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2020 DIGILAW 857 (TS)

R. Praveen Kumar v. M. Pratap Reddy

2020-12-16

A.RAJASEKHAR REDDY

body2020
ORDER : A. Rajasekhar Reddy, J. 1. The parties in all the revisions are common. Petitioner filed OS Nos. 1296 and 1307 of 2016, on the file of XVI Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-III Additional Family Court, Rangareddy District at Malkajgiri, against the 1st respondent herein, for recovery of the amounts. The 2nd respondent, as the G.P.A. holder of the petitioner, filed OS No. 864 of 2017 against the 1st respondent herein for recovery of the amount. In the three revisions, the 2nd respondent, is endorsed as not necessary parry. 2. As the parties have arrived at a settlement, the three suits were referred to Lok Adalat held at Mandal Legal Services Committee, at Malkajgiri, Rangareddy District. The Lok Adalat, vide common award dated 31.10.2018 in the Lok Adalat Case No. 64 of 2019, recorded compromise in all the three suits, and passed the award. The terms of compromise are as under : 1. In terms of settlement, defendant agreed to pay Rs. 40,00,000/- (Rupees Forty lakhs only) towards full and final settlement of the claim of plaintiff pertaining to all the suits on or before 30.4.2019 in two installments. 1st installment is payable by 31.1.2019. 2. In case of default to pay any of the installments, plaintiff is at liberty to execute the decree for entire suit claim of Rs. 41,21,000/-, Rs. 19,51,000/- and Rs. 53,21,000/-, pertaining to each suit together with interest @ 12% per annum till realization from the date of this award. 3. Plaintiff agreed to give consent for withdrawal of N.I. Act complaint in CC No. 120/2016 on the file of HI Special Magistrate, Cyberabad at Malkajgiri against which the defendant preferred an appeal before this Court in Crl. Apl. No. 776 of 2017 on discharge of the amount by the defendant in terms of the award on or before 30.4.2019. 4. Plaintiff is entitled for refund of Court-fee in all the suits. This Award of Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court." 3. The 1st respondent herein, who is the sole defendant in all the three suits, paid the first installment of Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty lakhs only), and the same was received by the petitioner. This Award of Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court." 3. The 1st respondent herein, who is the sole defendant in all the three suits, paid the first installment of Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty lakhs only), and the same was received by the petitioner. With regard to payment of 2nd installment, which is the final installment, the 1st respondent/defendant, filed I.A. No. 981 of 2019 in OS No. 864 of 2017, I.A. No. 980 of 2019 in OS No. 1307 and I.A. No. 979 of 2019 in OS No. 1296 of 2016, under Section 148 of CPC, seeking to extend the time for a period of sixty days. 4. The Trial Court, vide individual orders dated 26.8.2020, which are of identical in nature, allowed the applications. Assailing the same, the petitioner/plaintiff filed the present revisions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. 4. The Trial Court, vide individual orders dated 26.8.2020, which are of identical in nature, allowed the applications. Assailing the same, the petitioner/plaintiff filed the present revisions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff submits that the 1st respondent/defendant has agreed to pay the amount by 30.4.2019, and in terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties, the award was passed; that Section 2(a) of the Telangana Civil Courts Act, 1972 defines the 'Court', which means the 'Civil Court' established or deemed to be established under that Act; that Lok Adalat cannot be equated to a Civil Court as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1972; that the provision under Section 148 of C.P.C., which enables the Court to enlarge the time fixed or granted by the Court, cannot be made applicable to the award passed by Lok Adalat, for the reason that the Lok Adalat cannot be considered as 'Civil Court,' and even assuming that Lok Adalat is 'Court', since the time schedule for payment is not fixed or granted by the Court, and it is the parties who have agreed the time schedule, and that when the Court has not fixed or granted time, Section 148 of C.P.C., cannot be relied upon to enlarge the time; that the award passed by the Lok Adalat is a consent order, and as per Section 96(3) of C.P.C., no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties, and that even as per Section 21(2) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for short 'the Act of 1987'), award made by a Lok Adalat, shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any Court against the award; and that by allowing the present I.As., filed under Section 148 of C.P.C., seeking for extension of time, the Trial Court has modified the judgment and decree, which is contrary to the above provisions. 6. In support of the above contentions, learned Counsel relied on the judgments of the learned Single Judges of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Nimma Venkateswarlu v. Devireddy Krishnayya @ Venkata Krishnayya, 2007 (4) ALD 782 and K.C. Reddy v. Batcha Vasudevarao Naidu, 1999 (5) ALD 45 : 1999 (5) ALT 574 . 6. In support of the above contentions, learned Counsel relied on the judgments of the learned Single Judges of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Nimma Venkateswarlu v. Devireddy Krishnayya @ Venkata Krishnayya, 2007 (4) ALD 782 and K.C. Reddy v. Batcha Vasudevarao Naidu, 1999 (5) ALD 45 : 1999 (5) ALT 574 . With these submissions, learned Counsel sought to set aside the impugned orders. 7. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/defendant submits that the award passed by Lok Adalat is deemed to be the decree of a Civil Court and, thereby, the Court has all the power in relation to the decree passed by itself, which includes the power to extend the time in appropriate cases. He further submits that the Trial Court considering all the issues, and relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job, (2005) 6 SCC 478 , extended the time, and hence, no exception can be taken. With these submissions, he sought to dismiss the revisions. 8. In view of the rival contentions, the issue that arises for my consideration is, whether the impugned orders passed by the Civil Court, extending time for payment fixed in the award of the Lok Adalat, warrant any interference? 9. 'Court' is not defined under the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Counsel for the petitioner sought to rely on the definition of 'Court' under Section 2(a) of the Telangana Civil Courts Act, 1972. 'Court' is also defined under Section 2(aaa) of the Act of 1987, Section 2(d) of the said defines 'Lok Adalat' and Section 21 of the said Act deals with the 'award' of the Lok Adalat. The said provisions, for ready reference, are extracted as under : "Telangana Civil Courts Act, 1972: Section 2: Definitions: (a): "Court" means a Civil Court established or deemed to be established under this Act. Legal Services Act, 1987: 2. Definitions :........... (acta) "Court" means a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court and includes any Tribunal or any other authority constituted under any law for the time being in force, to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. ....... (d) "Lok Adalat" means a Lok Adalat organized under Chapter-VI; 21. Legal Services Act, 1987: 2. Definitions :........... (acta) "Court" means a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court and includes any Tribunal or any other authority constituted under any law for the time being in force, to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. ....... (d) "Lok Adalat" means a Lok Adalat organized under Chapter-VI; 21. Award of Lok Adalat:--(1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court or, as the case may be, an order of any other Court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred on it under sub-section (1) of Section 20, the Court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870). (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any Court against the award. 10. Under Section 2(a) of the Telangana Civil Courts Act, 1972, 'Court' means which is established or deemed to be established under the said Act. As per the definition of 'Court' under Section 2(aaa) of the Act, it includes the 'Civil Court'. 'Lok Adalat' as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act of 1987, means a Lok Adalat organized under Chapter-VI of the said Act. Further, from a reading of Section 21 of the Act of 1987, it is clear that the award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court and that every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall he to any Court against the award. 11. Thus, from a reading of definition of 'Court' under Section 2(aaa) the Act of 1987, it is clear that it includes 'Civil Court', as such, the contention that 'Lok Adalat' cannot be construed as 'Civil Court', cannot be countenanced. 12. 11. Thus, from a reading of definition of 'Court' under Section 2(aaa) the Act of 1987, it is clear that it includes 'Civil Court', as such, the contention that 'Lok Adalat' cannot be construed as 'Civil Court', cannot be countenanced. 12. In the decision reported in P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job (supra), the Apex Court, while interpreting Sections 21 and 22 of the Act of 1987 and Sections 89, 9, 47 and 148 of CPC, held that (executing) Court has all the powers in relation to Lok Adalat award, as it has in relation to a decree passed by itself, and this includes the power to extend the time in appropriate cases, while observing: "16. In our opinion, the award of the Lok Adalat is fictionally deemed to be a decree of Court and therefore the Courts have all the powers in relation thereto as it has in relation to a decree passed by itself. This, in our opinion, includes the powers to extend the time in appropriate case, in our opinion, the award passed by the Lok Adalat is the decision of the Court itself though arrived at by the simple method of conciliation instead of the process of arguments in Courts. The effect is the same. In this connection, the High Court has failed to note that by the award what is put an end to is the appeal in the District Court and thereby the litigations between brothers forever. The view taken by the High Court, in our view, will totally defeat the object and purposes of the Legal Services Authority Act and render the decision of the Lok Adalat meaningless." 13. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that since the parties have agreed for a time schedule and as the Court has not fixed or granted any time, Section 148 of C.P.C. cannot be invoked for enlargement of time. Further, the time that can be extended under the said provision shall not exceed thirty days, and that in the present case, the 1st respondent/defendant, sought for extension of sixty days by filing application under Section 148 of C.P.C., and hence the said provision cannot be made applicable. 14. Further, the time that can be extended under the said provision shall not exceed thirty days, and that in the present case, the 1st respondent/defendant, sought for extension of sixty days by filing application under Section 148 of C.P.C., and hence the said provision cannot be made applicable. 14. With regard to the first limb of contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is to be seen that the award of the Lok Adalat has all the trappings of a compromise decree passed by the Civil Court under Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C., and as already noted above, under Section 21(1) of the Act, the award of the Lok Adalat, shall be deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court. It is to be seen that under a compromise decree, both the parties agree for a time schedule, and based on such consensus, Civil Court passes a decree. In those circumstances, I am of the considered view that the time schedule agreed to between the parties, by passage of compromise decree, becomes the time allowed by the Court. Thus when the time schedule agreed to between the parties, becomes the time allowed by the Court, it gets jurisdiction even to extend the time, in appropriate cases. 15. The Apex Court in Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani, (1983) 2 SCC 127 , while examining the issue where the parties entered into a compromise with the leave of the Court, and that the appellant therein failed to deposit the amount, and sought for extension of time; held that the parties therein entered into a compromise and invited the Court to make an order in terms of the compromise, which the Court did, and that the time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the Court, and this gave the Court the jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases, while observing: "....... The parties, however, entered into a compromise and invited the Court to make an order in terms of the compromise, which the Court did. The time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the Court and this gave the Court the jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases. Of course, time would not be extended ordinarily, nor for the mere asking. It would be granted in rare cases to prevent manifest injustice. The time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the Court and this gave the Court the jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases. Of course, time would not be extended ordinarily, nor for the mere asking. It would be granted in rare cases to prevent manifest injustice. True the Court would not rewrite a contract between the parties but the Court would relieve against a forfeiture clause; And, where the contract of the parties has merged in the order of the Court, the Court's freedom to act to further the ends of justice would surely not stand curtained. Nothing said in Hukamchand's case, AIR 1968 SC 86 , militates against this view. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was in error in; thinking that they had no power to extend time. Even so, Shri Jawali submitted that this was not an appropriate case for granting any extension of time. We desire to express no opinion on that question. The High Court will decide that question. We accordingly, set aside that judgment dated 15th January, 1979, of the High Court and direct the High Court to dispose of I.A. No. VIII in Execution Second Appeal No. 89/74 in accordance with law." 16. In the decision of the Apex Court reported in P. Vijayakumari v. Indian Bank Represented by its Chief Manager, CA No. 3447 of 2008, dated 17.1.2018 reported in 2018 (3) ALD 42 (SC), the facts disclose that the Bank initiated proceedings against the borrower for recovery of the amount, and before the Lok Adalat, the parties had agreed for an amount to be paid within a certain period, and the borrower/appellant defaulted in paying the agreed amount within the stipulated period, but however, he could make the payment with delay. He filed application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal for condoning the delay that occurred in adhering to the time schedule of payment as agreed to in the Lok Adalat. The Tribunal dismissed the application and the Appellate Tribunal reversed the order of the Tribunal and condoned the delay. The Bank filed writ petition and the same was allowed by the High Court, restoring the order of dismissal passed by the primary Tribunal. Eventually the matter was carried to the Apex Court. The Tribunal dismissed the application and the Appellate Tribunal reversed the order of the Tribunal and condoned the delay. The Bank filed writ petition and the same was allowed by the High Court, restoring the order of dismissal passed by the primary Tribunal. Eventually the matter was carried to the Apex Court. In these facts and circumstances, the Apex Court, while setting aside the order of the High Court, and confirming the order of the lower Appellate Tribunal, held as under: "8. We have considered the matter. There was undoubtedly some delay in payment of the amount due as per the terms of the settlement reached in the Lok Adalat. It was also agreed by and between the parties that if the terms of payment including the time schedule of payment is not adhered to, the respondent - Bank will be at liberty to recover the entire amount due. The DRAT in the impugned order had considered the matter and had taken the view that even on the fact of the express terms between the parties that the bank would have a right to recover the full amount due in the event of default on the part of the appellants, the same was not the only course of action or the sole option and that on the grounds shown for the delay the same is liable to be understood in favour of the borrower. Accordingly, the matter was closed. In the writ petition filed by the Bank the position was reversed. 9. In the facts of the present case, the view taken by the learned Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), as noted above, cannot be said to be so wholly unreasonable or unsustainable so as to justify interference by the High Court. If the agreed amount stood paid though with some delay, condonation of the delay is a possible course of action, if the grounds for delay justified a departure from what was also agreed upon, i.e., the right of a Bank to recover the entire dues. All would depend on the facts of each case. Having regard to the totality of the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the ends of justice would be met if for the delay that had occurred, the appellants are made liable to pay simple interest @ 24% p.a., on the amount of Rs. All would depend on the facts of each case. Having regard to the totality of the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the ends of justice would be met if for the delay that had occurred, the appellants are made liable to pay simple interest @ 24% p.a., on the amount of Rs. 34.5 lakhs (as agreed to in the Lok Adalat) for the period from the date of the Award of Lok Adalat, i.e., 10.9.2004 to the date of last payment i.e., 29.10.2006. In addition, a further amount of Rs. 10 lakhs to be paid by the appellants to the respondent-Bank as compensation and costs." 17. Thus from the above judgment of the Apex Court it is clear that if the grounds for delay in payment are shown to be justified for departing from what was agreed upon before Lok Adalat, condonation of the delay is a possible course of action, and that all would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 18. In the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in Nimma Venkateswarlu's case (supra), the learned Single Judge, has not considered the judgment of the Apex Court, referred to above P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job (supra), on the issue, as such it is no longer a good law, and similarly the judgment of the learned Single Judge in K.C. Reddy's case (supra), is also against the dicta laid down by the Apex Court. 19. Coming to the facts of the present case, as noted above, the 1st respondent/defendant paid the first installment, and before the expiry of the date for payment of the second installment, which is the final installment, he filed the present applications seeking extension of time on the ground that due to loss of business, he is not in a position to pay within the time agreed and, therefore, sought two months time for payment of the balance amount. Considering these facts and circumstances, the Court below found that the conduct of the 1st respondent/defendant shows that he is ready and willing to comply with the terms of the Lok Adalath award, and accordingly it extended the time for payment, subject to payment of interest on the due amount at the rate of 12% from the due date on 30.4.2019. 20. 20. In the present case, it is to be noticed that though the 1st respondent/defendant filed application under Section 148 of C.P.C., which enables the Court to extend the time fixed or granted by the Court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by this Code for a period not exceeding thirty days, the Trial Court considering the facts and circumstances pleaded by the defendant, and also the law laid down by the Apex Court, extended the time subject to certain conditions. A learned Single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the decision reported in Irothumohan Rai v. Akoju Vanajakshi, 1999 (1) ALD 91 : 1999 (1) ALT 164 , held that "15. Procedural Laws are meant to see that Justice is done to the parties, but not to subvert the same on technicalities. Even though the application is filed under Section 148 CPC, under Section 151 CPC, the Court is having ample powers to extend the time, in exercise of the Inherent Jurisdiction vested in it, to prevent miscarriage of justice." Hence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard, cannot be countenanced. 21. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down in the judgments cited supra and in order to give life and enforceability to compromise award and not to defeat it on technical grounds, as held by the Apex Court in P.T. Thomas's case (supra), I am of the considered view that the impugned orders passed by the Trial Court extending time for payment, subject to certain conditions, does not warrant interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The issue framed is accordingly answered. 22. For the foregoing reasons, the revisions are dismissed. 23. Interlocutors applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. No order as to costs.