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2020 DIGILAW 868 (JHR)

Pramod Kumar v. State of Jharkhand

2020-09-09

SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

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JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Sabyasanchi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Ms. Ruchi Rampuria, the learned AC to SC-II appearing on behalf of the respondent-State and Mrs. Richa Sanchita, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Jharkhand Academic Council [JAC]. . 2. This writ petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard. 3. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for a direction upon the respondents to reckon cut-off date for upper age limit in view of Advertisement No.27 of 2011 is on 01.07.2011 instead of Advertisement No.04 of 2015 cut-off date on 01.08.2015 and consider the maximum age of the petitioner in general category for appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher in Government Primary School Class-I to Class-VIII. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has passed matriculation examination in the year 1986 in 1st Division from Bihar School Examination Board, Patna, Intermediate from Ranchi University, Ranchi in the year 1988, B.Sc.(H) Examination from Ranchi University, Ranchi in the year 1993 and the petitioner has completed his Post Graduation from Ranchi University in the year 2006. The petitioner had earlier applied for the post of appointment of general category for the post of Assistant Teacher in Government of Jharkhand School for Class-I to Class-VIII on the basis of Advertisement No.27 of 2011 dated 26.03.2011. Thereafter, he also applied for appointment under Advertisement No.95 of 2012. The Government of Jharkhand came out with the notification for appointment by the Advertisement No.4/2015. In the said advertisement, there is relaxation of age for 5 years. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in the year 2011 advertisement process relaxation up to 40 years of age whereas in the year 2015 it has been brought to 35 years of age and the cut-off in the year 2015 for counting the age under the 2015 advertisement, the cut-off date has been fixed on 01.08.2015. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in the year 2011 advertisement process relaxation up to 40 years of age whereas in the year 2015 it has been brought to 35 years of age and the cut-off in the year 2015 for counting the age under the 2015 advertisement, the cut-off date has been fixed on 01.08.2015. He further submits that due to delay on the part of the State, the petitioner has not been able to participate and in that view of the matter, the age relaxation is required to be there so that the petitioner and others can apply. He relied in the order of Hon'ble Patna High Court passed in C.W.J.C No.20587 of 2019 and submits that by Patna High Court the age relaxation was rejected to be issued and in that view of the matter, the writ petition is fit to be allowed. 5. Per contra, Ms. Ruchi Rampuria, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State submits that under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the recruitment rules and policy was framed by the Government of Jharkhand. The grievance of the petitioner relates to considering his age as per the publication made in the Advertisement No.27 of 2011 in which cut-off date for calculation of upper age limit was fixed on 01.07.2011. In view of that advertisement, the cut-off date reckoned as also 01.07.2011. The cut-off date is being provided for separate public advertisement. The first advertisement cannot be continued in all subsequent process of appointment. In view of Jharkhand Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2012 which prescribes clearance of Teachers' Eligibility Test [TET] and as per Rule No.13 thereof one-time measure relaxation was provided for 7 years. She submits that relaxation is the policy decision. The cut-off date fixed in the year 2015, i.e., 01.08.2015 is absolutely scientific and non-arbitrary. She submits that this matter has been set at rest in view of Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in case of “State of Jharkhand v. Kokila Devi & Ors.” in L.P.A. No.429 of 2014 and other analogous cases decided on 03.07.2017. She submits that Clause-V of Advertisement No.4 of 2015 minimum educational qualification has been fixed and in Clause-VII upper age limit for appointment was fixed as 01.08.2015. The petitioner attained the age of 43 years 11 months and 28 days on the cut-off date, i.e., 01.08.2015. She submits that Clause-V of Advertisement No.4 of 2015 minimum educational qualification has been fixed and in Clause-VII upper age limit for appointment was fixed as 01.08.2015. The petitioner attained the age of 43 years 11 months and 28 days on the cut-off date, i.e., 01.08.2015. The relaxation in upper age limit has been extended up to 7 years for one time opportunity. The petitioner had already crossed the upper age limit and in that view of the matter no relief can be extended to the petitioner. 6. Mrs. Richa Sanchita, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-JAC submits that the advertisement took place in the year 2015 whereas this writ petition has been filed in the year 2019. She further submits that all the process have already been completed and the candidates have been appointed and they are working. 7. Having heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court finds that there is subsequent advertisement in view of the policy decision of the Government and in the advertisement of 2015 the maximum age has been brought to 35 years and relaxation of 5 years is also there which is a policy decision of the Government. The contention of the petitioner is not acceptable in view of the fact that advertisement was also in the year 2015 and the candidates have already been appointed and working. The petitioner approached this Court in the year 2019 after completion of the entire exercise. The Court finds that there is no arbitrariness on the part of the State in fixing the cut-off date as 01.08.2015 pursuant to Advertisement No.4 of 2015 or contrary in law. The 5 years age relaxation has been given under Rule 13 of the Rules, 2012. 8. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Patna High Court judgment is not applicable. A reference may be made to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “Govt. of A.P. v. N. Subbarayudu” reported in (2008) 14 SCC 702 . Paragraph nos.5 to 9 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: 5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. Paragraph nos.5 to 9 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: 5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. (See State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal.) 6. No doubt in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India this Court had struck down the cut-off date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken in Nakara case as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal. 7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (vide SCC para 5), Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. (vide SCC para 31), University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary, etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. 9. 9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi the court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain. 9. In view of the aforesaid decision, the cut-off date prescribed by the Government of Jharkhand in Advertisement No.4 of 2015 cannot be quashed and this Court is not inclined to re-fix any cut-off date. The examination process is already over. As a cumulative effect of the above discussions, no relief can be extended to the petitioner, and hence, the writ petition [W.P.(S) No. 617 of 2019] stands dismissed. 10. I.A., if any, stands disposed of.