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2020 DIGILAW 853 (AP)

Varadhi Babu Kishore S/o. Surya Prakasam v. Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission

2020-12-22

R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO

body2020
ORDER : The petitioner had participated in the selection process for the post of Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector in pursuance of notification No.11 of 2018 against SC vacancy notified in Zone IV conducted by the 1st respondent. The petitioner was declared passed in the written examination conducted on 17.04.2019 and was issued Memo dated 05.11.2019 by the 1st respondent to attend for verification of original certificates scheduled on 27.11.2019. After the said verification, the 1st respondent by Memo dated 18.11.2019 directed the petitioner to attend the Medical Board scheduled on 05.12.2019 at King George Hospital, Visakhapatnam for checking the physical standards required for the post of AMVI as per rules. 2. The petitioner was examined by the Medical Board on 05.12.2019 and he was not informed of any defect or non-fulfilment of physical standards. However, in the final selected list dated 18.03.2020, the 4th respondent was shown as selected. It is submitted that while the petitioner got 148.98 marks, the 4th respondent had got 138.85 marks in the written examination and was clearly below the petitioner in the merit list. The petitioner had immediately submitted a representation dated 19.03.2020 pointing out the above injustice. 3. Subsequently, the petitioner gave a representation dated 26.05.2020 to the 1st respondent stating that as per Regulation 14 and 15 in G.O.Ms.No.147 dated 06.08.2016 the candidate would have a right of appeal if there was on the adverse decision of the Medical Board. He further stated that it was the duty of the 1st respondent to communicate the adverse decision of the Medical Board and accept the appeals without which the final selection list could not be released. Thereafter, he approached this Court by way of this writ petition filed on 29.05.2020. 4. In the writ petition, the petitioner submitted that there must have been some mistake or deliberate correction in the report of the Medical Board and as such he should be declared as the successful candidate in the place of the 4th respondent. As an interim measure, the writ petitioner also sought a direction to reconduct the medical examination by an independent Medical Board and not to effect the selection of the 4th respondent as Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector. 5. After notice, the 4th respondent entered appearance. All the respondents have filed their counter affidavits. 6. As an interim measure, the writ petitioner also sought a direction to reconduct the medical examination by an independent Medical Board and not to effect the selection of the 4th respondent as Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector. 5. After notice, the 4th respondent entered appearance. All the respondents have filed their counter affidavits. 6. In the counter filed by the 1st respondent, receipt of the representation of the petitioner, dated 26.05.2020 is not denied. The stand of the 1st respondent is that Clauses-14 and 15 of G.O.Ms.No.147, dated 06.08.2016 provided for an appeal against the decision of the Medical Board and it was the Medical Board that ought to inform the petitioner of any defect and the appeal of the petitioner would be against the decision of the Medical Board. The 1st respondent took the stand that since there were no directions to the 1st respondent, under G.O.Ms.No.147, there was nothing further to be done by the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent also stated that the petitioner had been intimated about his disqualification in the medical examination and that the petitioner was sent to an appellate medical board. However, a closer look at the said averments would show that in para-6 of the counter affidavit, the 1st respondent confused the Medical Board which examined the petitioner with the appellate Medical Board. 7. The 2nd and 3rd respondents filed a counter stating that they had acted upon the selection list of 21 candidates sent by the 1st respondent on 12.05.2020 and had issued proceedings on the same day for verification of original documents and thereafter, issued appointment proceedings dated 26.05.2020. It was further stated that the 4th respondent had reported for duty as Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector on 01.06.2020 and was posted as Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector in the office of the Deputy Transport Commissioner, Kurnool, after which he went for training for two months. 8. The 4th respondent, who was appointed as Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector, had also filed a counter stating that the petitioner cannot claim a second examination after such a long time as he would have rectified the defect of minimum chest expansion requirement of 5 cms., and as such cannot be permitted to get the benefit of a reexamination at this length of time. 9. 9. While the present writ petition was pending before this Court, the petitioner filed a memo dated 17.06.2020 stating that he had received a copy of the medical examination report conducted on 05.12.2019 under the Right to Information Act on 01.06.2020 and filed the same as additional material paper. 10. The petitioner had also filed replies to the counter affidavits filed by the 1st respondent and the 4th respondent. In the reply affidavit filed against the counter of the 1st respondent, the petitioner took the additional ground that a perusal of the medical examination report would show that the report was tampered by adding/interpolating certain numbers in the report. The petitioner also stated that he had chest expansion of 5 cms., which was recorded by the medical board but the subsequent interpolations showed as if he had a chest expansion of 4.5 cms., only. 11. This court with a view to ascertain prima facie facts, had called for the original medical report which was produced into the Court. A perusal of the medical report shows that the height of the petitioner was 164.5 cms., and the chest measurement on full inspiration was 86 cms., on full expiration 81.5 cms., and the expansion was 4.5 cms. The minimum physical requirement, for men, stipulated under G.O. Ms. No. 147, for the post of Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector (ST/SC & Aborginal Tribes) was a minimum chest measurement of 83.80 cms., and minimum chest difference of 5 cms. In the present case, the petitioner is shown to have a chest difference of 4.5 cms., which is below the minimum required measurement of 5 cms. 12. It is the case of the petitioner that the measurements were altered after the medical board had recorded the measurements. 13. The copy of the medical report would show that the measurements were done in the following way: “1. Height 164.5 cms., Weight 63 kg. 2. Chest Measurement a) On full inspiration 86 cms ., B.P. 130/80 b) On full expiration 81.5 cms., ECG (N) c) Difference (Expansion) 4.5 cms., 14. The figures mentioned above were written in hand and it is the case of the petitioner that originally the numbers recorded for full expiration was 81 but was changed to 81.5 by interpolating “.5” in the 81.5 figure. The figures mentioned above were written in hand and it is the case of the petitioner that originally the numbers recorded for full expiration was 81 but was changed to 81.5 by interpolating “.5” in the 81.5 figure. Similarly, the difference in expansion was shown at 5 cms., but the figure 4 was added in front of 5 to make the expansion 4.5 cms. This submission of the petitioner is hotly contested by the respondents. 15. Heard Sri J. Sudheer, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri A. Ramachandra Murthy, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent and Sri G.R. Sudhakar, learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent. 16. Sri G.R. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the 4th respondent took various objections to the case of the petitioner. He submitted that the question whether there was tampering of the figures in the medical report is a disputed question of fact which cannot be gone into by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; that the petitioner had attributed mala fides which require to be demonstrated in a particular manner and since the same was not done by the petitioner the said question cannot be looked into; that there was a provision for appeal under the provisions of G.O.Ms.No.147, which was not exercised by the petitioner and as such the present writ petition is not maintainable; that measuring the chest expansion at this late point is not permissible as the petitioner had adequate time to improve his physical fitness and to increase the chest expansion by virtue of various exercises, which are recommended for such chest expansion. 17. On the question of mala fides, Sri G.R. Sudhakar relied upon the Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1996 SC 302 , AIR 1996 SC 2804 . On the question of requirement of the petitioner to approach the appellate authority Sri G.R. Sudhakar relied upon United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 110 , Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Ltd. and another Vs. Iqbal and others, (2013) 10 SCC 83 , Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Ors., Vs Mathew K.C., AIR 2018 SC 676 , and Motiram Padu Joshi and others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2018) SCC Online SC 676. CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT: 18. Iqbal and others, (2013) 10 SCC 83 , Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Ors., Vs Mathew K.C., AIR 2018 SC 676 , and Motiram Padu Joshi and others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2018) SCC Online SC 676. CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT: 18. Before going into the merits of the case, it is necessary to deal with the contentions raised by Sri G.R. Sudhakar as to the maintainability and scope of the writ petition. 19. Sri G.R. Sudhakar contended that the disputed questions of fact cannot be gone into by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, as early as, in the cases of Gunwant Kaur Vs. Municipal Committee of Bhatinda, (1969) 3 SCC 769 and Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited Vs. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, (1970) 1 SCC 582 , had held that in appropriate cases, questions of fact can be considered by the Courts, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ABL International Limited and anr., Vs Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 553 had held in paragraph 19, as follows: “Therefore, it is clear from the above enunciation of law that merely because one of the parties to the litigation raises a dispute in regard to the facts of the case, the court entertaining such petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not always bound to relegate the parties to a suit. In the above case of Smt.Gunwant Kaur and others vs. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda ( (1969) 3 SCC 769 ), this Court even went to the extent of holding that in a writ petition, if the facts require, even oral evidence can be taken. This clearly shows that in an appropriate case, the writ court has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition even if the same arises out of a contractual obligation and/or involves some disputed questions of fact” 22. The contention that there is a bar on the Court going into disputed questions of fact has to be rejected. In any event, the decision of this court is being arrived at without going into any of the questions of fact being raised by either side. 23. The contention that there is a bar on the Court going into disputed questions of fact has to be rejected. In any event, the decision of this court is being arrived at without going into any of the questions of fact being raised by either side. 23. Sri G.R. Sudhakar cited two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court mentioned above on the question of mala fides. To my mind, the question of mala fides do not arise in the present case, as no such pleading has been made in the present writ petition and hence the plea of mala fides is not being considered. 24. It is true that in the case of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Ors., (1 supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court, considering the SARFAESI Act, had taken the view that the High Court should not ordinarily entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution where there is an effective alternative remedy, especially in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of the banks and other financial institutions. A perusal of the Judgement would show that the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not lay down an absolute bar, on the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, in cases where there is an effective alternative remedy. The observations in Paras 44 and 45 are apposite: “44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. 25. In Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Ltd. and anr. v. Iqbal and Ors., (2 supra) following United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Ors., (1 supra), the same principle was reiterated at Para 27: 27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. 26. The same principle was reiterated in Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Ors., v. Mathew K.C., (3 supra). The Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Motiram Padu Joshi and Ors., v. State of Maharashtra (4 supra) is in the case of a criminal appeal and does not appear to be relevant to the facts of the present case. 27. The presence of an alternative remedy is never a bar to a Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The refusal of Courts to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226, when an alternative remedy is available, is a self imposed restriction and not an absolute restriction prohibiting the Court from entertaining a writ petition. Even where the Courts would restrain themselves from interfering in a decision, which can be challenged under an alternative remedy, the Courts would take up cases where the decision suffers from the vices of orders passed without jurisdiction or orders passed or proceedings held in violation of principles of natural justice or where the proceedings or orders are violative of the Fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India. 28. 28. In the view taken by this Court in the present case, on the facts, it would have to be held that this is a case of violation of the provisions of G.O.Ms.No.147 as well as the principles of natural justice and as such the writ petition would be maintainable. 29. Coming to the facts of the case, G.O.Ms.No.147 dated 06.08.2016, prescribes the minimum physical standards required for candidates seeking appointment to the post of Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector ( ST/SC & Aborginal Tribes) as a minimum chest measurement of 83.80 cms., and minimum chest difference of 5 cms. The said G.O. also provides for the manner and method in which the medical examination of candidates is to be done. This position has been accepted by both the official respondents and the petitioner. The relevant regulations set out in the annexure to G.O.Ms.No.147 are regulations 14 and 15, which state as follows: “14. a. In case of doubt regarding health of a candidate the Chairman of the Medical Board may consult a suitable Hospital specialist to decide the issue of fitness or unfitness of the candidate for Government Service e.g. if a candidate is suspected to be suffering from any mental defect or aberration, the Chairman of the Board may consult a Hospital Psychiatrist, Psychologist, etc., b. When any defect is found it must be noted in the certificate and the medical examiner should state his opinion whether or not it is likely to interfere with the efficient performance of the duties which will be required of the candidate. c. In case where a candidate is declared unfit for appointment to the Government Service the ground for rejection may be communicated to the candidate in broad terms without giving minute details regarding the defects pointed out by the Medical Board. d. The report of the Medical Board should be treated as confidential. e. The decision of the Chairman of the Medical Board (conducting the medical examination of the concerned candidate) about the fitness of the candidate shall be final. 15. The candidates filing an appeal against the decision of the Medical Board have to deposit an appeal fee of Rs.100.00 in such manner as may be prescribed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in this behalf. This fee would be refunded if the candidate is declared fit by the Appellate Medical Board. 15. The candidates filing an appeal against the decision of the Medical Board have to deposit an appeal fee of Rs.100.00 in such manner as may be prescribed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in this behalf. This fee would be refunded if the candidate is declared fit by the Appellate Medical Board. The candidates may, if they like, enclose a medical certificate in support of their claim of being fit. Appeals should be submitted within 21 days of the date of the communication in which the decision of the Medical Board is communicated to the candidates; otherwise request for second medical examination by an Appellate Medical Board will not be entertained. The Medical Examination by the Appellate Medical Board be arranged as decided by Commission and no travelling allowance or daily allowance will be admissible for the journeys performed in connection with the medical examination.” 30. These two provisions can be summarised as follows: Wherever a candidate is not found to have the minimum physical measurements, the said defect should not only be noted in the certificate issued by the medical examiner but it should also contain an opinion whether such a defect is likely to interfere with the efficient performance of the duties, required of the candidate. Unless this opinion is separately expressed along with the certificate, it cannot be taken to mean that a complete certificate of medical examination has been prepared by the medical board. Clause-14(c) would show that where a candidate is declared unfit for appointment, the ground of rejection has to be communicated to the candidate in broad terms regarding the defects pointed out by the medical board. The language of Clause-14(c) clearly stipulates that it is the recruiting agency, which would have to forward this information to the candidate and it is not the medical board that is to forward this information. Even otherwise, it is the recruiting agency which would have the address and other details of the candidate for communication. These details would not be available with the Medical Board. Further, the medical board is a temporary gathering of medical personnel coming together for the purpose of verifying the physical and medical condition of the candidates and is not a permanent body which would be capable of undertaking a prolonged correspondence with the candidate. These details would not be available with the Medical Board. Further, the medical board is a temporary gathering of medical personnel coming together for the purpose of verifying the physical and medical condition of the candidates and is not a permanent body which would be capable of undertaking a prolonged correspondence with the candidate. The process of setting up an appellate/second medical board, in cases where an appeal is made under regulation 15, would have to be obviously undertaken by the recruiting agency. For all these reasons the body which should communicate the report/defect pointed out by the medical board would have to be the recruiting agency. Clause-15 provides that the candidates would have the right to file an appeal against the decision of the medical board within 21 days of the date of the communication in which the decision of the board is communicated to the candidates. The request for second medical examination by an appellate medical board cannot be entertained beyond 21 days after the initial decision of the medical board is communicated. 31. In the present case, the pleadings of both sides would clearly show that the defect said to have been found in the petitioner by the medical board was not accompanied with any opinion of the medical board as required under Clause 14 (b). The said defect was not communicated to the petitioner at any stage. It was only after the petitioner obtained information under the Right to Information, the petitioner was aware of the exact defect pointed out by the medical board. It must also be noted that the present writ petition was filed on 29.05.2020 while the information about the defect pointed out by the medical board was supplied to the petitioner, under the RTI Act, on 01.06.2020. In the circumstances, there was no occasion for the petitioner to appeal against the report of the medical board. 32. In view of the above facts, it would have to be held that the procedure set out under G.O.Ms.No.147 dated 06.08.2016 was not followed. Dehorsthe provisions of G.O. Ms. No. 147, a candidate who is being rejected on the ground that he does not meet the physical standards prescribed for the post, is entitled to be told of the reason why he is being rejected. Dehorsthe provisions of G.O. Ms. No. 147, a candidate who is being rejected on the ground that he does not meet the physical standards prescribed for the post, is entitled to be told of the reason why he is being rejected. Non supply of such information is clearly an unfair and arbitrary act, which would be violative of principles of natural justice. 33. Sri G.R. Sudhakar contends that the petitioner ought to have approached the appellate forum earlier. This contention would have to be rejected. The question of the petitioner approaching an appellate forum would arise only when the petitioner was informed about the defect of having a chest expansion below the minimum requirement. In the absence of such communication, the question of the petitioner exercising his right to appeal or delay in exercising his right would not arise. 34. Viewed from any angle, it is a case where there has been clear violation of the provisions/guidelines set out under G.O.Ms.No.147 resulting in injustice being meted out to the petitioner. 35. The further contention of Sri G.R. Sudhakar that the petitioner cannot be permitted to undergo a further examination as he had sufficient time to rectify his physical defect, is also not acceptable inasmuch as the delay has been caused on account of the misconception of the 1st respondent that it is the medical board which is the body which has to take further steps under Guideline 14 and 15 of G.O.Ms.No.147. Further, the petitioner had requested for re-examination on 29.05.2020 itself when he filed the present writ petition. 36. On account of the view expressed above, the question whether there was tampering of the medical report does not require to be gone into at this stage. 37. In these circumstances, this writ petition is allowed with the following directions: a) The 1st respondent shall constitute a fresh medical board consisting of Doctors drawn from Government Hospital/Hospitals and shall conduct a fresh medical test in relation to the question of chest measurements and chest expansion only. b) The said test will be conducted within 15 days from the date of receipt of this order. c) In the event of the petitioner being found to have a minimum chest expansion of 5 cms., or more, the petitioner shall be appointed as an Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector as per the notification No.11/2018, dated 05.12.2018. b) The said test will be conducted within 15 days from the date of receipt of this order. c) In the event of the petitioner being found to have a minimum chest expansion of 5 cms., or more, the petitioner shall be appointed as an Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector as per the notification No.11/2018, dated 05.12.2018. d) As far as the 4th respondent is concerned, it would be open to the respondents to explore the possibility of accommodating the 4th respondent in the post of Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector either on account of any existing vacancies or future vacancies. e) This direction to the respondents to consider the case of the 4th respondent shall not be treated as giving a right to the 4th respondent for such a consideration or appointment. The said direction is being given only on account of the fact that the 4th respondent is losing his job on account of the errors committed by the 1st respondent. f) The original medical report produced by the 1st Respondent shall be kept in a sealed cover in the custody of the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court for a period of three months and 1st thereafter returned to the standing Counsel of the Respondent, if there is no further proceedings pending before the Court. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.