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Gujarat High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 844 (GUJ)

Hiteshkumar Dahyabhai Rathod v. State Of Gujarat

2020-10-08

SANGEETA K.VISHEN

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the Collector, Narmada, whereby the service of the petitioner came to be terminated on the ground that the petitioner has committed a serious misconduct under provisions of the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Conduct Rules of 1971'). 2. The brief facts of the case are as under: 2.1 The Gujarat Subordinate Services Selection Board issued an advertisement inviting applications for the post of Assistant Clerk, Class-III. Apropos the said recruitment, the petitioner came to be appointed to the post of Assistant Clerk, Class-III vide appointment order dated 3.10.2012, which contained various terms and conditions. Condition No.1 envisages the appointment to be purely a temporary appointment and subject to the terms and conditions contained in the government resolutions dated 15.6.2004 and 3.3.2005 issued by the General Administration Department. Condition No.2 further provides that after 5 years if the service is found to be satisfactory and if the candidate is possessing the requisite qualification, he or she will be absorbed in the regular pay scale against the available vacancy. Condition No.5 provides that the appointment is purely a temporary appointment and during such period if the service is not found to be satisfactory or if there is any misconduct committed, the service of the petitioner would be put an end to without issuing any notice. 2.2 As aforesaid, after the issuance of the appointment order dated 3.10.2012, the petitioner took charge and since then, the petitioner has been working as Assistant Clerk with the office of respondent No.3. A criminal complaint being FIR CR I No.2 of 2017 (hereinafter referred to as 'FIR') came to be registered with Narmada ACB Police Station on 31.7.2017 against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1988'). The said complaint was filed by one Sureshbhai Bachubhai Bariya wherein it is alleged that the petitioner demanded illegal gratification from the complainant with regard to removing of charge from the land and consequential initiation of procedure for mutating entry in the revenue record with respect to land bearing Survey Nos.207, 212 and 273. 2.3 Pursuant to registration of the FIR, the petitioner came to be arrested. 2.3 Pursuant to registration of the FIR, the petitioner came to be arrested. The petitioner thereafter approached the Court of District & Sessions Judge, seeking regular bail in connection with the aforesaid FIR, which vide order dated 4.8.2017, allowed the application and the petitioner came to be released on bail. 2.4 The registration of the FIR led to the issuance of yadi dated 22.8.2017 by the office of respondent No.3, inter alia, stating that the offence committed by the petitioner, prima facie, is a serious offence and considering the seriousness, it has been decided to put an end to the service of the petitioner. With a view to giving an opportunity of hearing, the petitioner was required to submit his representation on 31.8.2017. In response to the aforesaid yadi, the petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 31.8.2017, inter alia, pointing out that the petitioner has been victimised in the trap of decoy and refuted all charges alleged against him. 2.5 According to the petitioner, the office of respondent No.3, without considering the reply dated 31.8.2017 of the petitioner, came to the conclusion that the petitioner has committed breach of clause (i) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules of 1971. Furthermore, the allegations against the petitioner are of serious in nature viz. offences committed under provisions of the Act of 1988 and it would not be in the interest of the administration to continue the petitioner in the government service. It has also been stated that as per condition No.14A of the government resolution dated 28.3.2016, it is permissible to the authority to put an end to the service of the fixed pay employee. Accordingly, the order dated 28.11.2017 came to be passed by the office of respondent No.3. 2.6 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the petitioner has preferred present petition with the aforementioned prayers. 3. Affidavit has been filed by the office of respondent No.3 contesting the present petition. It has been stated that the appointment of the petitioner was purely on temporary basis and on a fixed pay, for a period of 5 years; subject to fulfillment of conditions. As per condition No.14, if the candidate concerned is found to have been committed misconduct during the contractual period, it is open to the authority to put an end to the service of an employee, inter alia, by paying one month's salary. As per condition No.14, if the candidate concerned is found to have been committed misconduct during the contractual period, it is open to the authority to put an end to the service of an employee, inter alia, by paying one month's salary. 3.1 It is further stated that the petitioner was transferred to the office of the Mamlatdar, Garudeshwar, vide order dated 5.7.2014 and during the period from 9.7.2014 to 31.3.2015, the petitioner has received adverse remarks in his ACRs and accordingly, the petitioner was informed about the said adverse remarks and after considering his reply, the office of the Collector, Narmada, vide its order dated 24.8.2016, extended the contractual period for one year instead of confirming the appointment in the regular pay scale. It is stated that the service of the petitioner was not satisfactory and during the contractual period, the petitioner has committed misconduct which weighed with the authority to put an end to the service of the petitioner. 3.2 It is further stated that Narmada ACB Police Station has booked the petitioner for the commission of offences under provisions of the Act of 1988 by registering FIR. Accordingly, show cause notice dated 22.8.2017 was issued requiring the petitioner to show cause as to why the service of the petitioner should not be terminated considering the fact that the petitioner has indulged in commission of offence of serious nature. It is stated that during the trap organised by the Anti Corruption Bureau, the petitioner was caught red-handed, accepting the bribe of Rs.12,000/-. Upon receipt of the reply dated 31.8.2017 and the oral representation made by the petitioner on 4.9.2017 that the order dated 28.11.2017 came to be passed terminating the service of the petitioner which was purely temporary and ad hoc basis, i.e. for 5 + 1 years. It is stated that initial service of the petitioner was purely temporary and in a fixed pay and that respondent No.3 was well within his power to terminate the service in the event of commission of the serious misconduct, without issuing any notice. It is stated that initial service of the petitioner was purely temporary and in a fixed pay and that respondent No.3 was well within his power to terminate the service in the event of commission of the serious misconduct, without issuing any notice. Though the terms and conditions of the appointment order permit respondent No.3 to terminate the service without hearing the petitioner; however, in the present case, the petitioner has been offered sufficient opportunity of hearing to put forth his case and it is only thereafter that the order dated 28.11.2017 came to be passed, terminating the service of the petitioner for the breach of clause (i) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules of 1971. Therefore, it is urged that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. Mr. R.D. Kinariwala, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that respondent No.3 has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner has committed breach of clause (i) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules of 1971. Apropos the advertisement issued by the Gujarat Subordinate Services Selection Board, the petitioner participated in the recruitment process and he came to be appointed on the said post on the fixed pay of Rs.5,300/- initially for a period of 5 years. Pursuant to registration of the FIR for the offences under provisions of the Act of 1988, respondent No.3 had issued yadi dated 22.8.2017 pursuant to which, the petitioner has filed his reply on 31.8.2017 followed by order dated 28.11.2017 passed by respondent No.3 terminating the service of the petitioner. It is submitted that undisputedly, the office of respondent No.3 has not conducted any full-fledged enquiry as provided in the Gujarat Civil Service (Discipline and Appeals) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Discipline and Appeal Rules of 1971’) and straightaway passed the order, which is against the principles of natural justice as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Hon'ble Court. 4.1 It is further submitted that the action of respondent No.3 passing the order dated 28.11.2017, is clearly against clause 14A of the circular dated 28.3.2016 issued by the State Government in its Finance Department. 4.1 It is further submitted that the action of respondent No.3 passing the order dated 28.11.2017, is clearly against clause 14A of the circular dated 28.3.2016 issued by the State Government in its Finance Department. Clause 14A specifically states that after conducting enquiry and following principles of natural justice, the competent authority if comes to the conclusion that an employee concerned has committed any irregularity, then one month's notice was required to be issued and payment is to be made for that period. It is submitted that without observing the requirement contained in clause 14A, the service of the petitioner has been terminated. 4.2 It is submitted that as is clear from the record, except issuance of yadi dated 22.8.2017, respondent No.3 has not conducted any enquiry and therefore, the action of respondent No.3 in passing the order dated 28.11.2017, is nothing but an act contrary to the government resolution dated 28.3.2016 and therefore, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is submitted that the order as it appears, is stigmatic in nature having serious civil consequences and marring the future of the petitioner inasmuch as, with this order, the petitioner will not be able to secure any employment. Moreover, the order dated 28.11.2017 being a stigmatic order, the same could not have been passed in an abrupt manner and that too, without holding any full-fledged enquiry as per the provisions contained in the Discipline and Appeal Rules of 1971. 4.3 Learned advocate for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgments in the cases of (i) Chiragbhai Mahasukhbhai Pandya vs. State of Gujarat rendered in Special Civil Application No.11530 of 2018; (ii) Sandip Ajitsinh Vaghela vs. State of Gujarat rendered in Special Civil Application No.12071 of 2018; and (iii) State of Gujarat vs. Chetan Jayantilal Rajgor rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.1596 of 2019. In view of the aforesaid dictum, the issue involved in the present petition is no longer res integra. It has been held by this Hon'ble Court that irrespective of the fact that the delinquent was a regular employee or a contractual employee in a fixed pay, whenever any charge is levelled and action is found to be stigmatic, a full-scale departmental enquiry is must. It has been held by this Hon'ble Court that irrespective of the fact that the delinquent was a regular employee or a contractual employee in a fixed pay, whenever any charge is levelled and action is found to be stigmatic, a full-scale departmental enquiry is must. Therefore, it is submitted that the issue being covered by the law enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as by this Hon'ble Court, the petition deserves to be allowed and the order dated 28.11.2017 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5. Mr. Jayneel Parikh, learned Assistant Government Pleader, while referring to the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.3, submitted that the appointment of the petitioner was subject to the terms and conditions contained in the order dated 3.10.2012. Respondent No.3, while scrupulously following the requirement of the conditions enumerated in the appointment order so also affording sufficient opportunity of hearing, the order dated 28.11.2017 came to be passed. Pertinently, notice was given to the petitioner to file his representation and upon receipt of the reply coupled with the oral hearing on 4.9.2017, the order dated 28.11.2017 came to be passed putting an end to the service of the petitioner. Evidently, the service of the petitioner was not satisfactory inasmuch as, the petitioner has received adverse remarks in his ACRs and that is how the service of the petitioner was not confirmed and the contractual period was extended by one year. During this period, the petitioner has committed offences under provisions of the Act of 1988 and thus, considering the background the petitioner possessed, respondent No.3 has rightly passed the order dated 28.11.2017. Thus, it is urged that the petition be dismissed without granting any relief/s as prayed for. 6. Heard Mr. R.D. Kinariwala, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr.Jayneel Parikh, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent State, through video conferencing. 7. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties, the question which arises for consideration of this Court is as to whether respondent No.3 was justified in passing the order dated 28.11.2017, attaching stigma and terminating the service of the petitioner, without conducting any full-fledged enquiry. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the issue is no longer res integra. 8. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the issue is no longer res integra. 8. Pertinently, the petitioner was appointed vide order dated 3.10.2012 on temporary basis initially for a period of 5 years and in the fixed pay, through regular recruitment process. As per the terms and conditions contained in the said order dated 3.10.2012, it was open to the authorities to terminate the service of the petitioner after following the procedure. Condition No.5 provides that the appointment is purely a temporary appointment and during such period if the service is not found to be satisfactory or if there is any misconduct committed, the service of the petitioner would be put an end to without issuing any notice. Condition No.14 provides for putting an end to the service by issuing one month's notice or one month's notice pay. 9. The record reveals that the petitioner while he was posted at the office of the Mamlatdar, Garudeshwar, a trap was arranged by the Anti Corruption Bureau when the petitioner was caught red-handed, accepting the bribe of Rs.12,000/- which led to registration of the FIR being I CR No.2 of 2017 with Narmada ACB Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) as well as 13(2) of the Act of 1988 on 31.7.2017. The record further reveals that pursuant to the registration of the FIR, the petitioner came to be arrested and was thereafter released on bail. 10. The registration of the FIR being I CR No.2 of 2017 with Narmada ACB Police Station, led to the issuance of the yadi dated 22.8.2017, requiring the petitioner to submit his reply. The yadi states that as per the government resolution dated 28.3.2016 issued by the Finance Department, if at the end of the enquiry, the misconduct is proved, then after following principles of natural justice and paying one month's notice or one month's pay, the service can be put to an end to. It further states that the offences committed by the petitioner prima facie appears to be of serious in nature and considering seriousness of the allegations, it has been decided to put an end to the employment of the petitioner. It further states that the offences committed by the petitioner prima facie appears to be of serious in nature and considering seriousness of the allegations, it has been decided to put an end to the employment of the petitioner. It also states that before putting an end to the said contractual employment, by observing the principles of natural justice, it has been decided that the petitioner be given an opportunity to submit his written as well as oral reply. With this, the petitioner was asked to submit his reply by 31.8.2017 and if desirous, to make oral submissions on 4.9.2017 before respondent No.3. 11. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his written reply dated 31.8.2017, inter alia, refuting the allegation of commission of the offences and stating that the petitioner has been victimised in the trap of decoy for bribe. Thereafter on 4.9.2017, the oral hearing was given to the petitioner followed by passing of the order dated 28.11.2017 terminating the service of the petitioner. As is discernible from the order dated 28.11.2017, the preamble starts with the narration of the fact of the petitioner accepting the bribe and registration of the FIR being I CR No.2 of 2017 for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Act of 1988. It also records that pursuant to the registration of the FIR, the petitioner was arrested and was released on bail. It further records that a report was called for and received from the office of the Director, Anti Corruption Bureau and on examining the said report, it prima facie appears that the petitioner has been involved in accepting the bribe of Rs.12,000/- and has thereby committed serious offence under provisions of the Act of 1988. The order further proceeds that though condition No.10 of the government resolution dated 28.3.2016, obligates an employee to conduct himself in accordance with the Conduct Rules of 1971 during his tenure on contractual basis, the petitioner has committed a serious breach of clause (i) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 by not maintaining absolute integrity. Looking to the commission of offence of the corruption, continuation of the petitioner in service will have an adverse impact on the other employees and is likely to send wrong message. Looking to the commission of offence of the corruption, continuation of the petitioner in service will have an adverse impact on the other employees and is likely to send wrong message. The order concludes that in the interest of administration and as envisaged in the condition no.14A of the government resolution dated 28.3.2016, the service of the petitioner is discontinued. 12. Clearly, while exercising the powers and taking recourse of condition No.14A of the government resolution dated 28.3.2016, respondent No.3 passed an order dated 28.11.2017 terminating the service of the petitioner. Undisputably, such action is without conducting any full-fledged enquiry as contemplated under the provisions of the statutory rules. Read the contents of the order dated 28.11.2017, it clearly suggest that the stigma is writ large. Clearly, the misconduct was not the motive, but was precisely the foundation for passing the order dated 28.11.2017. Pertinently, the order dated 28.11.2017 has been passed in contravention of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as, no full-fledged enquiry as required by the statutory rules, much less any enquiry into the charge was held before passing of the order dated 28.11.2017, terminating the service of the petitioner. Such action on the part of respondent No.3 is against the settled principle enunciated by the Apex Court as well as this Court as regards compliance of principles of natural justice before taking such action, if the order is stigmatic in nature. Besides, in such an eventuality, irrespective of the status of the employee, viz. contractual or temporary, provisions of the Discipline and Appeal Rules of 1971 ought to have been adhered to. 13. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SBI vs. Palak Modi reported in (2013)3 SCC 607 . The Apex Court while considering the earlier judgments has held that if the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority is susceptible to nullification, on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice. In the case before the Apex Court, the issue was regarding use of unfair means by the private respondents and the action taken by the bank. The said misconduct constituted foundation of the decision taken by the bank for terminating the service of the private respondent therein. In the case before the Apex Court, the issue was regarding use of unfair means by the private respondents and the action taken by the bank. The said misconduct constituted foundation of the decision taken by the bank for terminating the service of the private respondent therein. The Apex Court held that the foundation for passing the termination order was misconduct, and the same could not have been passed without holding a full-fledged enquiry. 14. In another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerji vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 60 it has been held that though the order terminating the appellant therein was innocuous, but the order was referring to other orders, which entailed civil consequences. The Apex Court while referring to the earlier judgment in the case of Bishan Lal Gupta vs. State of Haryana, reported in (1978)1 SCC 202 observed that an ordinary enquiry of a show-cause might be sufficient for the purpose of deciding whether the probationer could be continued, but where the findings regarding misconduct are arrived at without conducting a regular departmental enquiry then the termination order will be vitiated. 15. The coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Chiragbhai Mahasukhbhai Pandya rendered in SCA No.11530 of 2018, has observed in paras 6.1 to 6.4 as under: “6.1 As recorded above, the impugned order proceeded on the basis of the First Information Report filed against the petitioner for the offences under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act to conclude that by accepting the amount of bribe, petitioner had committed misconduct. The order also mentions contention of the First Information Report to state that when the complainant was going on with his wife on 12th April, 2018 for the purpose of cutting the trees, the petitioner – delinquent snatched away the shovel and when the complainant requested to return the same, the petitioner was asked for bribe of Rs.500/-. It was mentioned in the order of termination that the petitioner had committed misconduct under the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 and since the petitioner was on a fixed pay, on the ground of taking and accepting bribe, his services were liable to be terminated. Stigma was cast against the petitioner which terminating his services as per the impugned order. Stigma was cast against the petitioner which terminating his services as per the impugned order. 6.2 Thus, it was clear from the bare reading of the recitals in the impugned order that the foundation of the order of termination was alleged events taking bribe and registration of First Information Report for such alleged offence. The authority passing the order of termination readily concluded that the petitioner has committed offence of taking bribe and thus had mis-conducted under the disciplinary rules. The order proceeded to terminate services with retrospective effect on the ground that misconduct as above was committed. Since the allegations of misconduct were the foundation for penal action taken against the petitioner, the above discussed principles of law would apply to grant relief to the petitioner. 6.3 While the impugned order would be liable to be set aside and the petitioner would be liable to be reinstated, since the petitioner's appointment was for a fixed term and was to come to an end at the end of five years on 13th July, 2022 as provided in the initial order, reinstatement which is being directed as per the present order shall be operative upto the said period to make up the total period of five years as per the conditions of the original order of appointment dated 14th July, 2017. This does not imply non-employment of the petitioner thereafter. 6.4 As a result of above discussion and reasons, the impugned order dated 23rd April, 2018 passed by Deputy Conservator of Forests is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner on the original post of Bit Guard with continuity of service and with salary/wages to be paid for interregnum, as well as with consequential benefits as if the order of termination was never passed. Reinstatement of the petitioner directed as above shall be upto 13th July 2022 so as to make up the total period of employment of five years as per the conditions of appointment. Resultant monetary benefits arising by virtue of the present order shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the present order.” 16. Similar view has been taken in another judgment in the case of Sandip Ajitsinh Vaghela vs. State of Gujarat rendered in SCA No.12071 of 2018. 17. Resultant monetary benefits arising by virtue of the present order shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the present order.” 16. Similar view has been taken in another judgment in the case of Sandip Ajitsinh Vaghela vs. State of Gujarat rendered in SCA No.12071 of 2018. 17. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Chetan Jayantilal Rajgor (Supra), while confirming the judgment of the learned single Judge, dismissed the appeal. In the case before the Division Bench, the contention was raised on behalf of the State Government that while discontinuing service of an employee concerned, adequate opportunities were extended and hence, the action cannot be said to be in violation of principles of natural justice. It was a specific case of the State Government before the Division Bench that the show cause notice was issued requiring the employee concerned to show cause as to why his service should not be discontinued in terms of the government resolution dated 4.6.2009 and it is only after considering the detailed reply filed by the employees concerned followed by a personal hearing that the authorities took a decision of putting an end to the contractual employment. It was contended before the Division Bench that such action cannot be termed to be de hors principles of natural justice. It was also the case of the State Government that full-fledged departmental enquiry are not to be conducted in a contractual employment inasmuch as, the contractual employment are governed by resolutions issued by the State Government from time to time. The Division Bench, while not accepting the aforesaid contentions raised by the State Government, affirmed the view taken by the learned single Judge, observing in paras 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11 as under: “6. In the cognate matter also, almost similar observations are visible and as such, we do not propose to over burden the present order. These observations if to be examined in the background of present fact situation, the same are found to be just and proper. It appears here that the original petitioners were dealt with by issuance of show cause notice with respect to serious charges levelled against them and the notice was given stating as to why in terms of their appointment, they may not be dismissed from the services. It appears here that the original petitioners were dealt with by issuance of show cause notice with respect to serious charges levelled against them and the notice was given stating as to why in terms of their appointment, they may not be dismissed from the services. Now, this show cause notice appears to have been replied at length by the original petitioners and subsequently, by giving a brief opportunity, without conducting full-scale departmental inquiry, an order of dismissal came to be passed. This procedure which has been adopted by the department against both the original petitioners and undisputedly, no departmental inquiry having been conducted against them, the learned Single Judge, on the basis of relevant proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court, was justified in his view that in the absence of full-scale departmental inquiry, the services of the writ petitioners cannot be terminated in the manner in which it has been put to an end. We see no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge, particularly having gone through the relevant record made available to us. 7. This view which has been taken by the learned Single Judge, to which we are also in agreement, stands fortified by few decisions by the Division Bench of this Court which have already been relied upon by the learned Single Judge. 8. The bone of contention of appellants – State authorities is that since the original petitioners are employed on a contract basis and fixed pay, the Department is not under an obligation to conduct a detailed full-scale departmental inquiry. Now, this contention has been the subject matter of scrutiny on earlier occasion before a Coordinate Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No.189 of 2018 between Vadodara Municipal Corporation v. Manishbhai Nayanbhai Modh, decided on 20.2.2018. The relevant observations contained in the said decision are reflecting in Para.4.1 which are also based upon the decision of the Apex Court and in consonance with the provision of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. The said observations have also been considered at length by the learned Single Judge which are reflecting in Para. 5.7 of the impugned order. 9. The said observations have also been considered at length by the learned Single Judge which are reflecting in Para. 5.7 of the impugned order. 9. Yet in another decision again by the Division Bench of this Court rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.841 of 2019 between Rahul Aydanbhai Vak v. State of Gujarat, decided on 15.4.2019, in which the same issue has been considered. The relevant discussion of the Division Bench in the said case is contained in Para.7, 8 and 9, in which in no uncertain terms, almost in similar set of circumstance, the Division Bench has clearly opined that full-scale departmental inquiry will have to be undertaken, if initiation of action on the basis of unsatisfactory work, gross negligence or indiscipline or any act which may tantamount to be stigmatic and as such, consistently this view has been clearly opined by the Division Bench. 11. From the overall material on record and in consideration of aforesaid observations, we see no distinguishable material to take a different view or deviate from the same. Since almost in similar issue, the proposition is to the effect that whenever any charge is levelled and action is found to be stigmatic, a full-scale departmental inquiry deserves to be undertaken irrespective of whether the delinquent was a regular employee or contractual employee on a fixed salary. As a result of this, we are of the considered opinion that since undisputedly by a brief procedure, an action is initiated against the respondents herein while dismissing their services, said action itself is found to be not on the touchstone of aforesaid proposition of law. As a result of this, no error is committed by the learned Single Judge. Having perused these material, we are not satisfied with the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants in both these appeals.” 18. From the aforesaid enuncitation, it is clear that whenever any charge is levelled and action is found to be stigmatic, a full-scale departmental enquiry deserves to be undertaken irrespective of whether the delinquent was a regular employee or contractual employee on a fixed salary. From the aforesaid enuncitation, it is clear that whenever any charge is levelled and action is found to be stigmatic, a full-scale departmental enquiry deserves to be undertaken irrespective of whether the delinquent was a regular employee or contractual employee on a fixed salary. The principles enunciated by the coordinate bench as well as by the Division Bench of this Court apply on all fours to the facts of the present case inasmuch as, the allegation against the petitioner is that by accepting the bribe, he has committed an offence under provisions of the Act of 1988 and thereby has not maintained absolute integrity and has acted in defiance of clause (i) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules of 1971. The aforesaid propositions of law have not been disputed by the learned Assistant Government Pleader on principle as well as on facts. 19. Quite apart, while passing the order, respondent No.3 has relied upon a report of Director, Anti Corruption Bureau, copy whereof, undisputedly, has not been provided to the petitioner. On this count as well, the order dated 28.11.2017 is in breach of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as, the contents of the report of the Director of the Anti Corruption Bureau has also weighed with respondent No.3 while passing the order dated 28.11.2017. The edifice on which the order dated 28.11.2017 has been passed, is the commission of offence by the petitioner under provisions of the Act of 1988 which clearly has the element of stigma. In view of the aforementioned discussion, respondent No.3 was not justified in passing the order dated 28.11.2017. Accordingly, the order dated 28.11.2017 passed by respondent No.3 deserves to be quashed and set aside and is hereby quashed and set aside. 20. Resultantly, the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner within two weeks from the date of receipt of this order and extend him all consequential benefits viz. pay, allowances etc. within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the order. However, it is made clear that this order shall not preclude the competent authority from taking any decision in accordance with law. 21. For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.