ORDER : R.M.CHHAYA, J. 1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs – “(A) Your Lordships be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned communication dated 26/09/2019 as being illegal and arbitrary, and be pleased to direct the respondent to remove the name of the petitioner from the holiday list and also from the list of debarred persons; (B) Pending admission hearing and final disposal of this petition, the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to stay implementation, execution, operation and enforcement of the impugned communication dated 26/09/2019.” 2. The following facts emerge from the record of the petition – 2.1 That the petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Vadodara. The respondent Corporation floated a Tender No.HO/PJ/UNA/MECH – 01 dated 23.03.2016, subject matter of which reads as under – “FABRICATION, ERECTION, TESTING AND COMISSIONING OF MILD STEEL VERTICAL STORAGE TANKS, PETROLEUM PRODUCT & FIRE HYDRANT PIPING, CONSTRUCTION OF PLANT BUILDINGS AND ALLIED WORKS FOR THE PROPOSED GRASSROOT PETROLEUM STORAGE TERMINAL AT UNA, HIMACHAL PRADESH” 2.2 As per the record, the petitioner filled in tender and gave its bid and the respondent Corporation awarded the tender to the petitioner and accordingly issued letter of acceptance on 30.08.2016. The said acceptance culminated into a contract dated 02.09.2016 which was made at Bombay. As per the said contract, Article 4 thereof inter alia postulates that all actions and proceedings arising out of or relative to the contract shall lie only in the competent civil court at Mumbai notwithstanding any other court or courts having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of the reference. 2.3 As the record unfolds, the dispute as regards work handled by the petitioner which was followed by a show cause notice dated 20.08.2018, inter alia calling for explanation from the petitioner for the delayed execution of the work. The same was replied by the petitioner on 29.08.2018 whereby, the petitioner requested for extension of time and the respondent accordingly extended the time till 18.12.2018. Further correspondence is found on record in form of communication dated 01.01.2019 and the petitioner by further communication dated 09.01.2019. replied to the same. The same was replied by the petitioner on 29.08.2018 whereby, the petitioner requested for extension of time and the respondent accordingly extended the time till 18.12.2018. Further correspondence is found on record in form of communication dated 01.01.2019 and the petitioner by further communication dated 09.01.2019. replied to the same. It is the case of the petitioner that on 15.02.2018 (wrongly mentioned as 15.02.2019 in para 3.14), a show cause notice for holding listing of the petitioner was given by the respondent. 2.4 The same was followed by further reply given by the petitioner dated 01.03.2019 and ultimately, by the impugned communication dated 26.09.2019, the petitioner was placed in “holiday list” for a period of two years starting from 24.04.2019 to 23.09.2021. The said communication is impugned in this petition under Article 226, which has been filed by the petitioner on 22.07.2020. 3. Various grounds are raised by the petitioner in this petition and in response to the notice issued by this Court, the respondent Corporation has filed reply wherein the respondent has raised preliminary objections regarding territorial jurisdiction of this Court on the following main grounds – (1) That the Respondent Corporation through its Mumbai Registered office floated the tender. (2) The pre-bid meeting was held in Mumbai. (3) The tender was submitted in Mumbai. (4) All correspondences ensured between the petitioner and the Respondent Corporation has been addressed by the respondent Corporation’s Mumbai registered office. (5) The contract was executed between the parties at Mumbai. (6) The work to be executed by the petitioner was at Una, Himachal Pradesh. (7) That the present petition is barred by delay and laches. 4. On the aforesaid grounds, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors vs. Adani Exports Ltd and Another reported in 2002 (1) SC 567 and in the case of Alchemist Ltd and Another vs. State Bank of Sikkim and Ors. reported in 2007 (11) SCC 335 , it is contended by the respondent Corporation that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction even if the petition is weighed under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. reported in 2007 (11) SCC 335 , it is contended by the respondent Corporation that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction even if the petition is weighed under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. It is also contended that even as per the provisions of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the present petition is not maintainable before this Court since no cause of action, whole or part, has arisen in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 5. Over and above the preliminary points, it is also contended by the respondent that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands. It is contended that the petitioner earlier approached this Court by way of filing Special Civil Application No. 14138 of 2019, which was withdrawn vide order dated 16.12.2019. 6. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder and has controverted the contentions raised by the respondent. It is contended by the petitioner that the registered office of the petitioner company is at Vadodara and as per Article 6.2 of the contract, any notice, order or other communication sought to be served by the owner, i.e., respondent, on the contractor, i.e., the petitioner Company, shall be deemed to have been sufficiently served if delivered by the head or through registered post acknowledgment due to the principal office of the contractor situated Vadodara. It is therefore contended that the acceptance of the contract can be said to be at Vadodara. It is also contended that as per section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, part of cause of action has arisen in the State of Gujarat, more particularly as the registered office of the petitioner is in the State of Gujarat. 7. It is also further contended that there is no delay or laches in filing the present petition and because of the fault on the part of the respondent Corporation, the petitioner is made a scapegoat by passing the impugned order. 8. Heard Mr. Nirad D. Buch, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Munjaal Bhatt for M.R. Bhatt and Company for the respondent Corporation on the preliminary objections raised by the respondent. 9. Mr. Buch, learned advocate for the petitioner has reiterated the stand taken by the petitioner in the petition as well as rejoinder has contended that this Court has territorial jurisdiction. Mr. Munjaal Bhatt for M.R. Bhatt and Company for the respondent Corporation on the preliminary objections raised by the respondent. 9. Mr. Buch, learned advocate for the petitioner has reiterated the stand taken by the petitioner in the petition as well as rejoinder has contended that this Court has territorial jurisdiction. Mr. Buch has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Interglobe Aviation Limited vs. N. Satchidanand reported in 2011 (7) SCC 463 , more particularly, para 17 to 20 to buttress his argument. As against that, Mr. Bhatt, learned advocate for the respondent Corporation has also reiterated the stand taken in the affidavit in reply and has relied upon the judgment of the Union of India (supra) and Alchemist Ltd & Anr (supra). 10. The preliminary objections which are raised by the respondent corporation needs to be scrutinized based upon the contract in question. It is an admitted position that the Tender No.HO/PJ/UNA/MECH – 01 was invited by the respondent from its Head Office at Mumbai. As can be seen from the tender document itself, the work was to be carried out at Una in Himachal Pradesh. After the acceptance of tender, the letter of acceptance by the respondent was also issued from Mumbai. The contract dated 02.09.2016 was also entered into at Mumbai. 11. The aforesaid facts clearly establish that the tender notice was issued at Mumbai. The work to be executed was at Una in Himachal Pradesh. The contract was made at Mumbai and signed at Mumbai. Except the fact that the registered office of the petitioner is at Vadodara, on the ground of jurisdiction, no other aspect comes out from the record. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Interglobe Aviation Limited (supra). No other contention is raised to counter the preliminary objection raised by the respondent. 12. At the first blush, on reading of the petition as it is, an impression is attempted to be created that a part of the cause of action has arisen at Vadodara and therefore, this Court has territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The question therefore which has arisen in this petition is whether in view of such admitted facts, this Court has territorial jurisdiction as provided under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India or not ? 13. The question therefore which has arisen in this petition is whether in view of such admitted facts, this Court has territorial jurisdiction as provided under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India or not ? 13. To appreciate the same, it would be apt to refer to the following judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court – 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Oil Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 has observed thus: 5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause notwithstanding anything in Article 32 - and provides that every High Court shall have power "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, "within those territories" directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises Jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or impart, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ 'is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court, That is at best its case in the writ petition. 6. It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. 6. It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh' Lord Watson said: "... the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour." Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and ors (supra) has observed thus: 15. Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India which speaks of the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court reads : “226.(2)- The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 16. 16. It is clear from the above constitutional provision that a High Court can exercise the jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in-part, arises. This provision in the Constitution has come up for consideration in a number of cases before this Court. In this regard, it would suffice for us to refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors. ( 1994 4 SCC 711 at 713) wherein it was held : Under Article 226 a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. The expression cause of action means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Thus the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial. 17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least inpart, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the courts territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in Paragraph 16 of the petition, in our opinion, fall into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad. 18. As we have noticed earlier, the fact that the respondents are carrying on the business of export and import or that they are receiving the export and import orders at Ahmedabad or that their documents and payments for exports and imports are sent/made at Ahmedabad, has no connection whatsoever with the dispute that is involved in the applications. Similarly, the fact that the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports that were made from Chennai were handled by the respondents from Ahmedabad have also no connection whatsoever with the actions of the appellants impugned in the application. The non-granting and denial of credit in the pass-book having an ultimate effect, if any, on the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad would not also, in our opinion, give rise to any such cause of action to a court at Ahmedabad to adjudicate on the actions complained against the appellants. 19. Mr. Ashok Desai, however, pleaded that the respondents have executed a bank guarantee and a Bond at Ahmedabad which in law the respondents are entitled to get cancelled through the intervention of the courts at Ahmedabad. 19. Mr. Ashok Desai, however, pleaded that the respondents have executed a bank guarantee and a Bond at Ahmedabad which in law the respondents are entitled to get cancelled through the intervention of the courts at Ahmedabad. This fact having been specifically pleaded in the application and a relief being sought for that purpose, would definitely give rise to a part of cause of action at Ahmedabad, but on behalf of the appellants, it is pointed out to us that the subject-matter involved in the applications pertains to the denial of the benefit of the importexports scheme which ended w.e.f. 31.3.1997 while the bank guarantee and the Bond in question were not part of the Pass Book Scheme which is the subject-matter of the special civil applications with which we are concerned now. Execution of the bank guarantee was not with reference to the demand of the respondents to give it due credit in the pass book but the same was executed much later than 31.3.1997 in regard to certain disputes pending with the customs authorities in regard to the valuations made by the said authorities as to the value of the export and import of prawn and its inputs. It was also pointed out that these customs authorities, as a matter of fact, are not even parties to these special civil applications. Thus, it is contended that the factum of the respondents having executed a bank guarantee and a Bond at Ahmedabad will have no direct nexus or bearing on the disputes involved in these applications. It is pointed out to us by learned counsel for the appellants that in regard to the correctness of the valuation, separate proceedings have been initiated and against the findings in those proceedings, separate appeals are pending in this Court, therefore, the bank guarantee and the Bond executed by the respondents, as a matter of fact, have nothing to do with the cause of action that may arise to challenge the denial of the benefit of the Pass Book Scheme. Inclusion of this totally extraneous claim in the present writ petition cannot be construed as being a factor giving rise to a cause of action. Inclusion of this totally extraneous claim in the present writ petition cannot be construed as being a factor giving rise to a cause of action. In the case of ONGC (supra), this Court negatived the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents therein that either the acquisition of knowledge made through media at a particular place or owning and having an office or property or residing at a particular place, receiving of a fax message at a particular place, receiving telephone calls and maintaining statements of accounts of business, printing of letterheads indicating branch offices of the firm, booking of orders from a particular place are not the factors which would give rise to either wholly or in part cause of action conferring territorial jurisdiction to courts. In the said case, this Court also held that the mere service of notice is also not a fact giving rise to a cause of action unless such notice is an integral part of the cause of action. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Alchemist Ltd & Anr (supra) has observed thus: 13. In Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao, the petitioner applied to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of prohibition restraining the Election Commission, (a statutory authority constituted by the President) having its office permanently located at New Delhi, from inquiring into the alleged disqualification of the petitioner from membership of the Madras Legislative Assembly. The High Court of Madras issued a writ. The aggrieved petitioner approached this Court. Allowing the appeal and reversing the decision of the High Court, this Court held that the High Court of Madras had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Speaking for the Court, Patanjali Sastri, C.J. made the following observations: 6. The High Court of Madras issued a writ. The aggrieved petitioner approached this Court. Allowing the appeal and reversing the decision of the High Court, this Court held that the High Court of Madras had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Speaking for the Court, Patanjali Sastri, C.J. made the following observations: 6. The makers of the Constitution, having decided to provide for certain basic safeguards for the people in the new set up, which they called fundamental rights, evidently thought it necessary to provide also a quick and inexpensive remedy for the enforcement of such rights and, finding that the prerogative writs which the Courts in England had developed and used whenever urgent necessity demanded immediate and decisive interposition, were peculiarly suited for the purpose, they conferred, in the States' sphere, new and wide powers on the High Courts of issuing directions, orders, or writs primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the power to issue such directions, etc., "for any other purpose" being also included with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same position as the Court of King's Bench in England. But wide as were the powers thus conferred, a two-fold limitation was placed upon their exercise. In the first place, the power is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", that is to say, the writs issued by the court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. Secondly, the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be "within those territories", which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories". (emphasis supplied) As to the cause of action, the Court stated: 8. "The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority 'within the territories' in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction". 14. Again, a question arose in Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, A Bench of seven Judges was called upon to consider the correctness or otherwise of Saka Venkata Rao. 14. Again, a question arose in Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, A Bench of seven Judges was called upon to consider the correctness or otherwise of Saka Venkata Rao. The majority (Sinha, C.J., Kapoor, Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Shah, JJ.) reaffirmed and approved the view taken by this Court earlier in Saka Venkata Rao and held that the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir was right in not entertaining the writ petition filed by the petitioner on the ground that it had no territorial jurisdiction. Speaking for the majority, Sinha, C.J., stated: 13. "It seems to us therefore that it is not permissible to read in Article 226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction". 15. The effect of the above decisions was that no High Court other than the High Court of Punjab (before the establishment of the High Court of Delhi) had jurisdiction to issue any direction, order or writ to the Union of India, because the seat of the Government of India was located in New Delhi. Cause of action was a concept totally irrelevant and alien for conferring jurisdiction on High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. An attempt to import such concept was repelled by this Court. In the circumstances, Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and after Clause 1, new Clause (1-A) was inserted which read as under: “226. "(1-A) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories". 16. It may be stated that by the Constitution (Fortysecond Amendment) Act, 1976, Clause (1-A) was renumbered as Clause (2). 16. It may be stated that by the Constitution (Fortysecond Amendment) Act, 1976, Clause (1-A) was renumbered as Clause (2). The underlying object of amendment was expressed in the following words: "Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the only High Court which has jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226. So that when any relief is sought against any Government, authority or person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises may also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions, orders or writs". (emphasis supplied) The effect of the amendment was that the accrual of cause of action was made an additional ground to confer jurisdiction on a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. As Joint Committee observed: "This clause would enable the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Committee feel that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises in part only should also be vested with such jurisdiction". 18. The legislative history of the constitutional provisions, therefore, make it clear that after 1963, cause of action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can be instituted in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action in whole or in part arises. 17. In the decision in the case of National Textile Corp. Ltd vs. Haribox Swarlram (2004) 9 SCC 786 ) Hon’ble Apex Court considered the issue with regard to territorial jurisdiction in backdrop of the facts which are summarized in para 3 of the decision which reads thus: 3. The case set up in the writ petition is as follows. The writ petitioners had been purchasing various quantities of cloth from Finlay Mills Limited and Gold Mohur Mills Limited, both situate in Bombay. The petitioners entered into contracts specified in Annexure-A to the writ petition and made advance payment against the same. The case set up in the writ petition is as follows. The writ petitioners had been purchasing various quantities of cloth from Finlay Mills Limited and Gold Mohur Mills Limited, both situate in Bombay. The petitioners entered into contracts specified in Annexure-A to the writ petition and made advance payment against the same. The concerned mills supplied and delivered the goods to the petitioners from time to time but a substantial part of the contract remained unexecuted. By the letter dated 26.9.1993 the mills were requested to take necessary steps for immediate delivery of the goods, in respect whereof payment had already been made. The mills vide their letter dated 29.9.1993 intimated that deliveries could not be effected as the banking transaction and accounts of the mills had been frozen, but assured that arrangements were being made to deliver the goods as early as possible. The management of the mills was taken over by the Central Government on 18.10.1993 under Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance, 1983 which was subsequently replaced by Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1993 on 25.12.1993. The Central Government constituted National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Limited for the purpose of managing the textile undertakings which in turn as additional custodian took over the management of the two textile undertakings. The writ petitioners, thereafter approached the appellants for release of the goods and one bale of contractual specification was delivered but 12 bales were detained by the Excise Authorities, as a consequence whereof the same were not delivered. The National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) vide their letter dated 15.3.1984 requested the Officer on Special Duty of taken over mills including Gold Mohur Mills and Gold Mohur Mills to furnish particulars in prescribed proforma to enable it to take up the matter with the Central Government for taking action under section 11(1) of the Act for the purpose of cancelling or varying any contract or agreement entered prior to pre-take over period which action had to be taken on or before 14.4.1984. After giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. the textile mills called upon the writ petitioners to verify the pre-take over contracts and joint meetings took place for the said purpose and the matter was referred back to the Officer on Special Duty. After giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. the textile mills called upon the writ petitioners to verify the pre-take over contracts and joint meetings took place for the said purpose and the matter was referred back to the Officer on Special Duty. The writ petitioners then vide their letter dated 13.10.1984 requested the Chairman-cum- Managing Director of National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Ltd. to deliver the balance quantity of cloth in terms of the pending contracts and to adjust all sums of money which had been paid by way of advance. The appellants sent a reply on 7.11.1994 stating that (1) all the outstanding contracts had been cancelled on the date of take over as they were not binding upon them; (2) the deposits that were made with the erstwhile management were not specifically marked towards any of invoice of packed material and as such could not be adjusted against any future delivery and the writ petitioners will have to claim this amount from the erstwhile management since the custodian is prohibited from discharging any liability pertaining to pre-take over period; and (3) there were no invoices against which payments were received from the petitioners prior to take over and as such the question of effecting delivery of paid stocks did not arise. The writ petitioners made several representations and they were informed by the letter dated 4.10.1989 that the matter relating to delivery of cloth in pursuance of pre-take over contracts was under active consideration. However, no delivery was effected. The writ petition was thereafter filed in December, 1989 seeking the reliefs mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment. In backdrop the said facts, Hon’ble Apex Court considered the issue about territorial jurisdiction and observed and held that: 10. Under Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is empowered to issue writs, orders or directions to any Government, authority or person exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Cause of action as understood in the civil proceedings means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. To put it in a different way, it is bundle of facts which taken with law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. 12. In the present case, the textile mills are situate in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to be made by them ex-factory at Bombay. According to the writ petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay. The learned Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the matter held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Division Bench has reversed this finding on the ground that concluded contract had come into existence which could be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing and consequently the question of revocation of the contract at its Calcutta address would constitute a cause of action. In our opinion, the view taken by the Division Bench is wholly erroneous in law. It was nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the appellant herein had initiated any action under Section 11 of the Act by issuing any notice to the writ petitioner for cancellation of the contract. In fact, it is stated in para 18 of the petition that the Central Government did not follow the procedure prescribed in Section 11 for cancellation of contract. Regarding the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the relevant statement was made in para 73 of the writ petition wherein it was stated as under : "73. Your petitioner carries on business and maintains all accounts at the aforesaid place of business within the jurisdiction. Your petitioner states that by reason of the aforesaid, your petitioners have suffered loss and damage at its said place of business within the jurisdiction. All notices and correspondences referred to herein-above addressed to your petitioner has been received by your petitioner at your petitioner's place of business within the jurisdiction. Your petitioner states that by reason of the aforesaid, your petitioners have suffered loss and damage at its said place of business within the jurisdiction. All notices and correspondences referred to herein-above addressed to your petitioner has been received by your petitioner at your petitioner's place of business within the jurisdiction. In the circumstances this Hon'ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the present application." 12.1 As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. However, in order to avoid any further harassment to the parties and to put an end to the litigation, we would examine the matter on merits as well. 18. In the decision in case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd vs. Kalyan Banerjee [ (2008) 3 SCC 456 ] Hon'ble Apex court considered said issue in light of the fact that the respondent before Hon'ble apex Court was an employee of the Eastern Coalfields Limited and was employed at Mugma area in district of Dhanbad, Jharkhand. The General Manager of the area whose office is also situate at Mugma was his appointing and disciplinary authority. The service of the respondent came to be terminated at Mugma, Jharkhand. However he filed writ application before Calcutta High court. In the said case Hon'ble apex Court held that: 9. As regards the question as to whether situs of office of the appellant would be relevant, this Court noticed decisions of this Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal [ AIR 1976 SC 331 ] and U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. and others [ (1995) 4 SCC 738 ] to hold: "26. As regards the question as to whether situs of office of the appellant would be relevant, this Court noticed decisions of this Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal [ AIR 1976 SC 331 ] and U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. and others [ (1995) 4 SCC 738 ] to hold: "26. The view taken by this Court in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad that the situs of issue of an order or notification by the Government would come within the meaning of the expression "cases arising" in clause 14 of the (Amalgamation) Order is not a correct view of law for the reason hereafter stated and to that extent the said decision is overruled. In fact, a legislation, it is trite, is not confined to a statute enacted by Parliament or the legislature of a State, which would include delegated legislation and subordinate legislation or an executive order made by the Union of India, State or any other statutory authority. In a case where the field is not covered by any statutory rule, executive instructions issued in this behalf shall also come within the purview thereof. Situs of office of Parliament, legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof. 27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority." 12. These directions are authorities for the proposition that only that court will have jurisdiction within which, the entire cause of action had arisen. In this case, no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 13. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma Area within the State of Jharkhand, we are of the opinion that only because the Head Office of the appellant company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the Head Office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the respondent. 19. In similar fact situation, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jewel vs. Commissioner of Service Tax- I reported in 2012 (2) GLH 555 and in the case of Cube Construction Engineering Ltd vs. National High Speed Rail Corporation Ltd reported in 2019 (3) 2194, relying upon the above referred two judgment as well as catena of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that in similar fact situation, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction. 20. In view of the aforesaid binding decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, in the fact situation arising in this petition, no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because the correspondence made by respondent has been addressed to the office of the petitioner situated at Vadodara, would not attract territorial jurisdiction of this Court as no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. 21. Only because the correspondence was addressed to the petitioner at his office situated at Vadodara cannot be termed as small faction of cause of action having accrued within the jurisdiction of this High Court. Even independently examining the issue, keeping in mind section 20 of the CPC, even at the cost of repetition, it deserves to be noted that the tender notice was issued from Mumbai, the contract was made at Mumbai, the tender work was to be executed in Una at Himachal Pradesh, no ingredients as provided in section 20 of the CPC would give jurisdiction even in part within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. 22. 22. As it is often said, while examining the issue as provided under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, mere clever drafting would not give territorial jurisdiction to this Court. The reliance placed by the learned advocate for the petitioner in the case of Interglobe Aviation Limited (supra) and more particularly the reference made to paras 17 to 21 of the said judgment also does not take the case of the petitioner any further. What is to be examined in this petition is, whether this High Court has territorial jurisdiction or not and this Court is not asked to interpret clause 4 of the contract whether the exclusive jurisdiction given to the Mumbai Court is proper or not. Also it does not take the case of the petitioner any further and does not give jurisdiction to this Court. As in this case, the facts clearly reveal that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court of Interglobe Aviation Limited (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 23. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent as regards territorial jurisdiction of this Court deserves to be upheld. The petition therefore fails only on the sole ground of this Court having no territorial jurisdiction to decide the legality, validity and propriety of the impugned communication issued by respondent. It goes without saying that it would be open for the petitioner to challenge the impugned communication before the Court of competent jurisdiction. We also make it clear that as we have upheld the preliminary objection and as we have come to the conclusion that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction, this Court has not gone into the merits of the larger issue including the issue of delay raised by the respondent. The petition is therefore rejected. However, in facts of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.