ORDER : B. Vijaysen Reddy, J. 1. The detention order passed against Kamble Anil, S/o. late Anjaiah, dated 29.10.2019, by the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City, in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertilizer Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (Amendment Act No. 1 of 1986) (for short 'the Act') and as approved by the Government vide G.O.Rt. No. 838 dated 02.05.2020, are challenged by way of this writ of Habeas Corpus as being illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional and violative of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. 2. Heard Mr. Khaja Nizamuddin, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. T. Srikanth Reddy, the learned Government Pleader for Home for the respondents. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the grounds of detention are vague, irrelevant and non-existing grounds. The detention order is passed in a mechanical way without proper application of mind. The activities of the detenu can be dealt with under ordinary criminal law and will not come under the purview of causing damage or insecurity to the public at large. Moreover, the detenu was granted conditional bails and his movements are all subject to the surveillance of the police. 4. Per contra, the learned Special Government Pleader submits that the detenu is involved in theft of gold ornaments, cell phones and wallets from the passengers traveling in RTC buses along with his associates in an organized manner in the limits of Hyderabad Police Commissionerate. The detenu has created large scale fear and panic among public, thereby, adversely affected public order. The detenu answers the description of Goonda under Section 2(g) of the Act and his activities attract the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order", as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act. There is possibility of detenu indulging in similar activities, which could affect maintenance of public order. Hence, the detaining authority formed subjective satisfaction that ordinary criminal law will not have deterrent effect in curbing the prejudicial activities of the detenu and as such, passed the detention order in larger public interest. There is possibility of detenu indulging in similar activities, which could affect maintenance of public order. Hence, the detaining authority formed subjective satisfaction that ordinary criminal law will not have deterrent effect in curbing the prejudicial activities of the detenu and as such, passed the detention order in larger public interest. Thus, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. The detenu is alleged to have been involved in four criminal cases, during 2016-2018, which are taken as antecedent criminal history. In the detention order, five cases have been considered as grounds for detention, as shown below: Sl. No. Crime No. and Date Police Station Offence Date of arrest Particulars of Bail 1. Cr. No. 11 of 2019 Dt. 09.01.19 Afzalgunj PS u/s. 379 IPC 23.06.2019 in Cr. No. 169 of 2019 Detenu moved bail petition; police filed counter on 02.07.19 opposing grant of bail and vide CRLMP. No. 807 of 2019 the detenu was released on bail vide release order dated 18.07.19. 2. Cr. No. 43 of 2019 Dt. 14.02.19 Afzalgunj PS u/s. 379 IPC 23.06.2019 in Cr. No. 169 of 2019 Detenu moved bail petition; police filed counter on 02.07.19 opposing grant of bail and vide CRLMP. No. 809 of 2019 the detenu was released on bail vide release order dated 18.07.19. 3. Cr. No. 61 of 2019 Dt. 05.03.19 Afzalgunj PS u/s 379 IPC 23.06.2019 in Cr. No. 169 of 2019 Detenu moved bail petition; police filed counter on 02.07.19 opposing grant of bail and vide CRLMP. No. 810 of 2019 the detenu was released on bail vide release order dated 18.07.19. 4. Cr. No. 134 of 2019 Dt. 07.05.19 Afzalgunj PS u/s 379 IPC 26.03.2019 in Cr. No. 169 of 2019 Detenu moved bail petition; APP opposed grant of bail and vide CRLMP. No. 806 of 2019 the detenu was released on bail vide release order dated 18.07.19. 5. Cr. No. 169 of 2019 Dt. 29.05.19 Afzalgunj PS u/s 379 IPC 23.06.2019 Detenu moved bail petition; APP opposed grant of bail and vide CRLMP. No. 845 of 2019detenu was released on bail vide release order dated 18.07.19. 6. It is evident from the impugned detention order that the detaining authority has formed an opinion that the detenu may violate the bail conditions and there is imminent possibility of the detenu committing similar offences prejudicial to public order. 7. No. 845 of 2019detenu was released on bail vide release order dated 18.07.19. 6. It is evident from the impugned detention order that the detaining authority has formed an opinion that the detenu may violate the bail conditions and there is imminent possibility of the detenu committing similar offences prejudicial to public order. 7. Right to life and personal liberty of an individual is a basic human right and precious right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It has got several facets including right of an accused to apply for bail. When a conditional bail is granted and there is violation of such conditions, the prosecuting agency has to take necessary steps for cancellation of bail. The very essence of imposing conditions for grant of bail is to ensure that the detenu/accused does not misuse the liberty granted to him on being released on bail. Keeping in view the nature and gravity of the offences, the background of the accused etc. the concerned Courts impose conditions while granting bail. Mere apprehension that bail conditions would be violated would not suffice and there should be plausible material available on record to come to such conclusion. Under the statutory mechanism, when detenu is granted bail and subjected to certain bail conditions, the same cannot be brushed aside by the detaining authority and mechanically hold that there is possibility of violation of bail conditions. 8. Assuming that bail conditions would be violated, the prosecuting agency is always at liberty to move application for cancellation of bail and without resorting to such step, the impugned detention order is passed. This Court in WP. No. 28524 of 2019 dated 06.02.2020, wherein it was held at para 12 as under: "(12) A perusal of the impugned detention order reveals that the detenu was granted bail only in crime No. 290/2019 of Inthezargunj PS. However, the apprehension of the detaining authority that the detenu may move 2nd bail application in the remaining cases, the same may be allowed by the concerned Courts and in the event of his release from the jail on bail, there is imminent possibility of him committing similar offences, unless he is prevented from doing so by an appropriate order of detention, is highly misplaced. If the detenu is enlarged on bail and violates the conditions of bail or indulges in similar crimes while on bail, the concerned authority/Public Prosecutor is free to move the concerned Court for getting the bail cancelled. It is the bounden duty of the police concerned to hand over the entire material record available to the Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor to see that the bail application of the detenu is dismissed. If the Police are vigilant enough to collect the data relating to the alleged offences, and to furnish the relevant information to the learned Public Prosecutors, the same could be placed by the learned Public Prosecutors before the concerned Court. It is the Police that have to take required measures to inform the Public Prosecutor about the criminal history of the offender. For the inaction of the Police, the detaining authority cannot be permitted to invoke the preventive detention laws, in order to breach the liberty of an individual." 9. A mechanism is provided under Cr.P.C. as to how accused has to be examined at the time of framing of charges, conduct of trial and opportunity given to accused to spell out his version under Section 313 Cr.P.C. When such structured mechanism is available under the provisions of Cr.P.C., which are in consonance with Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, the detaining authority cannot casually invoke the provisions of the Act. In a recent decision of this Court in RAPOLU MAHALAKSHMI v. STATE of TELANGANA, 2019 (2) ALD (Crl.) 950 (TS) it was held as under: 12. Every violation of criminal law does cause a rippled in the society. But the ripples can be calmed down by use of normal Criminal Justice System. It is only when an offence strikes the society, like a tsunami, that as a weapon of the last resort, the detaining authority is justified in invoking the powers under preventive detention laws. 13. Therefore, while invoking the magical formula of preventive detention, the detaining authority is required to firstly consider whether the offences, allegedly committed by the detenu, can be dealt with within the normal course of Criminal Justice System or not? The detaining authority should also examine whether the release of the detenu can be prevented by opposing his bail applications or not? If bail were granted, whether an application for cancellation of bail can be filed or not? The detaining authority should also examine whether the release of the detenu can be prevented by opposing his bail applications or not? If bail were granted, whether an application for cancellation of bail can be filed or not? Whether his detention under judicial custody can be ensured or not? It is only after assessing these circumstances, and after being satisfied that the answer of all these issues is in the negative, that the detaining authority may be justified in passing the detention order. 14. It has repeatedly come to the notice of this Court that the investigating agencies, especially the police, instead of furnishing complete details about the offender to the public prosecutor, fail to do so. Therefore, the public prosecution is not armed with the complete criminal record of the offender. Hence, the public prosecutor is not in a position to vehemently oppose the bail application. Resultantly, many a times, the alleged offender is granted bail by the Courts. Even thereafter, the State does not move a petition for cancellation of bail. Instead, it lets the offender go scot free. Therefore, the State fails to perform its duty within the arena of Criminal Justice System. 15. In such a scenario, faced with a raising crime rate, the State turns to the use of preventive detention laws to tackle the menace of crime in the society. Therefore, even for petty cases, the offenders are being preventively detained by the State. Needless to say, such a use of preventive powers amounts to colourable exercise of power, which cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 16. The entire political structure, which deals with democracy, the Constitution, and the rule of law, is based on the bedrock foundation of the faith of the people in the systems created by the law. It is, thus, faith of the people which needs to be strengthened by the State. Too frequent misuse of preventive laws would naturally undermine the faith of the people in the administrative system of the State. Instead of seeing the State as a protector, the State would be seen as a persecutor by the people. When personal liberty is invaded at the drop of a hat, the State ceases to be a democratic one. Rather, it transforms itself into a fascist regime. In such a scenario, misuse of preventive detention leads to oppression of the people. Instead of seeing the State as a protector, the State would be seen as a persecutor by the people. When personal liberty is invaded at the drop of a hat, the State ceases to be a democratic one. Rather, it transforms itself into a fascist regime. In such a scenario, misuse of preventive detention leads to oppression of the people. However, the constitutional mandate does not permit the State, that too a welfare State, to change its colour and transform itself into a Frankstein monster. Therefore, even in the Constitutional scheme, although Article 22 of the Constitution of India permits preventive detention, even then it requires that the power should be used as sparingly as possible, and strictly in accordance with law. 10. It is settled law that the provisions of the preventive detention law cannot be invoked when the detenu can be dealt with under ordinary criminal law. The offences based on which detention order is passed are IPC offences. The order of detention can be passed only when the detaining authority is satisfied that there is breach of peace and tranquility and that the activities of the detenu prejudicially affect public order. The activities in connection with the crimes referred to above relate to law and order and not public order. "Law and order" and "public order" are two different concepts. In PUSHKAR MUKHERJEE v. STATE of WEST BENGAL, (1969) 1 SCC 10 , the Supreme Court held as under: The question to be considered in the present case is whether grounds (a), (b) and (e) served on Subhas Chandra Bose are grounds which are relevant to "the maintenance of public order". All these grounds relate to cases of assault on solitary individuals either by knife or by using crackers and it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondent that these grounds have any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance of public order. In the present case we are concerned with detention under Section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof. It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof. It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act. The difference between the concepts of 'public order' and law and order' is similar to the distinction between 'public' and 'private' crimes in the realm of jurisprudence. In considering the material elements of crime, the historic tests which each community applies are intrinsic wrongfulness and social expediency which are the two most important factors which have led to the designation of certain conduct as criminal. Dr. Allen has distinguished 'public' and 'private' crimes in the sense that some offences primarily injure specific persons and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest 'and affect individuals only remotely. (See Dr. Allen's Legal Duties, p. 249). There is a broad distinction along these lines, but differences naturally arise in the application of any such test. The learned author has pointed out that out of 331 indictable English offences 203 are public wrongs and 128 private wrongs. 11. In the instant case, the offences are committed against specific individuals. (See Dr. Allen's Legal Duties, p. 249). There is a broad distinction along these lines, but differences naturally arise in the application of any such test. The learned author has pointed out that out of 331 indictable English offences 203 are public wrongs and 128 private wrongs. 11. In the instant case, the offences are committed against specific individuals. There is no material to show that the activities of the detenu have an impact on the public at large or community in general. It is only when the activities of the detenu have a reach on general public, affecting public order, the provisions of the Act have to be resorted to. The detaining authority did not give any proper and cogent reasons in arriving at the conclusion that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 12. In view of the foregoing reasons, the detention order is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned detention order dated 29.10.2019 passed by respondent No. 2, and the confirmation order dated 02.05.2020, passed by respondent No. 1 are set aside. The respondents are directed to set the detenu, namely Mr. Kamble Anil, s/o. late Anjaiah, at liberty forthwith, if he is no longer detained in judicial custody in the criminal cases, which have been so far registered against him. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.