ORDER : 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Bharatkumar Desai for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Rohan Shah for the respondent State through video conference. 2. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: “(A) YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased to issue mandamus or appropriate writ and/or direction may be kindly be granted directing the Respondents to produce before this Hon'ble court the order of Detention that may be passed by Respondent No2 and approved by the State Government against the petitioner in the interest of justice. (B) YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased to issue mandamus or appropriate writ and/or direction may be kindly be granted quashing and setting aside the order of the detention that ma be passed by The District Magistrate, Ahmedabad at – Ahmedabad (Res No-2) and approved by the State Government against the petitioner and to direct the Respondents, their agents and/or servants not be detain petitioner under Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Act in the interest of justice. (C) YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased to pending the hearing the final disposal of this petition an interim injunction may be granted restraining the Respondents, their agents and/or servant from detaining the petitioner and stay the detention order that may be passed by Respondent No-2 till the final disposal of this petition in the interest of justice. (D) YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased to pass such orders as thought fit in the interest of justice. (E) YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased to dispense with the filing of the affidavit as the facts are taken from the record of the FIR and sessions court and the petitioner is in jail.” 3. Brief facts of the case are as under: (4.1) It is the case of the petitioner that an FIR was registered against the petitioner being CR No.III-31/ 2019 dated 2nd February, 2019 with Palanpur Taluka police station on 2.2.2019 for offences under sections 65(A)(E),81,116(2) and 98(2) of the Prohibition Act. In the said FIR, the petitioner is named as the owner of the vehicle. (4.2) It is the case of the petitioner that apprehending detention order, the petitioner had preferred Special Civil Application No.13022/2019 which came to be withdrawn as not pressed by order dated 30.7.2019. In the said FIR, the petitioner is named as the owner of the vehicle. (4.2) It is the case of the petitioner that apprehending detention order, the petitioner had preferred Special Civil Application No.13022/2019 which came to be withdrawn as not pressed by order dated 30.7.2019. (4.3) It is the case of the petitioner that as per the knowledge of the petitioner, respondent authorities may pass detention order and therefore, the petitioner has preferred the present petition. 4. This Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.H.Vora) passed the following order on 13.01.2020: “1. By way of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner apprehends his detention under the provisions of Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short, the PASA Act) on account of registration of F.I.R/s. as described in para 7 of the petition. 2. According to the petitioner, except registration of the aforementioned FIR/s, no other material is available with the competent authority to detain the petitioner under the provisions of the PASA Act. 3. Upon perusal of the F.I.R/s., it appears that the petitioner apprehends his detention on account of registration of solitary offence under Prohibition Act and therefore, apprehension of the petitioner is well-founded and liberty of the petitioner is required to be protected. 4. Hence, Rule. Learned AGP waives service of rule on behalf of the respondent – State. 5. It is made clear that the petitioner is protected only in respect of the FIR/s as mentioned in the aforementioned para. The competent authority is at liberty to take suitable action against the petitioner in respect of offences, other than mentioned in the said para, if any, registered and incriminating materials found to detain the petitioner. The learned A.G.P. is directed to place on record the detention order, if any, passed against the petitioner for Court’s perusal. Direct service is permitted.” 5. Thereafter, the matter was heard on 18.09.2020, 28.09.2020, 09.10.2020 and 14.10.2020. The learned advocate Mr.Desai has placed on record copy of the order dated 08.04.2019 passed under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short “PASA”). He also placed on record the copy of order of the regular bail granted to the petitioner on 11th March, 2019. 6. Thereafter, the matter was heard on 18.09.2020, 28.09.2020, 09.10.2020 and 14.10.2020. The learned advocate Mr.Desai has placed on record copy of the order dated 08.04.2019 passed under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short “PASA”). He also placed on record the copy of order of the regular bail granted to the petitioner on 11th March, 2019. 6. Learned advocate Mr.Desai submitted that the respondent authorities have not executed the order of detention after 08.04.2019 in spite of the fact that the petitioner was available after he was granted bail on 11th March, 2019. Learned advocate Mr.Desai relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik V.s. State of Maharashtra reported in 2012(8) SCC 233 and submitted that as no serious efforts were made by the respondent authorities to apprehend the detenue and there is inordinate delay in execution of the detention order and therefore, such detention order is required to be quashed and setaside. 7. On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Rohan Shah submitted that the petitioner was absconding and therefore, the detention order could not be served upon the petitioner. 8. Having considered the submissions made by both the sides and having gone through the detention order placed on record, it appears that the detention order is passed by the respondent authority only considering the solitary offence under the Prohibition Act and, therefore, the apprehension of the petitioner is well founded. 9. Moreover, the Apex Court in case of Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik(supra) has held as under: “8) In order to consider the first contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant, it is useful to refer Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India which reads as under :- “(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” The above provision mandates that in the case of preventive detention, it is incumbent on the authority making such order to communicate to the person concerned/detenu the grounds on which the order has been made. It is also clear that after proper communication without delay, the detenu shall be afforded the earliest opportunity for making a representation against the said order. In the light of the above mandate, let us consider the first submission with reference to the various earlier decisions of this Court. (9) In P.M. Hari Kumar vs. Union of India and Others, (1995) 5 SCC 691 , which is almost similar to the case on hand, the only reason for delay in execution of the detention order was that the detenu was absconding and they could not serve the detention order on him because of his own fault. Rejecting the said contention, this Court held: “13. If the respondents were really sincere and anxious to serve the order of detention without any delay it was expected of them, in the fitness of things, to approach the High Court or, at least, the Court which initially granted the bail for its cancellation as, according to their own showing, the petitioner had violated the conditions imposed, and thereby enforce his appearance or production as the case might be. Surprisingly, however, no such steps were taken and instead thereof it is now claimed that a communication was sent to his residence which was returned undelivered. Apart from the fact that no such communication has been produced before us in support of such claim, it has not been stated that any follow-up action was taken till 381990, when Section 7 of the Act was invoked. Similarly inexplicable is the respondents' failure to insist upon the personal presence of the petitioner in the criminal case (CC No. 2 of 1993) filed at the instance of the Customs Authorities, more so when the carriage of its proceeding was with them and the order of detention was passed at their instance. Similarly inexplicable is the respondents' failure to insist upon the personal presence of the petitioner in the criminal case (CC No. 2 of 1993) filed at the instance of the Customs Authorities, more so when the carriage of its proceeding was with them and the order of detention was passed at their instance. On the contrary, he was allowed to remain absent, which necessarily raises the inference that the Customs Authorities did not oppose his prayer, much less bring to the notice of the Court about the order of detention passed against the detenu.” After finding that the respondent-authorities did not make sincere and earnest efforts and take urgent and effective steps which were available to them to serve the order of detention on the petitioner therein, this Court quashed the order of detention holding that the unusual delay in serving the order of detention has not been properly and satisfactorily explained. (10) In SMF Sultan Abdul Kader vs. Jt. Secy., to Govt. of India and Others, (1998) 8 SCC 343 , the order of detention was passed on 14.03.1996 but the detenu was detained only on 07.08.1997. After finding that no serious efforts were made by the police authorities to apprehend the detenu and the Joint Secretary himself had not made any efforts to find out from the police authorities as to why they were not able to apprehend the detenu, quashed the order of detention. (11) In A. Mohammed Farook vs. Jt. Secy. to G.O.I and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 360 , the only contention before the Court was that of delay in executing the order of detention. In that case, the detention order was passed on 25.02.1999 but the authorities have chosen to execute the detention order only on 06.04.1999 after an inordinate and unreasonable delay of nearly 40 days. In the absence of proper and acceptable reasons for the delay of 40 days in executing the detention order, this Court concluded that the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority in issuing the detention order dated 25.02.1999 gets vitiated and on this ground quashed the same. (12) It is clear that in the light of sub-section (5) of Article 22, it is incumbent on the Detaining Authority as well as the Executing Authority to serve the detention order at the earliest point of time. (12) It is clear that in the light of sub-section (5) of Article 22, it is incumbent on the Detaining Authority as well as the Executing Authority to serve the detention order at the earliest point of time. If there is any delay, it is the duty of the said authorities to afford proper explanation. (13) Now, let us consider the delay in the case on hand in serving the order of detention. Though the detention order was passed on 14.11.2006, the same was served only on 01.02.2008. Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, learned counsel appearing for the State contended that since the detenu himself was absconding, in spite of repeated attempts made by the Executing Authority, the same were not materialized. She also brought to our notice the affidavits filed by the concerned authorities explaining the efforts made in serving the order of detention. By giving details about their efforts, she pointed out that the detenu absconded after release from the prison on 11.11.2005 and actions were also taken under Sections 7(1)(b) and 7 (1)(a) of COFEPOSA and that the detenu did not comply with the same. It is pointed out from the other side that during this period, the bail order dated 11.11.2005 was not cancelled nor an attempt was made to forfeit the amount which was deposited by the detenu. When this Court posed a specific question to the learned counsel for the State about the delay, particularly, when the detenu was released on bail on 11.11.2005 and no proper steps have been taken for cancellation of the bail and forfeiture of the amount which was deposited by the detenu, it is not disputed that such recourse has not been taken. In such circumstances, the reasons stated in the affidavit filed by the Detaining and Executing Authorities that, on several occasions, their officers visited the residential address of the detenu and he could not be traced, are all unacceptable. We hold that the respondent-authorities did not make any sincere and earnest efforts in taking urgent effective steps which were available to them, particularly, when the detenu was on bail by orders of the court. We are satisfied that the unusual delay in serving the order of detention has not been properly and satisfactorily explained. We hold that the respondent-authorities did not make any sincere and earnest efforts in taking urgent effective steps which were available to them, particularly, when the detenu was on bail by orders of the court. We are satisfied that the unusual delay in serving the order of detention has not been properly and satisfactorily explained. In view of the same, we hold that the authorities have not executed the detention order promptly as required under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. (14) Now, coming to the second contention, namely, delay in passing the Detention Order, it is the claim of the appellant that there was a delay of 15 months in passing the order of detention. It is pointed out that though the DRI came to know of the incident by recording the statement of one Vijay Mehta on 03.08.2005 and the detenu was also arrested on 21.10.2005 and all the documents had also come into existence including the documents annexed with the grounds of detention, but still the authorities passed the order of detention only on 14.11.2006 after an unreasonable and inordinate delay of 15 months. It is also highlighted that during this period the detenu had not come into any adverse notice of the authorities and was also not alleged to have indulged in any similar illegal activities. Considering this, it is contended that the alleged incident has become stale and it is too remote in point of time. It is further submitted that there is no nexus or proximity between the alleged incident and the detention order. Finally, it is pointed out that the alleged incident has become irrelevant due to long lapse of time. Hence, the inordinate and unreasonable delay in passing the detention order against the detenu vitiates the detention itself. These aspects have been highlighted by this Court in several decisions. (15) In Lakshman Khatik vs. The State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 SCC 1 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while considering the detention order under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 has concluded that prompt action in such matters should be taken as soon as the incident like those which are referred to in the grounds have taken place. In the said decision, it was pointed out that all the three grounds on which the District Magistrate purports to have reached the required satisfaction are based on incidents which took place in rapid succession in the month of August, 1971. The first incident of unloading five bags of rice took place in the afternoon of August 3, 1971. The second incident took place on August 5, 1971 also in the afternoon practically at the same place as the first incident. This time also some rice was removed from the trucks carrying rice. The third incident took place in the afternoon of August 20, 1971 also at the same place. That also related to the removal of some rice from loaded trucks. In this factual scenario, this Court concluded that the District Magistrate could not have been possibly satisfied about the need for detention on March 22, 1972 having regard to the detenu’s conduct some seven months earlier. The following conclusion is very relevant. “5…..Indeed mere delay in passing a detention order is not conclusive, but we have to see the type of grounds given and consider whether such grounds could really weigh with an officer some 7 months later in coming to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the petitioner to prevent him from acting in a manner preiudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies of food-grains. It is not explained why there was such a long delay in passing the order. The District Magistrate appears almost to have passed an order of conviction and sentence for offences committed about 7 months earlier. The authorities concerned must have due regard to the object with which the order is passed, and if the object was to prevent disruption of supplies of food-grains one should think that prompt action in such matters should be taken as soon as incidents like those which are referred to in the grounds have taken place. The authorities concerned must have due regard to the object with which the order is passed, and if the object was to prevent disruption of supplies of food-grains one should think that prompt action in such matters should be taken as soon as incidents like those which are referred to in the grounds have taken place. In our opinion, the order of detention is invalid.” (16) In T.V. Abdul Rahman vs. State of Kerala and Others, (1989) 4 SCC 741 , in similar circumstance, this Court held: “10…...The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. 11. Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay between the date of order of detention and the date of securing the arrest of the detenu, such a delay would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner.” After holding so, this Court quashed the order of detention. (17) In Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar vs. S. Ramamurthi and Others, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 61, the effect of delay in passing the detention order has been considered in detail. (17) In Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar vs. S. Ramamurthi and Others, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 61, the effect of delay in passing the detention order has been considered in detail. After analyzing various earlier decisions, this Court held that delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an incident is not fatal to the detention of a person, in certain cases delay may be unavoidable and reasonable. However, what is required by law is that the delay must be satisfactorily explained by the Detaining Authority. (18) In Manju Ramesh Nahar vs. Union of India and Others, (1999) 4 SCC 116 , there was a delay of more than one year in arresting the detenu. This Court, while rejecting the vague explanation that the detenu was absconding, found that the detention order is vitiated. (19) In Adishwar Jain vs. Union of India and Another, (2006) 11 SCC 339 , this Court held that delay must be sufficiently explained. In that case, lapse of four months between proposal for detention and order of detention was not explained properly, hence, this Court quashed the detention order. (20) It is clear that if the delay is sufficiently explained, the same would not be a ground for quashing an order of detention under COFEPOSA. However, delay at both stages has to be explained and the Court is required to consider the question having regard to the overall picture. In Adishwar Jain’s case (supra), since a major part of delay remains unexplained, this Court quashed the detention order. (21) In Rajinder Arora vs. Union of India and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 796 , this Court considered the effect of passing the detention order after about ten months of the alleged illegal act. Basing reliance on the decision in T.A. Abdul Rahman (supra), the detention order was quashed on the ground of delay in passing the same. Summary: (22) It is clear that if there is unreasonable delay in execution of the detention order, the same vitiates the order of detention. In the case on hand, though the detenu was released on bail on 11.11.2005, the detention order was passed only on 14.11.2006, actually, if the detenu was absconding and was not available for the service of the detention order, the authorities could have taken steps for cancellation of the bail and for forfeiture of the amount deposited. Admittedly, no such recourse has been taken. Admittedly, no such recourse has been taken. If the respondents were really sincere and anxious to serve the order of detention without any delay, it was expected of them to approach the court concerned which granted bail for its cancellation, by pointing out that the detenu had violated the conditions imposed and thereby enforce his appearance or production as the case may be. Admittedly, no such steps were taken instead it was explained that several attempts were made to serve copy by visiting his house on many occasions. (23) Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the appellant has brought to our notice a detailed representation in the form of a petition sent to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, Detaining Authority, Fifth Floor, Mantralaya, Mumbai on 07.08.2007. It is also seen that the same has been acknowledged by them which is clear from the endorsement therein. The said representation contains the address of the detenu and his whereabouts. There is no explanation about any attempt made to verify the said address at least after 07.08.2007. We are satisfied that the reasons stated in the affidavit of the respondents explaining the delay are unacceptable and unsatisfactory. (24) In this regard, we reiterate that the Detaining Authority must explain satisfactorily the inordinate delay in executing the detention order, otherwise the subjective satisfaction gets vitiated. In the case on hand, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation explaining the delay of 14 ½ months, we are of the opinion that the detention order must stand vitiated by reason of non-execution thereof within a reasonable time. (25) We are also satisfied that no serious efforts were made by the Police Authorities to apprehend the detenu. Hence the unreasonable delay in executing the order creates a serious doubt regarding the genuineness of the Detention Authority as regards the immediate necessity of detaining the detenu in order to prevent him from carrying on the prejudicial activity referred to in the grounds of detention. We hold that the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority was not in lawful exercise of power vested in it. (26) As regards the second contention, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, the delay in passing the detention order, namely, after 15 months vitiates the detention itself. We hold that the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority was not in lawful exercise of power vested in it. (26) As regards the second contention, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, the delay in passing the detention order, namely, after 15 months vitiates the detention itself. The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Though there is no hard and fast rule and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf, however, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, it is incumbent on the part of the court to scrutinize whether the Detaining Authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a reasonable and acceptable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned. (27) It is also the duty of the court to investigate whether casual connection has been broken in the circumstance of each case. We are satisfied that in the absence of proper explanation for a period of 15 months in issuing the order of detention, the same has to be set aside. Since, we are in agreement with the contentions relating to delay in passing the Detention Order and serving the same on detenu, there is no need to go into the factual details. (28) Though Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair has raised an objection stating that the second contention, namely, delay in passing the order has not been raised before the High Court, since it goes against the constitutional mandate as provided in Article 22(5), we permitted the counsel for the appellant and also discussed the same. (29) In the light of the above discussion and conclusion, we are unable to accept the reasoning of the High Court. Consequently, we set aside the judgment dated 14.08.2008 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 455 of 2008 and quash the detention order dated 14.11.2006. Inasmuch as the detention period has already expired, no further direction is required for his release. The appeal is allowed.” 10. Consequently, we set aside the judgment dated 14.08.2008 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 455 of 2008 and quash the detention order dated 14.11.2006. Inasmuch as the detention period has already expired, no further direction is required for his release. The appeal is allowed.” 10. Considering the above dictum of law and in absence of any antecedents of the petitioner, as the detention order though passed on 08.04.2019 was not served upon the petitioner from 11th March, 2019 till the petitioner was protected by order dated 13.01.2020 by this Court, the same is required to be quashed and set aside on two grounds. Firstly, that there is inordinate delay in execution of the detention order, as the detaining authority has failed to explain satisfactorily such delay and therefore, the subjective satisfaction is vitiated. Moreover, no serious efforts were made by the respondent authorities to apprehend the detenu and therefore, unreasonable delay in executing the order creates a serious doubt regarding the genuineness of the detention. Secondly, considering the matter on merits, as the detention order is placed on record, the same is also not sustainable as the detaining authority has passed such order only on the basis of the solitary offence without there being any antecedent of the petitioner so as to attract the provisions of section 3(1) of the PASA Act. 11. At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v/s. State of West Bengal [ AIR 1970 SC 852 ], where the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been clearly laid down. The Court observed as follows : “Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof ? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 12. The distinction between "public order" and "law and order" has been carefully defined in a Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ram ManoharLohia v. State of Bihar & Others, (1966) 1 SCR 709 . In this judgment, His Lordship Hidayatullah, J. by giving various illustrations clearly defined the "public order" and "law and order". Relevant portion of the judgment reads thus: "....Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorder or only some? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(l)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances. It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State...." 13. In Darpan Kumar Sharma alias Dharban Kumar Sharma v. State of T.N. and others, reported in AIR 2003 SC 971 , the Supreme Court made the following observations: “The basis upon which the petitioner has been detained in the instant case is that he robbed on e Kumar at the point of knife a sum of Rs.1000/-. Any disorderly behaviour of a person in the public or commission of a criminal offence is bound, to some extent, affect the peace prevailing in the locality and it may also affect law and order but the same need not affect maintenance of public order. Under the definitions in the Act it is stated that the case of 'Goonda' the acts prejudicial to public order are 'when he is engaged, or is making preparations for engaging, in any of his activities as a goonda which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order'. Under the definitions in the Act it is stated that the case of 'Goonda' the acts prejudicial to public order are 'when he is engaged, or is making preparations for engaging, in any of his activities as a goonda which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order'. The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society; that a solitary assault on one individual can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act providing for preventive detention.” 14. In Siddharth @ SindhuLaxmanbhaiThorat v/s. District Magistrate, Navsari, in Letters Patent Appeal No.1020 of 2019 dated 08.05.2019, this Court has made following observations: “8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, We find that though there are powers available under section 3(1) of the Act, ordinary law of Indian Penal Code under which FIRs are registered in four offences for which punishment is prescribed in the Indian Penal Code, is sufficient and order of detention cannot be passed as a shortcut to exhaust such remedy. Ordinarily, this Court will be loath in interfering with subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. While arriving at subjective satisfaction, the detaining authority is supposed to undertake objective assessment of the material available. In this connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.2732 of 2010, dated 28.3.2011 in the case of Aartiben W/o Nandubhai Jayantibhai Sujnani vs. Commissioner of Police & others, wherein, this Court has quoted the observations made by Apex Court in the case of Pushker Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1970 SC 852 , wherein distinction is drawn between public order and law and order. The Supreme Court observed in the said judgment as under: “Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof ? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. The Supreme Court observed in the said judgment as under: “Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof ? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 9. We may further refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ArunGhosh v/s State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 98 ,wherein, the Apex Court has observed as under: “... Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act....” 10. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act....” 10. In another case of the Apex Court in the case of Ram ManoharLohia v/s State of Bihar & others (1966) 1 SCR 709 , wherein, the ApexCourt has observed as under: “...Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of disorder or only some? The answer to this serves to distinguish “public order” from “law and order” because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient or action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order re. A District Magistrate is entitled to are action under Rule 30(l)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.” 11. In the above judgments, the Apex Court distinguished the public order and law and order and advisability of invoking drastic remedy of preventive detention against citizens. Under the circumstances, in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Aartiben W/o Nandubhai Jayantibhai Sujnani vs. Commissioner of Police & others and considering the totality of circumstances, in our opinion, the detaining authority has failed to substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities of the appellant detenue adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. The order of detention, therefore, cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 15. The order of detention, therefore, cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 15. In view of above, I am inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIR/s by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2)of the Act. 16. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention No. D/MAG/1/PASA/41/2019 dated 08.04.2019 passed by the respondent – detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the concerned Court/authority by Fax or E-mail.