specific direction issued that the project must be closed and the books of accounts be wound up. He would further submit that the contention that the petitioners be continued in the preparatory activities of the ENCORE project is also misconceived. He would submit that the ENCORE project is also as on date not approved by the Government of India or by the World Bank. He further submitted that non-funding of the projects has resulted in their closure. The ENCORE project is altogether a separate project, not approved till date and therefore reliance thereon cannot be placed. 5.4 The decisions on which Mr. Raval has relied upon, in the submission of Mr. Patel, would all be decisions arising out of references of dispute before the Labour Court which would substantiate the stand of the respondent that it is the Labour Court which is the competent court. 5.4 The decisions on which Mr. Raval has relied upon, in the submission of Mr. Patel, would all be decisions arising out of references of dispute before the Labour Court which would substantiate the stand of the respondent that it is the Labour Court which is the competent court. He would rely on the decision of the Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corporation Ltd. vs. U. P. Rajya Setu Nigam S Karmachari Sangh [ (2004) 4 SCC 268 ] in support of his submission that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable and it is the Labour Court which should examine the issue even if the issue of unfair labour practice arises. It was a case where a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was entertained and the Apex Court deprecated the practice as is evident, in the submission of Mr. Patel by relying on paras 11, 14, 17 and 27 of the decision. 5.5 Mr. Patel also relied on a decision in the case of Chetankumar Sureshbhai Patel vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. delivered by this court in Special Civil Application No. 12302 of 2015 and group matters on 30.06.2016 wherein after discussing various decisions of the Apex Court on the issue of regularization, the court held after considering the decision in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others vs. Umadevi and others [2006 AIR (SC) 1806] that it is not open for the court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the petition was dismissed looking to the nature of appointment being primarily contractual in nature. 6. Having considered the submissions of the learned advocates for the respective parties, on a perusal of the memo of petition, contemporaneous documents annexed to the petition, the reply, the rejoinder, the Civil Application and the sur-rejoinder thereto, it is clear that from the appointment orders in the case of the petitioners, firstly in the year 2006 in case of petitioner no. 2 and that of year 2010 in case of petitioner no. 1 what is evident is that their appointments were contractual appointments. In the year 2006 and in the year 2010, when the petitioners were appointed, the orders of appointment specifically and categorically stated that their appointments were on a contractual basis. Subsequently, the petitioners were promoted/appointed as Project Coordinators. 2 and that of year 2010 in case of petitioner no. 1 what is evident is that their appointments were contractual appointments. In the year 2006 and in the year 2010, when the petitioners were appointed, the orders of appointment specifically and categorically stated that their appointments were on a contractual basis. Subsequently, the petitioners were promoted/appointed as Project Coordinators. When their appointments were made as Project Coordinators, their letters indicate that their appointments are as Project Coordinators for implementation of the ICZM Project, that the petitioners will have to work on such ICZM Project. The appointment orders categorically stated that their appointments are for 11 months on a contractual basis. 6.1 At one stage, by a communication dated 15.12.2018, the Commission albeit did decide to discontinue the project, what is evident from reading the affidavit-in-reply and that the earlier petition was withdrawn was that since the World Bank decided to continue funding of the project that the petitioners were continued. It is in light of these facts that the communication dated 17.01.2019 extending the appointments of the petitioners for a tenure upto 31.03.2019 has to be read. Merely because the petitioners continued to work from 2006 and 2010 respectively, it cannot be lost sight of the fact that their appointments were purely contractual in nature not giving any right in their favour for being regularized in service or claiming permanency. The court would not venture into deciding and ousting their claim for permanency particularly when an industrial reference before the Tribunal is at large, however, for the purposes of considering the case when the request is made by the petitioners for continuing them in service on the basis of the currency of the project is concerned, that finding of fact will have to be given i.e. the petitioners' appointments are contractual and therefore there cannot be any right for them to continue to work. 7. This is so particularly when the interim orders refusing interim relief are seen, a specific finding has been recorded that the appointments of the petitioners are project based and scheme based. Provisions of Section-2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act applies and therefore interim relief was refused. There was no challenge to the orders refusing interim relief by the petitioners and therefore I would agree with the submissions of Mr. Provisions of Section-2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act applies and therefore interim relief was refused. There was no challenge to the orders refusing interim relief by the petitioners and therefore I would agree with the submissions of Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel that having invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for reference when the main dispute is pending, merely for an offshoot of claiming interim protection of their services, once having lost before the industrial Tribunal by way of interim application, it is not open for the petitioners to invoke the jurisdiction of this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. Through various documents on record, Mr. Harsh Raval very vehemently tried to submit that the appointments of the petitioners are with the Gujarat Ecological Commission. That even if phase I of the ICZM Project has closed, the letter of 31.03.2020 by which the funding of the World Bank is stopped as a result of which the project is to be discontinued, phase II of ICZM is in progress, preparatory work of ENCORE is under way and the petitioners therefore can be continued in service, perusal of the reply on behalf of the Commission and the surrejoinder filed during the course of proceedings would indicate that the World Bank has completely shut down and stopped funding of the project i.e. ICZM Phase – I. The rejoinder further indicates that the so far as preparatory work for ENCORE or Phase - II Project of ICZM is concerned, the Government of India through the Ministry of Environment and Forests has not approved nor has the Central Government started any funding of the project. The 24 employees who had been working in the ENCORE project have also been discontinued. This is more so the reason why the contention of the petitioners that they be continued and permitted to work as part of an ENCORE project does not deserve and merit consideration. The project Phase -I has been stopped in terms of funds from the World Bank. The appointments of the petitioners especially as Project Coordinators was specifically for the ICZM project. A categorical undertaking was given by the petitioners that they are aware that their appointments are contractual. The project Phase -I has been stopped in terms of funds from the World Bank. The appointments of the petitioners especially as Project Coordinators was specifically for the ICZM project. A categorical undertaking was given by the petitioners that they are aware that their appointments are contractual. The contracts were signed with their open eyes and therefore it is now not open for the petitioners to turn around and say that their appointments are under a regular process of selection and therefore they be continued in service. The argument that the petitioners had no alternative but to sign on the dotted line and now claim that the respondent is indulging in unfair labour practice is one more reason why the petitioners ought to be relegated to an appropriate forum of Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal so formed and framed under the Industrial Disputes Act. 9. The judgment in the case of Nilajkar (supra) pressed by Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the petitioners would not apply to the facts of the present case. Admittedly, in the present case, reading the appointment order would indicate that it was an express statement known to the petitioners that their appointments are purely contractual and temporary, based on the ICZM Project. Therefore the support of the decision in the case of Nilajkar (Supra) would not help the petitioners. Even admittedly by them in the ground raised in the petition, there is a violation of provisions of Industrial Disputes Act; that it is a false paper arrangement of the GEC and violation of the Contract Labour Abolition Act. All these contentions are disputed questions of fact which can only be examined by the appropriate forum under the Industrial Disputes Act. The judgment in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corporation (supra) would squarely fall in place in the facts of the present case. Relevant paras thereof read as under: “11. All these contentions are disputed questions of fact which can only be examined by the appropriate forum under the Industrial Disputes Act. The judgment in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corporation (supra) would squarely fall in place in the facts of the present case. Relevant paras thereof read as under: “11. Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute and may not be read as a limitation on the Court's powers under Article 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner. There is another aspect of the matter. Certified Standing Orders have been held to constitute statutory terms and conditions of service - D.K. Yadav V. J.M.A Industries 1993 (3) SCC 259 . Although this statement of the law was doubted in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another V. Krishna Kant and Others 1995 (5) SCC 75 , it was not deviated from. It was however made clear that Certified Standing Orders do not constitute 'Statutory Provisions' in the sense that dismissal or removal of an employee in contravention of the Certified Standing Orders would be a contravention of statutory provisions enabling the workman to file a writ petition for their enforcement. This is what was said by this Court in Rajasthan Transport Corporation (supra): "Indeed, if it is held that certified Standing Orders constitute statutory provisions or have statutory force, a writ petition would also lie for their enforcement just as in the case of violation of the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Neither a suit would be necessary nor a reference under Industrial Disputes Act. We do not think the certified Standing Orders can be elevated to that status. It is one thing to say that they are statutorily imposed conditions of service and an altogether different thing to say that they constitute statutory provisions themselves." 14. The High Court incorrectly applied the provisions of Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to hold that no notice of strike was necessary. It is one thing to say that they are statutorily imposed conditions of service and an altogether different thing to say that they constitute statutory provisions themselves." 14. The High Court incorrectly applied the provisions of Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to hold that no notice of strike was necessary. It is conceded by the respondent that the operative Act was the UPIDA which differs materially, in this connection, with the Industrial Disputes Act. Under Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, a notice of strike is required to be given, as held by the High Court, only in the case of any public utility service and the appellant corporation is not a public utility service. However, under Section 65 of the UPIDA the notice of strike is required to be given in respect of an industrial establishment. It is not argued on behalf of the respondent that the appellant-Corporation is not an industrial establishment. Whatever the legal consequences of not giving of such notice may be, it cannot be said in the circumstances that the employees were admittedly on strike as a matter of fact. 17. It was argued before us by the respondent-Union that the notice issued by the appellant-Corporation to the workmen to rejoin duties did not sufficiently comply with the principles of natural justice and that individual notices were required to be given to each of the workmen. The submission was not raised by the respondent at any stage. Besides, whether the notice by advertisement was sufficient information for the purposes of compliance with the requirements of natural justice is again a question of fact the foundation of which should be pleaded and sufficiently proved. 24. The final submission of the respondent was that the UPIDA provided for penalty after a departmental enquiry, in respect of the workman who may have gone on illegal strike and, therefore, there could be no termination of services on account of illegal strike. The submission is unacceptable as we have said there is no proof that the respondents were on strike at all. Besides, merely because the action is punishable does not mean that the consequence of an unauthorised absence is not available under the Certified Standing Orders if it so specifically provides. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in setting aside the decision of the High Court in dismissing the writ petition. Besides, merely because the action is punishable does not mean that the consequence of an unauthorised absence is not available under the Certified Standing Orders if it so specifically provides. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in setting aside the decision of the High Court in dismissing the writ petition. This order will, however, not preclude the respondent-Union if it is otherwise so entitled to raise an industrial dispute under the UPIDA. The appeals are allowed but without any order as to costs.” 10. For the aforesaid reasons, this court deems it fit that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the prayers made is not maintainable and the petition is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief is vacated. In view of the dismissal of the main petition, Civil Application filed by the respondents is disposed of. After the aforesaid judgment was pronounced, Mr. Harsh Raval, learned advocate for the petitioner requested for stay of the judgment. Request is rejected.