JUDGMENT : 1. The Chelamattom Devaswom has preferred this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the interim order passed by the Labour court, Ernakulam in I.D. No. 9 of 2013, by which the Labour court concluded that the Chelamattom Devaswom would qualify to be an industry under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. The factual background relating to the proceedings under challenge may be set out as hereunder: The 3rd respondent, Smt. Geetha Narayanan, was employed as an Accountant in the Chelamattom Devaswom. The Devaswom is engaged in the administration and supervision of the estate and property of the Sreekrishna Temple, Chelamattom. Her service in the establishment was terminated on 17.10.2011 after conducting a domestic enquiry. The 3rd respondent challenged the proceedings before the Labour court contending that the alleged misconduct was not proved. The Devaswom on the other hand contested the proceedings by contending that the enquiry was proper. The Labour court by order dated 12.8.2015 passed an award holding that the reference was not maintainable as the Labour court had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the employees of Sree Krishna Swami Temple of Chelamattom and Chelamattom Devaswom. Challenging the above order, a Writ Petition was filed which was disposed of by a learned Single Judge with certain directions. The matter was taken in appeal by the Devaswom. By Ext.P5 judgment, the judgment of the Labour court was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the Labour court to reconsider the matter. While disposing of the matter, their Lordships of the Division Bench had occasion to observe as follows in paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 of the judgment: “6. Labour court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act gets jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute only if the employer, the Devaswom is an industry and the employee, is a workman as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. In the judgment of this Court In Paramekkavu Devaswom vs. Ramachandran, 2004 (3) KLT 553 and the subsequent cases Devaswoms have been held to be industry. In view of these judgments, the question to be examined in this case is whether the appellant would be qualified to be an industry, as defined in the Act, in which event alone the Labour Court gets jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue that was referred. 7. In view of these judgments, the question to be examined in this case is whether the appellant would be qualified to be an industry, as defined in the Act, in which event alone the Labour Court gets jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue that was referred. 7. Reading of the impugned award shows that the Labour Court has proceeded on the wrong premise that the employer is the temple and not Devaswom. The learned Single Judge has also fell into similar error.” 3. As directed by this Court, the Labour court reconsidered the matter. It took note of the various clauses in the bye laws of the Chelamattom Devaswom and found that the objectives of Devaswom includes profitable commercial activities including shopping complexes, lodges, marriage halls etc. The Labour court also perused the annual reports and concluded that the management have received amounts under the head sale of books, canteen, rent towards marriage hall, sale of prasadam etc. On the basis of the above materials, the Labour court concluded that these are profitable business activities being carried out by the Devaswom. It was thus held that the exemption in the definition of industry cannot be claimed by the management. The above order is under challenge. 4. Sri. Alexander Joseph, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that as per Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, supply or distribution of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature is excluded. According to the learned counsel, the institutions owned or managed by organizations wholly or substantially engaged in charitable, social and philanthropic activities is not an industry. 5. Per contra, Sri. V.J. James, the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent, submitted that the dispute was between the 3rd respondent and the management of the Chelamattom Devaswom and not between the respondent and the temple. The management is engaged in various commercial activities and is having a turn over of several crores. According to the learned counsel, the issue is settled by this Court in Paramekkavu Devaswom vs. Ramachandran, 2004 (3) KLT 553 . The management is engaged in various commercial activities and is having a turn over of several crores. According to the learned counsel, the issue is settled by this Court in Paramekkavu Devaswom vs. Ramachandran, 2004 (3) KLT 553 . The learned counsel has also referred to certain passages in the judgment of the Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewage Board vs. Rajappa, 1978 (1) LLJ 349 to bring home his point that the Devaswom will qualify to be ‘industry’ under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 if the facts reveal that they are engaged in commercial activities. 6. I have considered the submissions. 7. The issue raised in this case has been settled by this Court in Paramekkavu Devaswom (supra), which was approved by the Division Bench in Ext.P5 judgment. I think it would be apposite to extract paragraph Nos. 8 to 12 of the judgment: “8. While we examine the rival contentions, it may be necessary to examine the background in which the activities surrounding the temple had developed. Perhaps in the early stages, what might have been there was a place for worship, pure and simple, where devotees thronged to offer prayers. But, by passage of time, the activities had gradually developed by the patronage of the State Administration and liberal offerings of devotees. The temple came to possess substantial properties. Naturally, for the proper administration of such properties, and for proper arrangement of "Poojas" and maintenance of the temple as such, investiture of power and an organised system had to be introduced. Extensive properties, by itself were sufficient to generate wealth. Personnel were to be engaged for administrative and executive work and multifarious other activities. This gradual, but definite changes have made the substantial difference as between the past and the present. 9. Deity of a temple always is recognised as a legal person. The claim is not against the temple as it is. Here the employer is shown as the Management of Paramekkavu Devaswom. I feel that this itself is sufficient to dispel controversies. A temple as such cannot come within the definition of industry. Nor can that come as an industrial establishment or undertaking as envisaged under Section 2 (ka) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Temples are associated with religious activities, for satisfying the spiritual needs of believers. I feel that this itself is sufficient to dispel controversies. A temple as such cannot come within the definition of industry. Nor can that come as an industrial establishment or undertaking as envisaged under Section 2 (ka) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Temples are associated with religious activities, for satisfying the spiritual needs of believers. But as referred to earlier, the body of the management who are entrusted with the duties of looking after the properties of a religious institution stands on a different footing. The Industrial Disputes Act is a pre-independent statute, and even if perhaps the statute makers may not have intended to bring in an all encompassing definition, so long as there is no specific exclusion, interpretation, should be on the basis of the plain meaning gatherable, and text of the statute. 10. Devaswom literarily means the properties of Deva, viz. the God. The properties require to be appropriately managed. Though Deva (God) could never be equated to an employer, the properties received by him as gifts when invested for any purpose including generating wealth, loses the exclusive sanctity which it might originally enjoy. What is managed by Devaswom Authority, is the wealth of the deity, which has come to their hand. It may be for the benefit of community, but that also is not very relevant. An establishment has thus got itself created to manage the wealth, viz. Devaswom properties. The controller of the Estate, interestingly becomes the controller of the affairs of the God as well though the accretion of wealth always is thanks to the presence of the deity. The statutes could be equated to that of a minor. Thus the "All Powerful" comes within the tutelage of the Manager, as next friend. Therefore, the essential religious activities pertaining to the Pooja and rituals alone need to be separated from the industrial activities, all others coming under the Industrial Disputes Act. As to the category who are to be so segregated from the Industrial Disputes Act, is not an issue coming up for consideration here. 11. The definition of industry has two limbs, one giving accent to the element of activities from the point of view of employer, and the other looked from the perception of a person employed. The idea was to bring in all human endeavour within the four corners of the definition. 11. The definition of industry has two limbs, one giving accent to the element of activities from the point of view of employer, and the other looked from the perception of a person employed. The idea was to bring in all human endeavour within the four corners of the definition. In simple terms, if therefore a service, or employment was there, it merited to be called an industry, and consequently it become an industrial establishment. 12. In the present dispute, as could be seen from Ext.P5, the activities of the Devaswom, was multifaceted and included almost all commercial ventures as is usually understood. They have to maintain a substantial Establishment. As pointed out by Sri. Nagaresh, the commercial activities included renting of premises/furniture, agriculture, conduct of chitties and included running of educational institutions. They had to engage staff mainly clerical and of supportive nature, drivers, mahouts etc. The management directly conducted commercial Exhibitions, which were capable of bringing wealth. All these activities are separable from the essential rituals referred to above, and have characteristics of an organised business activity.” 8. In this context , I feel that reference to paragraph No. 107 of the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 would be apposite. Speaking for the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Shri. Krishna Iyer, J. in his inimitable style, observed thus:- 107. The second species of charity is really an allotropic modification of the first. If a kind-hearted businessman or high-minded industrialist or service-minded operator hires employees like his non-philanthropic counterparts and, in cooperation with them, produces and supplies goods or services to the lowly and the lost, the needy and the ailing without charging them any price or receiving a negligible return, people regard him as of charitable disposition and his enterprise as a charity. But then, so far as the workmen are concerned, it boots little whether he makes available the products free to the poor. They contribute labour in return for wages and conditions of service. For them the charitable employer is exactly like a commercial-minded employer. Both exact hard work, both pay similar wages, both treat them as human machine cogs and nothing more. The material difference between the commercial and the compassionate employers is not with reference to the workmen but with reference to the recipients of goods and services. For them the charitable employer is exactly like a commercial-minded employer. Both exact hard work, both pay similar wages, both treat them as human machine cogs and nothing more. The material difference between the commercial and the compassionate employers is not with reference to the workmen but with reference to the recipients of goods and services. Charity operates not vis-à-vis the workmen in which case they will be paying a liberal wage and generous extras with no prospect of strike. The beneficiaries of the employer's charity are the indigent consumers. Industrial law does not take note of such extraneous factors but regulates industrial relations between employers and employers, employers and workmen and workmen and workmen. From the point of view of the workmen there is no charity. For him charity must begin at home. From these strands of thought flows the conclusion that the second group may legitimately and legally be described as industry. The fallacy in the contrary contention lies in shifting the focus from the worker and the industrial activity to the disposal of the end product. This law has nothing to do with that. The income tax law may have, social opinion may have. 9. In the instant case, the Labour court has gone through the records produced by either sides and have concluded that the objectives of the Devaswom include profitable commercial activities. The same is borne out from the bye laws as well as the annual reports. The 3rd respondent is linked with the activities relating to the Devaswom and not the temple and in that view of the matter, the preliminary finding of the Labour court cannot be said to be perverse. 10. In D.P. Maheswari vs. Delhi Administration and Others, AIR 1984 SC 153 the Apex Court had deprecated the practice of entertaining Writ Petitions challenging orders passed by the Labour court/Industrial Tribunal on preliminary issues opining that delay in disposal of such matters was likely to delay the adjudication of main issue raised by the workman. It was held that in exercise of such jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court is not required to be too astute so as to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special Tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues. 11. It was held that in exercise of such jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court is not required to be too astute so as to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special Tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues. 11. Having gone through the entire records, I find that the Labour court has acted well within jurisdiction and the finding so arrived at cannot be said to be perverse or irrational warranting interference in exercise of the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. This Writ petition will stand dismissed. No Costs.