Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 866 (KER)

Mini, D/o. Thankappan v. Sivaraman, S/o. Govindan

2020-10-16

BECHU KURIAN THOMAS, S.V.BHATTI

body2020
JUDGMENT : Bechu Kurian Thomas, J. The jurisdiction of the Family Court to deal with a suit for injunction filed by the father-in-law against the daughter-in-law arises for consideration. The Family Court held that it has no jurisdiction since the said suit is not based on 'circumstances arising out of a marital relationship'. The daughter-in-law has preferred this appeal challenging the order returning the plaint for presentation to the proper court. 2. This case has an interesting past. A suit was originally filed before the Munsiff Court, Vaikom as O.S. No.157 of 2013. The relief claimed in the suit was for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to vacate the plaint schedule building and also for a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants or anybody acting under them from interfering with the title and possession of the plaintiffs, after such eviction. Plaintiffs in that suit are the respondents herein while the defendants in the suit are the appellants before us. The appellants before us are the daughter-in-law and grandchildren of the respondents while the respondents herein are the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the 1st appellant. For the purpose of easier comprehension, the parties are referred to as plaintiffs and defendants as arrayed in O.S. No.157 of 2013 of the Munsiff Court, Vaikom. 3. It was alleged in the plaint that the 1st plaintiff is the owner of the plaint schedule building and that defendants are the wife and children of their deceased son. According to plaintiffs, after marriage, the 1st defendant and her husband resided in a property, which was purchased by the 1st plaintiff in the name of his son and that when the son expressed his inclination to stay with his parents, the plaintiffs permitted the son along with his family to come and reside with them. While so, it is alleged that, the 1st defendant and the son of the plaintiffs slowly moved into a quarrelsome relationship, which ultimately ended up in the suicide of plaintiffs' son and thereafter, due to harassment by the 1st defendant and her family members, plaintiffs were forced to move out of the schedule building. According to the plaintiffs, even though defendants have an alternate building which remains in the name of the plaintiffs' son, defendants are residing in the building of the 1st plaintiff by force. It is in such circumstances, the suit was instituted before the Munsiff Court, Vaikom. According to the plaintiffs, even though defendants have an alternate building which remains in the name of the plaintiffs' son, defendants are residing in the building of the 1st plaintiff by force. It is in such circumstances, the suit was instituted before the Munsiff Court, Vaikom. The cause of action for the suit is stated to be the assault and forcible eviction of plaintiffs on 6.12.2011 by the 1st defendant and her brother. 4. After the written statement was filed, the learned Munsiff, by his order dated 11.2.2015, returned the suit for presentation before the proper court, after finding that by virtue of Section 7(1) Explanation (d) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short 'the Act') the suit was barred under the said provision as it is arising out of a marital relationship. 5. The plaint was re-presented before the Family Court, Kottayam. By the impugned order dated 29.2.2016, the Family Court found that the suit is beyond the scope of Sections 7(1) Expln.(c) and (d) of the Act and held that only the civil court has jurisdiction over the dispute. Accordingly, the plaint was returned by the Family Court to be presented to the proper court. 6. The defendants in the suit have preferred this appeal challenging the order of the Family Court. It is contended that the Family Court went wrong in holding that the dispute in the instant case does not attract the jurisdiction, especially since it had not taken into reckoning the very purpose of establishing the Family Courts. It was also submitted that the earlier rejection of plaint was never challenged and the same became final and binding. 7. We have heard Adv.B.Renjith Kumar, learned counsel for the defendants (Appellants) as well as Adv.K.K.Akil, learned counsel for the plaintiffs (Respondents). 8. Admittedly the plaint schedule building belongs to the 1st plaintiff. Even though the plaintiffs' son, who committed suicide, has a property with a building on it, the defendants reside in the house belonging to the 1st plaintiff. 7. We have heard Adv.B.Renjith Kumar, learned counsel for the defendants (Appellants) as well as Adv.K.K.Akil, learned counsel for the plaintiffs (Respondents). 8. Admittedly the plaint schedule building belongs to the 1st plaintiff. Even though the plaintiffs' son, who committed suicide, has a property with a building on it, the defendants reside in the house belonging to the 1st plaintiff. The learned counsel for the defendants relied upon the decision in Leby Issac v. Leena M. Ninan ( 2005 (3) KLT 665 ) to contend that circumstances arising out of a marital relationship means not only those circumstances which transpired during marital life but that it includes such circumstances which led to the marriage, developed thereafter, and also those which closely followed as a consequence of all these. The wide interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid case, according to Adv.B.Renjith Kumar, clearly contemplates that a suit of the nature as in the present case would be covered. On the other hand, it is argued by Adv.K.K.Akhil for the plaintiffs that, the suit is not based on circumstances arising out of marital relationship. The suit is based on the forcible eviction of plaintiffs from their house on 6.12.2011 and the continued illegal occupation of the house by the defendants and hence, the order of the Family Court is valid. Either way, according to the counsel for the respondents, all what the plaintiffs want is an adjudication by a court of law whether it be the Munsiff Court or the Family Court. 9. In order to appreciate the contentions raised, it is necessary to extract Section 7(1) Expln.(d) of the Act, which reads as follows: “7. Jurisdiction.-(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall- (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation, and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a District Court or, as the case may be, such subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation.-The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely- (a) xxx (b) xxx (c) xxx (d) a suit or proceeding for an order of injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship.” 10. The issue arises as to what does the word “any circumstances arising out of a marital relationship” mean? Does the suit in question fall in Explanation (d) of Section 7(1) of the Act? 11. A comparison of the provisions in Section 7(1) Expln. (c) and (d) will evince that while Section 7(1) Expln.(c) contemplates disputes between the parties to a marriage, Section 7(1) Expln.(d) deals with issues that need not necessarily be between the parties to a marriage. For a suit or proceeding to come under Sction 7(1) Expln.(d), the issue must stem from circumstances arising out of a marital relationship. This Court had in Leby Issac v. Leena M. Ninan ( 2005 (3) KLT 665 ) held that “So, circumstances in relation to a marital relationship will be those particulars which closely precedes, surrounds, accompanies and follows a marital relationship, That means, primarily those can be the marriage itself and the surrounding occurrences in connection with marriage. The main requirement is that such 'circumstances' must have a direct bearing on marriage, since the marriage precedes, the existence or origin of a 'marital relationship'. 'Circumstances' arising out of a marital relationship are therefore, 'occurrences or things which stand around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify the principal event' of a marriage or marital relationship, The expression 'in circumstances arising out of marital relationship' thus means not only those occurrences which transpired during marital life, but those also include such circumstances which led to the marriage, which developed thereafter, which took place during marital life, which resulted in breaking down of marriage and also those which 'closely' followed as a consequence of all these. If the intention of legislature was to take in only those occurrences which take place during a 'marital relationship', there was no necessity to use the word 'circumstances' in explanation (d) to S.7(1) of the Act. The same purpose could have been achieved if explanation (d) is worded without the term 'circumstances' also. If the intention of legislature was to take in only those occurrences which take place during a 'marital relationship', there was no necessity to use the word 'circumstances' in explanation (d) to S.7(1) of the Act. The same purpose could have been achieved if explanation (d) is worded without the term 'circumstances' also. So, the inclusion of word 'circumstances' in the relevant provision is quite significant and it must have been done to include all such circumstances surrounding, preceding and closely following a marital relationship i.e., the principal event of marriage and the eventualities surrounding the same”. 12. Relying upon Leby Issac's Case (supra), this Court had held in Janaki Amma v. Renuka Sadanandan ( 2016 (1) KLT 563 ) that the expression circumstances arising out of a marital relationship primarily meas the marriage itself and the surrounding occurrences in connection with the marriage. It was observed that the intention of the legislature was to include all circumstances surrounding, proceeding and closely following a marital relationship in which the principal event is the 'marriage' and the eventualities surrounding it. Similarly in Krishna Moorthy v. Soumya Krishnan ( 2015 (4) KLT 471 ), this Court held that a suit for declaration of title based on a claim/right arising out a marital relationship was maintainable in the Family Court. In the decision in Suprabha v. Sivaraman ( 2006 (1) KLT 712 ) this Court interpreted clause (d) of the Explanation to Section 7(1) of the Act and held that even if one of the parties to the marriage had expired, claim for value of gold ornaments and money paid at the time of marriage are matters coming under the terms 'circumstances arising out of a marital relationship”. 13. With the broad propositions of law laid down in the above case, it is necessary to answer the following questions in our quest to identify the forum for adjudicating the lis under consideration. (1) Is there a suit or a proceeding? (2) Is the relief sought for in the suit or proceeding one for an injunction or order? (3) Has the suit or proceeding stemmed from circumstances arising out of a marital relationship? If the answer to the above questions are all in the affirmative, then the Family Court alone has the jurisdiction. 14. It needs no explication to answer the first two questions. (3) Has the suit or proceeding stemmed from circumstances arising out of a marital relationship? If the answer to the above questions are all in the affirmative, then the Family Court alone has the jurisdiction. 14. It needs no explication to answer the first two questions. In the facts of the case, the answers are in the affirmative. As far as the answer to the third question is concerned, it is relevant to advert to the fact that the property involved in the suit does not belong to any of the parties to a marriage. It is the absolute property of the 1st plaintiff. In other words, the scheduled property, is the proprietary right of the 1st plaintiff. The said proprietary right of the 1st plaintiff cannot be a circumstance that arises out of a marital relationship. Plaintiffs are enforcing their proprietary right. Cause of action is stated to be the forcible eviction of plaintiffs on 6.12.2011. Enforcement of the proprietary right of the 1st plaintiff over any person is not a circumstance arising out of a marital relationship, merely because the person sought to be proceeded against happens to be the daughter-in-law and grandchildren. It is also apposite to bear in mind that the marriage between the son of the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant is not an issue in question. The rights that flow out of the marriage between the 1st defendant and the son of the plaintiffs are not called in question. In such an instance, it cannot be held that the enforcement of the proprietary right of the 1st plaintiff over his daughter-in-law will be a circumstance that closely precedes, surrounds, accompanies and follows a marital relationship. It is not the nomenclature of the relationship that will determine whether a matter falls under Section 7(1) Expln.(d) or not. Nomenclature of the relationship will be relevant for matters coming under Section 7(1) Expln.(c) while what is relevant for Section 7(1) Expln.(d) is nature of case and the cause of action stated. 15. The subject matter of the dispute, cause of action, the facts narrated are all matters which will have a bearing on the question of jurisdiction. Viewed in such a manner, we have no doubt that the suit is not for an injunction 'in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship'. 16. 15. The subject matter of the dispute, cause of action, the facts narrated are all matters which will have a bearing on the question of jurisdiction. Viewed in such a manner, we have no doubt that the suit is not for an injunction 'in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship'. 16. The earlier order returning the plaint has merged with the impugned order of the Family Court. Since the Family Court has held that the plaint is liable to be returned for presentation before the proper court, we find that there is no bar in considering the question of jurisdiction by the Family Court. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendants that earlier order of the Munsiff Court became final as it was not challenged, therefore does not merit acceptance. 17. In view of the above decision, while we confirm the order of the Family Court dated 29.2.2016 and dismiss this appeal, we direct that the jurisdictional Munsiff, to whom the plaint is presented for consideration, shall dispose of the suit, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.