JUDGMENT : M. Venkata Ramana, J. 1. This Civil Miscellaneous appeal is directed against the order dated 21.11.2017 in I.A. No. 1942 of 2015 in O.S. No. 804 of 2015 of the Court of the learned VII Additional District Judge (FTC), Visakhapatnam. 2. Application in I.A. No. 1942 of 2015 in O.S. No. 804 of 2015 was filed for grant of temporary injunction under Order-39, Rules 1 and 2 r/w. Section 94 and Section 151 CPC restraining the appellants and others from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property of the 1st respondent, during pendency of the suit. 3. The 1st respondent instituted the suit to declare four General Powers of Attorney bearing document Nos. 643/2015, 644/2015 and 646/2015 dated 23.02.2015, are vitiated by fraud, invalid/non-est, not binding on the 1st respondent and to grant a permanent injunction restraining the appellants and the 7th defendant from interfering with its peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. A further relief of permanent injunction is sought against the respondents 2 and 3, who are the defendants 9 and 10, from registering any document basing on four General Powers of Attorney referred to above. 4. The property in dispute is an extent of Ac. 10-30 2/3 cents situated in Marripalem & Kapparada villages of Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation in S. Nos. 59/1p;41/1p(new);32(old) or 42/4p(new):66/1;66/2; 66/3;66/4;57/3p;57/4p;57/5p; 58p and 59/3p within the following boundaries: East: Land belonging to M/s. Lakshmi Techno Solutions (P) Ltd., South: Bapuji Nagar Colony; West: Municipal Road and Jyothi Nagar and North: National Highway. It shall be referred to hereinafter as 'the suit property', for convenience. 5. The 1st respondent is an incorporated company in the activity of manufacturing electrical transformers stated to have its manufacturing unit in the suit property. It was known earlier as 'Andhra Pradesh Electrical Equipment Corporation' (APEEC) and it is a Birla Group company. 6. The 1st respondent claimed that it is the absolute owner of the suit property and that it had acquired a total extent of Ac. 21-27 2/3 cents at Marripalem & Kapparada villages of Visakhapatnam under different sale deeds from the original owners in between the years 1962 and 1965 while Ac. 2-30 cents was held by it initially as a lessee, which was later sold to it under four sale deeds of the years 2009 and 2011. 7. 21-27 2/3 cents at Marripalem & Kapparada villages of Visakhapatnam under different sale deeds from the original owners in between the years 1962 and 1965 while Ac. 2-30 cents was held by it initially as a lessee, which was later sold to it under four sale deeds of the years 2009 and 2011. 7. It is also the case of the 1st respondent that in the years 2004 and 2006 an extent of Ac. 11-45 cents was alienated in favour of M/s. Lakshmi Techno Solutions Private Limited and sale deeds were executed in the years 2013 and 2014 covering an extent of Ac. 10-97 cents in favour of M/s. Lakshmi Techno Solutions Private Limited. 8. The 1st respondent further claimed that on their application to Government of Andhra Pradesh for conversion of the suit land from industrial use to residential and commercial use, it was sanctioned through G.O. Ms. No. 249 dated 11.04.2014. It is also the contention of the 1st respondent that sheds have been raised in this land with electricity and telephone connections. 9. Further contention of the 1st respondent is that the appellants and the 7th defendant in order to grab the suit land fabricated four General Powers of Attorney referred to above, nature of which was confirmed in the investigation by police on a complaint presented by it and also by the registration authorities. In as much as attempt is made to interfere with its possession and enjoyment of the suit property by one Sri. Maridi Taviti Naidu and others to encroach into the property sold by this company to M/s. Lakshmi Techno Solutions Private Limited, a complaint was also given to the 5th Town Police Station, Visakhapatnam by the above company and in M.C. No. 28 of 2014 concerned to the above complaint, the then Tahsildar, held by his order dated 24.06.2014 in favour of the 1st respondent as to possession and title to the suit land. 10. In the above circumstances, it is the contention of the 1st respondent that in as much as the 1st respondent is in settled possession and enjoyment of the suit land with lawful title, temporary injunction against the appellant and the 7th defendant be granted restraining them from interfering with its possession and enjoyment of the suit land, pending suit. 11. In the above circumstances, it is the contention of the 1st respondent that in as much as the 1st respondent is in settled possession and enjoyment of the suit land with lawful title, temporary injunction against the appellant and the 7th defendant be granted restraining them from interfering with its possession and enjoyment of the suit land, pending suit. 11. The appellant resisted the claim of the 1st respondent denying its entire case of having right, title and interest to the suit land as well as an extent of Ac. 21-27 2/3 cents. They also denied that an extent of Ac. 11.45 cents was agreed to be sold in the year 2004 and 2006 to M/s. Lakshmi Techno Solutions Private Limited and of executing sale deeds in its favour. Denying that permission was given by the Government for converting use of this land from industrial to residential and commercial purposes by G.O. Ms. No. 294 darted 11.12.2014, the appellants questioned nature of this G.O. contending that it was obtained without following due procedure at the instance of Sri. Kambhampati Rama Mohana Rao, who is the owner of Sri. Lakshmi Techno Solutions Private Limited and a powerful politician at Visakhapatnam. 12. It is the further contention of the appellants that neither the 1st respondent nor M/s. Lakshmi Techno Solutions Private Limited has any right, title, interest, possession and enjoyment to the entire extent or the suit land. 13. Asserting that they have been in continuous peaceful possession and enjoyment of a total extent of Ac. 22-27 cents in 10 items of the property, setting out source of title through (1) Sri. Sanapala Jagannaikulu, Son of Sri. late Kamayya, (2) Sri. Bagadhi Neelayya, Son of Sri. late Krishnamma, (3) Sri. Nethinti Appanna, Son of Sri. late Chenchaiah and (4) Sri. Gandi Appalanaidu, Son of Sri. late Simhachalam. They claimed that the respondents 5 to 7 and Sri. Bagadhi Lakshminarayana (7th defendant) have acquired the above extent. They further contended that for the purpose of proper management the respondents 5 to 7 and Sri. Bagadhi Lakshminarayana had executed four GPAs in question in favour of the appellants 1 to 4. 14. Asserting that they have been the rightful owners, possessors and enjoyers of not only the suit land but the other extent covered by the suit S. Nos., in all, to an extent of Ac. Bagadhi Lakshminarayana had executed four GPAs in question in favour of the appellants 1 to 4. 14. Asserting that they have been the rightful owners, possessors and enjoyers of not only the suit land but the other extent covered by the suit S. Nos., in all, to an extent of Ac. 22-27 cents, denying that these GPAs are forged and fabricated, they questioned the claim of the 1st respondent on the premise that the 1st respondent did not have any cause of action to lay the suit against them, who undervalued the suit without paying proper court fee playing mischief and fraud in that process. Thus, they claimed that there are no bona fides in the case of the 1st respondent. 15. In the enquiry before the learned Trial Judge, Ex. P1 to Ex. P44 were marked on behalf of the 1st respondent and the appellants relied on Ex. R1 to Ex. R16 in support of their contention. 16. On the material, the learned trial Judge, accepted the contention of the 1st respondent. While rejecting the version of the appellants, the trial Court held that the material produced by the 1st respondent made out that it has been in possession and enjoyment of the property since a long time continuously and therefore, it is entitled for temporary injunction as sought against the appellants and Sri. Bagadhi Lakshminarayana (7th defendant) 17. Sri. O. Manohar Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants, and Sri. V. Ramesh, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. M. Chandra Sekhar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, addressed arguments. 18. Now, the following points arise for determination: 1. Whether the 1st respondent made out a prima facie case and balance of convenience in its favour against the appellants and 7th defendant? 2. Whether the 1st respondent would suffer irreparable loss and injury in the event of refusal to grant temporary injunction as sought? 3. Whether the learned trial Judge is justified in granting temporary injunction as prayed against the appellants and 7th defendant? 4. To what relief? POINT No. 1: 19. The burden is on the 1st respondent to establish its claim for grant of temporary injunction making out a prima facie case in its favour as well as balance of convenience. 3. Whether the learned trial Judge is justified in granting temporary injunction as prayed against the appellants and 7th defendant? 4. To what relief? POINT No. 1: 19. The burden is on the 1st respondent to establish its claim for grant of temporary injunction making out a prima facie case in its favour as well as balance of convenience. For this purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the 1st respondent to prove its lawful possession of the property and thereupon the burden shifts to the appellants to make out that the claim of the 1st respondent is not correct while asserting that they have been in rightful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. 20. In this context, on behalf of the 1st respondent reliance is placed on Gangubai Bablya Chaudhary and others vs. Sitaram Bhalchandra Sukhtankar and others : 1983(4) SCC 31 . In Para 6 of this ruling in this context it is stated: "6. When an interim injunction is sought, the Court may have to examine whether the party seeking the assistance of the Court, was at any time in lawful possession of the property and if it is so established one would prima facie ask the other side contesting the suit to show how the plaintiffs were dispossessed?" 21. Similarly, in M. Gurudas and others vs. Rasaranjan and Others : 2006 (8) SCC 367 relied on for the 1st respondent in para-21 it is stated as under:- "21. While considering the question of granting an order of injunction one way or the other, evidently, the court, apart from finding out a prima facie case, would consider the question in regard to the balance of convenience of the parties as also irreparable injury which might be suffered by the plaintiffs if the prayer for injunction is to be refused. The contention of the plaintiffs must be bona fide. The question sought to be tried must be a serious question and not only on a mere triable issue. [See Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and Ors. : [1990]2 SCC 117, Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors. : (1992) 1 SCC 719 , United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India and Ors. : (1981) 2 SCC 766 , Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Coca Cola Co. and Ors. : (1995)5 SCC 545 , Bina Murlidhar Hemdev and Ors. : [1990]2 SCC 117, Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors. : (1992) 1 SCC 719 , United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India and Ors. : (1981) 2 SCC 766 , Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Coca Cola Co. and Ors. : (1995)5 SCC 545 , Bina Murlidhar Hemdev and Ors. v. Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev : (1999) 5 SCC 222 and Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. : (2006) 1 SCC 540 ]." 22. For the purpose of arriving as to what is prima facie case and balance of convenience in the given facts and circumstances, in as much as enquiry under Order-39, Rules Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 CPC in terms of Section 94 CPC is summary in nature, pleadings assume any amount of importance. The effect of pleadings was considered in A. Shanmugam vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalana Sangam, represented by its President and others : 2012(6) SCC 430 observing in para-27 as under: "27. The pleadings must set-forth sufficient factual details to the extent that it reduces the ability to put forward a false or exaggerated claim or defence. The pleadings must inspire confidence and credibility. If false averments, evasive denials or false denials are introduced, then the Court must carefully look into it while deciding a case and insist that those who approach the Court must approach it with clean hands." 23. In the same ruling, referring to Meria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de sequeria : 2012 (5) SCC 370 , with reference to grant or refusal of injunction, the observations are thus recorded in para 33: "33. In Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes (supra), this Court examined the importance of grant or refusal of an injunction in paras 83 to 86 which read as under: (SCC pp. 393-94) "83. Grant or refusal of an injunction in a civil suit is the most important stage in the civil trial. Due care, caution, diligence and attention must be bestowed by the judicial officers and judges while granting or refusing injunction. In most cases, the fate of the case is decided by grant or refusal of an injunction. Experience has shown that once an injunction is granted, getting it vacated would become a nightmare for the Defendant. 84. Due care, caution, diligence and attention must be bestowed by the judicial officers and judges while granting or refusing injunction. In most cases, the fate of the case is decided by grant or refusal of an injunction. Experience has shown that once an injunction is granted, getting it vacated would become a nightmare for the Defendant. 84. In order to grant or refuse injunction, the judicial officer or the judge must carefully examine the entire pleadings and documents with utmost care and seriousness. The safe and better course is to give short notice on injunction application and pass an appropriate order after hearing both the sides. In case of grave urgency, if it becomes imperative to grant an ex-parte ad interim injunction, it should be granted for a specified period, such as, for two weeks. In those cases, the Plaintiff will have no inherent interest in delaying disposal of injunction application after obtaining an ex-parte ad interim injunction. 85. The Court, in order to avoid abuse of the process of law may also record in the injunction order that if the suit is eventually dismissed, the Plaintiff undertakes to pay restitution, actual or realistic costs. While passing the order, the Court must take into consideration the pragmatic realities and pass proper order for mesne profits. The Court must make serious endeavour to ensure that even-handed justice is given to both the parties. 86. Ordinarily, three main principles govern the grant or refusal of injunction. a) prima facie case; b) balance of convenience; and c) irreparable injury, which guide the Court in this regard. In the broad category of prima facie case, it is imperative for the Court to carefully analyse the pleadings and the documents on record and only on that basis the Court must be governed by the prima facie case. In grant and refusal of injunction, pleadings and documents play vital role." 24. Bearing in mind these principles, the material on record has to be considered in this matter. 25. The claim of the 1st respondent is that it has been in peaceful and lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit property upon acquisition of various extents under the sale deeds covered by Ex. P25 to Ex. P42 (Ex. P43 is Ex. P36 and Ex. P44 is Ex. B34). In fact, originals of Ex. P34 and Ex. 25. The claim of the 1st respondent is that it has been in peaceful and lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit property upon acquisition of various extents under the sale deeds covered by Ex. P25 to Ex. P42 (Ex. P43 is Ex. P36 and Ex. P44 is Ex. B34). In fact, originals of Ex. P34 and Ex. P36 are the sale deeds of the year 1963 and other sale deeds, registration extracts of which are produced by the 1st respondent, related to subsequent years. Thus, material was produced during enquiry by the 1st respondent contending that it had an extent of Ac. 21-27 2/3 cents in Marripalem and Kapparada villages within Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation limits. 26. Out of the above extent, Ac. 10-97 cents was sold in favour of M/s. Lakshmi Techno solutions under the sale deeds of the years 2013 and 2014 by it, upon initially executing agreements for sale-cum-GPA in its favour in the year 2004 and 2006. To establish its claim prima facie, the 1st respondent relied on Ex. P20, an order of MRO dated 26.05.2014 in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. It appears, the parties thereto are not parties to the present matter. However, in view of the above contention of the 1st respondent, Ex. P20 order of Mandal Executive Magistrate, Visakhapatnam (Urban) therein, assumed significance. In the sense, the extent of land sold by the 1st respondent to M/s. Lakshmi Techno Solutions Private Limited out of its total acquisition under Ex. P25 to Ex. P42 was subject matter therein. The possession of the land so held by M/s. Lakshmi Techno Solutions was confirmed in the above proceedings by the Mandal Executive Magistrate, Visakhapatnam (Urban). 27. Ex. P13 is a letter addressed by then Tahsildar, Visakhapatnam Urban to Inspector of Police, Air Port Zone, Kancharapalem P.S., with reference to Cr. No. 174 of 2015 registered by Kancharapalem Police Station, Visakhapatnam. It referred to Ac. 12-30 cents, being private lands covered by structures and that it is in possession and enjoyment of the 1st respondent company. Description of various documents and extents of land in different S. Nos., which are part of the suit land, is given in this letter. The effect of this document is considered only for the limited purpose of construing prima facie and manner of enjoyment of the suit land by the 1st respondent. 28. Ex. P3 is G.O. Ms. Description of various documents and extents of land in different S. Nos., which are part of the suit land, is given in this letter. The effect of this document is considered only for the limited purpose of construing prima facie and manner of enjoyment of the suit land by the 1st respondent. 28. Ex. P3 is G.O. Ms. No. 249, Municipal Administration & Urban Development (H2) Department, dated 11.12.2014 issued by Government of Andhra Pradesh permitting the 1st respondent to convert an extent of 31645.38 Sq. Mts., comprised in Sy. Nos. 57/3, 4, 5P, 66/1, 2, 3, 4 and 59/1P from industrial use to partly commercial and partly residential use subject to certain terms and conditions. On behalf of the 1st respondent, any amount of significance is attached to Ex. P3 contenting that it clearly indicated that the 1st respondent is in possession and enjoyment of the extent referred to therein and which is a part of the suit property. 29. On such basis, Sri. V. Ramesh, learned Senior Counsel, contended that in view of Section 110 of the Evidence Act, in as much as it is established that the 1st respondent is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property, it is for the appellants to establish how they have better title and right to it. This contention apparently is advanced, in order to dilute the effect of the well established principles that the burden is always on the person, who approaches the Court for the relief of temporary injunction, in a case of this nature. Unless possession is established or admitted lawfully, juridically or otherwise, invocation of Section 110 of the Evidence Act, cannot arise. The appellants did not at any stage and in any manner admit possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the 1st respondent. Therefore, this contention of the learned senior counsel cannot be accepted. 30. Nonetheless, Ex. P3 offers a circumstance to corroborate and support the version of the 1st respondent of its possession and enjoyment of the suit property, basing on Ex. P13 letter of MRO and Ex. P20-order of Mandal Executive Magistrate, Visakhapatnam (Urban). 31. The 1st respondent also produced Ex. P23-Electricity Bill with receipt and Ex. P24-telephone bill, in an attempt to establish that they relate to a part of the structures in the suit property like sheds etc. P13 letter of MRO and Ex. P20-order of Mandal Executive Magistrate, Visakhapatnam (Urban). 31. The 1st respondent also produced Ex. P23-Electricity Bill with receipt and Ex. P24-telephone bill, in an attempt to establish that they relate to a part of the structures in the suit property like sheds etc. They did not bear much significance when requirement is to produce such material establishing its lawful possession at this stage by 'something nicely cut and dried' manner. 32. The appellants strenuously contended that by virtue of the originals of Ex. R1 and Ex. R2 sale deeds dated 30.03.1963, 10 different extents as set out in para-13 of the written statement were purchased by Sri. Sanapala jagannaikulu, Son of Sri. late Kamayya, Sri. Bagadhi Neelayya, Son of Sri. late Krishnamma, Sri. Nethinti Appanna, Son of Sri. late Chenchaiah and Sri. Gandi Appala Naidu, Son of Sri. late Simhachalam from erstwhile owners Sri. Bandi Lakshmi Naidu and 6 others for valuable consideration. Their contention is also that all these four purchasers orally partitioned this extent, in all, Ac. 22-27 cents and by virtue of wills (some of them are Exs. R3, R5 and R7) their successors-in-interest became entitled to different extents therein. Ultimately, the appellants 5 to 7 and Sri. B. Lakshminarayana became entitled to such extents. They specifically pleaded that the appellant No. 6 Smt. Arangi Hemalatha became entitled to Ac. 3-90 cents from Sri. Sanapala Jagannaikulu. They also contended that Ac. 6-37 cents was acquired, which earlier belonged to Sri. Bagadhi Neelaiah, by Sri. Lakshminarayana, the 7th defendant. Similarly, they contended that Ac. 6-89 cents was acquired from Sri. Nethinti Appanna by the appellants 1 and 5. They also contended that the extent held by Sri. Gandi Appalanaidu came into the hands of the appellants 4 and 7 of Ac. 5-08 cents of Marripalem Village. 33. Thus, they contended that the 1st respondent never had any right, title or interest including possession of any extent out of Ac. 22-27 cents belonging to them and that for management of these different extents, the appellants 5 to 7, Sri. Bagadhi Lakshminarayana executed powers of attorney in Ex. P4 to Ex. P7 (They are also Ex. R11 to Ex. R14). 34. To assert that they are in possession and enjoyment of such extent, they relied on Ex. R9-statement of Sub Divisions and Ex. R10-extract of Survey and Settlement Register. Bagadhi Lakshminarayana executed powers of attorney in Ex. P4 to Ex. P7 (They are also Ex. R11 to Ex. R14). 34. To assert that they are in possession and enjoyment of such extent, they relied on Ex. R9-statement of Sub Divisions and Ex. R10-extract of Survey and Settlement Register. Though they reflect the names of the original owners and the ultimate beneficiaries viz., the appellants 5 to 7 and Sri. Bagadhi Lakshminarayana, they do not prima facie indicate their possession and enjoyment of these extents by the date of the suit. They are only indicating as a part of public record maintained in regular course of activity by the public authorities and what is recorded or stated therein, with reference to the land holding of their erstwhile owners viz., Sri. Jagannaikulu and 3 others and their successors-in-interest. They do not substantially prove their possession and enjoyment of the extent claimed by them, which are otherwise covered by Ex. R1 and Ex. R2. 35. A number of contentions are advanced questioning validity of Ex. P4 to Ex. P7-General Powers of Attorney, basing on Ex. P13-report of MRO with reference to investigation in progress as per Ex. P12-FIR of Kancharapalem Police Station, Ex. P16 report of District Registrar, who went to the extent of usurping the role of a civil Court in declaring nature of the documents referred to therein, which are the basis for the claim of the appellants, as if they are spurious and fabricated. Apparently, W.P. No. 27269 of 2015 was filed by the appellants questioning Ex. P16-report of District Registrar and an interim direction was also given as per Ex. P17-order therein. Similarly, W.P. No. 343308 of 2015 is pending on the file of this Court as seen from Ex. P11 wherein an interim order is in favour of the appellants. As seen from the nature of defence set up by the appellants, as detailed in written statement, these orders in favour of the 1st respondent are under a serious challenge not only in this suit but also in the writ petitions. Therefore, these orders of District Registrar and Ex. P21 and Ex. P22-letter of joint Sub Registrar as well as his affidavit produced in the context of C.C. No. 840 of 2015 on the file of the learned I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, cannot now be looked into. 36. The main contention of Sri. Therefore, these orders of District Registrar and Ex. P21 and Ex. P22-letter of joint Sub Registrar as well as his affidavit produced in the context of C.C. No. 840 of 2015 on the file of the learned I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, cannot now be looked into. 36. The main contention of Sri. O. Manohar Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants, is that having regard to the nature of material on record and pleadings set up by the parties, the learned trial Judge did not address the matter in proper perspective with reference to prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury which the party would suffer and that the impugned order is vitiated on account of the failure to record its satisfaction by the trial Court on the three basic principles. The learned counsel further contended that such satisfaction must rest on the documents produced by the 1st respondent and that the learned trial Judge relied on the material placed by the appellants. 37. Thus, Sri. O. Manohar Reddy, the learned counsel contended that instead of calling the 1st respondent to make out all these ingredients requiring to grant a temporary injunction, the learned trial Judge considered certain circumstances as if they reflect the weakness in their case. The learned counsel also pointed out certain unnecessary and unwarranted observations recorded by learned trial Judge, as if declaring the right, title and interest to the suit property claimed by the 1st respondent and referring to flow of title claimed by the appellants 5 to 7 and Sri. Bagadhi Lakshminarayana or in referring to the contents of Ex. P4 to Ex. P7-GPAs. Therefore, Sri. O. Manohar Reddy, the learned counsel, contended that the entire order requires to be set aside since it is bereft of any reasons and demonstrative of satisfaction of the Court. 38. To certain extent this contention of recording certain unwarranted and unnecessary observations by the learned trial Judge requires acceptance. These observations are in paras-16, 19 and 21. Obviously, they are recorded unmindful of the parameters which the trial Court has to bear in mind when considering an application under Order-39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The learned trial Judge also failed to note that it was only a summary enquiry by which the matter was being considered at that stage. Obviously, they are recorded unmindful of the parameters which the trial Court has to bear in mind when considering an application under Order-39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The learned trial Judge also failed to note that it was only a summary enquiry by which the matter was being considered at that stage. When there are many disputed facts, raising serious questions for resolution upon due trial, there was no necessity to record such observations. They could have been avoided as well. 39. The order under appeal, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, did not specifically set out the basis for grant of temporary injunction resting on three basic principles referred to above. 40. However, Sri. V. Ramesh, learned Senior Counsel, drawing attention of this Court, particularly paras 10 to 21 of the impugned order contended that the learned trial Judge clearly applied mind with reference to material on record and that para-20 reflected that there was consideration by the trial Court of prima facie case and balance of convenience, who had also applied the principles of law laid down by different Courts referred to in the course of hearing. 41. Thus, Sri. V. Ramesh, learned Senior Counsel, contended that in an appeal when considering the matter under Order-43, when discretion was chosen to be exercised by the learned trial Judge, this Court must be slow rather to disturb the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge. Reliance is placed in this context in Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vid (S) vs. Phundan Singh and others : 1999 (2) SCC 377 by learned Senior Counsel. In para-12 of this ruling, in this context, it is stated thus: "12. It may be pointed out that it is one thing to conclude that the trial court has not recorded its prima facie satisfaction on merits but granted the temporary injunction and it is another thing to hold that trial court has gone wrong in recording the prima facie satisfaction and setting aside that finding on the basis of the material on record because it has not considered the relevant material or because it has erroneously reached the finding or conclusions on the facts established. In the first situation, the appellate court will be justified in upsetting the order under appeal even without going into the merits of the case but in the second eventuality, it cannot set aside the impugned order without discussing the material on record and recording a contrary finding" 42. When the material is considered, particularly with reference to possession, it is prima facie established that the 1st respondent is in possession of the suit property. Such being the instance, despite there being a serious dispute as to title claimed by it, in the light of material produced by the appellants, the inference to draw is that a prima facie case is made out by the 1st respondent. There are serious issues to be tried with significant questions involved for ultimate decision by the trial Court. It is also duty of the Court, in the circumstances, to preserve the status of the property as was available on the date of the institution of the suit. In the same context, for the same reasons, the balance of convenience on a comparative scale tilts in favour of the 1st respondent than the appellants. Failure of the trial Court to record clear findings in the process of evaluation of the material on these fundamental invariables is not a reason by itself to accept the contention of the appellants and to set aside the impugned order. Thus, this point is answered in favour of the 1st respondent and against the appellants. POINT No. 2:- 43. In as much as prima facie case and balance of convenience stand in favour of the 1st respondent, if the possession of the suit property is disturbed, the 1st respondent would suffer irreparable loss and injury possibly which cannot be satisfied in monetary terms. Nonetheless while granting or maintaining the temporary injunction, the Court is also entitled to impose certain terms, mainly with a view to preserve the physical features of the property appearing on ground. Therefore, in order to meet the ends of justice, having regard to the serious title dispute subsisting in this matter, the 1st respondent shall also be directed to preserve the status of this property without altering its physical status and nature in any manner. Thus, this point is answered. Point No. 3: 44. Therefore, in order to meet the ends of justice, having regard to the serious title dispute subsisting in this matter, the 1st respondent shall also be directed to preserve the status of this property without altering its physical status and nature in any manner. Thus, this point is answered. Point No. 3: 44. Though the order under appeal is not satisfactory, on reappraisal of the material, in view of the findings recorded on points 1 and 2, grant of temporary injunction in favour of the 1st respondent has to be upheld. Thus, this point is answered. Point No. 4: 45. In view of findings on points 1 to 3, the Civil Miscellaneous appeal has to be dismissed and in the circumstances without costs, subject to terms recorded in point No. 2. 46. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No costs. While maintaining temporary injunction granted by the learned trial Judge in I.A. No. 1942 of 2015 in O.S. No. 804 of 2015 by order dated 21.11.2017, the 1st respondent is directed not to alter the physical status/features of the suit property, preserving the same as it is, till disposal of the suit. As sequel thereto, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. Interim orders, if any, shall stand vacated.