JUDGMENT : JYOTSNA REWAL DUA, J.:— In this bunch of writ petitions, the appropriate Government has declined to refer the dispute to the learned Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication on ground of delay. The order declining to refer the dispute has been assailed in the petitions. 2. A legal question needs firm answering before the individual factual matrix involved in these writ petitions can be separately examined. To explain the law point involved, for convenience, we lift bare minimum facts from the lead case CWP No. 2190/2020, Jai Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh. The petitioner had worked with H.P. Public Works Department from 1988 to 1993. His services were allegedly illegally terminated in 1993. Twenty six years later he raised an industrial dispute vide demand notice received by the respondents on 24.6.2019. The Labour Commissioner/appropriate Government after relying upon some decisions of this Court refused to refer the matter for adjudication to the Labour Court on grounds of delay. Reference of dispute by the appropriate Government to the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal is governed by provisions of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 10(1) being relevant is extracted hereinafter: “10. The Labour Commissioner/appropriate Government after relying upon some decisions of this Court refused to refer the matter for adjudication to the Labour Court on grounds of delay. Reference of dispute by the appropriate Government to the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal is governed by provisions of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 10(1) being relevant is extracted hereinafter: “10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.- (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing,- (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute, to a Court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under Clause (c); Provided further that where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced: Provided also that where the dispute in relation to which the Central Government is the appropriate Government, it shall be competent for the Government to refer the dispute to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, constituted by the State Government.” 3. The question whether on raising of an industrial dispute, the appropriate Government has to merely act as a post office and is compelled by law to send the reference for adjudication to the Labour Court or whether it can examine the facts of the case at that stage itself and refuse to refer on grounds of delay, stale claims, non-existence of alive dispute, has been engaging the attention of this Court from time to time. Some of the relevant judgments delivered by this Court on the point are being noticed hereinafter: 2(i) Laiq Ram v. State of H.P. along with other connected matters, CWP No. 1486/2007, decided on 6.1.2011: A Division Bench of this Court referred following question of law for adjudication by a Larger Bench: “Whether the State Government while exercising powers under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is precluded from deciding the question as to whether the claim made by a workman is stale or not?” The matter was heard by the Larger Bench. Hon'ble Justice R.B. Misra answered the reference by observing that it would not be open to the State Government, while exercising powers under Section 10(1) of the Act, to decide the question whether the claim by the workmen is stale or not. The relevant extract from the judgment delivered by Hon'ble Justice Misra is as under: “The words are plain, unambiguous and are clear in Section 10(1) of the Act so far as formation of the opinion by the appropriate Government regarding existence or apprehension of the industrial dispute. The intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the words used, therefore, liberty is not open to the appropriate Government to travel beyond the intention of legislature and it could not be presumed that the legislature has committed mistake in not providing limitation and while interpreting the statutory provision like Section 10(1) of the Act. It is not permissible to add words in the statute or in Section and read words into it which are not specifically provided therein when literal reading produces an intelligible result. It is also not permissible for the appropriate Government or the Court to add or subtract any word in the name of ‘stalement’ in any Section or statute while interpreting the same, as, such aspect would amount legislation which is not permissible even for the Court. It is also not permissible for the appropriate Government or the Court to add or subtract any word in the name of ‘stalement’ in any Section or statute while interpreting the same, as, such aspect would amount legislation which is not permissible even for the Court. Therefore, in view of the observations made above, it would not be open to the State Government, while exercising powers under Section 10(1) of the Act, to decide the question whether the claim by the workmen is stale or not, as such, the question, referred by the Division Bench of this Court, is dealt with accordingly.” While Hon'ble Justice Deepak Gupta observed that Government is authorized to form the opinion whether a dispute exists or not. Government is not powerless and in case an industrial dispute is raised after a great delay without any explanation, then the Government can refuse to make a reference on ground of claim being stale and the industrial dispute ceased to exist having faded with efflux of time. The view of Hon'ble Justice Deepak Gupta is extracted hereinafter: “The Apex Court clearly held that if sufficient material is not put-forth for enormous delay it would certainly be fatal. After carefully going through the various judgments of the Apex Court, it is apparent that in some cases the Apex Court itself has held that since there is delay in seeking the reference the dispute had faded away or had got eclipsed due to lapse of time. Even in those cases where the Apex Court held that the reference was proper and the dispute still existed, it went on to hold that in cases where lapse of time had caused fading or eclipsing of the dispute and nobody had kept the dispute alive, it would be reasonable to conclude that the dispute ceases to exist. The Government is authorized to form the opinion whether a dispute exists or not. This clearly shows that the Government is not powerless and in case there is great delay and there is no explanation for the delay then the Government can refuse to make a reference on the ground that the claim is stale and therefore the industrial dispute no longer exists. An industrial dispute can fade away and cease to exist because of long delay where the workman has taken no steps to keep the dispute alive. An industrial dispute can fade away and cease to exist because of long delay where the workman has taken no steps to keep the dispute alive. However, if the workman or the Union has kept the dispute alive even if no action has been initiated it will not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. Whether, a dispute exists or not, or has faded or got eclipsed is a question of fact which has to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case. I would answer the question in the aforesaid terms.” It would also be appropriate to notice here that while taking the above view, it was also observed in the judgment that “Once, a reference is made, there can be no manner of doubt that the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal cannot reject the claim on the ground that it is stale. The Tribunal or Labour Court gets jurisdiction to decide an industrial dispute only when a reference is made to it by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act. The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. If the employer makes a grievance that the workman has made a stale claim then the employer should challenge an order of reference by way of writ petition and here he can contend that since the claim is stale and highly belated no industrial dispute is existed or apprehended. The Labour Court may mould the relief but it cannot invalidate or strike down the reference.” Hon'ble Justice Surinder Thakur in his separate judgment while concurring with the view taken by Hon'ble Justice Deepak Gupta observed that appropriate Government has to be subjectively satisfied while forming the ‘opinion’ under Section 10(1) of the Act. Thus, by majority judgment delivered in Laiq Ram's case it was held that it is open to the appropriate Government to refuse to make a reference in case the claim of workman was stale and the industrial dispute had faded away because of long delay. However, in case the dispute was kept alive then it would not mean that dispute had ceased to exist even if no action had been initiated. However, in case the dispute was kept alive then it would not mean that dispute had ceased to exist even if no action had been initiated. Whether a dispute existed or not, had faded or not and ceased to be live dispute or not, is a question of fact which has to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case. 2(ii) Megh Nath v. State of H.P., CWP No. 6687 of 2014, decided on 24.9.2014: The appropriate Government had refused to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court on grounds of delay and laches. The Division Bench of this Court relying upon (2014) 10 SCC 301 titled Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Harayana Roadways, Hisar quashed the order of appropriate Government declining to refer the matter to the learned Labour Court by holding as under: “4. In the instant case also, though, there is also a delay in raising the industrial dispute but the Labour Court can always mould the relief taking into consideration the delay and laches. 5. In view of the definitive law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the impugned order dated 26.5.2014, Annexure P-2, is quashed and set aside. The Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, is directed to make reference to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court within six weeks from today.” The judgment passed by the Larger Bench in Laiq Ram's case supra was perhaps not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. 2(iii) Pratap Chand v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board alongwith connected matters, CWP No. 9467/2014, decided on 30.12.2014: Relying upon the judgment passed in Megh Nath's case supra, a Division Bench of this court quashed the orders passed by Labour Commissioner refusing to make the references to the Industrial Tribunal on ground of delay. The appropriate Government was directed to make the references in light of judgment rendered in Megh Nath's case supra and in light of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Raghubir Singh's case [ (2014) 10 SCC 301 ]. 2(iv) Bego Devi v. State of H.P., alongwith connected matters, CWP No. 1912/2016 decided on 26.10.2016: In these connected writ petitions also, the Labour Commissioner had refused to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal on ground of inordinate delay in raising the dispute. 2(iv) Bego Devi v. State of H.P., alongwith connected matters, CWP No. 1912/2016 decided on 26.10.2016: In these connected writ petitions also, the Labour Commissioner had refused to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal on ground of inordinate delay in raising the dispute. In para-5 of the judgment, the earlier pronouncement of the Court in Pratap Chand's case supra (CWP No. 9467/2014) was noticed and it was observed that the petitioners (in Bego Devi's case) were fence-sitters, watching what would happen to the other cases. They did not make any murmur till the judgments were rendered by the Apex Court and by the High Court in such cases. It was only after the judgments were delivered by this Court in Megh Nath's case, in Pratap Chand's case supra and after the decision of Raghubir Singh's case by the Hon'ble Apex Court that they instituted the writ petitions seeking similar reliefs. In paragraph-6, the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in (2015) 15 SCC 1 , titled Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department was noticed as under: “6. The apex Court in case titled Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 : AIR 2016 SC 2984 , has held that if the dispute survives reference is to be made and if dispute does not survive, reference is not to be made. It is apt to reproduce paras 42 and 43 of the said judgment herein. “42. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference Under Section 10(1) of the Act, yet it is for the ‘appropriate Government’ to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words ‘at any time’ used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry. 43. 43. On the application of the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, we are of the view that High Court correctly decided the issue holding that the reference at such a belated stage i.e. after fourteen years of termination without any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had not jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non existing dispute.” In paragraph-7 of the judgment in Bego Devi's case, it was observed that the petitioners had virtually accepted their termination orders without raising any finger for 8-10 years. This would lead to the conclusion that dispute of workmen did not survive. After elucidating the general law of land that delay takes away the setting of law, the writ petitions were dismissed with following operative portion: “22. The petitioners have made applications for making references after a considerable delay, after noticing the judgment made by the apex Court read with the judgments made by this Court, as discussed in para 5 supra. It appears that the petitioners were fencers, as discussed hereinabove and made an attempt for making references. The State has made the references perhaps in terms of the judgments made by this Court. The latest judgment was not in place at that time. Viewed thus, it cannot be said that the petitioners are similarly situated persons.” 2(v) Daulat Ram v. Executive Engineer, HPPWD, CWP No. 1887/2017, decided on 11.12.2017: It was held in this judgment that the reinstatement cannot be denied merely on ground of delay. The operative part of the judgment runs as under: “5. The petitioners-workmen in these writ petitions were working as Beldar in Dharampur division of Public Works Department, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi. A bunch of writ petitions has been decided by the Principal Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 20.12.2012, title Kanta Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Annexure P-6 to these writ petitions. The perusal of the judgment reveals that the prayer made by the petitioners-workmen in those writ petitions to refer the disputes to the Labour Court was declined by the Competent Authority on the ground of delay. Against such order of the Competent Authority they approached to this Court by filing writ petition(s) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. All the writ petitions were clubbed and decided vide Annexure P-6. Against such order of the Competent Authority they approached to this Court by filing writ petition(s) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. All the writ petitions were clubbed and decided vide Annexure P-6. The Principal Bench taking note of the fact that in some of the cases the Competent Authority has made the reference to Labour Court has held the order declining their prayer to refer the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court as illegal, did not relegate the parties to the competent authority or Labour Court and rather taking into consideration the past precedents has directed the respondent-State to re-engage all the workmen with continuity and seniority, however, without back wages. 6. We find no reasons to withheld such relief from the petitioners-workmen in these writ petitions. Therefore, in modification of the impugned award, we order the respondent-State to reinstate the petitioners-workmen as daily wager with continuity in service, of course without back wages within four months from the date of production of copy of this judgment before the respondent.” 2(vi) Nek Ram v. The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, CWP No. 581/2019, decided on 23.4.2019: Relying upon the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Prabhakar's case supra it was observed that ‘long and short of the matter is very well expressed by the maxim, vigilantibus non domientibus jura subveniunt, that is to say, the law assists those that are vigilant with their rights and not those that sleep thereupon.’ 2(vii) Bhupinder Singh v. State of H.P., CWP No. 610/2019, decided on 4.9.2019. In this case, previous judgments on the point were perhaps not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble division Bench. The Bench held that delay and laches by itself cannot be a ground for refusing to make a reference. In case a person is guilty of delay and laches, it may be a ground for the Labour Court either to refuse to grant relief or refuse to grant relief of back wages but the Government cannot take up the role of adjudicating authority while deciding the question as to whether a reference should be made or not. The Court directed the Government to make a reference of the dispute to the Labour Court, which it had declined on ground of delay and laches. 2(viii) Sh. The Court directed the Government to make a reference of the dispute to the Labour Court, which it had declined on ground of delay and laches. 2(viii) Sh. Karvir v. State of Himachal Pradesh, CWP No. 1091/2019, decided on 24.12.2019: The Labour Commissioner had declined to refer the dispute to the Labour Court on grounds of delay and laches. Relying upon (2015) 15 SCC 1 , titled Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department as well as on the larger Bench decision of this Court in Laiq Ram's case supra, it as held that: “A reference can be refused by the Appropriate Government, in case it finds that there is no live dispute and that the claim has become stale. Whether at the time of approaching the Appropriate Government, the dispute had become stale or not has to be examined in the facts and circumstances of each case, therefore, to contend that the Appropriate Government has to mechanically refer every dispute to the Labour Court, will not be correct position. Appropriate Government has the right to refuse to make reference in case the dispute has faded away with the efflux of time and has become stale.” From the perusal of above judgments, it is evident that the judgments rendered by different Hon'ble benches of this Court have not been taking a consistent view regarding power of appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act in respect of reference of disputes/claims raised by the workmen for adjudication to the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal. In some of the judgments, the appropriate Government has been held to be vested with power to decline referring the matter for adjudication to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal on grounds of delay, stale claims, faded/eclipsed/dead disputes etc. whereas in the others the view taken is that delay and laches cannot be a ground for refusing to make a reference and that it is the Labour Court which can refuse the relief, mould the relief or refuse to grant backwages on ground of delay. Hon'ble Apex Court though has settled the legal position after considering the law and the precedents right from 1953 to (2014) 10 SCC 301 , titled as Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, in (2015) 15 SCC 1 , titled Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and has culled out following principles: “28. Hon'ble Apex Court though has settled the legal position after considering the law and the precedents right from 1953 to (2014) 10 SCC 301 , titled as Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, in (2015) 15 SCC 1 , titled Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and has culled out following principles: “28. The aforesaid case law depicts the following: 28.1 The law of limitation does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 28.2. The words, “at anytime” used in Section 10 would support that there is no period of limitation in making an order of reference. 28.3 At the same time, the appropriate Government has to keep in mind as to whether the dispute is still existing or live dispute and has not become a stale claim and if that is so, the reference can be refused. 28.4 Whether dispute is alive or it has become stale/nonexistent at the time when the workman approaches the appropriate Government is an aspect which would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be any hard-and-fast rule regarding the time for making the order of reference.” The following paras of judgment in Prabhakar's case supra summarize the issue: “42.3 Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exist? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as “dead’, then it would not non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.6. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as “dead’, then it would not non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.6. In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an “existing dispute”. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no “industrial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted.” 4. Again in Para-44, it was held as under:— 44. To summarize, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the “appropriate Government” to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words “at any time” used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry.” 5. Consistency in various judgments passed by different Hon'ble Benches of this Court is not coming forth on the common legal point involved in these cases rather conflicting views are being taken. Even some of the observations in Larger Bench's decision in Laiq Ram's case supra, have been expressed differently by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Prabhakar's case supra. Over the period of time, law has also grown and not remained static. Even some of the observations in Larger Bench's decision in Laiq Ram's case supra, have been expressed differently by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Prabhakar's case supra. Over the period of time, law has also grown and not remained static. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the the following question involved needs to be resolved by a Larger Bench: Since there is inconsistency in various decisions of this Court with regard to the power and authority of the appropriate Government in making/refusing a reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act on the grounds of delayed-stale claims/faded, eclipsed, dead disputes etc. raised by workmen, therefore, the question of law requires authoritative pronouncement by a Larger Bench. 6. We, therefore, direct the Registry to place the matters before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench to consider the matter.