JUDGMENT : 1. In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 24.02.2011 passed by the Deputy Collector, Choriyasi Prant Collector Office, Choriyasi, Surat in Fragmentation Case No. 12 of 2008 as well as the order dated 13.06.2019 passed by the Deputy Collector, Olpad Prant, Olpad, Surat in Fragmentation Appeal No. 9 of 2016 (old case No. 13 of 2008). 2. Facts in brief are as under: 2.1 The petitioners possessed and were the joint owners of land bearing survey No. 57, Block No. 57 situated at village Kumbhariya, Taluka : Choriyasi, District : Surat. The case of the petitioners is that their names are reflected in the revenue records. According to the petitioners, when in 2016 they were desirous of converting land into non agricultural use, they came across the fact that the revenue entry nos. 2096 to 2099 were entered into in favour of the subsequent purchasers. 2.2 As far as respondent No.5 is concerned, revenue entry no. 2097 was entered into the revenue records in favour of respondent No.5. According to the petitioners, the petitioners had never sold the lands in question. The revenue entries, including the one in favour of respondent No.5 purportedly based on a sale deed dated 26.06.1995 was fraudulent as it was based on a power of attorney which was executed subsequent to the sale deed on 25.05.1997. The case of the petitioners is that since the sale in question in favour of respondent No.5 of the subject land was bogus and void in view of the fraudulent transaction as the sale deed was by a power of attorney holder subsequent to that of the sale deed, the sale was bad. The revenue entries in favour of the respondent No.5 therefore were also bad. 2.3 It appears that against the subsequent sellers, including the respondent No.5, proceedings were Suo Moto initiated for the breach of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. The Suo Motu proceedings were dropped by an order dated 24.02.2011. The revenue entries in favour of the respondent No.5 therefore were also bad. 2.3 It appears that against the subsequent sellers, including the respondent No.5, proceedings were Suo Moto initiated for the breach of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. The Suo Motu proceedings were dropped by an order dated 24.02.2011. In a subsequent proceeding for the same breach, being Old Case No. 13 of 2008, and in the Fragmentation Appeal re-numbered as 9 of 2016 against the respondent No.5 being one of the subsequent purchasers, based on the dropping of the Suo Motu proceedings by the order dated 24.02.2011, by the order of 13.06.2019 the proceedings under the Fragmentation Act were dropped. These orders are under challenge by the original vendor. 3. Mr. Percy Kavina, learned Senior Counsel, appearing with Mr. Manan Shah, learned advocate for the petitioners, would submit that the petitioners had never sold the land by way of a registered sale deed of 26.06.1995. He would submit that Survey No. 57 was sold in four blocks by four separate sale deeds and the respondent No.5 was sold Block No.3-B. The power of attorney carrying out the execution of the sale deeds was executed on 25.05.1997. Obviously, the power of attorney was forged and could not have been used for executing a sale deed of 1995. 3.1 Mr. Kavina, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that on inquiry, it was found that the subsequent purchasers, including the respondent No.5, thirteen years after the sale deed of 1995 made applications for entering their names in the revenue records on 05.09.1997 on the basis of a forged power of attorney of 1997 and a sale deed of 1995. He would submit that even an affidavit dated 29.12.2007 filed by one Jalwaben having no objection for entering the name in the revenue records was forged, as she had expired in the year 2000. 3.2 Mr. Kavina, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that revenue entries were made in favour of the subsequent purchasers, including the respondent No.5 which was subsequently cancelled on 29.12.2007. The revenue authorities found that there was a breach of Section 63 of the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. Appellate proceedings before the revenue authorities at the hands of the respondent No.5 cancelling the revenue entries in his favour are pending in an RTS Appeal. The revenue authorities found that there was a breach of Section 63 of the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. Appellate proceedings before the revenue authorities at the hands of the respondent No.5 cancelling the revenue entries in his favour are pending in an RTS Appeal. It was in these proceedings that when the orders under the Fragmentation Act were produced, did the petitioners come to know that the authorities under the Fragmentation Act have wrongly absolved the subsequent purchasers, the respondent No.5, including of the violation of the Fragmentation Act, inasmuch as, the sale was admittedly by way of sub-dividing into sub blocks, and therefore, the authorities ought to have held that there is a violation of the Fragmentation Act. 3.3 Mr. Kavina, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the fact that the fraudulent sale deed and power of attorney are a subject matter of a criminal proceedings before the appropriate Court, vindicates the stand of the petitioners that the petitioners are shown in the revenue records as owners of the land which was even an admitted fact as discussed in the order dated 24.02.2011. Notices under the provisions of the appropriate act ought to have been issued to the petitioners, as original owners, before absolving the respondent No.5 of violation of proceedings under the Fragmentation Act. 3.4 Mr. Kavina, learned Senior Counsel, drew the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act to submit that once a land is partitioned or transferred in breach of the Fragmentation Act, the sale deed stand automatically void, and therefore, a void transaction cannot be saved by a subsequent implementation of the town planning scheme and the orders of the authorities under the Fragmentation Act are therefore bad and must be set aside. 3.5 Mr.Kavina, learned Senior Counsel, would further submit that since the orders were passed in breach of principles of natural justice, this Court would not oust the petitioners on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. He would submit that in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Committee of Management & Ors., vs. Vice Chancellor & Ors., reported in AIR 2009 SC 1159 , the Supreme Court held that when the order is in violation of principles of natural justice, the superior court should not refuse to exercise their jurisdiction on the ground of alternative remedy. He also relied on the decision in the case of Balkrishna Ram vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2020 (2) SCC 422 and would submit that the rule of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and writ jurisdiction in the case on hand should be exercised in view of the glaring illegality committed by the lower authority. He would submit that, admittedly, when the orders have been passed by the authorities under the Fragmentation Act without notice to the original owners, i.e. the petitioners, the orders are void ab-initio, and such transactions on the basis of void documents are not binding on the parties. The orders are non est, and therefore, even delay should not weigh against the petitioners in exercising a discretion in their favour. 4. Mr.S.P.Majmudar, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondent No.5 and before answering the issue on merits, has raised certain preliminary objections as to the maintainability of the petition. He would submit as under: (i) Mr.Majmudar, learned advocate, would submit that the petitioners did not have locus standi to file the present petition. The present respondent purchased purchased the property by a registered sale deed of 1995. The petitioners have pocketed the sale consideration 25 years before the present proceedings. No civil suit or any proceeding challenging the registered sale deed had been initiated. Since the genuineness of transaction is not under challenge, the petitioners cannot be said to be "aggrieved person", and therefore, no locus. (ii) Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate, would further submit that the petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the Dy. Collector without exhausting the alternative remedy available under the Act, and therefore, this Court should not exercise discretion in favour of the petitioners. (iii) Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate, would further submit that that the petition also suffers from delay and latches. The order dated 24.02.2011 which was passed in Suo Motu proceedings has been challenged after nine years and the subsequent order of 13.06.2019 after one year. (iv) On the question that the order is in violation of principles of natural justice, Mr.Majmudar, learned advocate, would submit that merely because the order of 24.02.2011 observes that the names of the original ownners reflect in the revenue records cannot advance the case of the petitioners that they ought to have been heard. (iv) On the question that the order is in violation of principles of natural justice, Mr.Majmudar, learned advocate, would submit that merely because the order of 24.02.2011 observes that the names of the original ownners reflect in the revenue records cannot advance the case of the petitioners that they ought to have been heard. The stand of the petitioners that they were made aware of the order from the Office of the Mamlatdar in the year 2016 is also misconceived because it is evident that the orders of anticipatory bail which the respondent had obtained, make it clear that the certified copies of the documents were obtained by the petitioners in the year 2013. (v) On merits, Mr.Majmudar, learned advocate, would submit that, in fact, the power-of-attorney is of the year 1990 and not 1997. (vi) Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate, would submit that the revenue proceedings wherein the respondents have challenged cancellation of revenue entries in their favour are pending in the appropriate forum before the Collector, Surat. (vii) Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate, would submit that there is no breach of provisions of Section 8 of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act. He would submit that the proceedings under the Fragmentation Act were initiated Suo Motu as is evident from the proceedings in the Case No. 12 of 2008. No notice was, therefore, necessary to be issued to the petitioners. Moreover, as is stated earlier, the petitioners had no locus to challenge the proceedings after having sold the land 25 years since the deed of sale. With regard to the Fragmentation Appeal No. 9 of 2016, Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate, would submit that an entry being Entry No. 3102 was mutated in the revenue record and a notice was issued on 03.03.2017. (viii) In support of his submissions that the petitioners cannot challenge the orders of the authorities below, Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate, relied on a decision of this court dated 29.06.2018 rendered in the case of Purshotam Dhanjibhai Patel vs. Shivganga Farms Pvt. Ltd. In Letters Patent Appeal No. 490 of 2018 and group matters. He relied on para 17 thereof. (ix) He submitted that the authorities under the Fragmentation Act rightly closed the proceedings, as for a sale in the year 1995, Suo Moto proceedings were sought to be initiated after unreasonable delay of 13 years in the year 2008. He relied on para 17 thereof. (ix) He submitted that the authorities under the Fragmentation Act rightly closed the proceedings, as for a sale in the year 1995, Suo Moto proceedings were sought to be initiated after unreasonable delay of 13 years in the year 2008. Reliance was placed on a decision in the case of Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel v/s. State of Gujarat, reported in 1984 (2) GLR 1225 , where the Court had held that where powers are exercised after an unreasonable period of time, such powers cannot be treated to have been exercised in accordance with the provisions of Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act. Mr.Majmudar, learned advocate, also relied on a decision in the case of Valjibhai Jagjivanbhai v/s. State of Gujarat, reported in 2005 (3) GLR 1852 , in support of his submission that powers under the Fragmentation Act cannot be initiated after an unreasonable period of time. (x) By relying on an additional affidavit filed in the petition, Mr.Majmudar, learned advocate, would submit that even the petitioner No.3 Urmilaben had expired on 17.02.2020 and the petition though affirmed by one of the other petitioners, Urmilaben as a petitioner was already deceased, and therefore, the petition at the behest of the deceased litigant is also misconceived. 5. Considering the submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties, the Court needs to consider whether the petitioners who are the original owners can challenge the orders passed under the Fragmentation Act in the year 2011 by way of a petition in the year 2020. Moreover, since Shri Majmudar, learned advocate, has also raised the issue of locus standi of the petitioners, the same needs to be considered. 5.1 The case of the petitioners in a nutshell is that they were the original owners of the lands in question together with one Jalwaben. The sale, according to the petitioners, of the land bearing survey No.57, part of which i.e. Block 3-B was in favour of the respondent No.5 was void, inasmuch as, the sale deed of 1995 was on the basis of a power-of attorney which was executed in the year 1997. The case of the petitioners is that the petitioners have filed criminal proceedings against the respondents for having forged a power-of-attorney and the consequential execution of the sale deed based on this power-of-attorney. The case of the petitioners is that the petitioners have filed criminal proceedings against the respondents for having forged a power-of-attorney and the consequential execution of the sale deed based on this power-of-attorney. The other contention was that the orders under challenge are in violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as, no notices were issued to the petitioners who are admittedly the original owners of the land in question. Support also was sought to be made from the provisions of Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act to submit that once the transactions are void, and admittedly there is a breach of the Fragmentation Act, consequential proceedings must follow. 6. Let me first address the issue of Locus Standi of the petitioners to challenge these orders before this Court. Admittedly, the case of the petitioners is that the sale deed of 1995 is fraudulent and bogus, and therefore, based on the criminal prosecution and proceedings initiated against the respondents, the sale in question was non est, the transaction was void, and therefore, being the original owners, the proceedings under the Fragmentation Act closing the proceedings in favour of the respondent were violative of the principles of natural justice. 6.1 Admittedly, except for lodging criminal prosecution vis-a-vis the power-of-attorney being forged and the consequential proceedings being so forged, there is no proceeding against the respondent by filing a civil suit for setting aside the sale deed or the power-of-attorney in question. The sale deed as it stands, has stood the test of legality for 25 years now without any challenge. The respondent No.5 has a part of the land, which came in his favour is the owner as of now without dispute. The petitioner, therefore, would not have any locus to challenge the proceedings under the Fragmentation Act on the ground that he was the owner of the lands in question when the sale deed based on which the respondent No.5 has become the owner is not set aside nor any proceedings are initiated for setting aside such transactions. 6.2 It is in this context, that the decisions of this Court in the case of Parshotambhai (supra) needs to be considered. 6.2 It is in this context, that the decisions of this Court in the case of Parshotambhai (supra) needs to be considered. Para 17 thereof reads as under: “17 From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it is clear that when the seller has pocketed the amount of consideration and if he has lost the remedy even by filing civil suit or declaration that the transaction is null and void and illegal, the remedy of getting back the land which is not permissible directly, cannot be allowed to be done indirectly by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution. It is further clear that the concerned petitioner who is transferor and party to sale would never be said to be aggrieved party which would entitle him to carry the matter in appeal when the State has chosen not to challenge the order. It is further clear from the aforesaid decisions that to maintain the petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the party aggrieved must show that any of his fundamental rights or his legal rights have been infringed and thereby, the party is aggrieved by such infringement. What is meaning of person aggrieved is also discussed....” Annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE-R-8 (Colly.) are copies of Judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court in case of Parshotambhai Dhanjibhai Patel v/s. Shivganga Farms Pvt. Ltd. Reported in 2018 JS (Guj) 250 as well as in case of Navuji Lalji Vaghela v/s. State of Gujarat reported in 2011 (4) GLR 3636 .” 6.3 It is, therefore, apparently clear that even if I was not to oust the petitioners on the question of alternative remedy, the petitioners today had no locus to challenge these orders under the Fragmentation Act on the ground of they being the original owner when the sale deed and the power of attorney have for the past 25 years not been a subject matter of challenge. 7. Even on the question of they being not parties, or being not issued notices, what is evident from the order in Fragmentation Case No. 12 of 2008 is that it was a Suo Motu proceeding initiated at the hands of the reviewing authorities. The reviewing authorities on the basis of appreciation of the legal position, closed the case. 7. Even on the question of they being not parties, or being not issued notices, what is evident from the order in Fragmentation Case No. 12 of 2008 is that it was a Suo Motu proceeding initiated at the hands of the reviewing authorities. The reviewing authorities on the basis of appreciation of the legal position, closed the case. Even otherwise, as set out in the decision in the case of Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel (supra), any Suo Motu proceedings initiated after an unreasonable period of time cannot be entertained. Para 5 of the decision in the case of Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel (supra), reads as under: “5 It is true that no period of limitation is laid down by the said Act indicating as to within what period, the concerned authorities can initiate proceedings under Section-9. It is also true that power given to the authorities is coupled with the duty to act as per the provisions of Section-9 if power under sec. 9 can be validly invoked. But that does not mean that power can be exercised at any time may be after years or decades. Exercise of power has to be justified on the facts of each case and if on the facts of a given case, it is found that exercise of power after lapse of sufficiently long period between the impugned transaction and the date of exercise of that power would be arbitrary and unreasonable due to the fact that in the meanwhile parties had changed their position irretrievably oblivious of any possibility of future action by the authorities functioning under the Act on account of prolonged inaction on the part of these authorities and any attempt to put back the clock would result in irreparable injury to the concerned parties, then such exercise has to be treated to be unjust and illegal. In that view of the matter as seen above on the facts of this case, exercise of power under Sec.9 against the petitioner would be unreasonable and arbitrary....” 7.1 Even in the case of Valjibhai (supra), this Court in para 23 held as under: “23 Looking to the aforesaid different situations, there is no doubt in our mind that even the void transaction under sec. 9(1) if allowed to remain effective for considerably long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. 9(1) if allowed to remain effective for considerably long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions cited by Mr. Patel clearly states that even the void transaction cannot be said to be nonexistent in all cases and in all situations. It can remain effective and in existence till it is invalidated and set aside. If its existence is allowed to remain for a considerable period and with the passage of time it brings about several changes, creating valuable rights in favour of considerable section of people, it is difficult to accept the proposition that despite the change the Collector would be entitled to exercise the power under sub-section (3) of sec. 9 of the Act. Similar observations can also be made with regard to the land wherein no change is brought about, but number of years have passed after the transfer against provisions of the Act has taken place. In our opinion, when the things have been allowed to remain as such for years together, the purchaser cannot be deprived of his possession so as to render indirect benefit to the seller who was equally responsible for entering into such illegal transaction. Thus, in our view, when the authority had considerable opportunities to know about the transaction and despite that, has not taken any action thereon for years together, such authority cannot be allowed to exercise powers conferred upon it at a belated stage. The concept of reasonableness of time will equally apply in such cases. We therefore, hold that the Collector under sub-secs. (2) and (3) of sec.9 are required to be exercised within a reasonable time.” 8. All these circumstances lead the Court to believe and hold that even otherwise apart from the factum of locus, on merits, when the exercise of powers of Suo Motu were closed by the authorities, assuming for the sake of arguments that these authorities had taken legal recourse and sought to revive the violation of provisions under the Fragmentation Act, they would have been struck off on the ground of having been initiated after an unreasonable period of time. I would, therefore, agree with the submission of Mr. I would, therefore, agree with the submission of Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate, on two counts, namely, that the petitioners have no locus to challenge these proceedings after having sold the land and pocketed the money 25 years after the transaction and secondly no notices were necessary to be issued to the petitioners as they were Suo Motu proceedings in which the petitioners had no concern. Merely harping on the initiation of criminal prosecution would not resurrect the legality of the sale deeds or bring the sale transaction under cloud so as to disentitle the respondents of its fragmentation case violation resting finally. 9. With regard to the arguments of Mr. Kavina, learned Senior Counsel, that void transactions are nonest, while discussing the issue, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Valjibhai (supra) considered the question of void and voidable transactions, and in para 9 thereof, held as under: “9 It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing discussion that even inherently or fundamentally void orders are amenable to law of limitation to the extent they are required to be declared as such, and they have not been granted absolute immunity. In the instant case, any transfer or partition made contrary to the provisions of the Act is void as per the provisions of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.9 of the Act. However, before declaring it void the concerned authority will have to find out by following requisite procedure that the transfer or partition is contrary to the provisions of the Act. In light of these decisions of the Apex Court, it can as well be said that the proceedings which may have to be initiated either by the aggrieved party or by a competent authority, either to assert its right or to exercise the power conferred upon it by the statute respectively, it will have to do so within the prescribed period of limitation or if no period is prescribed by the law of limitation, within reasonable time.” 9.1 The Court held that even in the case of void transactions, the law of limitation would apply and unless and until they are declared as void within a reasonable period of time, they cannot be termed as void and the petitioner cannot claim benefit thereof on the ground of the transaction being void. 10. 10. Therefore, considering the fact that the orders dated 24.02.2011 and 13.06.2019 closing the fragmentation proceedings against the respondent No.5 were in light of the fact that the sale transactions pursuant to which the respondent No.5 became the owner is not a subject matter of challenge in civil suit, the petitioners neither have locus to challenge such proceedings under the Fragmentation Act and even otherwise, the challenge after nine years to the order should fail. 11. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. No costs.