JUDGMENT : SANGEETA CHANDRA, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by petitioners who are the three sons of one Ali Baksh S/o Fakira challenging the order passed by the respondent no. 1 dated 31.05.2016 in two Revisions filed by respondent nos. 2 to 7 against the orders passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 06.05.2013 and the order passed by the Consolidation Officer dated 26.08.2010. 2. The brief facts necessary for the decision of the controversy are as follows. 3. The dispute relates to Khata No. 13 situated in Village Kulha Ataura, Tehsil Hassan Ganj District Unnao. One Madari was the original tenure holder of five plots of land comprising Khata number 13, ad-measuring 1.804 hectare. Madari had two sons, Shukru and Fakira. Shukru died issue-less and his property devolved upon Fakira. Fakira had four sons namely Ali Baksh, Abdul Rahman, Mohammed Ali alias Buddha and Mulla. Mulla, having predeceased his father, was survived by his widow Rasoolan, arrayed as respondent no. 2 and a minor son Shamshad Ali, arrayed as respondent no. 6. Ali Baksh had three sons i.e. petitioner nos. 1, 2 and 3. Similarly, Abdul Rahman had three sons Fazlur Rehman, Jamaluddin and Basheeruddin. After the death of Fakira, an entry under PA-11 was made by the Supervisor Kanungo on 19.02.1983 giving one fourth share of Khata no. 13 equally to four sons/heirs of Fakira, Mullah being survived by his minor son Shamshad through his mother as natural guardian. Later on, Ali Baksh filed an application for mutating his name in the revenue records to the extent of half share on the basis of an un-registered Will dated 25.01.1982. The Tehsildar Hasanganj after issuing notice and hearing all the parties concerned allowed the application for mutation made by Ali Baksh by his order dated 06.08.1991 and directed deletion of the entries made earlier in the revenue records through PA-11. The Tehsildar accepted the copy of the Will and directed that half share of Khata number 13 should be recorded in the name of Ali Baksh. 4. The order passed by the Tehsildar was challenged in the Appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer Hasanganj by the respondent no. 2 on behalf of her minor son Shamshad. The Tehsildar accepted the copy of the Will and directed that half share of Khata number 13 should be recorded in the name of Ali Baksh. 4. The order passed by the Tehsildar was challenged in the Appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer Hasanganj by the respondent no. 2 on behalf of her minor son Shamshad. However, during the pendency of the Appeal a Notification under Section 4 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (herein after referred to as the ‘Act’) was issued for the village concerned. Consequently, the Appeal was dismissed as having abated under section 5(2) of the Act. On initiation of consolidation operations on 23.11.1991 in the village concerned, objections were filed by Rasoolan under section 9A-2 of the Act and also by Ali Baksh. In the objections filed by the respondent nos. 2 to 4, it was mentioned that the alleged Will was a forged document as no such Will had been made out by Fakira before his death. 5. The Consolidation Officer rejected the objections filed by the respondents. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated 26.08.2010 in a way partitioned Khata No. 13 allotting half share to the sons of Ali Baksh (now deceased) i.e. his three sons the petitioner nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the remaining half was divided equally among opposite party nos. 2 to 6 to the extent of 1/6 each. 6. Being aggrieved by the order dated 26.08.2010, the respondent nos. 2 to 6 filed an Appeal under section 11 of the Act. The Settlement Officer Consolidation dismissed the Appeal by his order dated 06.05.2013 after holding that Rasoolan had no right to file objections or to file the Appeal as the son of Mulla i.e. Shamshad was major and he should have filed the Appeal. Since the Will had been proved by the Tehsildar in his order dated 6.08.1991 and no proceedings were initiated for cancellation of the Will by the respondent nos. 2 to 6, there was no reason for not believing the Will dated 25.1.1982. 7. Against the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 6.5.2013, two Revisions were filed i.e. Revision No. 705/2012-13 by respondent nos. 2 to 6 and Revision No. 766/2012-13 by respondent nos. 3 to 7 before the respondent no. 1-Deputy Director of Consolidation. 2 to 6, there was no reason for not believing the Will dated 25.1.1982. 7. Against the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 6.5.2013, two Revisions were filed i.e. Revision No. 705/2012-13 by respondent nos. 2 to 6 and Revision No. 766/2012-13 by respondent nos. 3 to 7 before the respondent no. 1-Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the Revisions by the order impugned dated 31.05.2016 and set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation observing that the alleged un-registered Will dated 25.1.1982 had not been proved. It was held that Fakira did not execute any such will during his lifetime and the Will that was produced in 1991 before the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings was a forged document prepared in collusion with the attesting witnesses. The thumb impression of the testator was also not examined by any finger print expert. Had such Will come into existence on 25.1.1982, then it would have been produced before the supervisor Kanungo at the time when he passed the order dated 19.02.1983 on PA-11. At the time of execution of the Will there was no distinction between registered and unregistered Will nevertheless the Consolidation Officer having jurisdiction to consider all evidence ought to have considered the suspicious circumstances which led Fakira to have made out an unnatural disposition of his property giving the lions share to his eldest son Ali Baksh and the remaining half share alone having been left to the other three sons/Legal heirs. 8. Assailing the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, it has been submitted by Sri. M.A. Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri. Mohammad Aslam Khan appearing for the petitioners, that the Deputy Director of Consolidation ignored the fact that no proceedings were initiated for cancellation of the Will by the respondent nos. 2 to 7. He could not ignore the document. Before the Consolidation Officer, two objections were filed by the heirs of Fakira doubting the genuineness of the Will. The Consolidation Officer considered all evidence in detail. He framed six issues, one issue was related to whether the Will in question was a forged document and the other issue was related to the fact of possession of each of the co-sharers on the property. The Consolidation Officer considered all evidence in detail. He framed six issues, one issue was related to whether the Will in question was a forged document and the other issue was related to the fact of possession of each of the co-sharers on the property. On the issue number one, as to whether the Will dated 25.01.1982 was a forged document, the Consolidation Officer returned a finding in the negative. The Consolidation Officer also recorded a finding relating to the possession of Ali Baksh over one half share of Khata number 13. In the two Appeals filed before the Settlement Officer Consolidation by the respondent nos. 2 to 7, he concurred with to the finding of the Consolidation Officer with regard to the genuineness of the Will and also with regard to the possession of the petitioners' father over one half share of the property in dispute. Despite the findings recorded by the two learned courts below, the Deputy Director of Consolidation came to a different conclusion altogether only on the basis of conjectures and surmises. 9. It has further been submitted that the Deputy Director of Consolidation wrongly observed that Rasoolan was the widow of Mulla and at the time when Fakira died her son Shamshad was a minor, therefore, as a natural Guardian to her son she was fighting the case before the consolidation authorities. It has been submitted that Fakira died in 1983. The objections before the Consolidation Officer were filed in 1991. The Consolidation Officer decided the case in 2010 and at that time Shamshad was not minor and he could have filed the Appeal. The Settlement Officer Consolidation had rightly rejected the Appeal filed by Respondent no. 2 as not maintainable. 10. It has further been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that without looking into the Evidence Act and section 68 thereof, wherein it is provided as to how a document which is necessarily to be attested, has to be proven, the respondent no. 1 negated the findings recorded by the Tehsildar and two Consolidation Courts below which was based on oral evidence and cross-examination of witnesses. 11. It has also been submitted that the burden of proof was wrongly put on Ali Baksh the father of the petitioners, to prove the genuineness of the Will. 1 negated the findings recorded by the Tehsildar and two Consolidation Courts below which was based on oral evidence and cross-examination of witnesses. 11. It has also been submitted that the burden of proof was wrongly put on Ali Baksh the father of the petitioners, to prove the genuineness of the Will. It is well-known principle of law that onus of proof is on a party which alleges that the document in question is forged. If a fingerprint expert was to be summoned and his evidence was to be considered then such evidence had to be provided by the party who was alleging that the Will was a forged document. However, without there being any such evidence produced by the respondents, the Deputy Director of Consolidation came to the conclusion that the Will in question was a forged document and set aside the concurrent findings of the Consolidation officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation and also the order of the Tehsildar regarding mutation in the name of Ali Baksh on 1/2 share of the property. 12. It has further been argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that if the Deputy Director of Consolidation was of the opinion that all evidence was not properly considered by the learned courts below, he could have remanded the matter to the Consolidation Officer to take evidence regarding the genuineness of the Will which was seriously disputed and then to pass appropriate orders. It has been submitted that the Deputy Director of Consolidation far exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring the Will in question to be a forged document all by himself. 13. Additionally, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment rendered by this court in Daya Shankar vs. Smt. Bachi and Others, AIR 1982 All. 376 , to argue that after the Will was marked as Exhibit No. 1 by the learned Courts below, its validity could not be challenged in Revision and the observation of the Deputy Director of Consolidation with regard to the Will being a forged document is without any basis and hence liable to be set aside. 376 , to argue that after the Will was marked as Exhibit No. 1 by the learned Courts below, its validity could not be challenged in Revision and the observation of the Deputy Director of Consolidation with regard to the Will being a forged document is without any basis and hence liable to be set aside. The Deputy Director of Consolidation while allowing the Revisions had also made certain observations with regard to the ink used in the writing of the Will and the paper on which the Will was written and the thumb impression of the testator without there being any evidence on record to show that the Will was a forged document. 14. Sri. Abdul Razak Khan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 2 and 6 has argued that before the Consolidation Officer, only a true copy dated May, 1991 of the alleged Will dated 25.01.1982 was produced, the document being attested by the government notary on 31.01.2002. No documentary evidence was filed to prove that the original Will had gone missing and hence a true copy alone of the said unregistered Will is being submitted. There was no examination of the attesting witnesses or the scribe. Only the order passed by the Tehsildar dated 06.08.1991 was relied upon despite specific objections being filed by the respondents that the unregistered Will was fictitious and forged document which was not made out by Fakira. The Consolidation Officer having framed issues regarding the genuineness of the Will ought to have considered all evidence sought to be led by either parties regarding the said Will. A perusal of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer would show that the Consolidation Officer merely placed reliance upon the order passed by the Tehsildar in summary proceedings. As per law settled by this court and the Supreme Court, mutation proceedings are summary proceedings and findings recorded in such proceedings cannot be treated to be binding on regular courts in regular proceedings. 15. As per law settled by this court and the Supreme Court, mutation proceedings are summary proceedings and findings recorded in such proceedings cannot be treated to be binding on regular courts in regular proceedings. 15. It has further been pointed out by the counsel for the respondent that the claim of the widow of Mulla and the sons of Abdul Rehman and that of Buddha was rejected summarily by the Consolidation Officer and by the Settlement Officer Consolidation without realizing that they were acting as a regular Civil Courts deciding a question of title on the basis of an unregistered Will, the original copy of which was also not produced but only true copy attested by the notary was produced before them. The findings recorded in mutation proceedings being summary proceedings and which abated after Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued, had to be considered afresh before the Consolidation Officer who acted as a regular Revenue Court under Section 9A-2 to give declaration regarding title and share of each of the claimants. It has been submitted that once the Appeal filed against the order of the Tehsildar dated 06.08.1991 had abated, the order of the Tehsidar also stood abated. 16. Sri. A.R. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent, has read out the portion of the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and also by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, which clearly establish that only a notarized attested copy of the unregistered Will was produced before the Consolidation Courts. The evidence for proving the Will, for e.g. the statements of attesting witnesses etc. were taken only by the Tehsildar concerned in mutation proceedings and even the order passed by the Tehsildar dated 06.08.1991 did not deal with the statements allegedly made by the attesting witnesses in their entirety. The Consolidation Officer further wrongly rejected the objections filed by Rasoolan widow of Mulla along with her son Shamshad on the ground that she had no locus to file the objections as she was not a tenure holder and her objections were undated and had no verification by Assistant Consolidation Officer. 17. The Consolidation Officer further wrongly rejected the objections filed by Rasoolan widow of Mulla along with her son Shamshad on the ground that she had no locus to file the objections as she was not a tenure holder and her objections were undated and had no verification by Assistant Consolidation Officer. 17. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that two Appeals were filed challenging the said order passed by the Consolidation Officer one by Smt. Rasoolan along with Shamshad her son and another by the sons of Abdul Rahman along with Muhammad Ali alias Buddha son of Fakira. The said Appeals were dismissed arbitrarily by the Settlement Officer Consolidation affirming the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. It has been submitted that no adjudication was made as to whether the unregistered Will was a genuine document but the order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings was relied upon by the Settlement Officer Consolidation also. 18. Sri. A.R. Khan, learned counsel has submitted that when entry was made in PA-11 on 19.02.1983, in favour of all the four sons of Fakira, the unregistered Will was not produced by the petitioners' father Ali Baksh although it was said to have been made out by Fakira on 25 January, 1982. Had such a Will been in existence, it would have been produced before the Supervisor Kanungo, who recorded the property of Khata No. 13 in the name of all the co-sharers equally. 19. Sri. A.R. Khan has also submitted that the evidence of Jamaluddin @ Jhallu son of Abdul Rehman had been relied upon by the Consolidation Officer against that of his mother Smt. Rukana Jhallu @ Jamaluddin admitted the possession of Ali Baksh on half of the property but his admission could only be with respect to his share of the property and not with regard to the share of the other sons and legal heirs of Fakira. It has also been pointed out from the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation that contradictory findings have been recorded in the latter part of the order saying that Shamshad did not file any objections whereas in the initial part of the same order, the Settlement Officer Consolidation states that Shamshad son of Mulla had filed objections through his mother Smt. Rasoolan. 20. 20. Under Section 67 of the Evidence Act, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting and for proving such handwriting the opinion of experts and persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are relevant. 21. It has further been submitted that under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness, at least, has been examined for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be any attesting witness alive and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 22. It has been submitted that in H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, AIR 1959 SCC 443 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law with regard to proving of a Will. In the absence of proof of execution and attestation the alleged Will could not have been looked into. It has been submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court was relied upon by this Court in Mewa Lal vs. Additional District Judge Gorakhpur, 1978 ARC 308, wherein it was held that a party propounding a Will or otherwise making a claim on the basis of a Will is required to prove the document. 23. It has also been submitted that the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation have wrongly held that the Tehsildar’s order dated 06.08.1991 passed in mutation proceedings had become final amongst the parties. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that mutation proceedings being summary in nature, an order passed therein is of no consequence and will not act either as res-judicata nor it is binding upon the parties. The Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the case of Akhtar Hussain and Another vs. Board of Revenue, Lucknow, 1987 All L.J. 272. Similar observations have been made by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sawarni vs. Smt. Inder Kaur and Others, 1996 (7) JT (SC) 580 and Narayan Singh and Another vs. Additional Commissioner Meerut, 1999 (17) LCD 778 and Bindeshwari vs. Board of Revenue, 2002 (20) LCD 2006, Mst. Bhagirathi Devi vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Varanasi, 2016 (133) RD 450 . 24. Bhagirathi Devi vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Varanasi, 2016 (133) RD 450 . 24. The learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance upon this court’s judgment in Jokhu vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Pratapgarh and Others, 2018 (36) LCD 453, wherein it has been held that an order passed in mutation proceedings and evidence relied on in mutation proceedings could not be relied upon before the consolidation courts and the parties had to lead fresh evidence in consolidation proceedings to prove their case. 25. It has been submitted that the order passed by the Tehsildar dated 06.08.1991 had been challenged by filing an Appeal before the Deputy District Magistrate, Unnao. This Appeal had abated on the ground of commencement of consolidation proceedings in the village concerned. In Gorakh Nath Dubey vs. Hari Narain Singh, 1973 RD 423 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the dispute had to be decided on the basis of evidence led before the consolidation authorities and not on the basis of order or evidence led in proceedings which had abated on the commencement of consolidation operations. 26. It has further been submitted that under Section 48 of the Act very wide powers have been vested in the Deputy Director of Consolidation and in Revision or Reference before him, he has to be satisfied regarding the correctness, legality or propriety of an order passed by the court below after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, and he may make any order in such a case as he thinks fit. Under Explanation 3 to the Section 48, it has been clearly provided by the legislature that the power of the Deputy Director of Consolidation to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of an order includes the power to examine any finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by any sub-ordinate authority and also included the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence. The learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon the following cases to buttress his argument that the Deputy Director of Consolidation had vast powers in Revision. Sheshmani and Another vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti, 2000 (2) SCC 523 , Har Narain Singh vs. Joint Director of Consolation, 2003 (21) LCD 808, Ram Bahal vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Azamgarh, 2016 (16) SCC 493, Thakur Prasad vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2018 (36) LCD 2159. 27. Sheshmani and Another vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti, 2000 (2) SCC 523 , Har Narain Singh vs. Joint Director of Consolation, 2003 (21) LCD 808, Ram Bahal vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Azamgarh, 2016 (16) SCC 493, Thakur Prasad vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2018 (36) LCD 2159. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioners in rejoinder has relied upon the findings recorded by the Tehsildar in his order dated 06.08.1991 where two attesting witnesses to the Will as well as the then Gram Pradhan of the village concerned had been examined and had given statements before the Tehsildar about Fakira executing the Will. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Section 68 and Section 33 as well as Section 80 of the Evidence Act to say that a document that has been proved to be genuine in a proceeding between the same parties would act as a res-judicata and need not be proved again. 28. It has further been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that although Ali Baksh and the petitioners produced all evidence to prove the Will, no evidence was produced by the respondents who alleged that the Will was a forged and fabricated document. In the absence of evidence to show that no such Will was ever executed, the order of two Consolidation Authorities could not have been interfered with by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It has been submitted that if the counsel for the respondent’s argument is to be believed that the original document i.e. the unregistered Will executed by Fakira was never produced before the Consolidation Officer, then the Deputy Director of Consolidation’s observation regarding the ink and the quality of paper and the thumb impression on the Will etc can be ignored as perverse. 29. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings and by the Consolidation Courts, in my opinion the issues which arise for consideration in this case can be summarized as follows:- (a) The relevance of evidence taken by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings. (b) The consequence of abatement of appeal against the order of the Tehsildar dated 6 August 1991 after consolidation operations began in the village concerned. (c) Whether the Will was proved adequately Before the consolidation authorities? (d) The extent of the power of the DDC in Revision. 30. (b) The consequence of abatement of appeal against the order of the Tehsildar dated 6 August 1991 after consolidation operations began in the village concerned. (c) Whether the Will was proved adequately Before the consolidation authorities? (d) The extent of the power of the DDC in Revision. 30. From a perusal of the order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings dated 06.08.1991, it is evident that the objection to the PA-11 entries dated 19.02.1983 was raised for the first time after seven years by Ali Baksh son of Fakira on the basis of an unregistered will dated 25.01.1982. An objection was filed by Shamshad S/o Mulla through his mother on 11.10.1990 saying that no such Will was ever made out by Fakira before his death and the unregistered Will was a forged document. Ali Baksh on the other hand produced copies of the Khatauni of 1386 to 1391 Fasli and of 1392 to 1396 Fasli to show his possession and produced marginal witnesses Fakira son of Bhaggan, and Randhir son of Baiju and also gave oral evidence of Munishwar Singh the then gram Pradhan and of himself before the Tehsildar. On the other hand, Shamshad son of Mulla, and Buddha son of Fakira, also gave evidence. None of the statements given by the marginal witnesses, nor that of Ali Baksh, the propounder of the Will, nor of Buddha and Shamshad who opposed such evidence by saying that it was forged was considered in detail. The observation of the Tehsildar rejecting the objections of Shamshad son of Mulla were as follows:- ^^eSusa i=koyh ij miyC/k leLr vfHkys[kksa ,oa lk{;ksa dk HkyhHkkafr voyksdu o v/;;u fd;k rFkk fo}ku vf/koDrkx.k dh cgl lquhA i=koyh ij miyC/k vfHkys[kksa ,oa lk{;ksa ds voyksdu ls olh;r dh iqf"V gksrh gSA vr,o mtznkj dh vkifRr cyghu gSA ftls fujLr fd;k tkrk gS rFkk vkosnd dk nkf[ky [kkfjt ÁkFkZuk&i= Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA** 31. The order of the Tehsildar is a short order running in three pages typed in double space. There is no discussion at all of the statements made by the marginal witnesses to the Will. The requirements of Section 68 of the Evidence Act were not met. The order of the Tehsildar is a short order running in three pages typed in double space. There is no discussion at all of the statements made by the marginal witnesses to the Will. The requirements of Section 68 of the Evidence Act were not met. There is no clear statement recorded that the marginal witnesses had indeed seen Fakira dictating the Will to the writer/the scribe of the document, or that the Will was written in their presence or was read out in their presence and that of the testator, who after understanding the contents thereof had put his thumb impression thereon. 32. I will now deal with the arguments raised by Shri Mohammed Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate on the basis of judgment rendered in Daya Shankar vs. Smt. Bachi, AIR 1982 All. 376 and the unreported judgment in Second Appeal No. 279/1992, Bhojpal vs. Amrendra, that once if a document is exhibited in the court of first instance and marked as such by the trial court, no argument regarding its admissibility as evidence can be raised in appeal. I have gone through both the judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is evident from the same that they have been rendered in different circumstances altogether. The Court was considering matters in Appeal arising out of Regular Civil Suits filed under the Civil Procedure Code. The Consolidation Authorities however were relying upon an order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings where also only a true copy dated May, 1991 of a handwritten unregistered Will dated 25.01.1982 was produced. A mutation proceeding cannot be equated to a court proceeding under C.P.C. 33. Under Section 33 of the Evidence Act relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding or before any other person authorised by law to take such evidence is relevant for the purpose of proving in a subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states only when the witness is dead or cannot be found or is incapable of giving evidence or is kept out of the way by the adverse party or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which the court considers unreasonable. Moreover, the proceedings should be between the same parties so that representatives in interest and the adverse party in the first proceedings have had the right and opportunity to cross-examine them and that the questions in issue was substantially the same in the first and second proceedings. 34. Against the order dated 06.08.1991, an Appeal had been filed before the Sub-divisional officer Hasanganj which was dismissed as abated on Section 4 notification being issued under the Act for the village concerned. 35. In Moolchand vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1995 LCD 1094 , the Supreme Court was considering a case where the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation had passed orders on the basis of a preliminary decree in a suit for partition filed by the respondents in 1980. This suit was pending in the Board of Revenue when in 1994, on account of issuance of Section 4 notification under the Act it abated, still the Settlement Officer Consolidation the Deputy Director Consolidation and the High Court followed the preliminary decree. The question as framed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case was whether preliminary decree would also abate if the suit abated under section 5 of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondent had submitted that a suit for partition or any such suit, for example, a suit for redemption or foreclosure, based on a mortgage, in which two decrees i.e., a preliminary decree and a final decree are passed are to be distinguished from an ordinary suit in which only one decree is passed. Since in this case a suit for partition had been filed in the revenue court under Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, the issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Act would not affect the proceedings for preparation of a final decree which were pending before the Board. The preliminary decree could not be said to be abated as it had attained finality. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 4 and 5 of the Act and observe that suits or proceedings relating to declaration of right or interest in the land falling in the consolidation area would all stand abated once an order is passed in this behalf by the court concerned before whom such suit or proceeding is pending. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 4 and 5 of the Act and observe that suits or proceedings relating to declaration of right or interest in the land falling in the consolidation area would all stand abated once an order is passed in this behalf by the court concerned before whom such suit or proceeding is pending. This abatement takes place without prejudice to the rights of the persons affected to agitate the right or interest involved in the said proceedings before the appropriate Consolidation Authority. 36. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in a suit for partition of a holding filed under section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, a preliminary decree is passed determining separately the share of the plaintiff and each of the other tenure holders recording there in and that part of the joint holding which the tenure holders wish to remain as joint and thereafter to determine separately the value of the share of the plaintiff and each of the others tenure holders. In a suit for partition, the revenue court like the civil court has first to pass a preliminary decree determining and declaring the rights of the parties and their shares if any in the holding. Thereafter proceedings of preparation of final decree are initiated under Rules 158 to 164 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Rules, where the respective shares of the tenure holders are separated as per metes and bounds. In other words, a preliminary decree for partition declares the rights of the parties and their shares in the joint family property which is the subject matter of the suit. The final decree specifies the division by metes and bounds. 37. The question before the Court was whether a notification under Section 4 of the Consolidation Act would abate the entire suit or it will not affect the proceedings up to the stage of and include a preliminary decree, if the notification was issued after the passing of the preliminary decree? 37. The question before the Court was whether a notification under Section 4 of the Consolidation Act would abate the entire suit or it will not affect the proceedings up to the stage of and include a preliminary decree, if the notification was issued after the passing of the preliminary decree? The Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to several of its judgments, for example, Ram Adhar Singh vs. Ram Roop Singh, AIR 1968 SCC 4714 followed in Chattar Singh vs. Thakur Prasad Singh, 1975 (4) SCC 457 and Munshi Maqbool Raza vs. Hasan Raza, 1977 (3) SCC 578 , which were noticed and affirmed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satya Narain Prasad Shah vs. State of Bihar, 1980 Supp. SCC 477 and in the case of Mst. Bibi Rahmani Khatoon and Others vs. Harkoo Gope and Others, 1981 (3) SCC 173 , where the Supreme Court held that proceedings pending in the civil court or in appeal shall all stand abated. 38. The Supreme Court thereafter considered the argument that a preliminary decree is an Appealable decree and if an Appeal is not filed against such a decree and its correctness is not challenged, it becomes final and the party aggrieved thereby will not be permitted to challenge its correctness in an Appeal against the final decree, as Ordinarily the preliminary decree settles the rights of the parties and the final decree works out those rights. The Hon'ble Supreme Court however observed that even if a preliminary decree has been passed in a case but it has been appealed against, the Appeal is pending on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, the notification will have the effect of abating the entire suit proceedings including the preliminary decree. On the contrary, if an Appeal is filed against the final decree without there being any Appeal against the preliminary decree and the preliminary decree becomes unassailable on account of section 97 of the C.P.C. the notification under Section 4 would abate the proceedings relating to the final decree without in any way touching or impairing or affecting the preliminary decree. Such a preliminary decree can be given effect to in proceedings before the Consolidation Authorities. Such a preliminary decree can be given effect to in proceedings before the Consolidation Authorities. In view of the provisions contained in Section 9A-2 of the Act which enables the Consolidation Authorities to specify the share of individual tenure holders in joint holdings for the purpose of effecting partition to ensure proper consolidation and to settle the disputes between the parties with regard to the claims to land or partition of joint holdings. 39. In view of Section 8 of the Act after field partaal has been done, Extracts/copies of the field Book are issued along with notices under section 9 and objections are invited. Such objections are filed under section 9A-2 of the Act and if any dispute regarding the share and possession of the parties for a particular Khata is pointed out, the dispute should be referred by the Assistant Consolidation Officer to the Consolidation officer. In the instant case after the field partaal was made, the dispute was noted and objections were also filed and there was no reconciliation of such objections before the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the dispute was forwarded to the Consolidation Officer for decision on merit. 40. The order of the Tehsildar could not be relied upon and any finding recorded by the Tehsildar was not binding on the Consolidation Officer. No evidence was led to prove that the attesting witness were dead or could not be found or were incapable of giving evidence. 41. In H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 , Hon'ble Supreme Court after placing reliance upon several judgments by the Privy Council has observed in Para 18 as follows:- “18. What is the true legal position in the matter of proof of wills? It is well-known that the proof of wills presents a recurring topic for decision in courts and there are a large number of judicial pronouncements on the subject. The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under Section 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Sections 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Section 68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a court of law.” 42. The Supreme Court further observed that although the burden of proof in all other matters is upon the person who challenges the document there is one important feature which distinguishes Wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the Will speaks from the death of the testator, and so when it is promoted or produced before a court, the testator who had already departed the world cannot say whether it is real or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last Will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of Wills, the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of other documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the Will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions, and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily the marginal or attesting witnesses may sufficiently prove the execution of the document by the testator. Ordinarily the marginal or attesting witnesses may sufficiently prove the execution of the document by the testator. In other words the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged regarding proof of the essential facts as indicated on the basis of evidence of marginal witnesses alone. However, there may be cases in which the execution of the Will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The contents of the Will may otherwise indicate that the dispositions made in the Will were unnatural and improbable and it was very unlikely that the testator would have knowingly executed the said document. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. In case the propounder himself is the main beneficiary of such a Will, then the burden of proof is undoubtedly heavy. It was observed “where a Will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable scepticism, it is in connection with Wills that present such suspicious circumstances that the decision of the English courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience” this test mainly emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last Will of the testator, the court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive. 43. With regard to the argument raised by the appellant before it that all the relevant evidence had been produced by the propounder of the Will who was the appellant and no evidence in rebuttal was raised with regard to the argument raised by the appellant and no evidence in rebuttal was led by the respondents, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed on the basis of English case law that those who take the benefit under a Will and have been instrumental in preparing or obtaining it, has thrown upon them the onus of showing the righteousness of the transaction, the onus probandi lies in every case upon the party propounding Will and he must satisfy the conscience of the court that the instrument so propounded is the last Will of a free and capable testator. If the propounder of the Will is the main beneficiary then circumstances arise that generally excite the suspicion of the court and calls upon it to be vigilant and serious in examining the evidence in support of the instrument. Direct evidence about the execution of the Will has to be produced before the court concerned and this onus can be only discharged on production of the marginal witnesses. Once it is held that the Will had not been proved by the propounder adequately, no other issue survives for decision. 44. This Court in Mewa Lal vs. Additional District Judge Gorakhpur, 1978 ARC 308, has followed the law laid down by the Supreme Court in H. Venkatchala (supra). 45. The copy of the Will dated 25.01.1982 is also on record as an annexure to the writ petition which shows that the Will was allegedly made out on 25.01.1982 and a copy thereof was prepared on 28.08.1991. In the alleged Will, Fakira says that he had attained the age of eighty years and was unsure of the time of his death. He was being looked after by all his sons, Ali Baksh, Abdul Rahman and Buddha and by his grandson Shamshad Ali son of Mulla and they all lived together in the same house. He being satisfied with the care taken by his family was executing out the Will on 25.01.1982 that till his death he would remain the owner in possession of all his property, thereafter, one half of his property ad-measuring total of 7 bigha 12 biswa 14 biswansi, be given to Ali Baksh his eldest son and the remaining half may be divided between Abdul Rahman and Buddha son of Fakira and Shamshad Ali son of Mulla. No reason whatsoever has been given by the testator as to why he preferred his eldest son over his three other sons/legal heirs as he mentioned that all his family members lived together with him in the same house and took good care of him and he was equally pleased with all of them. No reason whatsoever has been given by the testator as to why he preferred his eldest son over his three other sons/legal heirs as he mentioned that all his family members lived together with him in the same house and took good care of him and he was equally pleased with all of them. When the matter was raised before the Consolidation Officer in objections filed by Abdul Rahman and Buddha sons of Fakira on the one hand, and Rasoolan widow of Mullah on behalf of her son Shamshad Ali, one issue was framed whether the Will in question was a forged document and another issue was framed with regard to the possession of the property in dispute by Ali Baksh and a third issue framed was whether the Tehsildar Hasanganj has already finally decided the dispute now being raised by means of objection under section 9A-2. 46. With regard to issue number one relating to whether the Will in question was forged, the Consolidation Officer was never confronted with the actual original copy of the Will. Only a true copy of the alleged Will dated 25.01.1982 attested by the Government Notary on 31.01.1991 was produced and the details of the contents of the Will were mentioned and thereafter the Consolidation Officer simply observed that a case under section 34 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, namely, Case No. 46 of 1990 was decided by the Tehsildar Hasanganj, where he had found the Will to be proved on the basis of evidence produced before him and had directed recording of the name of Ali Baksh son of Fakira over half of Khata No. 13. The observation of the Consolidation Officer is to the effect that the objectors have not been able to produce any evidence to prove that Will in question was a forged document. The issue no. 1 was decided in favour of Ali Baksh. 47. The observation of the Consolidation Officer is to the effect that the objectors have not been able to produce any evidence to prove that Will in question was a forged document. The issue no. 1 was decided in favour of Ali Baksh. 47. Similarly, with respect to the question of possession over the property in dispute, the Consolidation Officer has observed that Ali Baksh was admitted to be in possession of the property in question by Jallu alias Jamal Uddin son of Abdul Rahman in his oral statement recorded on 4 August 2009, therefore, the oral statement of all other objectors i.e. Rukana widow of Abdul Rehman, Buddha son of Fakira, and Rasoolan widow of Mulla, could not be accepted as their statements were recorded later on and can be said to be an afterthought. 48. With respect to issue no. 6, the Consolidation Officer observed that the Tehsildar on the basis of the Will dated 25.01.1982 and by his order dated 06.08.1991, directed half of the property to be recorded in the name of Ali Baksh. The Amal Daramad of the order dated 06.08.1991 was carried out in the Khatauni on 14.08.1991 by the Lekhpal. Ali Baksh had filed a certified copy of the order dated 06.08.1991 which showed that the matter had been decided finally by the Tehsildar Hasanganj on 06.08.1991, whereas Section 4 notification with regard to village concerned was issued on 23.11.1991 after the order of the Tehsildar. The issue was therefore decided finally against the objectors. 49. The order of the Consolidation Officer shows that with regard to the issue of the Will being a forged document there is no consideration of any evidence at all by him. The Consolidation Officer has merely observed that the matter having been finally decided under section 34 of the UPZA & LR Act by the Tehsildar on 6.08.1991, a date much prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act on 23.11.1991, the matter needed no further consideration. The Consolidation Officer has merely observed that the matter having been finally decided under section 34 of the UPZA & LR Act by the Tehsildar on 6.08.1991, a date much prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act on 23.11.1991, the matter needed no further consideration. With regard to the possession of the property in question also the only reason assigned by the Consolidation Officer to accept the stand of Ali Baksh and his three sons over that of the other heirs of Fakira, was that Jhallu Son of Abdul Rahman, had given his oral statement before that of other objectors, therefore, the statement of Rasoolan, Rukana and Buddha, could be discarded as being an afterthought. 50. This Court shall now deal with arguments of learned counsel with regard to the scope of power of Deputy Director of Consolidation in Revision filed under Section 48. The language of the Section as amended by addition of Explanation 3 with effect from 2002, has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several cases. In Sher Singh vs. Joint Director of Consolidation, (1978) 3 SCC 172 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering Section 48 before its amendment and held that the language of the Section being pari materia with Section 115 C.P.C. confines revisional jurisdiction of the Court to cases of illegal or irregular exercise or non-exercise or illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the subordinate courts. Section 48 as amended in 1963 came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Shanti Prakash Gupta vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1981) Supp SCC 73. It held that the scope of the Section had become wider through the amendment carried out and if Deputy Director of Consolidation finds that the order of the learned Courts below is palpably erroneous or likely to cause miscarriage of justice it can certainly intervene. 51. It held that the scope of the Section had become wider through the amendment carried out and if Deputy Director of Consolidation finds that the order of the learned Courts below is palpably erroneous or likely to cause miscarriage of justice it can certainly intervene. 51. In Ram Lal vs. Deputy Director Consolidation, (1994) Supp 2 SCC 198, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed that the Deputy Director of Consolidation in Revision could not lightly interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below but at the same time it can consider: “Whether the legally admissible evidence has not been considered by the authorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion they reached is based on no evidence, or impropriety had been committed or there was any procedural irregularity, which goes to the root of the matter, had been committed in recording the order.” (Emphasis supplied) 52. The counsel for the parties have relied upon Preetam Singh vs. Assistant Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 327, where a Division Bench was considering a Reference made by a single judge for decision to a Larger Bench regarding the scope of Section 48. It observed that even though the apparent width of Section 48 is very wide, still, in view of certain other provisions contained in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the right of a party to seek relief in Revision is not unlimited. It observed that the exercise of revisional powers is in the discretion of the Revising Authority and the applicant in the Revision is not in the position of an appellant in an Appeal against the decree. In an Appeal against the decree, the appellant can seek the intervention of the appellate court as a matter of right. 53. Hon'ble Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Larger Bench of the High Court in Preetam Singh (supra) in its judgment rendered in Preetam Singh vs. Assistant Director of Consolidation and Others, 1996 (2) SCC 270 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “6. When the matter was in revision before the Assistant Director (Consolidation), he had the entire matter before him and his jurisdiction was unfettered. While in seisin of the matter in his revisional jurisdiction, he was in complete control and in position to test the correctness of the order made by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) effecting remand. When the matter was in revision before the Assistant Director (Consolidation), he had the entire matter before him and his jurisdiction was unfettered. While in seisin of the matter in his revisional jurisdiction, he was in complete control and in position to test the correctness of the order made by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) effecting remand. In other words, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction the Assistant Director (Consolidation) could examine the finding recorded by the Settlement Officer as to the abandonment of the land in dispute by those tenants who had been recorded at the crucial time in the Khasra of 1359 Fasli. That power as a superior court the Assistant Director (Consolidation) had, even if the remand order of the Settlement Officer had not been specifically put to challenge in separate and independent proceedings. It is noteworthy that the Court of the Assistant Director (Consolidation) is a court of revisional jurisdiction otherwise having suo-motu power to correct any order of the subordinate officer. In this situation the Assistant Director (Consolidation) should not have felt fettered in doing complete justice between the parties when the entire matter was before him. The war of legalistic fought in the High Court was of no material benefit to the appellants. A decision on merit covering the entire controversy was due from the Assistant Director (Consolidation).” (Emphasis supplied) 54. The scope of section 48 was also considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sheshmani and Another vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti, 2000 (2) SCC 523 , the Supreme Court considered its earlier decisions and the question as to whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation was legally justified in upsetting the findings recorded by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation. It observed that in the case before it, the Consolidation Officer as well as the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation had ignored the sale certificate in favour of the predecessor of the respondents. Learned Courts below had proceeded on a wrong premise and against the settled principles of law, therefore, the Deputy Director Consolidation was well justified in exercising his power of Revision in coming to a different conclusion. 55. Learned Courts below had proceeded on a wrong premise and against the settled principles of law, therefore, the Deputy Director Consolidation was well justified in exercising his power of Revision in coming to a different conclusion. 55. In Jagdamba Prasad vs. Kripa Shankar, (2014) 5 SCC 707 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph-15 that if the subordinate courts had acted within the jurisdiction, the revisional authority cannot exceed its jurisdiction and come to a contradictory conclusion, by admitting new facts either in the form of documents or otherwise, to come to the said conclusion. 56. In Ram Bahal vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Azamgarh, 2016 (16) SCC 493, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 48 again. The appellants were shown to be recorded in the possession column in the entries in the revenue record. The Consolidation Officer allowed the objections of the respondents. The Appeal of the appellants before the Settlement Officer Consolidation was allowed. The names of the appellants were permitted to be recorded as Sirdar over the land in dispute. Aggrieved by such an order, the respondents had filed a Revision before the Deputy Director Consolidation which was allowed. The order of the Consolidation Officer restored. The High Court declined to interfere. In appeal the counsel for the appellant had argued that the order of the Consolidation Officer and the Deputy Director Consolidation as also that of the High Court are based on some proceedings under Sections 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act which were mutation proceedings and any admission made in mutation proceedings is not binding on the maker in a title matter. The Supreme Court observed that from a perusal of the orders impugned it was evident that the Consolidation Officer and the DDC had examined the evidence afresh and had given a categorical finding that the predecessors of the respondents were recorded as sub-tenants and by virtue of entry in their favour they became Sirdars. The Supreme Court observed that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be said to be based on re-appreciation of evidence afresh. It was only a case of examining the correctness and validity of the entries in the Khasra/Khatauni filed by the parties and coming to a different conclusion. The Supreme Court observed that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be said to be based on re-appreciation of evidence afresh. It was only a case of examining the correctness and validity of the entries in the Khasra/Khatauni filed by the parties and coming to a different conclusion. In the case of the petitioners herein it is apparent that orders passed in mutation proceedings by the Tehsildar were alone considered by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation and thus there was a failure to appreciate evidence produced before them and also an impropriety that went to the root of the matter, which justified interference by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 57. This fact has not been denied in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioners that the Appeal before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had abated. As such, the order passed in mutation proceedings lost its efficacy and the application of Ali Baksh filed before the Tehsildar and registered as Case No. 46 of 1990 would also stand abated, leaving it open for the Consolidation Authorities is to decide afresh the rights and interests of the parties on the basis of evidence led before them. 58. I will now deal with the arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the Will in question was not challenged before the competent civil court. In Ram Padarath and Others vs. Second Additional District Judge, Sultanpur, 1988 (6) LCD, a Full Bench of this court after referring to Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act which makes a specific provision for cancellation of void as well as voidable documents, observed that voidable documents are those whose legal effect cannot be put to an end without they being cancelled by a declaratory decree in this regard by the civil court in a regular suit filed under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. A void document however is not required to be cancelled necessarily. Its legal effect, if any, can be put to an end by declaring it to be void and granting some relief based upon such observations instead of canceling it. Once it is held to be void it can be ignored by any court or authority, being of no legal effect or consequence. Its legal effect, if any, can be put to an end by declaring it to be void and granting some relief based upon such observations instead of canceling it. Once it is held to be void it can be ignored by any court or authority, being of no legal effect or consequence. For such a void document to be declared so, a person may approach the competent civil court however if apart from cancellation, some other relief is claimed which is the “real relief” and the claim for which provides the proximate ground or reason for approaching the court of law or when any other relief can be claimed or is involved in the matter cropping up because of the evidence of the void document or instrument, and the “real relief” claimed is one which is mentioned in Schedule-II of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the same can be granted by the revenue court only, and the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant such a relief or reliefs is ousted by section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act . The law relating to right, title and interest over agricultural land is contained in U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The said Act being a special Act, enumerates in schedule II the types of suits etc, the cognizance of which is to be taken by the Revenue Court specified therein. In the Explanation attached to Section 331, it has been specifically mentioned that if the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted. 59. The Full Bench after considering the phrase “cause of action” and the phrase “any relief” as mentioned in Section 331 of the Act, came to the conclusion that the Explanation to Section 331 has enlarged its scope further. The cause of action may determine the form and keeps the jurisdiction of the revenue courts intact as also the reliefs of the nature which is mentioned under Schedule-II of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The cause of action may determine the form and keeps the jurisdiction of the revenue courts intact as also the reliefs of the nature which is mentioned under Schedule-II of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The Full Bench observed that the reliefs of the nature mentioned in schedule II of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act can be claimed from the Revenue Court which can take cognizance of such suit or proceeding, notwithstanding that the relief provided in a different language can also be granted by the Civil Court. If no relief can be granted to a person unless the declaration of his tenancy rights is made, in that situation the suit would be cognizable by the revenue court as such a declaration can only be granted by the revenue court. Even in cases where the suit is for injunction and/or possession if he is out of possession, then the suit will be cognizable by the revenue court notwithstanding that any relief for injunction may otherwise be granted by the civil court. 60. The Full Bench in Ram Padarath (supra) relied upon Chandrika Misir vs. Bhaiya Lal, AIR 1973 SC 2391 , which had said in a case arising out of a suit for injunction and in the alternative for possession in respect of agricultural land, that in view of schedule II of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, the relief of possession could only be granted by the revenue courts under Section 331 of the Act and thus ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The Supreme Court observed that the civil court would have no jurisdiction as the case first involves the declaration of rights as a tenure holder which could only be granted by the revenue courts, and thereafter relief could have been granted regarding injunction to protect possession. In paragraph 22, the Full Bench observed that the forum for action in relation to void documents or regarding agricultural land depends on the “real cause of action” with reference to the facts averred. Void documents necessarily do not require cancellation like voidable documents. 61. With regard to U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act also observations were made to by the Full Bench in Ram Padarath (supra). 62. In paragraph 23 onwards, it was observed in paragraph 24 as follows:- “24. The jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities is wider than civil and revenue courts. Void documents necessarily do not require cancellation like voidable documents. 61. With regard to U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act also observations were made to by the Full Bench in Ram Padarath (supra). 62. In paragraph 23 onwards, it was observed in paragraph 24 as follows:- “24. The jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities is wider than civil and revenue courts. Section 5(2) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act provides that any suit pending in the trial court or in appeal before any appellate court in which right, title and interest over land is involved will stand abated. In view of the said provision of any appeal, may it be a special appeal, pending before Hon'ble Supreme Court would abate. Adjudication of right, title and interest over ‘land’ by the consolidation authorities is final. Section 8 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act provides for revision of the village map after provisional consolidation Scheme for unit is prepared. Section 8-A of the said Act provides for preparation of Statement of Principles, while Section 9 provides for issue of extracts from records and statements and publication of records mentioned in Section 8 and Section 8-A and issue of notice for inviting objection. Section 9-A provides for disposal of cases relating to claim to land and partition of joint holding. The order passed by the consolidation officer is subject to appellate and revisional jurisdiction. Even if rights are claimed on the basis of void sale-deed or questioned before the consolidation authorities, the consolidation authorities, after recording a finding on the same that it was void sale-deed can determine the rights, title and interest in the land in accordance with law ignoring the said deed on the ground that it was void. The Full Bench of this Court in Ram Nath vs. Smt. Munna, 1976 AWC 412 took the same view relying on Gorakh Nath's case (supra). The entries are to be corrected by the consolidation authorities themselves and one has not to approach the authorities under U.P. Land Revenue Act after decision by civil or revenue court to correct the papers in accordance with their judgment and decree. If a document is cancelled by civil court then entry is to be made by the registering officer on the copy as provided in Section 31(2) of the Specific Relief Act, which gives seal to the legal ineffectiveness of the said document. If a document is cancelled by civil court then entry is to be made by the registering officer on the copy as provided in Section 31(2) of the Specific Relief Act, which gives seal to the legal ineffectiveness of the said document. But after determination by consolidation authorities the right, title of the parties taking into consideration void document, the entries will be corrected. After consolidation operations are over, the question cannot be raised or raked up before any civil or revenue court thereafter in view of Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which puts a bar on the jurisdiction of civil or revenue court not only to adjudicate such right and title or interest over land adjudicated by consolidation authorities or which could have been raised before them, but was not raised. The jurisdiction of consolidation authorities is thus wider than that of civil court and revenue court.” (Emphasis supplied) 63. In Ram Padarath (supra), the Full Bench referred to the earlier decision of this Court in Ram Awalamb vs. Jata Shankar and Others, 1968 ALJ 1108. It observed that the Full Bench in Ram Awalamb (supra) did not keep any distinction in respect of void or voidable sale-deeds and it accordingly observed that if cause of action for cancellation of a deed arises, the effective relief of cancellation under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act would be in a civil court and a suit in a revenue court will not be an effective substitute. The Full Bench observed that Section 331 along with its Explanation cannot be read so as to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court if the primary relief on the same cause of action can be granted by the civil court notwithstanding the fact, that a consequential relief or ancillary relief flowing out of the main relief, the grant which also becomes necessary, can be granted by revenue court alone. 64. In other words, in Ram Padarath (supra) the Full Bench of this Court held that suit for cancellation of void document would generally lie in the civil court, except when declaration of right to a status as tenure holder is necessarily needed, in which event the relief of cancellation would be redundant without the consequential relief being also granted, such relief can be granted by the revenue courts only under section 331 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. The civil court jurisdiction in such cases is ousted if the principal relief can be granted only by the revenue court, the ancillary relief flowing from the principal relief can also be granted by the revenue court and vice versa. 65. In Gorakh Nath Dubey vs. Hari Narain Singh, 1973 RD 423 , the Supreme Court was considering a case where the plaintiff had filed a suit for cancellation of a sale-deed to the extent of his share in fixed rate tenancy plots and for avoidance of sale to the extent of his share. During the pendency of the Second Appeal in the High Court filed by the defendant against the decree in favour of the plaintiff, the notification under Section 4 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1954 was published declaring that the village in which the plots in dispute were situated had come under consolidation operations. The appellant filed an application under Section 5 of the Act in the Second Appeal. The High Court rejected such application under section 5 saying that it did not apply to a case in which decision could be granted only after cancellation of the sale-deed to the extent of half. The High Court had relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Ram Adhar Singh vs. Ramswarup Singh and Others, 1968 RD 254, wherein the Supreme Court was considering the question whether a suit for possession of agricultural land under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act would abate when Section 5 of the Act did not mention suits for possession. The Supreme Court in Ram Adhar Singh (supra) held that the language of Section 5 of the Act was wide enough to cover suit for possession involving declaration of rights and interests in land which can be the subject matter of decision in consolidation proceedings. The whole object of Section 5 of the Act was to remove from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil and revenue courts, for the duration of consolidation operations, all disputes which could be decided in the course of consolidation proceedings before the special courts governed by special procedures. Such adjudication by Consolidation Authorities were considered more suitable, just and efficacious for speedy decisions which had to be taken in order to enable consolidation operations to be finalized within a reasonable time. 66. Such adjudication by Consolidation Authorities were considered more suitable, just and efficacious for speedy decisions which had to be taken in order to enable consolidation operations to be finalized within a reasonable time. 66. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gorakhnath (supra) observed that there is no decision directly on the question whether a suit for cancellation of a sale-deed which was pending on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, abates under section 5 of the Act. The Supreme Court observed that the weight of the decisions in Allahabad High Court is cast in favour of the view that questions relating to validity of sale-deeds, gifts and Wills would be gone into in proceedings before the consolidation authorities, because such questions naturally and necessarily arose and had to be decided in the course of adjudication on the rights or interests in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings. 67. The Supreme Court thereafter observed that a distinction can be made between cases in which a document is wholly or partially invalid so that in case of the former it may be disregarded by any court or authority and in the case of the latter it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. While referring to void documents the Supreme Court observed an alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid and to this effect a regular adjudication would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interests in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction by necessary implication of the statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the Consolidation Authorities have no power to cancel the same and therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a Court having power to cancel it. 68. 68. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in the case before it, i.e. in Gorakhnath (supra) the plaintiffs claim was that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid, inoperative and void. Such a claim could be adjudicated upon by the consolidation court. Therefore the Supreme Court held that the suit had abated in its entirety and should have been declared to have so abated by the High Court by allowing the application of the appellant under Section 5 of the Act so that it becomes clear that there is no decision by any other court on the merits of the claim to enable the consolidation authorities to decide afresh the rights and interests of the plaintiff to the property in dispute. 69. In the case before this court, the ratio of the judgment in Gorakhnath Dubey (supra) applies to the fullest. 70. In Jokhu vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra) this Court was considering a case where the Consolidation Authorities, without there being any declaration cancelling the sale-deed in question by the competent civil court, had ignored the said sale-deed on objection being taken by Srimati Dhiraji the respondent, that she was duped and the sale-deed had been executed by playing fraud upon her and that no sale consideration was paid to her. This court referred to a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dulari Devi vs. Janardhan Singh and Others, 1990 Supp SCC 216, wherein it was held that a sale-deed found to have been executed by fraudulent misrepresentation as to its character and not as to its contents, will determine if such transaction will be void and not voidable. The Supreme Court in the case of Gorakhnath Dubey (supra) had made a distinction between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority, and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. In Ningawwa vs. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabnar, AIR 1968 SC 956 , the Supreme Court referred to the well established principle that a contract or other transaction induced or tendered by fraud is not void but only voidable at the option of the party making it. The transaction remains valid until it was avoided. In Ningawwa vs. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabnar, AIR 1968 SC 956 , the Supreme Court referred to the well established principle that a contract or other transaction induced or tendered by fraud is not void but only voidable at the option of the party making it. The transaction remains valid until it was avoided. It referred to the legal position where earlier authorities made a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the content thereof (please refer to paragraph-5). With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable. 71. It is apparent that the Will allegedly made out by Fakeera on 25.01.1982 having not been proved at all at any stage before any competent court, by leading evidence, would be a void document as its character itself had been challenged by the objectors when they raised an objection under Section 9A-2 of the Act that it had never been executed at all, it was a forged document, which came into existence due to the collusion between Ali Baksh and the marginal witnesses. The Reference to limitation having expired by the Settlement Officer Consolidation is also untenable as in the case of Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabnar (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed that limitation runs from the date the objectors become aware of the existence of the document and not from the date it was executed. The Will was produced for the first time in Case No. 46 before the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings and it was objected to from the very beginning by the respondents. The original copy of the Will was never produced before the Consolidation Authorities. A true copy of the Will made out in May, 1991 and attested by the Government notary in 2001 alone was produced before the Consolidation Officer. Such a document which was inadmissible in evidence and was never proved beyond doubt before any competent court of law could not have been relied upon by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings was set at naught, as soon as the Appeal against it was abated under section 5(2) of the Act. 72. The order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings was set at naught, as soon as the Appeal against it was abated under section 5(2) of the Act. 72. In Jokhu versus Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra) this Court considered arguments raised before it that in mutation proceedings entries had been made on the basis of a registered sale-deed which was now being questioned before the Consolidation Court without the sale-deed being challenged before a regular civil court. It was argued that the Consolidation Courts lacked the jurisdiction of trying an issue relating to validity of any document said to have been obtained by impersonation and fraud and the appropriate course before the party concerned is to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil court seeking cancellation of such document. This Court considered the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sawarni vs. Inder Kaur, 1996 (6) SCC 223 and Sankalchan Jaychandbhai Patel vs. Vithalbhai Jaychandbhai Patel, 1996 (6) SCC 433 , that mutation in revenue records does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title, rather it only enables the person in whose favour mutation order is passed to pay the land revenue, to observe that summary proceedings not being regular proceedings, any orders passed there in do not have the character of a regular declaratory decree passed by a court of competent Jurisdiction. Any party even if not recorded in the revenue records on the basis of any mutation order can always challenge such an entry and put forth his or her claim once the consolidation operations begin in the village by filing objections under Section 9A-22 of the Act. It is settled law that mutation entries are only to enable the State to collect revenues from the person who is in possession and enjoyment of the property and that the right, title and interest as to the property in question should be established ignoring such entries. Entries in the revenue records are only one of the modes of proof of the enjoyment of the property. Mutation proceedings do not create any title or interest thereon. Similar views have been expressed by this Court in the case of Awadhesh Singh vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation. 73. Entries in the revenue records are only one of the modes of proof of the enjoyment of the property. Mutation proceedings do not create any title or interest thereon. Similar views have been expressed by this Court in the case of Awadhesh Singh vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation. 73. In the case of Vishwa Nath and Another vs. Board of Revenue and Others, 2004 (4) AWC 3141 , this Court was considering the preliminary objections with regard to entertaining a writ petition arising out of mutation proceedings. This Court considered Sections 34 and 35 and also Sections 40 and 40-A of the U.P. Land Revenue Act along with the provisions of U.P. Revenue Court Manual. It observed that in a disputed case the Tehsildar shall only make a preliminary enquiry to determine the dispute, and its nature before referring to the case to the Collector for disposal under Section 35. The Collector shall then make a summary enquiry and shall take such further evidence as the parties were desirous to produce and as may be necessary in his opinion for completing the enquiry including evidence as recorded by Tehsildar or a qualified Naib Tehsildar. It is the court of the Collector which takes the evidence and has jurisdiction to decide the objection raised. The report of mutation can be given on the basis of transfer or succession on the basis of Will. The Collector may either accept or reject a Will, but the findings given in the mutation proceedings are only summary in nature subject to decision by the competent court. It is always open to the petitioners to establish their right on the basis of Will in a competent Court. The Court observed that findings in summary proceedings have no bearing on the adjudication of title by the competent court nor findings given in mutation proceedings could be treated to be findings establishing any title. It is always open to the petitioners to establish their right on the basis of Will in a competent Court. The Court observed that findings in summary proceedings have no bearing on the adjudication of title by the competent court nor findings given in mutation proceedings could be treated to be findings establishing any title. In the case of Buddha Pal Singh Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2012 (5) ADJ 266 , the court observed in paragraph 4, 5, 6 and 7 as under:- “(4) In sum and substance proceedings of mutation, correction of revenue entries or settlement of disputes as to entries or in annual registers as prescribed under Section 33 of the Act initiated or decided under Sections 34/35, 39, 40 and 54 of the Act are all summary in nature subject to determination of rights of the parties by the competent court of jurisdiction. (5) Section 40-A of the Act lays down that orders passed under Sections 35, 39, 40 and 54 of the Act, apart from certain other orders, would not be a bar for instituting any suit in a competent court for relief on the basis of a right in the holding. It means that irrespective of the orders passed aforesaid under the provisions, parties are free to get their rights on a holding adjudicated before competent court. (6) The law is well-settled that: (i) mutation proceedings are summary in nature wherein title of the parties over the land involved is not decided. (ii) mutation order or revenue entries are only for the fiscal purposes to enable the State to collect revenue from the person recorded. (iii) they neither extinguish nor create title. (iv) the order of mutation does not in any way effect the title of the parties over the land in dispute. (v) such orders or entries are not documents of title and are subject to decision of the competent court. (7) It is equally settled that the orders for mutation are passed on the basis of the possession of the parties and since no substantive rights of the parties are decided in mutation proceedings, ordinarily a writ petition is not maintainable in respect of orders passed in mutation proceedings unless found to be totally without jurisdiction or contrary to the title already decided by the competent court. The parties are always free to get their rights in respect of the disputed land adjudicated by competent court.” 74. In Bhurey vs. Pir Bux, 1973 SCC Online All. 13, a Division Bench of this Court was considering an Appeal arising out of proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Consolidation Officer held that the appellants were entitled to be recorded as Sirdar. On Appeal the findings was reversed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The matter was taken up in Revision and the Deputy Director of Consolidation restored the order of the Consolidation Officer. The writ court had quashed the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and remanded the matter back to him to consider afresh. Earlier in a suit filed by the predecessor in interest of the parties, a compromise had been filed on the basis of which compromise decree in mutation proceedings also orders were passed in favour of the appellant. Thereafter consolidation proceedings commenced and the question whether Bhurey alone was the Sirdar of the plots in dispute was agitated before the Consolidation Authorities. It was argued that since the decree had been passed by the civil court on the basis of a compromise, it would operate as an estoppel if not as res-judicata. Even if the proceedings before the civil court for declaration of title was barred by Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and were therefore without jurisdiction and void, the admission of the predecessor in interest of respondents and the application for compromise decree would bind him. Reliance was also placed upon an admission of the predecessors of the respondents in the mutation proceedings. The Court observed in paragraph 12 that “it is well-established that any consent or admission made in mutation proceedings has no relevance in regular title proceedings. Consequently, the alleged admission of Ilahi Baksh and Ali Baksh is not admissible in the present title proceedings. The Deputy Director was in error in spelling out an exclusive title in Bhurey on the basis of these admissions. 75. Now I shall examine the orders of the two learned courts below. The alleged Will dated 25.01.1982 was never produced in original before the Consolidation Officer. A true copy of the alleged Will dated May, 1991 said to be attested by Government Notary on 31.01.2002 , was produced before the Consolidation Officer. 75. Now I shall examine the orders of the two learned courts below. The alleged Will dated 25.01.1982 was never produced in original before the Consolidation Officer. A true copy of the alleged Will dated May, 1991 said to be attested by Government Notary on 31.01.2002 , was produced before the Consolidation Officer. No other evidence was filed to prove the said un-registered Will but despite specific objection being raised by other heirs of Fakira, the Consolidation Officer accepted the order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings as having become final between the parties with regard to the Will and the shares of each son therein. 76. Aggrieved by the order dated 26.08.2010, two Appeals were filed before the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The Settlement Officer Consolidation clubbed both these Appeals and heard and decided them together. A perusal of the order of the appellate court shows that the Settlement Officer Consolidation rejected the Appeal of Rasoolan on technical grounds, whereas the Appeal filed by Shamshad son of Mulla along with the sons of Abdul Rehman, was rejected on the ground that the Will dated 25.01.1982 was not challenged in a Regular Suit and having not been set aside by a regular court of law, it was binding upon the Consolidation Authorities also. Moreover the order of the Tehsildar dated 6.08.1991 also remained unchallenged and had become final between the parties. 77. The reason given by the Settlement Officer Consolidation to accept the Will which made out an unnatural disposition of the property unduly favouring one son over the others has been mentioned for the first time in the order of the Appellate court to the effect that Ali Baksh had stated that he looked after Shukru, his uncle who had died issueless and whose property had also devolved upon Fakira, as a result, Fakira had given half share of the property in dispute being morally bound to favour Ali Baksh as Shukru during his lifetime had mentioned that he wished to give his half share of the joint family property to Ali Baksh who looked after him. The Appeal filed by Rasoolan has been rejected as not maintainable on the ground that in the Khatauni of Khata No. 13 there is no mention of any share of Rasoolan, widow of Mullah. The Appeal filed by Rasoolan has been rejected as not maintainable on the ground that in the Khatauni of Khata No. 13 there is no mention of any share of Rasoolan, widow of Mullah. The three sons of Abdul Rehman and Shamshad Ali son of Mulla had not given any power of attorney to Rasoolan to file the Appeal, whereas Rasoolan herself was not a recorded co-sharer of the property in question therefore the Appeal filed by her was not maintainable. 78. The Settlement Officer Consolidation nevertheless on the basis of Appeal filed by the three sons of Abdul Rahman, Shamshad Ali son of Mulla, entertained the Appeal and observed that the finding of the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings in his order dated 6.08.1991 having become final between the parties, there was no reason not to follow the same, moreover no Suit had been filed for declaration of the Will as a forged document within the limitation period prescribed of three years by any of the appellants. As a result, there was no reason to interfere in the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. Moreover, Jallu Son of Abdul Rehman in his statement before the Consolidation Officer had admitted the half share of Ali Baksh while that of the other three brothers in the remaining half share only of the property in dispute. 79. The observations made by the Settlement Officer Consolidation being the first Appellate Court are unfortunate. It is evident that Rasoolan had filed objections under section 9A-2 on behalf of Shamshad Ali son of Mulla as his mother and on her objections being rejected, she was entitled to file the Appeal. Even if her appeal was found to be not maintainable, the Appeal filed by Shamshad Ali along with Buddha, third son of Fakira, and the three sons of Abdul Rahman was still maintainable. The Settlement Officer Consolidation has also made a baseless observation that Jallu son of Abdul Rehman had accepted the half share of Ali Baksh and his sons on the property in dispute. A perusal of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer shows that the Consolidation Officer had recorded the statement of Jhallu given on 05.08.2009 wherein he admitted the fact that Ali Baksh was in possession of half share of the disputed property in pursuance of the order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings. 80. A perusal of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer shows that the Consolidation Officer had recorded the statement of Jhallu given on 05.08.2009 wherein he admitted the fact that Ali Baksh was in possession of half share of the disputed property in pursuance of the order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings. 80. The Deputy Director Consolidation in the two Revision nos. 239 and 748 filed by Rasoolan and Shamshad Ali and others against the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 13.05.2013 and the order passed by the consolidation officer dated 26.08.2010 has first considered the pedigree as admitted by all the parties to the dispute, thereafter he has considered the arguments raised by the revisionists that the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation have not considered evidence afresh, but have summarily disposed of the matter only on the basis of the order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings on 06.08.1991. 81. It was again reiterated that no Will was made out by Fakira son of Madari as alleged by Ali Baksh and his sons. The Will being a forged document was accepted on the basis of only the order passed by the Tehsildar without taking any fresh evidence. The thumb impression of Fakira allegedly affixed to the Will having been challenged the consolidation authorities ought to have summoned evidence from a fingerprint expert. Moreover the property in dispute was ancestral property and not the self acquired property of Fakira therefore he could not have made out a Will regarding its disposition in the first place. 82. After hearing both the parties, the Deputy Director of Consolidation rejected the argument advanced by the respondents to the Revision on the ground that had Shukru indeed wished to give his share of the ancestral property to Ali Baksh, the eldest son of Fakira, he could himself have made out a Will in this regard. Shukru had died issueless and intestate, therefore it could now not be argued by Ali Baksh and his sons that to carry out the wishes of Shukru his brother Fakira had given half share of the property in question to Ali Baksh and divided the remaining half equally amongst his three other sons/legal heirs. Mulla having predeceased him, Shamshad Ali was given one sixth as a result. Mulla having predeceased him, Shamshad Ali was given one sixth as a result. Moreover the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation had made a mistake in relying upon the order passed by the Tehsildar in mutation proceedings without letting the parties adduce fresh evidence. It has been observed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation that when Mulla Died in the lifetime of Fakira, Rasoolan his widow was only 25 years old and their only son Shamshad Ali was a minor and Rasoolan being widow and natural guardian of her son had filed objections before the Consolidation Officer. Such objections could not be thrown out only on technical grounds of Rasoolan not being recorded co-sharer of the property in dispute. 83. After referring to the reasons and circumstances which made him doubt the execution of the Will by Fakira son of Madaari, the Deputy Director of Consolidation further refers to the copy of the unregistered Will available on record. Having perused the same, certain discrepancies were noted in the ink, the paper on which the alleged Will had been written out, an observation has been made that although he had no expertise in the matter nevertheless, on the face of it the alleged Will appeared to be a forged one. The conclusion having been reached by the Deputy Director of Consolidation regarding the alleged Will dated 25.01.1982 being a forged document, it made consideration of all other issues raised before him unnecessary. The two Revisions were accepted and the order passed by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation were set aside and directions issued To divide the property in dispute equally amongst all the four sons/heirs of Fakira now represented in Revisions filed before him by their sons. 84. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The writ petition stands dismissed. The order dated 31.05.2016 and the consequential order dated 04.06.2016 are upheld. As a consequence of dismissal of the writ petition, the petitioners shall deposit Rs. 3 lakhs only in the Registry of this Court as costs within two months, which shall be released to the respondent nos. 2 and 6 on appropriate application being made in this regard.