ORDER : Siddhartha Varma, J. 1. Written submissions have been filed. They may be kept on record. 2. This writ petition has been filed against the award dated 20.11.2015, which was passed when an industrial dispute was raised by the Respondent no. 2 which was referred before the Labour Court, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh on 10.3.2011 with the following reference:- ^^D;k lsok;kstd }kjk vius Jfed Jh iquhr dqekj iq= LoΠtxnh'k izlkn in&csynkj dks fnukad 16-2-2005 ls dk;Z ls i`Fkd@oafpr fd;k tkuk mfpr ,oa oS|kfud gS\ ;fn ugh] rks lacf/kr Jfed D;k fgrykHk@{kfriwfrZ ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS ,oa vU; fdl fooj.kksa lfgrA 3. When the reference was answered in favour of the respondent no. 2 the instant writ petition was filed. Briefly stated the case of the respondent no. 2 before the Labour Court was that he was engaged as a Beldar by the petitioner in October, 1999, on a Daily Wage basis. However, when by an oral order with effect from 15.2.2005, the respondent no. 2 was removed from service, he had raised the industrial dispute. The ground taken in support of his case before the Labour Court was that before the termination of his service the mandatory notice under Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (herein after referred to as 'the U.P. Act') was not given to him. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the award on the following amongst other grounds:- I. The Labour Court had wrongly shifted the burden of proof, for proving as to for what time the respondent no. 2 had worked with the Employer, on the petitioner. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of this Court dated 31.7.2019 which was passed in writ petition numbered as Writ Petition No. 60572 of 2011 (M/s. Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and others) and specifically relied upon paragraphs 21 to 33 of that writ petition. II. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent no. 2 was only a daily wager at the time of his disengagement on 16.2.2005 and as such, therefore, the Labour Court was not justified in passing the award for reinstatement of the respondent no. 2. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon: 2013 (5) SCC 136 (Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan, Development Corporation and another v. Gitam Singh) and 2007 (9) SCC 353 (Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. 2. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon: 2013 (5) SCC 136 (Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan, Development Corporation and another v. Gitam Singh) and 2007 (9) SCC 353 (Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. vs. M.C. Joshi). III. An officer of the petitioner's organization had passed an order dated 26.8.2005 to the effect that the respondent no. 2 who was a daily wager had not put in 240 days in a calendar year and this order dated 26.8.2005 was not taken into account by the Labour Court. IV. The respondent no. 2 had come up with a wrong fact that his disengagement was a direct effect of the filing of a Writ Petition No. 47476 of 2005 by him which in fact was filed after the disengagement of the respondent no. 2. V. The evidence as was produced from the side of the petitioner was not considered in its right perspective. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 however, in reply, submitted that though the burden of proof was on the respondent no. 2, the moment he stepped into the witness box he had discharged his burden and, thereafter, the onus to prove as to how much the respondent no. 2 had worked with the employer had shifted on the petitioner. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon 2006 (1) SCC 106 (R.M. Yellatti v. The Assistant Executive Engineer). Since learned counsel for the petitioner specifically relied upon a certain portion of paragraph 17 of the judgment, the same is being reproduced here as under:- "17. Analyzing the above decisions of this court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case." 6. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 specifically stated that when the petitioner had produced evidence which had no relevance i.e. the attendance registers for the years 1984 to 1985 when in fact the respondent no. 2 had worked for 1999 to 2005 then it was the sacred duty of the petitioner to have produced the papers as were required to be produced as per the orders of the Labour Court. He further submitted that when the petitioner did not produce evidence as was ordered by the Labour Court then an adverse inference had to be drawn. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 further submitted that continuous service was wrongly calculated by the order dated 28.8.2005 of the officer of the petitioner, and, therefore, that order was rightly not taken into account by the Labour Court. The calculation had to be done as per Section 2(g) of the U.P. Act and not as per Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 relied upon 2003 (99) FLR 331 (M/s. U.P. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. vs. Ramanuj Yadav and Others). 8. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 also submitted that Section 2(oo)(bb) was a provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (central) which was not applicable in the State of U.P. 9. In the end, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 submitted that since work as was being done by the respondent no. 2 was of a permanent nature the finding of fact as had been arrived at by the Labour Court might not be interfered with. 10. In the end, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 submitted that since work as was being done by the respondent no. 2 was of a permanent nature the finding of fact as had been arrived at by the Labour Court might not be interfered with. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that definitely the burden of proof lay on the respondent no. 2 to prove his case. However, given the fact that the respondent no. 2 was a daily wager and that he had no access to the records of the respondent no. 2 his burden of proving his case was over the moment he entered into the witness box and stated that he had put in more that 240 days of work. However, the onus of proving the fact that the respondent no. 2 had not worked continuously for 240 days shifted to the petitioner, who, when was directed to produce the relevant papers did not do so. In fact, he had produced all irrelevant evidence which did not pertain to the period the respondent no. 2 had worked for. I also find that since the order dated 26.8.2005 was passed dehors the provisions of Section 2(g) of the U.P. Act, its finding were not binding on the Labour Court. 11. The Labour Court has found that the respondent no. 2 was doing work of a permanent nature and, therefore, it was in the fitness of things that he was ordered to be reinstated. 12. Under such circumstances, no interference is warranted in the writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.