JUDGMENT : 1. The captioned appeals have arisen out of a common judgment, hence they have been clubbed and heard together. 2. The appellants are aggrieved by the judgment dated 31.07.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Khunti, in S.T. Case No.343 of 2008, whereby, the appellants have been found guilty and convicted for the offences under Section 452, 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Witch (DAAIN) Practices Act 1999 and sentenced to undergo R.I. for life and a fine of Rs.5000/-each, under Sections 302 of Indian Penal Code, and R.I. of seven years and fine of Rs.4000/-each, for the offence under Section 452 of Indian Penal Code, and imprisonment of three months for the offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Witch (DAAIN) Practices Act, 1999. 3. The prosecution case as unfolded in the fardbeyan (Ext.-2), of the informant Biren Devi (P.W.2), is that in the night of 28/29.12.2007, while she and her family members were sleeping in the house, then at around 7:00 p.m., Chana Budhu Munda came to her house asking for water. She opened the door and in the light of lamp (dibhri) she saw Chana Budhu's face was covered with paint. Her daughter gave a bowl of water to Chana Budhu Munda and while he was drinking the water, then Tezwa Munda armed with a kulhari entered her house, whereupon the informant and her daughter ran out of the house. It is stated that a fair-complexioned person armed with kulhari was accompanying Tezwa Munda. It is alleged that the accused persons started assaulting her husband. She shouted for help but none came to her help. Thereafter she went to the Chowkidar and when she returned home she found her husband lying dead a bloodied condition. It is alleged that previously Tezwa Munda had forbade and threatened to kill the informant and her husband for practicing witchcraft. 4. On the basis of the fardbeyan, Khunti P.S. Case No.147 of 2007 was registered under Section 302 read 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Witch (DAAIN) Practices Act 1999. 5. The police investigated the case and submitted the charge-sheet against the accused persons. Accordingly cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. 5. The police investigated the case and submitted the charge-sheet against the accused persons. Accordingly cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. The sessions court read over and explained the charges under Sections 452, 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3 and 4 of Prevention of Witch (DAAIN) Practices Act 1999 to the accused persons to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. During trial the prosecution examined altogether seven (7) witnesses. P.W. 1-Sushila Mundain is the daughter of the deceased, P.W.2-Biren Devi is the informant and wife of the deceased. P.W.5-Dr. Sudhir Kumar Sinha, had conducted the post-mortem over the dead body of the deceased and has proved the post-mortem report Ext.1. P.W.6-Lilly Bage, is a formal witness, who has proved the signature of the Officer-in-Charge (since dead) on the fardbeyan and the endorsement (Exhibits 2 and 2/1) on the fardbeyan. P.W.-6 has identified and proved the signature i.e., Ext.-3, of the then Officer-in-Charge on the formal F.I.R., P.W.7-Ajit Kumar Singh, the Judicial Magistrate, has proved the statement recorded by him of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 under Section 164 Cr.P.C, i.e., Ext.4 and 5. P.W.3-Duskan Munda has been declared hostile and PW-4 Jiwan Mashih Munda is a hearsay witness. 7. PW-1 is the daughter of the deceased and as per her deposition, in the night of 28/29.12.2007, while she and her family members were going to sleep then Chana Budhu Munda came and asked for water. At that time a lamp (dhibari) was burning in the house. Her mother (P.W.-2) opened the door and gave water to Chana Budhu Munda. Thereafter on hearing the clap of the Chana Budhu Munda, co-accused Tezwa Munda and Soma Munda, armed with an axe and a knife respectively, entered their house. Tezwa Munda struck her father on the head with the axe and Soma Munda stabbed him with the knife. Then, she and her mother ran out of the house and hid in the field. Her mother informed the Chowkidar about the incident. In cross-examination no material contradiction has been elicited to discredit her testimony. 8. PW-2, the informant, has deposed that in the night of 28.12.2007, when she and her family members were in the house, then Chana Budhu Munda came and asked her to open the door. Her mother informed the Chowkidar about the incident. In cross-examination no material contradiction has been elicited to discredit her testimony. 8. PW-2, the informant, has deposed that in the night of 28.12.2007, when she and her family members were in the house, then Chana Budhu Munda came and asked her to open the door. A lamp (Dibhari) and an electric bulb was burning in the house. On asking of Chana Budhu Munda she gave him water to drink. Thereafter, Chana Budhu Munda started clapping whereupon accused Tezwa Munda and Soma Munda entered her house and Tezwa Munda struck an axe blow on the head of her husband and Soma Munda stabbed him on the chest with the knife. She has stated that she and her daughter ran out of the house and informed the Chowkidar about the incident. During cross-examination at para-3 she has stated that she had fled after witnessing murder of her husband. In para-5 of her cross -examination she stated that the Chowkidar had come on the same night and the dead body of her husband was lying in the house. 9. PW-4 Jiwan Mashih Munda, the son of the informant has stated that he had come home on the next day. He saw the dead body of his father. His mother told him that Chana Budhu Munda, Tezwa Munda and Soma Munda had killed his father. His mother (P.W.-2) had identified the accused persons in the light of electric bulb. In cross-examination he has stated that police had recorded his statement on 29.12.2007. 10. P.W.5 is the Doctor who conducted the autopsy on the dead body and found the following injuries (i) incised wound on upper part of abdomen 1”x ½’’to cavity deep. (ii) incised wound on right side of scalp behind and above right ear 4”x ½ into bone deep. (iii) right parietal bone cut apart 2 ½ x ¼’’ cavity deep. On dissection: -(i) liquid blood and clots were found in abdominal cavity. (ii) brain tissue was cut at two places surrounded with clots (iii) right parietal bone was cut apart 2 ½ x ¼ whole thickness. In the opinion of the Doctor cause of death was shock and hemorrhage due to the aforesaid injuries caused by sharp cutting weapon. 11. On dissection: -(i) liquid blood and clots were found in abdominal cavity. (ii) brain tissue was cut at two places surrounded with clots (iii) right parietal bone was cut apart 2 ½ x ¼ whole thickness. In the opinion of the Doctor cause of death was shock and hemorrhage due to the aforesaid injuries caused by sharp cutting weapon. 11. On closure of the prosecution evidence the statement of the accused/appellants was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The defence of the accused persons was of complete denial. On consideration of the evidence on record the learned court below found the accused/ appellants guilty and convicted them by the judgment impugned herein. 12. Learned counsel, for the appellants while assailing the judgment has argued that P.W.-3, the independent witness has not supported the prosecution's case. It is submitted that P.W.-1, 2 and 4 are the daughter, wife and son of the deceased and are highly interested witnesses. It is submitted that P.Ws. 1 and 2 have deposed that Soma Munda was armed with knife whereas in the fardbeyan P.W.-2 has not named accused Soma Munda rather she has stated that a fair complexioned person armed with axe was accompanying Tezwa Munda. P.Ws. 1 and 2 have deposed that Soma Munda had inflicted knife blows on the chest of the deceased but no penetrating injury was found on the body of the deceased by P.W.-5-the Doctor. It is submitted that P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 have embellished and made material improvements in their deposition regarding the means and mode of identification of the accused persons. P.W.2 has stated that she had identified the accused/appellants in the light of the electric bulb as well as lamp, whereas in the fardbeyan P.W.-2 has not stated that an electric bulb was burning in the house. Learned counsel has argued that the aforesaid material contradictions have not been considered and appreciated by the trial court, accordingly the impugned judgment suffers from perversity in findings of the evidence on record. Learned counsel has argued that the prosecution has not been able to bring home the charges against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt, hence the appellants are entitled to be acquitted by giving them the benefit of doubt and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. 13. Learned counsel has argued that the prosecution has not been able to bring home the charges against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt, hence the appellants are entitled to be acquitted by giving them the benefit of doubt and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. 13. Per contra, learned APP has contended that just because the witnesses are agnates or related to each other, their evidence or testimony cannot be categorized as that of interested witnesses. It is argued that they are natural witnesses who were present in house and had witnessed the commission of the crime by the appellants. It is argued that minor contradictions and discrepancies in the testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 regarding the mode and means of identification of the accused does not render their testimony untrustworthy in entirety. Learned A.P.P has submitted that the testimony of P.W.-5-the Doctor and the findings in the post-mortem report corroborates the ocular testimony of P.Ws. 1 and 2. It is canvassed that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any perversity in findings. 14. We have considered the rival contentions and perused the testimony of witnesses. As per the medical evidence, i.e., the post-mortem report (Ext.-1), the deceased met a homicidal death. P.Ws. 1 and 2 have testifed that the appellant Chana Budhu Munda had come to their house asking for water and when P.W.2 opened the door then Chana Budhu Munda clapped his hands whereupon accused Tezwa Munda and Soma Munda entered the house. P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 have deposed that Tezwa Munda was armed with an axe and accused Soma Munda was armed with a big knife. Both the accused assaulted the husband of P.W.-2 with axe and knife. On witnessing the assault P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 ran out of the house. They have deposed that they had identified the accused persons in the light of electric bulb and the lamp (dhibari). The statement of P.Ws. 1 and 2 was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C by P.W.-7. P.W.-1 and P.W.-2's testimonies are consistent with the statement made by them under Section 164 Cr.P.C. It is abundantly clear that no material contradictions has been elicited in cross-examination of P.Ws. 1 and 2 to disbelieve their testimony. In fact the deposition of P.W.-1 and 2 is credible and reliable. 15. P.W.-1 and P.W.-2's testimonies are consistent with the statement made by them under Section 164 Cr.P.C. It is abundantly clear that no material contradictions has been elicited in cross-examination of P.Ws. 1 and 2 to disbelieve their testimony. In fact the deposition of P.W.-1 and 2 is credible and reliable. 15. P.W.1 and 2 have deposed that on the clapping of accused Chana Budhu Munda, the other accused persons entered their house, which manifestly establishes that the accused persons in a pre-planned manner and in furtherance of common intention for committing the muder of the deceased, had come to the house of P.W.-2. In this context it is relevant to enunciate the enshrined principles of constructive liability under Section 34 I.P.C. It is settled proposition that Section 34 enunciate the principle that when it is proved that the criminal act is done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, then the liability for committing the crime may be imposed on the other persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone. In Ramaswami Ayyangar v. State of Tamilnadu, (1976) 3 SCC 779 , it has been observed by the Apex Court that Section 34 is to be read along with the preceding Section 33 which makes it clear that the “act” described in Section 34 includes the series of acts as a single act. The acts committed by different confederates in the criminal action may be different but all must in one way or the other participate and engage in the criminal enterprise. Even a person not doing any particular act but only standing guard to prevent any prospective aid to the victims, may be guilty of common intention. However, in case of an offence involving physical violence it is essential, for the application of Section 34, that such accused must be physically present at the place of the actual commission of crime for the purposes of facilitating accomplishment of “criminal act” as mentioned in that section. 16. In our view, the contention of learned counsel that mode of identification of accused is not consistent to the narration made in the fardbeyan vis-a-vis the deposition of P.W. 1 and P.W.-2, is not a vital omission so as to disbelieve their testimony. 16. In our view, the contention of learned counsel that mode of identification of accused is not consistent to the narration made in the fardbeyan vis-a-vis the deposition of P.W. 1 and P.W.-2, is not a vital omission so as to disbelieve their testimony. It is settled law that every discrepancy or contradiction does not matter much in assessing the reliability and credibility of a witness or the truthfulness of their version, unless the discrepancies and contradictions are so material and substantial that it destroys the substratum of the case. It is settled proposition that for minor discrepancies and contradictions the witnesses cannot be condemned and their testimony cannot be rendered untrustworthy. The variations or improvements in the testimony of PW-1 and P.W.2 are of not much significance so as to disbelieve and discard their testimony in totality. 17. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the medical evidence i.e., the postmortem report (Ext.-1) does not corroborate the ocular evidence is not acceptable for the simple reason that it is will settled proposition that medical evidence is only an evidence of opinion and it is not conclusive. In this context it is pertinent to state that when oral evidence is found to be inconsistent with the medical opinion then the question of relying upon one or the other would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down thereof. The occular evidence, if found acceptable has to be given importance to over medical opinion. At this juncture it is pertinent to state that in Darbara Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 476 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed at page-10, as under:- “ 10 …....So far as the question of inconsistency between the medical evidence and the ocular evidence is concerned, the law is well settled that, unless the oral evidence available is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, the oral evidence would have primacy. In the event of contradictions between medical and ocular evidence, the ocular testimony of a witness will have greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence and when medical evidence makes the oral testimony improbable, the same becomes a relevant factor in the process of evaluation of such evidence. In the event of contradictions between medical and ocular evidence, the ocular testimony of a witness will have greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence and when medical evidence makes the oral testimony improbable, the same becomes a relevant factor in the process of evaluation of such evidence. It is only when the contradiction between the two is so extreme that the medical evidence completely rules out all possibilities of the ocular evidence being true at all, that the ocular evidence is liable to be disbelieved. In the case at hand it is evident that P.W.-5 the Doctor had found multiple sharp cutting injuries on the head and abdomen of the deceased. The medical evidence corroborates the testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 who have categorically testified that appellant Tejwa Munda and Soma Munda assaulted with axe and knife on the head and chest of the deceased and their testimony has remained intact. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant's contention that non-examination of Investigating Officer has prejudiced the defence is not acceptable, as the defence has not been able to elicit any material contradiction in the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.-2 to discredit their testimony. In fact, no suggestion neither attention was drawn in cross-examination of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 vis-a-vis the statement made by them under Section 161 Cr.P.C before the police and their statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Resultantly, in our considered opinion the nonexamination of Investigating Officer has not prejudiced the defence and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. In this connection it is relevant to point out that that in Bahadur Naik v. State of Bihar, (2000) 9 SCC 153 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, in para 2, as under; 2. “...The appellant has not been able to shake the credibility of the eyewitnesses. No material contradiction in the case of the prosecution has been shown to us. Under these facts and circumstances, the non-examination of the investigating officer as a witness is of no consequence. It has not been shown what prejudice has been caused to the appellant by such non-examination.” 19. The non-production of the blood-stained earth and clothes before the court and non-sending of the aforesaid materials for serological examination is due to laches and fault of the Investigating Officer. It appears that the Investigating Officer died due to which the prosecution could not examine the Investigating Officer. The non-production of the blood-stained earth and clothes before the court and non-sending of the aforesaid materials for serological examination is due to laches and fault of the Investigating Officer. It appears that the Investigating Officer died due to which the prosecution could not examine the Investigating Officer. However, it is evident from the deposition of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 that they had witnessed the killing of the deceased (the father and husband of P.W.-1) by appellants Tejwa Munda and Soma Munda who had entered the house on the clapping of appellant Chana Budhu Munda. P.W.-4 the son of the deceased has testified that when he came home then P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 disclosed to him that his father was killed by the appellants. In State of U.P. v. HarbanSahai, (1998) 6 SCC 50 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, in para 11, as under; 11 “...... The third reasoning of the High Court is that the blood-stained earth collected by the Investigating Officer from the place of occurrence was not forwarded to the Chemical Examiner to test the origin of blood. Such reasoning is too tenuous and even if such contention was advanced by the defence, the High Court need not have taken any serious heed to it. Omission to send the earth collected from the place of occurrence for chemical examination has not vitiated the investigation to any extent. We disapprove the aforesaid reasoning of the High Court.” Thus in view of the proposition, as propounded by the Supreme Court, it is abundantly clear, that P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 are natural witnesses who were present in the house at the time of commission of the crime. Their testimony is consistent regarding the sequence of events and the manner of occurrence. In view of the unimpeachable testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, non-sending of the seized materials or non-production of the forensic report cannot be the ground for disbelieving and throwing out the prosecution case. 20. Another limb of argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is that no independent witnesses have been examined to support or corroborate the testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2. Such argument cannot be countenanced, as Section 134 of Evidence Act provides that the court is required to weigh the quality of the witness and not count the quantity of witnesses. Such argument cannot be countenanced, as Section 134 of Evidence Act provides that the court is required to weigh the quality of the witness and not count the quantity of witnesses. What is important is not how many witnesses have been examined by the prosecution but what is the nature and quality of evidence adduced by the prosecution. In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150 , it has been observed, in para 16, as under; 16. “…... It is no doubt true that there is only one eyewitness who is also a close relative of the deceased viz. his son. But it is well settled that it is quality of evidence and not quantity of evidence which is material. Quantity of evidence was never considered to be a test for deciding a criminal trial and the emphasis of courts is always on quality of evidence.” In Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, in para 14, as under: 14. “….. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. … The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.” In the backdrop of the well-settled proposition of law the argument that the witnesses are related to the deceased and are partisan witnesses is palpably fallacious and stands rejected. 21. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, in our considered opinion there is no perversity in the findings of evidence on record, consequently the impugned judgment does not suffer from any illegality or impropriety meriting any interference by this Court. 22. On examination of the evidence on record it appears that no material evidence has been brought forth by the prosecution to establish the charge under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Witch (DAAIN) Practices Act 1999, resultantly the conviction of the appellants under the aforesaid Sections is hereby, set aside. 23. 22. On examination of the evidence on record it appears that no material evidence has been brought forth by the prosecution to establish the charge under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Witch (DAAIN) Practices Act 1999, resultantly the conviction of the appellants under the aforesaid Sections is hereby, set aside. 23. On consideration and examination of the evidence on record the appellants are found guilty for the offencees under Section 452 and 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, accordingly the judgment and sentence passed by the trial court, to that extent, stands affirmed. 24. In the result, these appeals are, hereby, dismissed with modification of the judgment to the extent as indicated above. Appeal dismissed.