ORDER : Siddhartha Varma, J. 1. When on 27.1.2000 the services of the respondent no. 3 were done away with, a dispute was raised by the respondent no. 3-Pramod Kumar which was referred to the Labour Tribunal at Meerut with the following reference: ^^D;k lsok;kstdksa }kjk vius fookfnr Jfed Jh izeksn dqekj iq= gjiky flag dh lsok,a fnukad 27-1-2000 ls lekIr fd;k tkuk mfpr ,ao oS/kkfud gS\ ;fn ugha rks lEcaf/kr Jfed fdl fgrykHk@vuqrks"k dks ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS ,oa vU; fdl fooj.k lfgr\^^ 2. When the reference was decided in favour of respondent no. 3 on 13.4.2012 whereby the order dated 27.1.2000 was set-aside and the respondent no. 3 was given 50% of his back-wages, the present writ petition was filed. 3. The facts of the case are that on 29.12.1999, one Sri Subhash Chandra Jaggi, Vice-President and the Head of the Establishment run by the petitioner was shot dead inside the factory premises. Thereupon a Fact Finding Committee was constituted to identify the culprits who might have been involved in the murder of the Vice-President, Sri Subhash Chandra Jaggi. Sri Ajay Sharma, the person appointed for conducting the Fact Finding Inquiry, submitted his report on 21.1.2000 by which he had held the respondent no. 3-Pramod Kumar along with one Ajay Kumar guilty of the murder of Subhash Chandra Jaggi. On 27.1.2000, an order terminating the services of respondent no. 3 was passed. Aggrieved thereof, the respondent no. 3 had raised an industrial dispute which was referred by the State Government on 20.12.2002 for a decision to the Industrial Tribunal (V), Meerut. In the interregnum, after the murder of Subhash Chandra Jaggi on 29.12.1999, the police had also, upon a First Information Report being lodged, submitted a charge-sheet on 29.2.2000 and a Sessions Trial being Sessions Trial No. 647 of 2000 was initiated. The respondent no. 3 was released on bail on 16.5.2000 and after a full-fledged trial, the respondent no. 3 was finally acquitted in the Sessions Trial on 28.5.2002. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 3 had filed their Written Submissions, which are made part of the record. 5. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner were as follows: (i) The petitioner could not have retained the respondent no. 3 in its establishment as, because of his doings, they had no confidence in respondent no. 3 had filed their Written Submissions, which are made part of the record. 5. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner were as follows: (i) The petitioner could not have retained the respondent no. 3 in its establishment as, because of his doings, they had no confidence in respondent no. 3 at all and, therefore, because of the loss of confidence in respondent no. 3, the petitioner could not reinstate him. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that after the murder had taken place on 29.12.1999, a Fact Finding Inquiry in absolutely unambiguous terms had held that the respondent no. 3 was definitely involved in the murder and he submitted that the mere fact that the respondent no. 3 had been acquitted by a Criminal Court would not mean that he could be taken back by the petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that the very fact that the respondent no. 3 had absconded after the commission of the murder spoke volumes about the fact that the respondent no. 3 was guilty. Still further, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent no. 3 had been out of service for the past 21 years and now he could not be taken back and adjusted in the establishment of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner to support his arguments relied upon (2012) 1 SCC 442 : Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. M.G. Vittal Rao; (2005) 2 SCC 481 : Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. M. Chandrashekhar Reddy & Ors. and (2003) 99 FLR 24 : DCM Sri Ram Industries Ltd. Meerut vs. State of U.P. & Ors.. (ii) The further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that acquittal of the respondent no. 3 was not an honourable acquittal but was one which was based on a benefit of doubt. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon various decisions of the Apex Court submitted that a departmental inquiry and a criminal trial were held in two different spheres. When a departmental inquiry was held, it was always the intention of the department to see as to whether the establishment would be brought to any harm if the delinquent official is retained in service. He submitted that a domestic inquiry was based on the doctrine of "preponderance of probabilities" whereas a criminal trial is based on different considerations altogether. When a departmental inquiry was held, it was always the intention of the department to see as to whether the establishment would be brought to any harm if the delinquent official is retained in service. He submitted that a domestic inquiry was based on the doctrine of "preponderance of probabilities" whereas a criminal trial is based on different considerations altogether. He submitted that in a criminal trial if there was even a single doubt, the trial resulted in an acquittal and it could always be presumed that the guilty had been discharged of the stigma of being a criminal. However, he submitted that when it was found in the departmental inquiry that the respondent no. 3 was involved in the criminal case, then he could not have been retained by the establishment i.e. by the petitioner. (iii) Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Tribunal in the award had not found any error in the fact finding report. (iv) Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that if the inquiry which was conducted was erroneous then the petitioner which had made a specific prayer for a fresh inquiry in the written statement filed before the Tribunal, should have been allowed an opportunity to lead further evidence whereby charges against the respondent no. 3 could have been looked into. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon (2018) 18 SCC 21: M.L. Singla vs. Punjab National Bank; (2006) 6 SCC 325 : Amrit Vanaspati Co. Ltd. vs. Khem Chand & Anr.; (2018) 4 SCC 483 : Kurukshetra University vs. Prithvi Singh; (1999) 1 SCC 517 : Neeta Kaplish vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and 2012 (4) ADJ 473 : U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rajendra Singh & Anr.. While the petitioner had argued that the standards of departmental inquiry and a criminal trial were based on different parameters, he had taken recourse to the decisions reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 : Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr. vs. S. Samuthiram and (2018) 1 SCC 797 : Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr.. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 3, however, in reply submitted that in the absence of a full-fledged inquiry, wherein the respondent no. 3 was included in the inquiry, it could be presumed that there were no departmental inquiry whatsoever. vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr.. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 3, however, in reply submitted that in the absence of a full-fledged inquiry, wherein the respondent no. 3 was included in the inquiry, it could be presumed that there were no departmental inquiry whatsoever. Learned counsel submitted that the Standing Orders also contemplated for a full-fledged inquiry, even if the delinquent absented himself. She submitted that a full-fledged inquiry ought to have been undergone. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent no. 3 was a permanent employee of the petitioner and his services could not have been done-away with without any departmental inquiry. To support her arguments, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 relied upon the decisions reported in 1993 (67) FLR 111 : D.K. Yadav vs. M/s. J.M.A. Industries Ltd.; 2008 (118) FLR 1121 : Union of India vs. Naman Singh Shekhawat and (2010) 10 SCC 471: Amar Chakravarti & Ors. vs. M/s. Maruti Suzuki India Limited.. 7. The further contention of the learned counsel for respondent no. 3 was that whether the petitioner had lost confidence in respondent no. 3 was never pleaded or argued before the Tribunal and, therefore, in the High Court while the award was being challenged, it could not be argued that the award was bad on account of the fact that it had not considered that there was loss of confidence in respondent no. 3. In this regard, learned counsel relied upon the decision reported in (1988) 4 SCC 534 : Bharat Singh & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors.. 8. Furthermore, learned counsel for respondent no. 3 submitted that the petitioner could not have also taken a case of loss of confidence in respondent no. 3 as the respondent no. 3 was not working on any post where, if he was reinstated, he would divulge some secret etc. which would be detrimental to the employer and, therefore, it could not be argued by the petitioner that they had lost confidence in the respondent no. 3. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 relied upon 1975 (30) FLR 140 : L. Michael vs. Jhonson Pumps Limited.. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 also submitted that when the respondent no. 3 was being reinstated, he should have been granted the back-wages. 10. 3. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 relied upon 1975 (30) FLR 140 : L. Michael vs. Jhonson Pumps Limited.. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 also submitted that when the respondent no. 3 was being reinstated, he should have been granted the back-wages. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 3, this Court is of the view that no interference is warranted in this writ petition. After the Vice-President of the petitioner-establishment Sri Subhash Chandra Jaggi was found murdered, services of the respondent no. 3 were dispensed with on 27.1.2000 only on account of the fact that a police case had been registered against the respondent no. 3 and the respondent no. 3 was found involved in that crime. It was also found that because of the trial which was being undergone in the Criminal Court, the services of respondent no. 3 were done away with as the involvement in the trial constituted a serious offence under the Standing Orders. The order of termination itself had stated that on account of the nature of the offence, it was not possible to conduct any domestic inquiry against the respondent no. 3. The Court, therefore, finds that simply because of the institution of the criminal case, the termination order had been passed. Furthermore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the criminal trial had resulted in an acquittal on the basis of "benefit of doubt" and not on the basis of a full-fledged trial which could be called an "honourable acquittal" appears to be absolutely fallacious. A perusal of the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court definitely shows that it was based on a correct assessment of evidence as was led by the prosecution and the defence. The acquittal had not resulted on account of the fact that there was no evidence or that witnesses had been won over by the accused. It is another matter that the acquittal had taken place on account of the fact that the Trial Court had found that the evidence against the accused was doubtful. The acquittal had not resulted on account of the fact that there was no evidence or that witnesses had been won over by the accused. It is another matter that the acquittal had taken place on account of the fact that the Trial Court had found that the evidence against the accused was doubtful. Furthermore, since the termination order was based on the fact that a Criminal Trial was being undergone and that there was no occasion for the petitioner to pray for a domestic inquiry, I find that the order of termination could not be sustained. The domestic inquiry itself was not undergone by the petitioner when the respondent no. 3 was involved and, therefore, when the trial had resulted in an acquittal and that too on the basis of a genuine analysis of evidence brought on record by the prosecution as also by the defence, then no fault can be found with the award. Still further, the Court finds that the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was loss of confidence, also holds no water. The respondent no. 3 was a Cane Inspector and could always be adjusted in the organization of the petitioner which is a huge-one. 11. Under such circumstances, there is no interference warranted in the writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed.