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2020 DIGILAW 878 (TS)

State of Telangana v. Anish Construction Co.

2020-12-22

M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO, T.AMARNATH GOUD

body2020
JUDGMENT : M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J. 1. This OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014 was filed by the State of Telangana represented by the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department, the District Collector, Medchal-Malkajgiri and the Tahsildar, Kukatpally Mandal, Medchal-Malkajgiri District, challenging the order dated 19.9.2013 in Application No. 837 of 2013 in CS No. 7 of 1958. 2. The appellants are the successors to the Government of A.P. which was respondent No. 180, District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, who was respondent No. 181 and Tahsildar, Balanagar Mandal, who was respondent No. 182 in Application No. 837 of 2013 in CS No. 7 of 1958. 3. CS No. 7 of 1958 has been filed for partition and separate possession of 'Matruka' properties of late Nawab Moin-ud-Dowlah Bahadur forming Paigah Asmajahi. 4. A preliminary decree had been passed on 6.4.1959 by the then High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the basis of a compromise under which the plaintiff-Sahebzadi Sultan Jahan Begum and Nawab Zahir Yar Jung Bahadur-1st respondent, received cash, mansions, urban properties and securities and defendant Nos. 2 to 22 were granted shares in all other suit schedule properties including the properties shown in Property Nos. 230 to 234 of Schedule 'A' annexed to the preliminary decree. Application No. 837 of 2013 and order passed therein by learned Single Judge 5. Respondents 1 and 2 filed Application No. 837 of 2013 for passing of a final decree in their favour in respect of land admeasuring Acres 92.56 cents in Survey No. 57 of Shamshiguda Village, Balanagar Mandal, Rangareddy District and for other reliefs mentioned therein. 6. By order dated 19.9.2013, the learned Single Judge allowed Application No. 837 of 2013 in CS No. 7 of 1958. 7. This order was passed in the presence of the Government Pleader for Revenue appearing for respondents 18 to 182 in Application No. 837 of 2013, whose successors are the appellants in this appeal OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014. OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014 8. This order dated 19.9.2013 of the learned Single Judge in Application No. 837 of 2013 is challenged by the appellants herein by filing OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014. OSA (SR) MP No. 1205 of 2016-application for condonation of delay in representing the OSA 9. OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014 8. This order dated 19.9.2013 of the learned Single Judge in Application No. 837 of 2013 is challenged by the appellants herein by filing OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014. OSA (SR) MP No. 1205 of 2016-application for condonation of delay in representing the OSA 9. Application OSA (SR) MP No. 1205 of 2016 was filed by the two appellants in the application OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016 for condonation of delay in representing the appeal. 10. They contended that the appeal which was filed on 17.4.2014 was returned with objections by the Registry and it was again filed on 28.4.2014, but it was not pursued in view of the bifurcation of the State since the file relating to CS No. 7 of 1958 had got mixed up with other files of other cases; segregation of files took certain time, and this resulted in delay of 886 days in re-presenting the appeal. 11. On 18.1.2017, OSA (SR) MP No. 1205 of 2016 filed for condonation of delay of 886 days in re-presenting the appeal was condoned accepting the reasons mentioned in support of the said application by the Division Bench of this Court. OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016 (IA No. 2 of 2016) the application for condonation of delay in presentation/filing of the appeal. 12. On 1.11.2016, OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016 (IA No. 2 of 2016) was filed by the appellants for condonation of delay of 182 days in filing the appeal. 13. In the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal it was stated that the order, which is challenged in the OSA (SR) had been passed on 19.9.2013 and the appeal was filed on 17.4.2014 and it could not be filed within time since during that period the State was undergoing lot of turmoil for bifurcation of the State, that the entire administrative machinery had come to a standstill, and no administrative instructions could be obtained from the Government for taking necessary action for filing the appeal in time. 14. A prayer was made in OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 182 days in filing the appeal. Counter of 2nd respondent in I.A. No. 2 of 2016: 15. 14. A prayer was made in OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 182 days in filing the appeal. Counter of 2nd respondent in I.A. No. 2 of 2016: 15. The 2nd respondent in I.A. No. 2 of 2016 filed a counter-affidavit disputing that the appeal was filed on 28.4.2014 and also that it was filed within the limitation on the basis of a carbon copy. It is contended that a Memorandum of Appeal has to be filed alongwith certified copy of the impugned judgment and in the absence of such enclosure to the memorandum of appeal, the appeal is not maintainable. 16. According to it, absence of certified copy of the judgment makes the filing of the appeal incomplete, defective and incompetent. 17. It is contended that till 7.4.2016, when application for certified copy was filed, the period of delay has to be counted; that there is a delay in filing the appeal and the affidavit of the appellants reads that the judgment copy was obtained on 20.4.2016 and the entire file was reconstructed and submitted to the Registrar, and these are all false allegations. 18. It is contended that the respondent had applied and got under Right to Information Act, 2005 on 18.12.2013 photocopy of a File No. LCI/615/2003 containing of 450 pages; that Page 84 of the said bundle (copy of which was appended to the counter-affidavit as Ex. B1) shows that the Deputy Collector of Rangareddy District had received copy of the judgment of the learned Single Judge much prior to 10.10.2013; photo copy of the judgment of the learned Single Judge was found in that file, which is filed as Ex. B2 to the counter-affidavit, and it indicates that it was received by the Office of the Deputy Collector and Tahsildar on 5.10.2013. 19. It is also stated that while dealing with the same judgment under appeal, at Page 90 of the file, the signature of the Collector and Joint Collector on the note-file is to be found, that the signature of the Collector's peshi is dated 11.10.2013 and that of the Joint Collector's peshi is dated 23.10.2013 and this disproves the version put forward in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and also representing the appeal. 20. 20. It is also stated that the OSA (SR) was filed on 16.6.2014 and thereafter it was returned and re-presented on many occasions and the conduct of the appellants established their negligence which disentitles them from seeking any condonation of delay from this Court. 21. It is also stated that the question of reconstruction of the file alleged in the affidavit filed by the appellants is also false. 22. It is stated that at Page 67 in the file/paperbook supplied under the RTI Act, there is a finding that the subject property is a private property and the same is enclosed as Ex. B3. Additional counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent 23. An additional counter-affidavit was also filed by the 2nd respondent stating that at the time of filing of the initial counter-affidavit in application OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016, the deponent on behalf of the 2nd respondent did not have complete information with regard to presentation and re-presentation of the appeal; that papers served on its Counsel did not contain the date when the Memorandum of Appeal was signed; that the 2nd respondent had applied for certified copy of the OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014 with regard to all the endorsements of the return and re-presentation; that the said OSA bears the seal of the High Court which shows that it was received on 28.4.2014, but an endorsement on 16.6.2014 reads that OSA (SR) was erroneously allotted on 28.4.2014 and that the main SR number was issued on 16.6.2014. It is contended that in the computer it is fed that this SR was filed on 16.6.2014; and on 16.6.2014 an endorsement of return was made without noting in detail the defects in presentation and the file was returned on 17.6.2014. It is stated that the file was collected by the appellants on 19.6.2014 and subsequently re-presentation was made on 1.11.2016 and also on 8.11.2016. 24. It is contended that a close scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal furnished to the 2nd respondent shows that the appellants merely filed a docket either on 28.4.2014 or 16.6.2014, that certified copy shows that the grounds of appeal was signed on 1.11.2016 and the other docket was attached to it and filed. 25. 24. It is contended that a close scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal furnished to the 2nd respondent shows that the appellants merely filed a docket either on 28.4.2014 or 16.6.2014, that certified copy shows that the grounds of appeal was signed on 1.11.2016 and the other docket was attached to it and filed. 25. It is contended that filing of mere docket does not amount to filing of appeal; what should be the contents of Memorandum of Appeal is prescribed in Order XLI Rule 1 CPC and absence of compliance with mandatory provision of Order XLI Rule 1(1) CPC is apparent; therefore, the date of presentation of the appeal by the appellants has to be taken as 1.11.2016 when the grounds of appeal was signed and not on 18.4.2014 or 28.4.2014, as is contended by the appellants or on 16.6.2014 as the computer shows. 26. It is therefore contended that the delay in presentation of the appeal is 729 days but not 182 days as is contended by the appellants, and the reasons given in the affidavit filed in support of the delay application are also not correct. 27. It is contended that the reason assigned for the delay in filing the appeal i.e., on account of the bifurcation of the State cannot be accepted; the noting on 11.10.2013 indicates that the Government had already initiated steps in the matter; and that time taken from 5.10.2013 when copy of the order was received by the 3rd respondent till 17.4.2014 remains unexplained. 28. It is also contended that the affidavit filed in support of the petition for condonation of delay cannot precede the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal; that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires the Memorandum of Appeal should be accompanied by the affidavit explaining the delay, which means that affidavit should explain the delay upto the date of filing of the appeal; that in the instant case affidavit was sworn on 29.10.2016 and the memo is signed on 1.11.2016 and these facts indicate the casual and careless approach of the deponent, who was a responsible officer, being District Collector. 29. Alongwith the additional counter-affidavit, the following documents were filed by the 2nd respondent: (i) certified copy of the docket noting dated 28.4.2014 and (ii) the system noting in the computer that appeal was filed on 16.6.2014. 29. Alongwith the additional counter-affidavit, the following documents were filed by the 2nd respondent: (i) certified copy of the docket noting dated 28.4.2014 and (ii) the system noting in the computer that appeal was filed on 16.6.2014. The events after filing of I.A. No. 2 of 2016 30. In OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016 (I.A. No. 2 of 2016), the application filed for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, time was granted to the Counsel for respondents to file counter-affidavit. The matter was then adjourned to 21.4.2017. 31. On that day, counter-affidavit was filed by the 2nd respondent on behalf of itself and 1st respondent in application OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016 and the matter was adjourned to 1.2.2017 for filing of reply. 32. Thereafter, the application OSA (SR) No. 1206 of 2016 was listed on 8.2.2017 and a report was called for from the Registrar (Judicial) as to the date on which the appeal was actually presented. 33. The Registrar (Judicial) then filed a report stating that the appeal was presented on 28.4.2014 and not on 16.6.2014. 34. Thereafter, on 17.3.2017, when the application OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016 was listed, the Special Government Pleader appearing for the appellants requested for an adjournment for filing of an appropriate application for recalculation of the delay in filing the appeal till filing of the certified copy of the impugned judgment. Application OSA MP (SR) No. 555 of 2017 (IA No. 2 of 2017) 35. Ultimately, on 4.4.2017, application OSA MP (SR) No. 555 of 2017 (renumbered as I.A. No. 2 of 2017), was filed by the appellants for condonation of delay of 913 days in filing of the appeal OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014. 36. At Para 10 of the affidavit filed alongwith the said application, it is stated that the order of the learned Single Judge was passed on 19.9.2013 and the memorandum of appeal was filed in the Registry on 18.4.2014 on the strength of a carbon copy of the impugned order, and if the same was taken into consideration, the period of delay in filing the appeal is only 182 days. 37. 37. It is stated that the Registry returned the Memorandum of Appeal with objections but they were not re-submitted after complying with the office objections in time during the period 2013 to 2014 when the State was undergoing lot of turmoil in the bifurcation of the State, that the entire administrative machinery had come to a standstill and no administrative instructions could be taken for taking necessary action in the matter. It is stated that after complying with the objections Memorandum of Appeal was resubmitted alongwith certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree on 20.4.2016. 38. It is contended that Memorandum of Appeal was filed alongwith certified copy of the order and that would meet the requirements of the law insofar as filing of the appeal within limitation is concerned. It is stated that carbon copy of the order has already been filed, and non-filing of the certified copy of the order would not make the filing of the memorandum of appeal irregular and that it was a bona fide action. 39. It is contended that Memorandum of Appeal was resubmitted on 20.4.2016 and if delay is counted from 19.9.2013 after excluding 30 days, the delay in filing the Memorandum of Appeal till 20.4.2016 would be 913 days. 40. It is contended that after bifurcation of the State there was a change in the administrative set up and change in Law-officer of the State and the files pertaining to both the States were in the process of segregation and in that process, in the case file pertaining to the State, the memorandum of appeal got mixed up with the return files pertaining to the State of A.P. and after lot of procedure, the file was traced, that too, without the enclosure that were filed alongwith the memorandum of appeal. It is submitted that the entire file was reconstructed and resubmitted and the memorandum of appeal could not be filed alongwith the certified copy of the order impugned. Counter of 2nd respondent in I.A. No. 2 of 2017 41. The 2nd respondent filed a counter-affidavit to application OSA MP (SR) No. 555 of 2017 (renumbered as I.A. No. 2 of 2017) disputing the allegations leveled in the affidavit filed in support of I.A. No. 2 of 2017 by the appellants. 42. Counter of 2nd respondent in I.A. No. 2 of 2017 41. The 2nd respondent filed a counter-affidavit to application OSA MP (SR) No. 555 of 2017 (renumbered as I.A. No. 2 of 2017) disputing the allegations leveled in the affidavit filed in support of I.A. No. 2 of 2017 by the appellants. 42. It is contended that the appellants acted in mala fide manner and though several decrees had been obtained by certain third parties with regard to land in Survey No. 52 of Shamshiguda Village including a decree in Application No. 1043 of 2011 in CS No. 7 of 1958 on 30.12.2011 {certified copy of the same was enclosed to the counter) and on the basis of the said decree, sale deed dated 6.4.2015 was also executed, the appellants did not question the said decree dated 30.12.2011 in Application No. 1043 of 2011 and have only chosen to file an appeal against the final decree passed in Application No. 837 of 2013 in CS No. 7 of 1958. 43. It is contended that certified copy of the judgment was received by the appellants on 5.10.2013 and the appellants had not explained anywhere what prevented them from filing the appeal within the period of limitation from the date of receiving the same. It is also stated that the story of reconstruction of the file set up by the appellants is a lie, because the 2nd respondent had obtained copy of the file under RTI on 8.12.2013, which had been filed alongwith the earlier counter-affidavit filed in I.A. No. 2 of 2016. 44. It is reiterated that the appellants had filed only the docket and not the grounds of appeal on 18.4.2014 and that memorandum of grounds of appeal bears date 1.11.2016; though the delay condonation application I.A. No. 2 of 2017 mentions the period of delay as 913 days, in fact the actual period of delay is 1,122 days and so the I.A. No. 2 of 2017 also has to be dismissed. Submissions of Sri J. Ramchander Rao, Addl. Advocate General appearing for the appellants in I.A. Nos. 2 of 2016 and 2 of 2017: 45. Sri J. Ramchander Rao, Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants in I.A. No. 2 of 2016 and I.A. No. 2 of 2017 contended that the reasons assigned by the appellants for condonation of delay be accepted and the delay be condoned. 46. Advocate General appearing for the appellants in I.A. Nos. 2 of 2016 and 2 of 2017: 45. Sri J. Ramchander Rao, Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants in I.A. No. 2 of 2016 and I.A. No. 2 of 2017 contended that the reasons assigned by the appellants for condonation of delay be accepted and the delay be condoned. 46. He stated that due to bifurcation of the State, steps could not be taken to file the appeal within the period of limitation prescribed by law. 47. He also contended that if the said period of delay is not condoned, grave and irreparable loss would be caused to the public interest, since the said appellants were not heard by the learned Single Judge, before passing the impugned order. Submissions of Counsel appearing for respondents in both applications: 48. Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, learned Senior Counsel appearing for 2nd respondent, Sri P. Rajashekar, learned Counsel appearing for 1st respondent and Sri P. Shiva Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 174 and 175 in I.A. No. 2 of 2016 refuted the said contentions and reiterated the stand taken by the 2nd respondent in the counter-affidavit filed by it, which was also adopted by the 1st respondent. 49. They stated categorically that the impugned order was passed on 19.9.2013 in Application No. 837 of 2013 in CS No. 7 of 1958 by the learned Single Judge in the presence of the learned Government Pleader for Revenue appeared for the predecessors of the appellants and so the State cannot set up ignorance of the passing of the order or that it was not heard before the impugned order was passed by the learned Single Judge. 50. They contended that there has been inordinate delay in filing of the OSA by the appellants, that the reasons assigned by the appellants cannot be accepted and the delay cannot be condoned. Consideration by the Court: 51. We have noted the submissions of both sides. 52. A reading of the impugned order indicates that the predecessors of the appellants i.e., the then composite State of A.P., the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, and the Tahsildar, Balanagar Mandal, i.e., respondents 180-182 in Application No. 837 of 2013, were represented before the learned Single Judge by the then Government Pleader for Revenue and the order was passed in the presence of the said Government Pleader. 53. 53. Post bifurcation of the composite State of A.P. into the State of Telangana and the residuary State of A.P. and also creation of new Districts in the State of Telangana in October, 2016, the present appellants became successors to respondents 180 to 182 in Application No. 837 of 2013. 54. The appellants could not explain why at the time when the matter was heard before the learned Single Judge, the learned Government Pleader for Revenue did not file a counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents 180 to 182 and did not make any oral submissions opposing grant of relief to respondents 1 & 2 herein i.e., passing of final decree in Application No. 837 of 2013 at the instance of the respondents 1 & 2. 55. At this point of time, the appellants cannot contended that they were not heard by the learned Single Judge before he allowed on 19.9.2013 the Application No. 837 of 2013 in CS No. 7 of 1958. 56. When the predecessors of the appellants had opportunity to oppose the said application and they did not choose to do so by either filing counter-affidavit or making oral submissions, the appellants cannot claim denial of opportunity by the learned Single Judge before he decided Application No. 837 of 2013. 57. We shall next examine as to whether the reasons assigned by the appellants for condonation of delay in filing the appeal OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014 can be accepted and the period of delay be condoned. 58. No doubt, in I.A. No. 2 of 2016 (OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016), the appellants had asserted that the period of delay is only 182 days, but in I.A. No. 2 of 2017 (OSA (SR) MP No. 555 of 2017), they now admit that the period of delay is 913 days. 59. Alongwith the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent in I.A. No. 2 of 2016, they had enclosed copies of the information furnished to the 2nd respondent under Right to Information Act, 2005 i.e., information relating to the Application No. 837 of 2013, order passed therein and in particular the events after the application was decided on 19.9.2013. 60. Ex. B1, which is enclosed to the said counter-affidavit indicates that the Deputy Collector, Rangareddy District, received copy of the judgment in Application No. 837 of 2013 on 10.10.2013; Ex. 60. Ex. B1, which is enclosed to the said counter-affidavit indicates that the Deputy Collector, Rangareddy District, received copy of the judgment in Application No. 837 of 2013 on 10.10.2013; Ex. B2 is the photo copy of the judgment in Application No. 837 of 2013, copy of which is found in the file, which shows that the Office of the Deputy Collector and Tahsildar received the copy of the judgment on 5.10.2013 itself. At Page 90 of the file, which is enclosed to the counter-affidavit, the signatures of the Collector's peshi dated 11.10.2013 and the Joint Collector's peshi dated 23.10.2013, are found. 61. In the affidavit originally filed in I.A. No. 2 of 2016 by the appellants they did not mention when the copy of the impugned order was received by them. This appears to be a deliberate omission by the appellants. 62. Having received copy of the judgment on 5.10.2013, it is incumbent on the appellants to show sufficient cause why they waited till 17.4.2014 to file the appeal, assuming for the sake of argument without conceding that the appeal was presented on 17.4.2014 (this aspect will be dealt with later). 63. There is no such explanation forthcoming and the plea that the State was undergoing lot of turmoil for bifurcation and the entire administrative machinery had come to a standstill and no administrative instructions could be obtained from the Government for taking necessary action for filing the appeal in time, cannot be accepted. 64. We may also mention that the bifurcation of the composite State of A.P. into new State of Telangana and residuary State of A.P. happened on 2.6.2014 as per the provisions of the A.P. Re-Organization Act, 2014. 65. When the copy of the judgment was received by the appellants on 5/10.10.2013, the appeal ought to have been filed by 9.11.2013 as the period of limitation for filing the original side appeal is 30 days. 66. The Supreme Court in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733 , has held that no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute "sufficient cause" for not filing the appeal earlier. 66. The Supreme Court in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733 , has held that no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute "sufficient cause" for not filing the appeal earlier. It observed that though a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal, if it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired, it was not possible to file the appeal within time. Though there may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation, which may further delay the filing of the appeal, but that limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed, must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. 67. The agitation for the separate State of Telangana had been going on from 1969 and picked up pace in 2009 and continued upto 2.6.2014. It cannot be said that for the entire period prior to 2.6.2014, there was no administration in the Composite State of A.P. at all and so administrative instructions could not be obtained from the State Government for filing the appeal in time. 68. We may also point out that under Order XLI of Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the expressions 'appeal' and 'memorandum of appeal' are used to denote two distinct things. 69. In Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) I, Sales Tax, Kanpur Range, Kanpur, AIR 1968 SC 488 , the Supreme Court pointed out this distinction and stated that in Wharton's Law Lexicon, the word 'appeal' is defined as the judicial examination of the decision by a higher Court of the decision of an inferior Court; the appeal is the judicial examination; the memorandum of appeal contains the grounds on which the judicial examination is invited; and for the purpose of limitation and for the purposes of rules of the Court, it is required that a written memorandum of appeal shall be filed. 70. When we looked at the date on which the memorandum of appeal was signed in the OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014, the date, shown is 1.11.2016, though the docket annexed to it bears the date 28.4.2014. 71. 70. When we looked at the date on which the memorandum of appeal was signed in the OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014, the date, shown is 1.11.2016, though the docket annexed to it bears the date 28.4.2014. 71. It appears that only the docket alongwith carbon copy of the judgment was presented on 28.4.2014 without the "memorandum of grounds of appeal" annexed to them. 72. Therefore, the appeal cannot be said to have been presented on 28.4.2014, merely because the docket bears the said date. It can only be taken as having been filed on 1.11.2016 and not on 17.4.2014 or 28.4.2014 because no "memorandum of grounds of appeal" was filed in the High Court on those dates. 73. According to us, for the purpose of limitation, the date of filing of "memorandum of appeal" alone can be looked into, which is 1.11.2016, and if the said date is taken, the period of delay in filing the appeal is 1,022 days. 74. We are also of the opinion that the docket enclosed to the "memorandum of grounds of appeal" bears the Court stamp dated 28.4.2014, and this was intended only to hoodwink the Court. So the appellants have not acted in a bona fide manner. 75. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by L.Rs. v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC 448 , the Supreme Court held that incorrect statement made in the application seeking condonation of delay itself is sufficient to reject the application without any further inquiry as to whether the averments made in the application reveal sufficient cause to condone the delay; and that a party taking a false stand to get rid of the bar of limitation should not be encouraged to get any premium on the falsehood on his part by condoning delay. It relied on its own judgment in Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, (1993) 1 SCC 572 . It further went on to held that the Statutes of limitation are described as 'statutes of peace' and an unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty and some kind of limitation is essential for public order. It also observed that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and laws of Limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. It also observed that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and laws of Limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. It also held that settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation for the said delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue and it would not serve public interest. 76. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Ltd. and another, (2012) 3 SCC 563 , the Supreme Court reviewed the entire case law relating to the aspect of condonation of delay when sought by the State of its instrumentalities, and observed that in the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically, merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before the Court. It observed that: "26. Inspite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with Court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with Court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact-that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government Departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government Departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay." (Emphasis supplied) 77. We may also point out that though certified copy of the judgment had been communicated to the Deputy Collector and Tahsildar on 5/10.10.2013, the respondents have not explained why the appeal was presented with a carbon copy of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 78. We may also point out that though certified copy of the judgment had been communicated to the Deputy Collector and Tahsildar on 5/10.10.2013, the respondents have not explained why the appeal was presented with a carbon copy of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 78. Having regard to the above settled legal position, we are satisfied that false averments have been made in the affidavits filed seeking condonation of delay in I.A. Nos. 2 of 2016 and 2 of 2017 by the appellants, and the reasons assigned by them for filing OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014 beyond the period of 30 days fixed for filing the said appeal cannot be accepted as amounting to "sufficient cause" within the meaning of the said term under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 79. Therefore, I.A. No. 2 of 2016 (OSA (SR) MP No. 1206 of 2016) and I.A. No. 2 of 2017 (OSA (SR) No. 555 of 2017) are both dismissed. 80. Consequently, OSA (SR) No. 3744 of 2014 is also dismissed. No order as to costs. 81. Miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.