ORDER : M. Satyanarayana Murthy, J. 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India is filed to issue a Writ of Mandamus declaring the Proceedings in Roc. No. 759/2019/A2/DSC-2019 dated 06.10.2019 as well as consequential proceedings in Roc. No. 931/2019/A2/KDP dated 02.12.2019 issued by the first respondent as illegal, arbitrary, and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, set-aside the same and issue consequential direction directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioners into service as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II with all consequential benefits including arrears of salary. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the State Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 217 (Municipal Administration and Urban Development) Department dated 20.07.2019 establishing Ward Secretariats in the urban local bodies and created the post of Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II in the newly created Ward Secretariats with an objective to serve the beneficiaries who are entitled to welfare schemes introduced by the State Government. In pursuance of the aforesaid Government Policy, as the entire Ward Secretariat posts fall under Municipal Administration Department, the Municipal Administration Department issued Notification No. 6 of 2019 dated 26.07.2019 calling applications from the eligible candidates to fill up the posts of Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II, prescribing the qualification for the aforesaid post as Graduate in Arts and Humanities. 3. It is the case that the petitioners applied for the said post through online and the competent authorities after considering and satisfying with the qualification mentioned in the applications of the petitioners, allowed the petitioners to participate in the selection process by issuing hall tickets and enabled them to appear for the examination. The petitioners qualified in the examination in the respective categories for appointment to the post of Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II. Thereafter, the first respondent appointed all the petitioners by proceedings dated 29.09.2019 and accordingly, the petitioners joined in the respective posts as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II. 4. While the matter stood thus, when the petitioners were working as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II, the first respondent vide Proceedings in Roc. No. 759/2019/A2/DSC-2019 dated 06.10.2019 cancelled the appointment of the petitioners by proceedings dated 29.09.2019 stating that the District Collector issued instructions and directed to cancel the appointment of the petitioners. 4. While the matter stood thus, when the petitioners were working as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II, the first respondent vide Proceedings in Roc. No. 759/2019/A2/DSC-2019 dated 06.10.2019 cancelled the appointment of the petitioners by proceedings dated 29.09.2019 stating that the District Collector issued instructions and directed to cancel the appointment of the petitioners. Though no reason is assigned for cancellation of the appointment of the petitioners, however, in the subject column it is stated that, after re-verification of the certificates, it is found that the petitioners are ineligible with reference to their educational qualifications and therefore, appointment orders are cancelled. It is also contended by the petitioners that, the first respondent did not issue any notice while issuing proceedings dated 06.10.2019. Hence, the petitioners filed the present writ petition to declare the Proceedings in Roc. No. 759/2019/A2/DSC-2019 dated 06.10.2019 as well as consequential proceedings in Roc. No. 931/2019/A2/KDP dated 02.12.2019 issued by the first respondent as illegal, arbitrary and set-aside the same. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, during arguments, reiterated the contentions urged in the writ petition, whereas, learned Government Pleader for Services supported the proceedings impugned in the writ petition. 6. No doubt, the State Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 217 (Municipal Administration and Urban Development) Department dated 20.07.2019 establishing Ward Secretariats in the urban local bodies and created the post of Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II in the newly created Ward Secretariats with an objective to serve the beneficiaries who are entitled to welfare schemes introduced by the State Government without causing any inconvenience to the beneficiaries. 7. In pursuance of the aforesaid Government Policy, Municipal Administration Department issued Notification No. 6 of 2019 dated 26.07.2019 calling applications from the eligible candidates to fill up the posts of Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II, prescribing the qualification for the aforesaid post as Graduate in Arts and Humanities. 8. The competent authority after considering the applications of the petitioners and after satisfying that the petitioners possessed requisite qualification for the post of Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II, the authorities allowed the petitioners to appear for the examinations in the selection process by issuing hall tickets, enabling the petitioners to participate in the selection process, including examinations held on 08.09.2019. 9. 9. After completion of selection process, the petitioners were appointed as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II and suddenly their appointment was cancelled vide Proceedings in Roc. No. 759/2019/A2/DSC-2019 dated 06.10.2019 and the same was challenged before this Court in W.P. No. 16535 of 2019 and this Court vide order dated 25.10.2019 allowed the writ petition holding that cancellation of appointment of the petitioners without issuing notice and opportunity is illegal and directed the authorities to issue notice and opportunity and conduct the enquiry by following principles of natural justice. 10. In pursuance of the order passed in W.P. No. 16535 of 2019 dated 25.10.2019, the respondents appear to have conducted enquiry and these petitioners also appeared before the authorities during enquiry. However, the order impugned in the writ petition i.e. Roc. No. 931/2019/A2/KDP dated 02.12.2019 did not disclose any reason, much less, specific reason as to the disqualification of these petitioners for being appointed as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II, the operative portion of the impugned order of the first petitioner (similar orders were issued to the other petitioners also), reads as follows: "Further, in pursuant of the Hon'ble High Court orders issued vide reference 13th read above, Sri. Cherukuri Babavali, s/o. Brahmaiah, R/o. YSR Kadapa District had been called for enquiry and he has attended the same on 23.11.2019 and submitted all Educational Qualifications Certificates. Upon perusal of all the documents submitted by him in original, it is found that he is ineligible for the post of Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II, as per the Notification No. 6/2019 dated 27.07.2019 as he did not satisfy the educational qualification as mentioned in the notification No. 6/2019 dated 26.07.2019." 11. During hearing, Sri. P.V. Krishnaiah, learned counsel for the petitioners specifically contended that the impugned orders did not disclose any details as to why the petitioners were disqualified for being appointed for the post of Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II and in the absence of such details, the impugned Proceedings in Roc. No. 759/2019/A2/DSC-2019 dated 06.10.2019 as well as consequential proceedings in Roc. No. 931/2019/A2/KDP dated 02.12.2019 are invalid and requested to set-aside the same. 12. Whereas, learned Government Pleader for Services-I filed counter affidavit contending that the petitioners possessed only a Degree in Commerce, but not in Arts and Humanities, which is the pre-requisite qualification for being appointed as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II. No. 931/2019/A2/KDP dated 02.12.2019 are invalid and requested to set-aside the same. 12. Whereas, learned Government Pleader for Services-I filed counter affidavit contending that the petitioners possessed only a Degree in Commerce, but not in Arts and Humanities, which is the pre-requisite qualification for being appointed as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II. On this ground alone, the petitioners were disqualified and services of these petitioners were terminated. 13. Undoubtedly, the petitioners allegedly appeared for the examination, participated in the selection process, appointed to the said post and posted as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II and the first respondent suddenly terminated their services. Sudden termination of services of the petitioners by the first respondent without affording any opportunity was challenged in W.P. No. 16535 of 2019. However, the writ petition was allowed. Even now, the respondents are required to follow the procedure prescribed under law and the impugned order passed by the authorities shall disclose reasons. But, the operative portion of the impugned orders dated 02.12.2019 does not disclose any specific reason, except concluding that on perusal of the documents submitted by the petitioners in original, it is found that they are ineligible to the post of Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II. Except this conclusion, no other reason was assigned. 14. Learned Government Pleader for Services-I contended that, the petitioners possessed qualification of Degree in Commerce, which is not equivalent to Degree in Arts and Humanities, which is pre-requisite qualification for being appointed as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II. But, the impugned order is silent about the same. However, learned Government Pleader wanted to substitute the impugned reason by filing counter affidavit and this is impermissible, in view of the law declared by the Apex Court in M.S. Gill v. Election Commission of India : (1978) 1 SCC 405 and this Court in Leela Enterprises v. Kamar Sultana : 2017(5) ALD 374 . Therefore, the impugned Proceedings in Roc. No. 759/2019/A2/DSC-2019 dated 06.10.2019 as well as consequential proceedings in Roc. No. 931/2019/A2/KDP dated 02.12.2019 are illegal and arbitrary. 15. In M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd., v. STO, Rourkela-I Circle & Ors.: 2008 (5) Supreme 281 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court testing the correctness of an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax against the assessment, at Paragraph 10, held as follows: "10. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. 15. In M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd., v. STO, Rourkela-I Circle & Ors.: 2008 (5) Supreme 281 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court testing the correctness of an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax against the assessment, at Paragraph 10, held as follows: "10. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same it becomes lifeless." 16. The expression "speaking order" was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of the writ of certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See pp. 1878-97, Vol. 4, Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the Report). The Apex Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the "inscrutable face of a sphinx". 17. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala: AIR 1961 SC 1669 , the question of recording reasons came up for consideration in the context of a refusal by Harinagar to transfer, without giving reasons, shares held by Shyam Sunder. Challenging such refusal, the transferee moved the High Court contending, inter alia, that the refusal is mala fide, arbitrary and capricious. The High Court rejected such pleas and the transferee was asked to file a suit. The transferee filed an appeal to the Central Government under Section 111(3) of the Companies Act, 1956 which was dismissed. Thereafter, the son of the original transferee filed another application for transfer of his shares which was similarly refused by the Company. On appeal, the Central Government quashed the resolution passed by the Company and directed the Company to register the transfer. However, in passing the said order, the Government did not give any reason. The Company challenged the said decision before this Court. The other question which arose in Harinagar was whether the Central Government, in passing the appellate order acted as a tribunal and is amenable to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court. However, in passing the said order, the Government did not give any reason. The Company challenged the said decision before this Court. The other question which arose in Harinagar was whether the Central Government, in passing the appellate order acted as a tribunal and is amenable to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court. Even though in Harinagar the decision was administrative, this Court insisted on the requirement of recording reason and further held that in exercising appellate powers, the Central Government acted as a tribunal in exercising judicial powers of the State and such exercise is subject to Article 136 of the Constitution of India, jurisdiction of this Court. Such powers, the Apex Court held, cannot be effectively exercised if reasons are not given by the Central Government in support of the order. 18. Again in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India : AIR 1967 SC 1606 , the Constitution Bench of this Court examined the question whether the Central Government was bound to pass a speaking order while dismissing a revision and confirming the order of the State Government in the context of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, and having regard to the provision of Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules. The Constitution Bench held that in exercising its power of revision under the aforesaid Rule the Central Government acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Where the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government without specifying any reason, this Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136, may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds on which the Central Government upheld the order of the State Government. Therefore, the Apex Court insisted on reasons being given. 19. In Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. : (1970) 1 SCC 764 , while dealing with the U.P. Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order under which the licence was cancelled, this Court held that such an order of cancellation is quasi-judicial and must be a speaking one. The Apex Court further held that merely giving an opportunity of hearing is not enough and further pointed out where the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reason is even greater. The Apex Court further held that merely giving an opportunity of hearing is not enough and further pointed out where the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reason is even greater. The learned Judges held that the recording of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim ensures that the decision is not a result of caprice, whim or fancy but was arrived at after considering the relevant law and that the decision was just. 20. In Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor : (1973) 2 SCC 836 this Court while dealing with the question of selection under the Indian Administrative Service/Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations held that the expression "reasons for the proposed supersession" should not be mere rubber-stamp reasons. Such reasons must disclose how mind was applied to the subject-matter for a decision regardless of the fact whether such a decision is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. This Court held that the reasons in such context would mean the link between materials which are considered and the conclusions which are reached. Reasons must reveal a rational nexus between the two. 21. In a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr., Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department : (1979) 4 SCC 642 , while giving the majority judgment the principle in Latin was referred which runs as follows: "Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex." The English version of the said is that: . 'reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself'." 22. Summarising the above discussion, in The Collector v. K. Krishnaveni1, the Division Bench of Madras High Court culled out the following principles: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor.) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor.) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process"." 23. Even according to principles of natural justice, the authorities must disclose reasons for arriving at such conclusion and it is only to enable the person to know the reason for his termination or for passing any adverse order against him/her and it is a guide for the Appellate Authority to decide such an issue. Thus, Proceedings in Roc. No. 759/2019/A2/DSC-2019 dated 06.10.2019 as well as consequential proceedings in Roc. No. 931/2019/A2/KDP dated 02.12.2019 is contrary and against the principles of natural justice and the same is liable to be set-aside. 24. In the result, writ petition is allowed, setting aside the Proceedings in Roc. No. 759/2019/A2/DSC-2019 dated 06.10.2019 as well as consequential proceedings in Roc. No. 931/2019/A2/KDP dated 02.12.2019, directing the respondents to forthwith reinstate the petitioners into service as Ward Welfare and Development Secretary Grade-II with all consequential benefits, including arrears of salary etc. However, this order will not preclude the respondents to pass appropriate order(s), strictly complying with the mandatory requirements by following principles of natural justice. 25. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand dismissed. 1W.A. No. 1995 of 2018 dated 03.09.2019 (unreported)