JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner detenu has filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality and validity of the order of detention dated 19.03.2020 passed by the respondent authority under the provisions contained in the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Act’). The impugned order has been confirmed by the PASA Board on 28.09.2020. 2. As per the case of the petitioner, he is the resident of Daman, the Union Territory, and is running a Bar & Restaurant in the name and style of “Kamal Bar & Restaurant” at Daman. The petitioner has been granted the certificate of registration under the Central Sales Tax (Registration & Turnover) Rules, 1957 as well as the certificate of Registration under Daman & Diu Value Added Tax Regulation, 2005. The Department of Excise, Daman had also granted the licence of retail sale of foreign liquor/Indian made liquor in the year 1993, which has been renewed from time to time till this date. According to him, the impugned order of detention has been passed by respondent No. 2 on the ground that the petitioner was involved in three cases for the offence registered under the Gujarat Prohibition Act, and therefore, was a bootlegger within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the said Act and that his activities were likely to adversely affect the maintenance of the public order. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present petition has been filed. 3. It is sought to be submitted by the learned advocate Mr. Prajapati for the petitioner that apart from the fact that no offence as alleged in the three FIRs registered against the petitioner as mentioned in the impugned order has been committed by the petitioner, the provisions contained in the Gujarat Prohibition Act do not apply to the Union Territory of Daman, and therefore, also, the question of violation of the provisions contained in the Prohibition Act would not arise. In this regard, Mr. Prajapati has relied upon two unreported decisions of this Court in the case of Yogeshbhai Bhikhabhai Chaudhari versus State of Gujarat and Another in Criminal Misc. Application No. 18791 of 2014, dated 22.07.2019, and in the case of Mahendrabhai Dahayabhai (Kamli) Patel versus State of Gujarat and others in Criminal Misc. Application (For Quashing & Setting Aside FIR/Order) No. 3992 of 2013 and others, dated 25.09.2013. Application No. 18791 of 2014, dated 22.07.2019, and in the case of Mahendrabhai Dahayabhai (Kamli) Patel versus State of Gujarat and others in Criminal Misc. Application (For Quashing & Setting Aside FIR/Order) No. 3992 of 2013 and others, dated 25.09.2013. He has also pressed into service the certificates issued by the different authorities at Annexure ‘C’ collectively. 4. Learned AGP Ms. Jyoti Bhatt, however submitted that the applicant is involved in three offences under the Gujarat Prohibition Act and the coaccused had categorically stated that the muddamal liquor was purchased from the shop of the present applicant at Daman. She also submitted that since the coaccused were arrested within the territory of State of Gujarat for the violation of the provisions contained in the Prohibition Act, the present applicant being coaccused, would also be liable for the said offences. 5. At the outset, it may be stated that as transpiring from the impugned detention order, though the petitioner is allegedly involved in three cases for the offences under the Gujarat Prohibition Act, in all three cases, he was involved at the instance of the statement made by the coaccused. Even if the allegations made in the said cases are prima facie held to be true, then also the coaccused had made their respective statements to the effect that the muddamal liquor was sold by the present applicant from his Bar and Restaurant at Daman. In all three cases, similar allegations have been made and similar statements of coaccused have been recorded, relying upon which the impugned order of detention has been passed, declaring him as the “bootlegger” as defined under Section 2(b) of the said Act. The definition of “bootlegger” contained in the said provision reads as under: “2(b) “bootlegger” means the person who distills, manufacturers, stores, transports, imports, exports, sells, or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant in contravention of any provision of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and the Rules and Orders made thereunder, or of any other law for the time being in force or who knowingly expands or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel, or other conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the things described above by or through any other persons, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such thing;” 6. At this juncture, it is required to be noted that the Coordinate Bench in the case of Mahendrabhai Dahayabhai (Kamli) Patel versus State of Gujarat and others (supra) while quashing the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., in respect of the offences allegedly committed under the Gujarat Prohibition Act at Daman, had observed as under : “6. On a perusal of the allegations made in the first information reports in question, it is apparent that in all the said first information reports, the allegation against the applicant herein is that the other coaccused persons had purchased bottles of liquor from his wine shop namely, Royal Wine Shop situated at Daman. As rightly submitted by the learned advocate for the applicant, the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 would not be applicable to the Union Territory of Daman. Under the circumstances, the sale of liquor under a licence duly issued by the competent authority, viz. the Department of Excise, Daman, cannot in any manner be said to constitute an offence under the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act. Merely because the other accused persons, who, after purchasing the bottles of liquor from the applicant’s licensed wine shop at Daman had sought to bring the same within the State of Gujarat and were apprehended in Gujarat with such liquor bottles, it cannot be said that the applicant has committed any offence so as to invoke provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act. It may also be noted that it is not the case of the prosecution that the bottles of liquor had been brought within the limits of the State of Gujarat at the instance of the applicant or that he was in any manner involved in bringing the same within the State. Under the circumstances, having regard to the role attributed to the applicant in the offence in question, no offence under the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act can be said to be constituted. Therefore, arraigning the applicant for the above offences under the Bombay Prohibition Act is totally misconceived and amounts to abuse of the process of law. This is, therefore, a fit case for exercise of inherent powers under section 482 of the Code to prevent the abuse of the process of court.” 7. The said judgment has also been followed by the Coordinate Bench in Yogeshbhai Bhikhabhai Chaudhari versus State of Gujarat and Another in Criminal Misc. This is, therefore, a fit case for exercise of inherent powers under section 482 of the Code to prevent the abuse of the process of court.” 7. The said judgment has also been followed by the Coordinate Bench in Yogeshbhai Bhikhabhai Chaudhari versus State of Gujarat and Another in Criminal Misc. Application No. 18791 of 2014 (supra). 8. In view of the above and in view of the undisputed fact that the provisions contained in the Gujarat Prohibition Act are not applicable to the Union Territory of Daman, the petitioner could not be said to have committed any offence under the Prohibition Act and he could not be termed as the “bootlegger” within the meaning of section 2(b) of the said Act. Under the circumstances, no any order of detention could have been passed against the petitioner under section 3 of the said Act on the ground that the petitioner being a bootlegger was acting in the manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. 9. In that view of the matter, the impugned order of detention being thoroughly misconceived and illegal deserves to be quashed and set aside, and is hereby set aside. The petitioner – detenu is directed to be set free forthwith, if not required in any other case. 10. The petition is allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute.