JUDGMENT : J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is at the instance of an unsuccessful writ applicant (detenue) of a writ application and is directed against the judgment and order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 27th August, 2020 in the Special Civil Application No.9784 of 2020. 2. It appears from the materials on record that the appellant (detenue) has been preventively detained under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 as a “Cruel Person” as defined under Section 2(bbb) of the Act vide the order passed by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City dated 14th July, 2020 in exercise of powers under Section 3(2) of the Act. 3. The learned Single Judge declined to entertain the writ application seeking to challenge the order of detention on the ground that the detenue has an alternative efficacious remedy of preferring a representation to the PASA Board. The learned Single Judge, while rejecting the writ application, held as under :- “6. From the bare reading of the said provisions, it clearly transpires that in every case, where the detention order has been made under the Act the State Government within three weeks thereof has to place the same before the Advisory Board, the grounds on which the order has been made, and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order and where the order has been made by the Authorised Officer, also the report made by the officer, within three weeks from the date of order of detention. The procedure after the matter is referred to the Advisory Board has been prescribed in Section 12 of the said Act. The report that may be submitted by the PASA Board to the State Government within seven weeks from the date of detention is required to be kept confidential. 7. So far as the present case is concerned, the order impugned has been passed on 29.07.2020 and the same being under consideration before the Advisory Board, the Court is not inclined to entertain the present petition at this juncture. Even if the detenue does not make any representation the Advisory Board is obliged to consider the matter place before it along with the order of the detention, and to submit its report/opinion within seven weeks of the detention. Even if the detenue does not make any representation the Advisory Board is obliged to consider the matter place before it along with the order of the detention, and to submit its report/opinion within seven weeks of the detention. Thus, by entertaining the petition at this stage when the matter is under consideration before the Board, may result into conflict of orders. Even otherwise, it is needless to say that when the alternative efficacious remedy, that too a statutory remedy is available to the petitioner, the Court would not exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As held by Supreme Court in case of Punjab National Bank vs O.C. Krishnan And Ors., reported (2001) 6 SCC 569 , even though a provision under an Act may not expressly oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said Constitutional Provisions. 8. In that view of the matter, the Court is not inclined to entertain the present petition at this juncture, and hence, the present petition is dismissed.” 4. Being dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant (detenue) is here before this Court with the present appeal. 5. In a very recent pronouncement of this very Bench in the case of Vijay @ Ballu Bharatbhai Ramanbhai Patni vs. State of Gujarat, Letters Patent Appeal No.454 of 2020, decided on 31.08.2020, this Court has taken the view that the writ application, seeking to challenge an order of preventive detention should not be rejected on the ground that the detenue has an alternative efficacious remedy of filing a representation to the PASA Board, or if already preferred, then the detenue should wait for the outcome of the same before invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. 6. In view of the decision of this very Court, referred to above, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge committed a serious error in declining to entertain the writ application on the ground of alternative efficacious remedy. 7. Ordinarily, we would have remitted the matter to the learned Single Judge for being decided on its own merits. In view of the decision of this very Court, referred to above, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge committed a serious error in declining to entertain the writ application on the ground of alternative efficacious remedy. 7. Ordinarily, we would have remitted the matter to the learned Single Judge for being decided on its own merits. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we on our own have thought fit to look into the legality and validity of the detention order. 8. As noted above, the detenue has been detained as a “Cruel Person” as defined under Section 2(bbb) of the Act, 1985 as according to the Detaining Authority, two offences have been registered against the detenue under the provisions of the Gujarat Animal Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2011. 9. The first offence came to be registered on 14th April, 2019 at the Rakhiyal Police Station vide C.R. No.II-3073/2019 and the second offence came to be registered on 27th April, 2019 at the Amraiwadi Police Station vide C.R. No.II-3085/2019. 10. Section 2(bbb) of the Act reads thus:- “bbb) "cruel person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of an offence punishable under section 8 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954;". 11. Thus, “Cruel Person” means a person who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit, abets the commission of an offence punishable under Section 8 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954. It is clear on plain reading of the afore-quoted definition that before a person is branded as a “Cruel Person”, the Detaining Authority should arrive at a subjective satisfaction that such person is either a member or leader of a gang habitually indulging in the commission of an offence punishable under Section 8 of the Act, 1954. The term “habitually” examined from any angle literal, or legal, would require presence of an element of repetitiveness. In the case on hand, barring the two offences registered against the detenue, there was no material before the Detaining Authority to arrive at a subjective satisfaction that the detenue is habitually or repetitively involved in the offence. 12. The term “habitually” examined from any angle literal, or legal, would require presence of an element of repetitiveness. In the case on hand, barring the two offences registered against the detenue, there was no material before the Detaining Authority to arrive at a subjective satisfaction that the detenue is habitually or repetitively involved in the offence. 12. It appears from the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the detenue and not disputed by the learned AGP appearing for the State that the appellant herein is not the main accused. His name came to be disclosed in the statement made by a co-accused before the police. Nothing incriminating was recovered from the possession of the appellant herein. It further appears that in both the cases, referred to above, this High Court granted anticipatory bail as the only evidence against the appellant herein is in the form of statements of the co-accused. 13. Section 3 of the PASA Act speaks about the power to make orders detaining certain persons. It reads as under: “Sec.3 Power to make orders detaining certain persons : (1) The State Government may if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) If having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. (3) When any order is made under this section by an authorised officer, he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, has a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government. (4) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" when such person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities, whether as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Explanation:- For the purpose of this sub-section, public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in this sub-section directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health." 14. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v/s. State of West Bengal [ AIR 1970 SC 852 ], where the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been clearly laid down. The Court observed as follows : “Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof ? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 15. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the grounds of detention, in our opinion, the detaining authority has failed to substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities of the appellant-detenu adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Just because two cases have been registered against the appellant-detenu under the Gujarat Animal Preservation (Amendment) Act, 2011 (for short “the Act, 2011”), by itself, do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The appellant may be punished for the alleged offences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community much less public order. 16. At this stage, it would be expedient to quote the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Ramesh Vandha Modhwadiya through brother, Laxmanbhai Vandha v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2009(3) GLH 296 , wherein in paragraph 11, the Division Bench has observed as under:- “11. PASA Act has been enacted with a clear object to prevent the crime and to protect the society from anti-social elements and dangerous characters against perpetration of crime by placing them under detention for such a duration as would disable them from resorting to undesirable criminal activities. The provisions of the Act are intended to deal with habitual criminals, dangerous and desperate outlaws, who are so hardened and incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of the penal laws and the mortal fear of punishment for crime are not sufficient deterrents for them. Law is well settled that the power under the Act should be exercised with restraint and great caution. Law is well settled that the power under the Act should be exercised with restraint and great caution. In order to pass an order of detention under the Act against any person, the detaining authority must be satisfied that he is a ‘dangerous person' within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the PASA Act, who habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act as according to sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act it is such ‘dangerous person' who for the purpose of Section 3 shall be deemed to be a person “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” against whom an order of detention may lawfully be made. Further, subsection (1) of Section 3 confers power on the State Government and a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police under the direction of the State Government to detain a person on being satisfied that it is necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of ‘public order'. The explanation attached to sub-section (4) of Section 3 reproduced above in the foregoing para contemplates that ‘public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in sub-section (4) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 also provides that for the purpose of Section 3, a person shall be deemed to be ‘acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order' when such person is a ‘dangerous person' and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether besides the person being a ‘dangerous person' his alleged activities fall within the ambit of the expression ‘public order'. A distinction has to be drawn between law and order and maintenance of public order.” 17. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether besides the person being a ‘dangerous person' his alleged activities fall within the ambit of the expression ‘public order'. A distinction has to be drawn between law and order and maintenance of public order.” 17. By catena of judicial pronouncements, the following aspects have emerged, unquestionably, which are required to be kept live on the mental radar before reaching to the subjective satisfaction for passing the order for detention. (i) Only relevant and vital material is required to be taken into consideration for subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. (ii) It is an unwritten law, constitutional and administrative, that wherever a decision making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of the statutory functionary, there is an implicit incumbency to apply his mind to the pertinent and proximate matters only eschewing the irrelevant and remote aspects. (iii) There can be no dispute about the settled proposition that the detention order requires subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which cannot be questioned by the Court. Nonetheless, if the detaining authority does not consider relevant circumstances or considers wholly unnecessary, immaterial and irrelevant circumstances, then such subjective satisfaction would be vitiated. (iv) In quashing the order of detention, the Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction. The anxiety of the Court should be to ascertain as to whether the decision-making process for reaching the subjective satisfaction on objective facts, is in any way influenced, coloured or affected by any caprice, malice or irrelevant considerations or non-application of mind. (v) Subjective satisfaction cannot be re-examined or reviewed by the Court on the ground that ordinarily general criminal law can be invoked instead of special enactment. (vi) At the time of making a detention order, the authority should arrive at proper satisfaction and such satisfaction should be reflected, clearly, and in categorical terms in the order of detention. (vii) The satisfaction cannot be inferred by very making of the order which says that "it was necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial" falling within the mischief of Section 3(1) of the Act. (viii) The detaining authority will have to justify the detention order from the material that existed before him and the process of considering the said material should be reflected in the order of detention by an expression of satisfaction. (viii) The detaining authority will have to justify the detention order from the material that existed before him and the process of considering the said material should be reflected in the order of detention by an expression of satisfaction. (ix) Justification for such an order should exist in the very ground furnished to the detenu to reinforce the detention order. Ordinarily, it cannot be explained subsequently by substituting further reasons. It is, therefore, clear that the decision of the authority must be natural culmination of the application of mind to the relevant and material facts. (x) The subjective satisfaction is based on mental process and it must be followed by the authority in taking action for passing the detention order. (i) First, in such a process, in the first stage is to examine the material adduced against the prospective detenu to show either from his conduct or his antecedent history that he has been acting in a prejudicial manner. (ii) Second, if the aforesaid material appears, satisfactorily, to the authority concerned, then the detaining authority has to further consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in prejudicial manner in the near future, if he is not prevented from doing so by passing an order of detention. For passing a detention order based on subjective satisfaction, the answer of the aforesaid aspects and points must be against the prospective detenu. The absence of application of mind to the pertinent and proximate material and vital matters would show lack of statutory satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority. 18. It would be appropriate, at this juncture, to articulate the most important and guiding observations, made in a decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court, in Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, 2000 SCC (Cri) 659 : 2000 (2) GLR 1532 (SC) : 2000 (3) SCC 409 . "Personal liberty is one of the most cherished freedoms, perhaps more important than the other freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. It was for this reason that the Founding Fathers enacted the safeguards in Art. 22 in the Constitution so as to limit the power of the State to detain a person without trial, which may otherwise pass the test of Art. 21, by humanising the harsh authority over individual liberty. It was for this reason that the Founding Fathers enacted the safeguards in Art. 22 in the Constitution so as to limit the power of the State to detain a person without trial, which may otherwise pass the test of Art. 21, by humanising the harsh authority over individual liberty. Since, preventive detention is a form of precautionary State action, intended to prevent a person from indulging in a conduct, injurious to the society or the security of the State or public order, it has been recognised as "a necessary evil" and is tolerated in a free society in the larger interest of security of the State and maintenance of public order. However, the power being drastic, the restrictions placed on a person to preventively, detain must, consistently with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal. In a democracy governed by the rule of law, the drastic power to detain a person without trial for security of the State and/or maintenance of public order, must be strictly construed. This Court, as the guardian of the Constitution, though not the only guardian, has zealously attempted to preserve and protect the liberty of a citizen. However, where individual liberty comes into conflict with an interest of the security of the State or public order, then the liberty of the individual must give way to the larger interest of the nation." 19. We also take notice of the fact that in the first case registered against the detenue, he was ordered to be released on anticipatory bail by the Sessions Court vide the order dated 01.05.2019, whereas in the second case registered against the detenue, this High Court granted anticipatory bail vide order dated 04.02.2020. If the Detaining Authority was so much concerned about the alleged nefarious activities of the detenue as a “Cruel Person”, why it took five months to pass the order of detention from the date of order of anticipatory bail granted by this Court, i.e., 04.02.2020. This delay could be said to have snapped the live link between the passing of the detention order and the object sought to be achieved by the same. This delay, which has not been explained in any manner, could be said to have vitiated the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority. 20. We also take notice of the fact that two statements have been recorded of two witnesses in camera dated 14.07.2020. This delay, which has not been explained in any manner, could be said to have vitiated the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority. 20. We also take notice of the fact that two statements have been recorded of two witnesses in camera dated 14.07.2020. These two statements have been relied upon to arrive at the subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenue are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. It appears that on the very same date, i.e., 14.07.2020, the order of detention also came to be passed. The Detaining Authority has claimed privilege under Section 9(2) of the Act in public interest for not disclosing the identity of the two witnesses. This entire exercise, in our opinion, is nothing but an eyewash. The two statements could be said to be nothing but rhetorical incantation of the words “cruel” or “prejudicial to maintenance of public order”. The same cannot be sufficient justification to invoke the draconian powers of preventive detention. 21. We have noticed something very unusual in the grounds of detention. At various places in the grounds of detention, it has been stated that the activities of the detenue are of such a nature that the religious sentiments of the people at large would get hurt. We may only observe that an order of preventive detention cannot be passed on the basis of the religious sentiments of the people. The sentiments of the people has no legal force. A person can be detained or branded as a “Cruel Person” only if he falls within the ambit of the definition as provided under Section 2(ccc) of the Act and the other provisions of the Act. By saying that the religious sentiments of the people are being hurt due to the alleged cruel activities of the detenue is something which the Detaining Authority could be said to be ex-facie extraneous to the Act. 22. Be that as it may, we are convinced that the appellant could not have been detained under the PASA as a “Cruel Person” on the grounds relied upon by the Detaining Authority. 23. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The Special Civil Application No.9784 of 2020 is allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 14.07.2020 is hereby quashed and set aside. 23. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The Special Civil Application No.9784 of 2020 is allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 14.07.2020 is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case.