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2020 DIGILAW 87 (KAR)

Anand And Others v. State Of Karnataka And Others

2020-01-09

H.T.NARENDRA PRASAD

body2020
JUDGMENT H.T. Narendra Prasad, J. - These writ petitions are directed against the order dated 12.09.2011 passed by the third respondent, the order dated 02.06.2014 passed by the second respondent and the order dated 26.10.2018 passed by the third respondent, whereby the authority has restored the land in favour of the legal representatives of the original grantee by exercising the power under Sections 4 and 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short, the PTCL Act). 2. The case of the petitioners is that the land bearing Sy. No. (Old No. 26) new No. 120 measuring 2 acres situated at Basavapattana Village, Jangamakote Hobli, Sidlaghatta Taluk was originally granted in favour of Guddigangappa under the Land Grant Rules and saguvali chit came to be issued on 30.11.1964. The legal representatives of the original grantee have sold one acre of land in favour of one Muninanjappa, who is the father of the petitioners in W.P. No. 40687/2019, by a registered sale deed dated 19.08.1974 and another one acre in favour of one Narasimhaiah @ Narasimhappa under a registered sale deed dated 15.07.1977. The PTCL Act came into force on 01.01.1979. The legal representatives of the original grantee have filed an application under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act for restoration of the land on 29.10.2007. The Assistant Commissioner, by order dated 12.09.2011 allowed the application and restored the land in favour of the legal representatives of the original grantee. Being aggrieved by the same petitioners in W.P. No. 40687/2019 filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner by order dated 02.06.2014 has dismissed the appeal confirming the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. Consequently, the Assistant Commissioner by order dated 26.10.2018 directed the Tahasildar to restore the land in favour of the original grantee. Being aggrieved by the same, petitioners have filed these writ petitions. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that the land in question was originally granted in favour of Guddigangappa by the Government and saguvali chit has been issued on 30.11.1964. The legal representatives of the original grantee have sold one acre each in favour of father of the petitioners in both the petitions on 19.08.1974 and 15.07.1977. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that the land in question was originally granted in favour of Guddigangappa by the Government and saguvali chit has been issued on 30.11.1964. The legal representatives of the original grantee have sold one acre each in favour of father of the petitioners in both the petitions on 19.08.1974 and 15.07.1977. The legal representatives of the original grantee have filed an application for restoration of the land on 29.10.2007, after a lapse of 33 years. There is an inordinate delay in filing the application. The application filed by the legal representatives of the original grantee itself is not maintainable. Without considering this aspect of the matter both the authorities, the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner have allowed the application filed by the legal representatives of the original grantee and Tahasildar was also directed to restore the said land in favour of the legal representatives of the original grantee. In support of their case, they have relied on the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another . Learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No. 47665/2019 submitted that the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner has ve passed the impugned orders without giving an opportunity of hearing to them. Hence, they sought for allowing the writ petition. 4. Per contra, Sri Ajay R.A., learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 and Smt. Savitramma, learned Government Pleader have contended that the land was granted in the year 1964. As on the date of the grant condition for non-alienation was for a period of 15 years. But the legal representatives of the original grantee have sold the land in favour of the fathers of the petitioners by registered sale deeds dated 19.08.1974 and 15.07.1977. Therefore, the authorities have rightly restored the land in favour of the legal representatives of the original grantee. Hence, they sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the writ papers. 6. It is not in dispute that the land in question measuring 2 acres situated at Basavapattana Village, Jangamakote Hobli, Sidlaghatta Taluk was granted to one Guddigangappa in the year 1964 and saguvali chit has been issued on 30.11.1964. Hence, they sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the writ papers. 6. It is not in dispute that the land in question measuring 2 acres situated at Basavapattana Village, Jangamakote Hobli, Sidlaghatta Taluk was granted to one Guddigangappa in the year 1964 and saguvali chit has been issued on 30.11.1964. The legal representatives of the original grantee have sold one acre each in favour of fathers of the petitioners in both the petitions on 19.08.1974 and 15.07.1977, respectively. The PTCL Act came into force with effect from 01.01.1979. The legal representatives of the original grantee have filed an application for restoration of the land under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act on 29.10.2007. There is an inordinate delay of 28 years in filing the application for invoking the provisions of the PTCL Act. The Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti (supra) has held as hereunder: '8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017 (6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa v. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa v. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda v. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors., 2000 (2) Kr.L.J. Sh. NAB holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly.' 7. In view of the above, the application filed by the legal representatives of the original grantee itself is not maintainable and the impugned orders passed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are not sustainable. 8. Accordingly, writ petitions are allowed. The impugned order dated 12.09.2011 passed by the third respondent, the order dated 02.06.2014 passed by the 2nd respondent and the order dated 26.10.2018 passed by the third respondent are hereby quashed.