JUDGMENT : S.Manikumar, J. Instant writ appeal is filed against the judgment in W.P.(C) No.10456 of 2020 dated 11.05.2020, by which, a learned single Judge of this Court declined to issue the orders, as sought for, and accordingly, dismissed the writ petition. Relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder: “7. I have considered the contentions advanced on either side and have gone through the pleadings and the materials placed on record. Airport Entry Permits have been denied to the petitioners on the basis of Ext.P7. Ext.P7 refers to clause 11.10 as well as clause 11.9.1 of Airport Entry Permit Guidelines. Clause 11.9 specifies that Airport Entry Permit shall not be issued, if during performances of background check, it is determined that the applicant was convicted of certain serious crimes specifically referred to in clauses 11.9.1 and 11.9.2. Clause 11.10 provides that the decision of DG, BCAS shall be final in cases where an FIR is registered and/or a case is pending before the Court in India. Clause 11.12 provides that if a person is found involved in any crime or misuse of the Airport Entry Permit, it shall be the responsibility of the sponsoring agency to communicate the same to the issuing authority immediately for cancellation. It is therefore evident that background checks are called for with regard to the issuance of Airport Entry Permits. Clause 11.9 would make it clear that permits are not to be issued where the applicants are convicted of serious crimes. Clause 11.10 provides that the decision of the DG, BCAS in respect of Airport Entry Permits will be final in cases where FIR is registered. Therefore, it is clear that where criminal cases are pending, it is for the 1st respondent to consider whether permits are to be issued or not. 8. In the instant case, it is clear that a crime is pending against the petitioners and the same has also been charge sheeted. Ext.P7 proceedings had been issued by the DG, BCAS denying Airport Entry Permits pursuant to which respondents 2 and 3 have also redeployed the petitioners by Ext.R2(b) proceedings in other departments where entry into Airport is not contemplated. The learned Standing Counsel submits that the petitioners have been put to no prejudice due to the denial of Airport Entry Permits because of the redeployment effected by Ext.R2(b). The learned Standing Counsel submits that the petitioners have been put to no prejudice due to the denial of Airport Entry Permits because of the redeployment effected by Ext.R2(b). Be that as it may, in view of the fact that the 1st respondent has issued Ext.P7 order declining the Airport Entry Permits on the ground that a serious crime is pending trial as against the petitioners, I am of the opinion that the contention that Ext.P7 as well as the counter affidavit refers only to clause 11.9.1 of Ext.R2(a) cannot come to the aid of the petitioners. Since the petitioners have already been redeployed in posts which do not require Airport entry, I am of the opinion that the petitioners cannot be said to be aggrieved by the denial of Airport Entry Permits to them. In the above view of the matter, I am not inclined to issue the orders as sought for. The writ petition fails and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.” 2. At the time of filing of the instant appeal appellants/petitioners were working as Junior Executive, Air Traffic Control, Senior Assistant, Fire Services and Senior Superintendent, Fire Services in the International Airport, Trivandrum. While they were working in the Calicut International Airport, on 10.06.2015 at 9.40 hours, there occurred a confrontation and scuffle with a CISF personnel, deputed in the Airport, and the rifle possessed by the CISF personnel accidentally fired and he succumbed. On the basis of the said incident, Exhibit-P4 F.I.R was registered by the Karipoor Police under Sections 143, 147, 148, 326, 302 r/w. Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. During the course of investigation, Section 302 was substituted by Section 304 of the IPC. 3. Appellants approached this Court and filed applications for anticipatory bail. Since it was found that no overt act has been attributed to appellants 1 and 2, they were granted anticipatory bail by a learned single Judge of this Court vide Exhibits-P5 and P6 orders dated 20.07.2015 in B.A. Nos.4005 and 3970 of 2015. The 3rd appellant was also granted bail by the learned Sessions Judge, Manjeri. 4. Appellants have further stated that after the alleged incident, appellants were transferred from Calicut Airport to Trivandrum International Airport on their requests. Since then, they have been working as such. The 3rd appellant was also granted bail by the learned Sessions Judge, Manjeri. 4. Appellants have further stated that after the alleged incident, appellants were transferred from Calicut Airport to Trivandrum International Airport on their requests. Since then, they have been working as such. Thereafter, the appellants were issued with Airport Entry Pass, periodically by the Airport Director and Chief Security Officer viz, respondents 2 and 3, for the last 5 years, without any objections. However, their renewal application was rejected by Exhibit-P7 order dated 28.04.2020, on the ground of their involvement in a criminal case. 5. Appellants have contended that denial of Airport Entry Passes to them, after 5 years of registration of the crime, cannot be justified under any circumstances, is justifiable by law. It is further contended that before or after the registration of Exhibit-P4 FIR, there were no complaints as regards the service of the appellants and AEPs were continuously issued. 6. Appellants have further stated that in Exhibits-P5 and P6 orders, a learned single Judge had categorically observed that there was no overt act attributed to them. Moreover, the appellants have an unblemished service in their whole career. Despite the fact that a crime has been registered against the appellants, they have been renewed/issued with entry passes all throughout. 7. Appellants have further stated that in a similar circumstance, another employee of the Airport, who was denied with entry permit, approached this court by filing Crl.M.C. No.8250 of 2018 and a learned single Judge, vide Exhibit-P8 order in Crl.M.A. No.2 of 2019 dated 28.01.2019, directed that registration of Crime No.81 of 2018 by the Karipur Police shall not be an embargo in considering the application of the petitioner therein for renewal of the permit for entry into the airport. 8. Appellants have further stated that a reading of Clause 11.9 of the Airport Entry Permit (AEP) Guidelines, 2019, as a whole, would indicate that denial of AEP is only when an applicant is convicted and not otherwise. This is necessarily on the jurisprudential principle that every man is presumed to be innocent unless convicted by a competent Court of Law. Assuming that the appellants are acquitted after trial, which may attain judicial finality after 5 or 10 years, their future career would be spoiled forever. 9. This is necessarily on the jurisprudential principle that every man is presumed to be innocent unless convicted by a competent Court of Law. Assuming that the appellants are acquitted after trial, which may attain judicial finality after 5 or 10 years, their future career would be spoiled forever. 9. The reliefs sought for by the appellants in the writ petition are,- “i. Call for the entire records leading to Exhibit-P7 and quash the same by issuance of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate, writs, orders or directions; ii. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writs, orders, or directions, commanding the respondents 2 and 3 viz., The Airport Director and the Chief Security Officer, Trivandrum International Airport, Trivandrum, to issue Airport Entry Passes to the petitioners, without taking into consideration the pendency of Crime No.432/2015 of the Karipoor Police Station. ” 10. Before the writ court, respondents 2 and 3 have filed a counter affidavit, wherein it was contended as under:- A) The writ petition is not maintainable either in law or on facts. Neither any statutory right nor fundamental right of the petitioners are infringed by Exhibit-P7 order of the 1st respondent. Exhibit P7 order is validly passed, as the crime for serious offences is registered and the matter is still pending adjudication. B) Petitioners were on the rolls of Calicut Airport during the incident and Crime No. 432/15, u/s 143, 147, 148, 353, 326, 304 r/w. 149 IPC was registered by the Karipur Police. Exhibits-P4 to P6 are matters on record. However, the observation of this Court that "no over act has been attributed to the petitioners" in Exhibits-P5 and P6 is not a final finding on or adjudication of their innocence. The case is still pending and final adjudication is yet to come. Petitioners cannot be allowed to take advantage of the observation of this Court in Exhibis-P5 and P6. C) The 1st petitioner was transferred from Calicut Airport to Trivandrum International Airport vide Memorandum dated 18.01.2016. The 2nd and 3rd petitioners were also transferred from Calicut Airport to Trivandrum International Airport vide Memorandum dated 23.05.2016. It is true that Temporary Airport Entry Permits (TAEPs) were issued to the petitioners for a period of 30 days duration and renewed on operational requirement. The 2nd and 3rd petitioners were also transferred from Calicut Airport to Trivandrum International Airport vide Memorandum dated 23.05.2016. It is true that Temporary Airport Entry Permits (TAEPs) were issued to the petitioners for a period of 30 days duration and renewed on operational requirement. As per Clause 11.10 of AEP Guidelines, 2019, the decision of Director General (DG), Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) shall be final in cases where an FIR is registered and/or a case is pending before the Court in India. D) In the present case, the applications submitted by petitioners for issuance of AEP were forwarded to Regional Director, BCAS, Trivandrum. The Regional Director, BCAS, Regional Office, Trivandrum vide Exhibit-P7, has informed that after perusing the file of the applicants (petitioners in the writ petition), DG, BCAS has ordered that the applicants may not be issued with AEP, since the offences come under the category of serious crime mentioned in Clause 11.9.1 of AEP Guidelines. In this case, the 1st respondent, is the authority to consider the application for AEPs. E) Exhibit-P7 letter was not issued by the 2nd respondent. But it was issued by the Regional Director, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), Regional Office, Trivandrum, validly, in tune with Exhibit-R2(a) AEP Guidelines. F) Airport Entry Permits are issued by BCAS and not by AAI. The Regional Director, BCAS, Regional Office, Trivandrum vide Exhibit-P7, has informed that after perusing the file of the petitioners, DG, BCAS has ordered that the petitioners may not be issued with any AEP, since the offences come under the category of serious crime mentioned in Clause 11.9.1 of AEP Guidelines, 2019. G) In compliance of Exhibit-P7 order dated 28.04.2020 of BCAS, Temporary Airport Entry Permits (TAEPs) of the petitioners were not renewed. The contention that there was no complaint before and after the registration of Exhibit-P4 crime is not a ground for issuance of issue Airport Entry Permits continuously. The observation that no overt acts are attributed to the petitioners in Exhibits-P5 and P6 orders of this Court is only a preliminary observation, for consideration of bail application and such observation cannot be considered as final adjudication on innocence of the petitioners. H) No details are available at the Airport Authority of India, Trivandrum. The observation that no overt acts are attributed to the petitioners in Exhibits-P5 and P6 orders of this Court is only a preliminary observation, for consideration of bail application and such observation cannot be considered as final adjudication on innocence of the petitioners. H) No details are available at the Airport Authority of India, Trivandrum. Exhibit-P8 order cannot be a justification nor it can be taken as a precedence, for issuance of AEPs to the petitioners for the reason that even going by the order, the entire criminal proceedings is under challenge before this court and the facts relating to the crime committed are not known. The said order cannot be considered similar in nature as that of the instant case. I) TAEPs were issued to the petitioners for a period of 30 days duration and renewed on operational requirement. According to Clause 11.10 of AEP Guidelines, the decision of the Director General, BCAS, shall be final, in cases where an FIR is registered and/or a case is pending before the court in India. Merely because permits were issued for the past 5 years, cannot be now considered as a justification for issuing/renewing permits continuously even now. As long as Exhibit-P7 order is in force, it is binding on respondents 2 & 3 and on the basis of that, even Temporary AEPs cannot be even issued. J) Since TAEPs, issued to the petitioners were not renewed as per letter Exhibit-P7 of BCAS, the petitioners were deployed in other departments vide office order dated 27.05.2020 [Exhibit-R2(b)], where they do not require any Airport Entry Permits for performing the duties. K) In compliance of Exhibit-P7 letter of BCAS, TAEPs issued to the petitioners were not renewed. They cannot rely on Exhibit-P8, wherein the entire criminal proceedings itself is under challenge before this Court. Crime No. 432 of 2015 is registered for the offences stated supra and the final adjudication is yet to come. The AEPs are validly rejected as per Exhibit-P7 order, which is binding on the respondents 2 and 3. Petitioners are also suitably deployed in other departments where AEPs are not required, vide Exhibit-R2(b) order, without having any adverse impact on their seniority, posts/grade and salary. Hence, the petitioners cannot have a grievance at this juncture till the adjudication of the criminal case is over. Petitioners are also suitably deployed in other departments where AEPs are not required, vide Exhibit-R2(b) order, without having any adverse impact on their seniority, posts/grade and salary. Hence, the petitioners cannot have a grievance at this juncture till the adjudication of the criminal case is over. The Exhibit-R2(b) is issued with the approval of the Central Headquarters, AAI and invoking administrative powers of the 2nd respondent. For the foregoing reasons, the 2nd respondent sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 11. After considering the submissions advanced and taking note of the materials on record, writ court, by the impugned judgment, dismissed the writ petition, as extracted above. 12. On the grounds raised, Mr. K.B. Pradeep, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that reading of Clause 11.9 of the guidelines as a whole necessarily indicate that denial of Airport Entry Permit can be made only when an applicant is convicted and not otherwise. This is necessarily on the jurisprudential principle that every man is presumed to be innocent unless convicted by a competent Court of Law. 13. The learned counsel further submitted that mere registration of a crime does not make a person liable for any penal consequences by the administrative authorities, otherwise sanctioned by law. After registration of the crime, even the police have realized that there was no intentional act on the part of any of the accused and the rifle was accidentally fired at the hands of the CISF personnel himself. It is on this sole ground that the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was later deleted from the span of investigation. It is also to be noted that while considering the applications for anticipatory bail, this Court has specifically observed that the incident happened was by accident and no overt acts have been attributed to the appellants. 14. It is also the case of the appellants that for all these five years, they have been issued with entry permits by respondents 2 and 3, and now, after the period of 5 years, on a one fine morning, the authority cannot take a different stand, as the matter is still pending trial and there is no change of circumstances, warranting a different consideration for renewal of AEP. 15. 15. Appellants have further contended that in a similar situation, when another employee of the Airport was denied entry passes, this court directed the same to be renewed, without taking into consideration, a crime was registered against that person, as evidenced by Exhibit-P8. The appellants had applied for AEP in the prescribed format, along with a declaration regarding the case, and with the approval of Airport Director, for the last 5 years. 16. Appellants have further contended that paragraph No.6 of the counter affidavit filed by respondents 2 and 3 specifically states that AEPs were issued to the appellants for a period of 30 days and renewed on operational requirement for the last 5 years, without break. There is no change of circumstances for the authorities to suddenly come to a conclusion warranting denial. There are no materials before them to take a different stand. 17. Inviting our attention to Clauses 8.3.3.5 and 8.3.3.6 of the Airport Entry Permit Guidelines, 2019 issued by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Mr. K.B. Pradeep, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that report of the AEP Committee has not been furnished to the appellants, despite a request made under the Right to Information Act, 2005. According to him, it is not even reflected in Exhibit-P7 proceedings. 18. Referring to Clause 11.9 of the guidelines, learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that there is a procedure contemplated for checking the background before issuance or denial of the permit, which, in the case on hand, has not been followed. He also submitted that Clause 11.9 of the guidelines should be read conjointly with Clause 11.10, and only in the case of conviction of offences mentioned therein, AEP can be denied, and not otherwise. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that writ court has erred in taking note of the subsequent order of posting the appellants in areas, which does not require entry into airport area and that, the writ court ought to have adverted to the correctness of the order impugned therein on its own merit, without reference to the subjective change of posting. By the subsequent order of posting the appellants to other places, their rights to continue their training are affected. For the above said reasons, he prayed for reversal of the impugned judgment 20. By the subsequent order of posting the appellants to other places, their rights to continue their training are affected. For the above said reasons, he prayed for reversal of the impugned judgment 20. Refuting to the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellants for reversal of the impugned judgment, Mr. V. Santharam, learned counsel for respondents 2 & 3, submitted that it is the prerogative of the Airports Authority of India, to take security measures. Referring to the incidents happened in Calicut International Airport, which lead to the death of a member of CISF and the registration of crime under Sections 143, 147, 148, 326, 302 r/w Section 149 IPC, he submitted that the above facts were taken note of by the Director General, BCAS, New Delhi, respondent No.1, and referred to in Exhibit-P7 order. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents 2 & 3 further submitted that in the case of FIR/crime registered and pending, the 1st respondent, who has been appraised of the report of Aerodrome Entry Permit Committee, is empowered to take appropriate decision, which, in the case on hand, taken. According to him, the offences are also serious. He further submitted that the alleged incident occurred on 10.06.2015 and within one month, having regard to the security measures, suitable orders were issued for posting the officers in places where, there is no requirement of entry into the airport. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 further submitted that the reasons assigned on the correctness of the subsequent posting orders, are facts which are introduced in the writ appeal, for the first time, and the same cannot be a ground to quash Exhibit-P7 order. For the abovesaid reasons, he prayed to sustain the impugned judgment. 23. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. 24. Exhibit-P7 letter dated 28.04.2020 sent by the Regional Director, Ministry of Civil Aviation, BCAS, Regional Office, Thiruvananthapuram, to the Airport Director, Trivandrum International Airport, the 2nd respondent, impugned in the writ petition, reads thus: “No. RD/BCAS/TRV/PAEP/2020 Date: 28.04.2020 To The Airport Director Trivandrum International Airport Trivandrum. Sir, Sub:-Rejection of AEP application by Fire Service staff of Trivandrum-Reg. 24. Exhibit-P7 letter dated 28.04.2020 sent by the Regional Director, Ministry of Civil Aviation, BCAS, Regional Office, Thiruvananthapuram, to the Airport Director, Trivandrum International Airport, the 2nd respondent, impugned in the writ petition, reads thus: “No. RD/BCAS/TRV/PAEP/2020 Date: 28.04.2020 To The Airport Director Trivandrum International Airport Trivandrum. Sir, Sub:-Rejection of AEP application by Fire Service staff of Trivandrum-Reg. With reference to the above subject, the applications for issuance of AEP for the following Fire and Rescue staff forwarded by you has been verified by this office and during scrutiny of applications, it is noticed that they are arrayed as accused in crime No.432/2015 U/s 143, 147, 332, 353, 304 r/w 149 IPC of Karipur PS, Kerala and the case is still under trail before the Hon'ble JM/I/Manjeri court. 1. Sri. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Suptd/ Rescue and Fire staff of AAI TRV 2. Sri. Jomon. M, Sr. Asst., Rescue and fire Section AAI TRV 3. Sri. Vinod Krishnan, JE /ATM dept. AAI TRV. Later the applications were put up before the AEP Committee at RD level and subjected for discussion. According to AEP guidelines 2019 point 11.10: the decision of DG, BCAS shall be final in cases where an FIR is registered and/or a case is pending before the Court in India. As such, the applications along with the notings were forwarded to DG, BCAS for further necessary action. After perusing the file of the above applicants DG, BCAS has ordered that the applicants may not be issued with AEP, since, the offences comes under the category of serious crimes mentioned in Para 11.9.1 of AEP guidelines 2019. The offences took place on the airport premises and involve snatching of pistol from CISF official and firing. The case has been chargesheeted also. As per the AEP new guidelines Para 11,9,1: Certain serious crimes, specifically possession and use of hard drugs, trafficking in bed and soft drugs, trafficking in weapons or the illegal possession of weapons, assault, extortion, acts endangering public safety including acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, sexual offences or membership of a criminal organization (in exceptional circumstances, DG, BCAS may determine that such a person has been fully rehabilitated and, therefore, no longer constitutes a risk). 11.9.2 Other relevant offences such as burglary, fencing of stolen goods, Embezzlement, fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, without restitution. 11.9.2 Other relevant offences such as burglary, fencing of stolen goods, Embezzlement, fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, without restitution. Therefore, it is instructed that no any AEP be issued to the above three employees til further orders. For information and necessary action. Sd/- Regional Director, Regional Office, Trivandrum” 25. Office order dated 27.05.2020 [Exhibit-R2(b)] issued by the Assistant General Manager (HR), Airports Authority of India, Department of Human Resources Management, to the appellants reads thus: “No.AAI/TV/Internal Trans.2020/401 Dated. 27.05.2020 OFFICE ORDER The Director General, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), Government of India, New Delhi, has ordered that the AEP may not be issued to the following officials till further order. (1) Shri Vinod C. Krishnan, JE (ATC) (2) Shri Ajith Kumar N.R., Sr. Supdt. (FS) (3) Shri M. Jomon, Sr. Asst. (FS) Consequent on the rejection of AEP applications by BCAS, the ED (Security) CHQ, New Delhi, has instructed to deploy the above officials in other departments. Accordingly, the Competent Authority has decided to attach the above officials in the following departments with immediate effect till further orders. Sl. No. Name of the Official & Designation Attached to 01 Shri Vinod C. Krishnan, Jr. Executive (ATC) Office of JGM (Finance) 02 Shri Ajith Kumar N.R, Sr. Supdt. (FS) Office of JGM (OPS)/GFS 03 Shri M. Jomon, Sr. Asst. (FS) Office of JGM (OPS)/TM They are advised to report to the HoDs of attached departments for further instructions. This issues with the approval of Airport Director. Sd/- (SANKAR MOHAN. R.) ASST. GENERAL MANAGER (HR)” 26. As per clause 5.1 of the Airport Entry Permit (AEP) Guidelines, 2019, for entry into airports/civil enclaves in India, issued by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, “Aerodrome Entry permit” means the photo identify card, smart card, or temporary permit issued by the Director General (DG), Bureau of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Civil Aviation or any person authorized by the Central Government for entry into the aerodrome or part of aerodrome. If used in conjunction with an automated access control system, permits may be equipped with electronic or other machine-readable codes to allow entry. The period of Validity of an AEW will be from minimum 31 days to maximum 02 years. Any such AEP having a validity of up to 30 days will be classified as TAEP. 27. If used in conjunction with an automated access control system, permits may be equipped with electronic or other machine-readable codes to allow entry. The period of Validity of an AEW will be from minimum 31 days to maximum 02 years. Any such AEP having a validity of up to 30 days will be classified as TAEP. 27. Clause 8.3.3.5 of the Airport Entry Permit (AEP) Guidelines, 2019 states that AEP will be approved by an Aerodrome Entry Permit Committee headed by an officer of BCAS, not below the rank of Assistant Director with following as members:- a) Chief Aerodrome Security Officer (CASO), ASG (CISF/State Police) b) Airport Director or his representative – Convenor. c) Representative from AAI (Gazetted Officer) wherever Airport Director is not from AAI. Note. Meeting of the AEP Committee will be held, at least once every month or as per the requirement of an airport. Every member shall with dissent note with specific reasons in case of disagreement. The copy of minutes of meeting along with signed copy of approval note will be digitally mailed to each member of the committee for record keeping. 28. As per Clause 8.3.3.6 of the Airport Entry Permit (AEP) Guidelines, 2019, all AEPS (inducing for more than one region and all airports) shall be issued by RD, BCAS of the region concerned, within 05 days after the receipt of BGC report and AEP Committee report. 29. Clause 8.3.3.7 of the guidelines states that RD, BCAS will initiate Police background check within 07 days. On receipt of BGC report, RD BCAS shall approve/issue AEPs within 05 days. AEP shall be issued, even if background check report is not received, within one month, which shall be subject to the reconciliation with BGC report later. One of the five government issued IDs, as mentioned in this document, is mandatory in such cases also. The BGC report shall be reconciled post issuance of AEP mandatorily within 03 months. In event of non-receipt of Police BGC of any individual within this period, the AEP issued shall be withdrawn. 30. As per Clause 8.3.3.8 of the guidelines, BCAS and Airport Director shall be authorised to issue TAEP of short duration with validity of minimum one day and maximum 30 days each. In event of non-receipt of Police BGC of any individual within this period, the AEP issued shall be withdrawn. 30. As per Clause 8.3.3.8 of the guidelines, BCAS and Airport Director shall be authorised to issue TAEP of short duration with validity of minimum one day and maximum 30 days each. The combined durations of such TAEPs in a single TAEP cycle for an individual shall not exceed 30 days (the year will be counted from the date of issuance of first TAEP). 31. Clause 11 of the Airport Entry Permit (AEP) Guidelines, 2019 deals with Background checks procedure. Let us consider, who has to consider the background of the employees. As per Clause 11.1 of the guidelines, each entity in an airport shall vouch for the valid requirement for each AEP/TAEP prior to its issuance to their employees. It is the employer's responsibility to complete adequate pre-employment checks or other inquiries, to ensure that the individual concerned does not pose a potential threat to the airport. AEPs shall not be issued without such undertaking. Authorised Signatories shall submit the application with documents directly to BCAS with a digital copy to the Airport Operator. They shall verify these documents as mentioned at the aforementioned paras of Acceptance and Verification. 32. As per Clause 11.2 of the guidelines, the Regional Directors, BCAS will examine the documents, ensure compliance of observation, if any, and send it for Police background check to the concerned Superintendent of Police/District Authority, within a week. If an Indian citizen has stayed in some foreign countries for more than one year continuously in the last five years, his background check shall also be conducted by the Central Security Agencies. 33. As per Clause 11.3 of the guidelines, RD, BCAS while issuing TAEPs up to 30 days will send reminders to Police authorities so that verification report is received within a month. AEP shall be issued to all persons requested by the entities even if background check report is not received within one month. One of the five government issued IDs as mentioned in this document is mandatory in such cases also. The background check report may be received post issuance of AEPs. If anything adverse comes in the notice, the AEP may be terminated, without assigning any reason. 34. One of the five government issued IDs as mentioned in this document is mandatory in such cases also. The background check report may be received post issuance of AEPs. If anything adverse comes in the notice, the AEP may be terminated, without assigning any reason. 34. Clause 11.9 of the guidelines states that Aerodrome Entry Permit shall not be issued if, during a performance of background check, it is determined that applicant was convicted of. 35. Clause 11.9.1 states that certain serious crimes, specifically possession and use of hard drugs, trafficking in hard and soft drugs, trafficking in weapons or the illegal possession of weapons, assault, extortion, acts endangering public safety, including acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, sexual offences or membership of a criminal organization (in exceptional circumstances, DG, BCAS may determine that such a person has been fully rehabilitated and, therefore, no longer constitutes a risk). 36. Clause 11.10 of the AEP Guidelines, 2019 states that the decision of DG, BCAS shall be final in cases where an FIR is registered and/or a case is pending before the Court in India. 37. At this juncture, it is relevant to note the background facts and the offences considered by the Director General, BCAS, New Delhi, in Exhibit-P7 order. With reference to the rejection of AEP application by Fire Service Staff of Trivandrum, the applications of the appellants herein for issuance of AEP, forwarded by the Airport Director, respondent No.2, have been verified by DG, BCAS and during scrutiny, it was noticed that appellants were arrayed as accused in Crime No.432/2015 of Karipur Police Station, Kerala, under Sections 143, 147, 332, 353, 304 r/w 149 of the India Penal Code. The offences took place in the airport premises and involve snatching of a pistol from CISF official and firing. The case has been charge-sheeted and is under trail before the learned Magistrate, Manjeri. 38. Clause 11.12 of the guidelines states that if a person is found to have involved in any crime or misused the AEP, it shall be the responsibility of the Sponsoring Agency to communicate the same to the issuing authority immediately for cancellation of his/her Aerodrome Entry Permit. Thus, if a person is involved in a crime, the sponsorship authority has to communicate the same to the issuing authority for cancellation of AEP. 39. Thus, if a person is involved in a crime, the sponsorship authority has to communicate the same to the issuing authority for cancellation of AEP. 39. Perusal of Exhibit-P7 order dated 28.04.2020 shows that after considering the applications, the AEP Committee had discussed the matter at the Regional Director level, and thereafter, sent the same to the Director General, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, respondent No.1. As per Clause 11.10 of the guidelines, as regards issue of AEP, the decision of Director General, BCAS final, in cases wherein an FIR is registered and/or a case is pending before the Court in India. 40. Though a contention has been raised that AEP can be denied, only if there is conviction of offences mentioned in Clause 11.9.1 of the guidelines and that, in the case on hand, there is only a charge sheet, the power to deny AEP in the case of conviction and pending FIR, is distinct. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that Clauses 11.9 and 11.10 of the guidelines should be read together, cannot be accepted. 41. Perusal of Exhibit-P7 order dated 28.04.2020 shows that the Director General, BCAS, respondent No.1, has considered that the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellants come under the category of serious offences, mentioned in Clause 11.9.1 of the guidelines, and it cannot be contended that the 1st respondent has exercised the power under Clause 11.9.1 of the guidelines, to deny AEP. 42. If there was any conviction, the issuing authority himself would have denied AEP and that there was no necessity to refer the matter to the 1st respondent. Inasmuch as an FIR has been registered against the appellants, in which they also have been charge-sheeted, as per Clause 11.10 of the guidelines, a decision at the hands of DG BCAS, was necessitated and thus, the matter has been forwarded to him. 43. Security of the Airport is the paramount consideration. Having regard to the gravity of the offences to which the appellants are charged, appropriate measures have to be taken by the competent authority, to decide as to whether, AEP can be issued or not. 44. Giving due consideration to the guidelines, it cannot be contended that the appellants, as a matter of right, can demand that AEP should be issued to them, dehorstheir involvement in serious offences, which occurred inside the airport. 44. Giving due consideration to the guidelines, it cannot be contended that the appellants, as a matter of right, can demand that AEP should be issued to them, dehorstheir involvement in serious offences, which occurred inside the airport. Decision of the 1st respondent, Director General, BCAS, and communicated by the 2nd respondent -Airport Director, Trivandrum International Airport, cannot be said to be arbitrary or contrary to the guidelines, warranting interference, in exercise of judicial review. On this aspect, let us consider a few decisions. “(i) The principle of “Wednesbury unreasonableness” or irrationality, classified by Lord Diplock as one of the grounds for intervention in judicial review, was lucidly summarised by Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [(1948) 1 KB 223 ; (1947) 2 All ER 680] as follows: “…the court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view of seeing whether it has taken into account matters which it ought not to take into account, or conversely, has refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which it ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that the local authority, nevertheless, have come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere.” (ii) In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [(1984) 3 All ER 935], Lord Diplock enunciated three grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review, viz. (i) illegality (ii) irrationality and (iii) procedural impropriety, as follows: “By “illegality” he means that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it, and whether he has or has not, is a justiciable question; by “irrationality” he means “Wednesbury unreasonableness”. (i) illegality (ii) irrationality and (iii) procedural impropriety, as follows: “By “illegality” he means that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it, and whether he has or has not, is a justiciable question; by “irrationality” he means “Wednesbury unreasonableness”. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided, could have arrived at it; and by “procedural impropriety” he means not only failure to observe the basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness, but also failure to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which the tribunal's jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.” (iii) In Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. [ (1990) 3 SCC 223 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: “56. The Court has neither the means nor the knowledge to re-evaluate the factual basis of the impugned orders. The Court, in exercise of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence. In the words of Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Company, 311 US 570, 85 L. ed. 358: “Nothing in the Constitution warrants a rejection of these expert conclusions. Nor, on the basis of intrinsic skills and equipment, are the federal courts qualified to set their independent judgment on such matters against that of the chosen state authorities.... When we consider the limiting conditions of litigation the adaptability of the judicial process only to issues definitely circumscribed and susceptible of being judged by the techniques and criteria within the special competence of lawyers it is clear that the Due Process Clause does not require the feel of the expert to be supplanted by an independent view of judges on the conflicting testimony and prophecies and impressions of expert witnesses.” This observation is of even greater significance in the absence of a Due Process Clause. 57. Judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy. 57. Judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy. The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to matters within the province of either. The Court does not supplant the "feel of the expert" by its own views. When the legislature acts within the sphere of its authority and delegates power to an agent, it may empower the agent to make findings of fact which are conclusive provided such findings satisfy the test of reasonableness. In all such cases, judicial inquiry is confined to the question whether the findings of fact are reasonably based on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. As stated by Jagannatha Shetty, J. in M\s. Gupta Sugar Works, (supra): “......the court does not act like a chartered accountant nor acts like an income tax officer. The court is not concerned with any individual case or any particular problem. The court only examines whether the price determined was with due regard to considerations provided by the statute. And whether extraneous matters have been excluded from determination.” (iv) In State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 714 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: “The scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of the omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law or do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court.” (v) In Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: “A person entrusted with discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his attention to matters which he is bound to consider. He must call his attention to matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules he may truly be said to be acting unreasonably. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. It is an unwritten rule of law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to be subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote.” (vi) In Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel v. Anilbhai Jayanitbhai Patel, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 200 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para 18 observed as under:— “18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. In other words, when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision. The following passage from Professor Bernard Schwartz's book Administrative Law (Third Edition) aptly echo's our thoughts on the scope of judicial review: “Reviewing courts, the cases are now insisting, may not simply renounce their responsibility by mumbling an indiscriminate litany of deference to expertise. The following passage from Professor Bernard Schwartz's book Administrative Law (Third Edition) aptly echo's our thoughts on the scope of judicial review: “Reviewing courts, the cases are now insisting, may not simply renounce their responsibility by mumbling an indiscriminate litany of deference to expertise. Due deference to the agency does not mean abdication of the duty of judicial review and rubber-stamping of agency action: [W]e must accord the agency considerable, but not too much deference; it is entitled to exercise its discretion, but only so far and no further.” Quoting Judge Leventhal from Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2 d 841 (D.C.Ci.1970), he further says as under: “…the reviewing court must intervene if it “becomes aware…that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making…” (vii) In Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 645 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:— “15. The court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above; like illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Whether action falls within any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in that regard would not be sufficient. 50. There should be judicial restraint while making judicial review in administrative matters. Where irrelevant aspects have been eschewed from consideration and no relevant aspect has been ignored and the administrative decisions have nexus with the facts on record, there is no scope for interference. The duty of the court is (a) to confine itself to the question of legality; (b) to decide whether the decision making authority exceeded its powers (c) committed an error of law (d) committed breach of the rules of natural justice and (e) reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached or (f) abused its powers. Administrative action is subject to control by judicial review in the following manner: (i) Illegality.-This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. 51. Administrative action is subject to control by judicial review in the following manner: (i) Illegality.-This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. 51. …......................................Professor De Smith in his classical work “Judicial Review of Administrative Action” 4th Edition at pages 285-287 states the legal position in his own terse language that the relevant principles formulated by the Courts may be broadly summarized as follows. The authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorized to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (I) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires.” (viii) In Bank of India v. T. Jogram reported in (2007) 7 SCC 236 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is well settled principle of law that Judicial review is not against the decision, but is against the decision making process. (ix) In Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Ors. [ (2007) 14 SCC 517 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and malafides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made 'lawfully' and not to check whether choice or decision is 'sound'. (ix) In Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Ors. [ (2007) 14 SCC 517 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and malafides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made 'lawfully' and not to check whether choice or decision is 'sound'. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold............................” (x) In State of Maharashtra v. Prakash Prahland Patil reported in (2009) 12 SCC 159 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 5 and 6, held as follows: “5. The scope for judicial review has been examined by this court in several cases. It has been consistently held that the power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the supreme lex to other organs of the State. A mere wrong decision, without anything more, in most of the cases will not be sufficient to attract the power of judicial review. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the supreme lex to other organs of the State. A mere wrong decision, without anything more, in most of the cases will not be sufficient to attract the power of judicial review. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon a court is limited to see that the authority concerned functions within its limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice. 6. The courts cannot be called upon to undertake governmental duties and functions. Courts should not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. While exercising power of judicial review the court is more concerned with the decision making process than the merit of the decision itself.” (xi) In All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar reported in (2010) 6 SCC 614 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows: “22. Judicial review conventionally is concerned with the question of jurisdiction and natural justice and the Court is not much concerned with the merits of the decision but how the decision was reached. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister of State for Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935 the (GCHQ Case) the House of Lords rationalized the grounds of judicial review and ruled that the basis of judicial review could be highlighted under three principal heads, namely, illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. Illegality as a ground of judicial review means that the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making powers and must give effect to it. Grounds such as acting ultra vires, errors of law and/or fact, onerous conditions, improper purpose, relevant and irrelevant factors, acting in bad faith, fettering discretion, unauthorized delegation, failure to act etc., fall under the heading “illegality”. Procedural impropriety may be due to the failure to comply with the mandatory procedures such as breach of natural justice, such as audi alteram partem, absence of bias, the duty to act fairly, legitimate expectations, failure to give reasons etc. 23. Procedural impropriety may be due to the failure to comply with the mandatory procedures such as breach of natural justice, such as audi alteram partem, absence of bias, the duty to act fairly, legitimate expectations, failure to give reasons etc. 23. Ground of irrationality takes in Wednesbury unreasonableness propounded in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 680, Lord Greene MR alluded to the grounds of attack which could be made against the decision, citing unreasonableness as an ‘umbrella concept’ which covers the major heads of review and pointed out that the court can interfere with a decision if it is so absurd that no reasonable decision maker would in law come to it. In GCHQ Case (supra) Lord Diplock fashioned the principle of unreasonableness and preferred to use the term irrationality as follows: “By ‘irrationality’ I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as “Wednesbury's unreasonableness”, ……. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.” 24. In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex- parte Brind, (1991) 1 AllER 720 , the House of Lords re-examined the reasonableness of the exercise of the Home Secretary's discretion to issue a notice banning the transmission of speech by representatives of the Irish Republican Army and its political party, Sinn Fein. Court ruled that the exercise of the Home Secretary's power did not amount to an unreasonable exercise of discretion despite the issue involving a denial of freedom of expression. House of Lords however, stressed that in all cases raising a human rights issue proportionality is the appropriate standard of review. 25. The House of Lords in R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2001) 2 AC 532 demonstrated how the traditional test of Wednesbury unreasonableness has moved towards the doctrine of necessity and proportionality. Lord Steyn noted that the criteria of proportionality are more precise and more sophisticated than traditional grounds of review and went on to outline three concrete differences between the two:— (1) Proportionality may require the reviewing Court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions. Lord Steyn noted that the criteria of proportionality are more precise and more sophisticated than traditional grounds of review and went on to outline three concrete differences between the two:— (1) Proportionality may require the reviewing Court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions. (2) Proportionality test may go further than the traditional grounds of review in as much as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations. (3) Even the heightened scrutiny test is not necessarily appropriate to the protection of human rights. Lord Steyn also felt most cases would be decided in the same way whatever approach is adopted, though conceded for human right cases proportionality is the appropriate test. 26. The question arose as to whether doctrine of proportionality applies only where fundamental human rights are in issue or whether it will come to provide all aspects of judicial review. Lord Steyn in R. (Alconbury Development Limited) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, (2001) 2 All ER 929 stated as follows:— “I consider that even without reference to the Human Rights Act, 1998 the time has come to recognize that this principle (proportionality) is part of English administrative law not only when Judges are dealing with Community acts but also when they are dealing with acts subject to domestic law. Trying to keep the Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate compartments seems to me to be unnecessary and confusing”. Lord Steyn was of the opinion that the difference between both the principles was in practice much less than it was sometimes suggested and whatever principle was applied the result in the case was the same. 27. Whether the proportionality will ultimately supersede the concept of reasonableness or rationality was also considered by Dyson Lord Justice in R. (Association of British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2003] QB 1397 and stated as follows:— “We have difficulty in seeing what justification there now is for retaining Wednesbury test ….. but we consider that it is not for this Court to perform burial rights. The continuing existence of the Wednesbury test has been acknowledged by House of Lords on more than one occasion. but we consider that it is not for this Court to perform burial rights. The continuing existence of the Wednesbury test has been acknowledged by House of Lords on more than one occasion. A survey of the various judgments of House of Lords, Court of Appeals, etc. would reveal for the time being both the tests continued to co-exist.” 28. Position in English Administrative Law is that both the tests that is. Wednesbury and proportionality continue to co-exist and the proportionality test is more and more applied, when there is violation of human rights, and fundamental freedom and the Wednesbury finds its presence more on the domestic law when there is violations of citizens ordinary rights. Proportionality principle has not so far replaced the Wednesbury principle and the time has not reached to say good bye to Wednesbury much less its burial. 29. In Huang case, (2007) 4 All ER 15 (HL), the House of Lords was concerned with the question whether denial of asylum infringes Article 8 (Right to Respect Family Life) of the Human Rights Act, 1998. House of Lords ruled that it was the duty of the authorities when faced with individuals who did not qualify under the rules to consider whether the refusal of asylum status was unlawful on the ground that it violated the individual's right to family life. A structured proportionality test has emerged from that decision in the context of the violation of human rights. In R (Daly) (supra) the House of Lords considered both common law and Article 8 of the convention and ruled that the policy of excluding prisoners from their cells while prison officers conducted searches, which included scrutinizing privileged legal correspondence was unlawful. 30. Both the above-mentioned cases, mainly concerned with the violation of human rights under the Human Rights Act, 1998 but demonstrated the movement away from the traditional test of Wednesbury unreasonableness towards the test of proportionality. But it is not safe to conclude that the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality. 31. 30. Both the above-mentioned cases, mainly concerned with the violation of human rights under the Human Rights Act, 1998 but demonstrated the movement away from the traditional test of Wednesbury unreasonableness towards the test of proportionality. But it is not safe to conclude that the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality. 31. Justice S.B. Sinha, as His Lordship then was, speaking for the Bench in State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava, (2006) 3 SCC 276 after referring to the judgment of the Court of appeal in Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2005) 3 All ER 435 R. v. Secretary of State of the Home Department, ex parte Daly, (2001) 3 All ER 433 (HL) opined that Wednesbury principle may not now be held to be applicable in view of the development in constitutional law and held as follows:— “24. While saying so, we are not oblivious of the fact that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality. 25. It is interesting to note that the Wednesbury principles may not now be held to be applicable in view of the development in constitutional law in this behalf. See, for example, Huang v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt. wherein referring to R. v. Secretary of State of the Home Department, ex parte Daly, it was held that in certain cases, the adjudicator may require to conduct a judicial exercise which is not merely more intrusive than Wednesbury, but involves a full-blown merit judgment, which is yet more than ex p. Daly, requires on a judicial review where the court has to decide a proportionality issue.” 32. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava case was later followed in Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Prabha D. Kanan, (2006) 11 SCC 67 . Following the above mentioned two judgments in Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2008) 2 SCC 161 , the Bench has referred to a passage in HWR Wade and CF Forsyth on Administrative Law, 9th Edition. Following the above mentioned two judgments in Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2008) 2 SCC 161 , the Bench has referred to a passage in HWR Wade and CF Forsyth on Administrative Law, 9th Edition. (2004), pages 371-372 with the caption “Goodbye to Wednesbury” and quoted from the book which reads as follows:— “The Wednesbury doctrine is now in terminal decline but the coup de grace has not yet fallen, despite calls for it from very high authorities” and opined that in some jurisdictions the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to doctrine of proportionality.” 33. Indian Airlines Ltd.'s case and Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava's case (supra) were again followed in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Hazarilal, (2008) 3 SCC 273 , and the Bench opined as follows:— “Furthermore the legal parameters of judicial review have undergone a change. Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality.”. 34. With due respect, we are unable to subscribe to that view, which is an overstatement of the English Administrative Law. 35. Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness as such has not been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality though that test is being applied more and more when violation of human rights is alleged. H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth in the 10th Edition of Administrative Law (2009), has omitted the passage quoted by this court in Jitender Kumar case and stated as follows: “Notwithstanding the apparent persuasiveness of these views the coup de grace has not yet fallen on Wednesbury unreasonableness. Where a matter falls outside the ambit of 1998 Act, the doctrine is regularly relied upon by the courts. Reports of its imminent demise are perhaps exaggerated.” (emphasis applied). 36. Wednesbury and Proportionality-Wednesbury applies to a decision which is so reprehensible in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral or ethical standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the issue to be decided could have arrived at it. Proportionality as a legal test is capable of being more precise and fastidious than a reasonableness test as well as requiring a more intrusive review of a decision made by a public authority which requires the courts to ‘assess the balance or equation’ struck by the decision maker. Proportionality as a legal test is capable of being more precise and fastidious than a reasonableness test as well as requiring a more intrusive review of a decision made by a public authority which requires the courts to ‘assess the balance or equation’ struck by the decision maker. Proportionality test in some jurisdictions is also described as the “least injurious means” or “minimal impairment” test so as to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens and to ensure a fair balance between individual rights and public interest. Suffice to say that there has been an overlapping of all these tests in its content and structure, it is difficult to compartmentalize or lay down a straight jacket formula and to say that Wednesbury has met with its death knell is too tall a statement. Let us, however, recognize the fact that the current trend seems to favour proportionality test but Wednesbury has not met with its judicial burial and a state burial, with full honours is surely not to happen in the near future. 37. Proportionality, requires the Court to judge whether action taken was really needed as well as whether it was within the range of courses of action which could reasonably be followed. Proportionality is more concerned with the aims and intention of the decision-maker and whether the decision-maker has achieved more or less the correct balance or equilibrium. Courts entrusted with the task of judicial review has to examine whether decision taken by the authority is proportionate, i.e. well balanced and harmonious, to this extent court may indulge in a merit review and if the court finds that the decision is proportionate, it seldom interferes with the decision taken and if it finds that the decision is disproportionate i.e. if the court feels that it is not well balanced or harmonious and does not stand to reason it may tend to interfere. 38. Leyland and Anthony on Textbook on Administrative Law (5th edn. OUP, 2005) at p.331 has amply put as follows: “Proportionality works on the assumption that administrative action ought not to go beyond what is necessary to achieve its desired results (in every day terms, that you should not use a sledgehammer to crack a nut) and in contrast to irrationality is often understood to bring the courts much closer to reviewing the merits of a decision”. 39. 39. Courts have to develop an indefeasible and principled approach to proportionality till that is done there will always be an overlapping between the traditional grounds of review and the principle of proportionality and the cases would continue to be decided in the same manner whichever principle is adopted. Proportionality as the word indicates has reference to variables or comparison, it enables the Court to apply the principle with various degrees of intensity and offers a potentially deeper inquiry into the reasons, projected by the decision maker.” (xii) In Union of India v. Rajasthan High Court reported in (2017) 2 SCC 599 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 13, while discussing the scope of judicial review, held as follows: “13. ……..The powers under Article 226 are wide -wide enough to reach out to injustice wherever it may originate. These powers have been construed liberally and have been applied expansively where human rights have been violated. But, the notion of injustice is relatable to justice under the law. Justice should not be made to depend upon the individual perception of a decision maker on where a balance or solution should lie. Judges are expected to apply standards which are objective and well defined by law and founded upon constitutional principle. When they do so, judges walk the path on a road well-travelled. When judicial creativity leads judges to roads less travelled, in search of justice, they have yet to remain firmly rooted in law and the Constitution. The distinction between what lies within and what lies outside the power of judicial review is necessary to preserve the sanctity of judicial power. Judicial power is respected and adhered to in a system based on the rule of law precisely for its nuanced and restrained exercise. If these restraints are not maintained the court as an institution would invite a justifiable criticism of encroaching upon a terrain on which it singularly lacks expertise and which is entrusted for governance to the legislative and executive arms of government. Judgments are enforced, above all, because of the belief which society and arms of governance of a democratic society hold in the sanctity of the judicial process. This sanctity is based on institutional prestige. Institutional authority is established over long years, by a steadfast commitment to a calibrated exercise of judicial power. Judgments are enforced, above all, because of the belief which society and arms of governance of a democratic society hold in the sanctity of the judicial process. This sanctity is based on institutional prestige. Institutional authority is established over long years, by a steadfast commitment to a calibrated exercise of judicial power. Fear of consequences is one reason why citizens obey the law as well as judicial decisions. But there are far stronger reasons why they do so and the foundation for that must be carefully preserved. That is the rationale for the principle that judicial review is confined to cases where there is a breach of law or of the Constitution.” (xiii) In Royal Medical Trust v. Union of India reported in (2017) 16 SCC 605 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the scope of judicial review, held as follows: “The principle of judicial review by the constitutional courts have been lucidly stated in many an authority of this Court. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, dealing with the concept of Judicial Review, the Court held:— “Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment proclaimed: ‘Judicial review’ is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficial power.” Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in their work Judicial Review (1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say: “If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a mere obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher judiciary of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the Law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Butcher v. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18-3-1991.” Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court's ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court's ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action.” (xiv) In Kerala State Beverages (M and M) Corporation Limited and Ors. v. P.P. Suresh and Ors. [ (2019) 9 SCC 710 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus; “26. The challenge to the order dated 07.08.2004 by which the Respondents were deprived of an opportunity of being considered for employment is on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions and Ors. v. Minister for the Civil Services, held that the interference with an administrative action could be on the grounds of 'illegality', 'irrationality' and 'procedural impropriety'. He was of the opinion that 'proportionality' could be an additional ground of review in the future. Interference with an administrative decision by applying the Wednesbury's principles is restricted only to decisions which are outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.” 28. In Om Kumar v. Union of India [ AIR 2000 SC 3689 ], this Court held as follows: “By 'proportionality', we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will see that the legislature and the administrative authority 'maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve'. The legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively or not, is for the Court. The legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively or not, is for the Court. That is what is meant by proportionality.” In this case, M. Jagannadha Rao, J. examined the development of principles of proportionality for review of administrative decision in England and in India. After referring to several judgments, it was held that the proportionality test is applied by the Court as a primary reviewing authority in cases where there is a violation of Articles 19 and 21. The proportionality test can also be applied by the Court in reviewing a decision where the challenge to administrative action is on the ground that it was discriminatory and therefore violative of Article 14. It was clarified that the principles of Wednesbury have to be followed when an administrative action is challenged as being arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In such a case, the Court would be doing a secondary review. 29. While exercising primary review, the Court is entitled to ask the State to justify the policy and whether there was an imminent need for restricting the fundamental rights of the claimants. In secondary review, the Court shows deference to the decision of the executive. 30. Proportionality involves 'balancing test' and 'necessity test'. [Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Association and Anr. (2007) 4 SCC 669 ] Whereas the balancing test permits scrutiny of excessive and onerous penalties or infringement of rights or interests and a manifest imbalance of relevant considerations, the necessity test requires infringement of human rights to be through the least restrictive alternatives. [Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1955) and Wade & Forsyth: Administrative Law (2005) (2007) 4 SCC 669 ] 31. An administrative decision can be said to be proportionate if: (a) The objective with which a decision is made to curtail fundamental rights is important; (b) The measures taken to achieve the objective have a rational connection with the objective; and (c) The means that impair the rights of individuals are no more than necessary. (xv) In Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate and Ors. [ (2019) 10 SCC 738 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: “13. (xv) In Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate and Ors. [ (2019) 10 SCC 738 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: “13. In the present case, the learned Judges of the Division Bench have arrived at a finding that such a sanction was, in fact, granted. We will examine the correctness of the said finding of fact at a subsequent stage. However, before doing that, we propose to examine the scope of the powers of the High Court of judicial review of an administrative action. Though, there are a catena of judgments of this Court on the said issue, the law laid down by this Court in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 lays down the basic principles which still hold the field. Paragraph 77 of the said judgment reads thus: “77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law? 3. Committed a breach of the Rules of natural justice? 4. Reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. Abused its powers.” Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not Rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind, (1991) 1 AC 696 , Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, 'consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention'. 14. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, 'consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention'. 14. It could thus be seen that the scope of judicial review of an administrative action is very limited. Unless the Court comes to a conclusion, that the decision maker has not understood the law correctly that regulates his decision-making power or when it is found that the decision of the decision maker is vitiated by irrationality and that too on the principle of "Wednesbury Unreasonableness" or unless it is found that there has been a procedural impropriety in the decision-making process, it would not be permissible for the High Court to interfere in the decision making process. It is also equally well settled, that it is not permissible for the Court to examine the validity of the decision but this Court can examine only the correctness of the decision-making process. 15. This Court recently in the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission v. Abdul Halim reported in [ AIR 2019 SC 4504 ] had again an occasion to consider the scope of interference under Article 226 in an administrative action. “31. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137 . If the provision of a statutory Rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari. 32. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari. 32. The sweep of power Under Article 226 may be wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a decision is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could have ever arrived at it, the same is liable to be struck down by a writ Court. If the decision cannot rationally be supported by the materials on record, the same may be regarded as perverse. 33. However, the power of the Court to examine the reasonableness of an order of the authorities does not enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of the grounds in support of a decision to examine the merits of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the decision. The test is not what the Court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the Court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken, which has led to manifest injustice. The writ Court does not interfere, because a decision is not perfect.” 23. …......As discussed hereinabove, the High Court, while exercising its powers of judicial review of administrative action, could not have interfered with the decision unless the decision suffers from the vice of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety.” 45. Contention of the appellants that earlier, they were issued with Temporary Airport Entry Permits (TAEPs) and, therefore, they have a right to be issued with a permanent AEP, cannot be countenanced for the reason that, it is only temporary. Merely because another employee involved in a crime has been issued with AEP, the appellants cannot demand AEP as a matter of right because, a discretion is conferred on the 1st respondent – Director General, to consider the nature of the offences/case pending. 46. In this context, let us consider a few decisions as to how, discretion has to be exercised. 46. In this context, let us consider a few decisions as to how, discretion has to be exercised. (i) In Suman Gupta and Others v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others [ AIR 1983 SC 1235 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while explaining as to how administrative discretion should be exercised, at paragraph No. 6, held as follows: "The exercise of all administrative power vested in public authority must be structured within a system of controls informed by both relevance and reason -relevance in relation to the object which it seeks to serve, and reason in regard to the manner in which it attempts to do so. Wherever the exercise of such power affects individual rights, there can be no greater assurance protecting is valid exercise than its governance by these twin tests. A stream of case law radiating from the now well known decision in this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [ (1978) 1 SCC 248 ] has laid down in clear terms that Article 14 of the Constitution is violated by powers and procedures which in themselves result in unfairness and arbitrariness. It must be remembered that our entire constitutional system is founded in the rule of law, and in any system so designed it is impossible to conceive of legitimate power which is arbitrary in character and travels beyond the bounds of reason.” In the above reported judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court further held as under:- "We do not doubt that in the realm of administrative power the element of discretion may properly find place, where the statute or the nature of the power intends so. But there is a well recognised distinction between an administrative power to be exercised within defined limits in the reasonable discretion of designated authority and the vesting of an absolute and uncontrolled power in such authority. But there is a well recognised distinction between an administrative power to be exercised within defined limits in the reasonable discretion of designated authority and the vesting of an absolute and uncontrolled power in such authority. One is power controlled by law countenanced by the Constitution, the other falls outside the Constitution altogether." (ii) Reiterating as to how the discretionary power has to be exercised, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sant Raj and Another v. O.P. Singla and Others [ AIR 1984 SC 1595 ], held that,- "Whenever, it is said that something has to be done, within the discretion of the authority, then that something has to be done, according to the rules of reason and justice and not according to private opinion, according to law and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular and it must be exercised within the limit to which an honest man to the discharge of his office ought to find himself. Discretion means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour, it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. (iii) In Fasih Chaudhary v. Director General, Doordarshan and Others [ AIR 1989 SC 157 and (1989) 1 SCC 89 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that exercise of discretion should be legitimate, fair and without any aversion, malice or affection. Nothing should be done which may give the impression of favouritism or nepotism. While fair play in action in such matters is an essential requirement, “free play in the joints” is also a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere as the present one. (iv) In Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and Others [AIR 1991 SCC 1902], while considering a litigation arising out of Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "Discretion is an effective tool in administration. It provides an option to the authority concerned to adopt one or the other alternative. But a better, proper and legal exercise of discretion is one where the authority examines the fact, is aware of law and then decides objectively and rationally what serves the interest better. When a statute either provides guidance or rules or regulations are framed for exercise of discretion then the action should be in accordance with it. But a better, proper and legal exercise of discretion is one where the authority examines the fact, is aware of law and then decides objectively and rationally what serves the interest better. When a statute either provides guidance or rules or regulations are framed for exercise of discretion then the action should be in accordance with it. Even where statutes are silent and only power is conferred to act in one or the other manner, the Authority cannot act whimsically or arbitrarily. It should be guided by reasonableness and fairness. The legislature never intends its authority to abuse the law or use it unfairly. Where the law requires an authority to act or decide, 'if it appears to it necessary' or if he is 'of opinion that a particular act should be done' then it is implicit that it should be done objectively, fairly and reasonably. In a democratic set up the people or community being sovereign the exercise of discretion must be guided by the inherent philosophy that the exerciser of discretion is accountable for his action. It is to be tested on anvil of rule of law and fairness or justice particularly if competing interests of members of society is involved. Decisions affecting public interest or the necessity of doing it in the light of guidance provided by the Act and rules may not require intimation to person affected yet the exercise of discretion is vitiated if the action is bereft of rationality, lacks objective and purposive approach. Public interest or general good or social betterment have no doubt priority over private or individual interest but it must not be a pretext to justify the arbitrary or illegal exercise of power. It must withstand scrutiny of the legislative standard provided by the statute itself. The authority exercising discretion must not appear to be impervious to legislative directions. The action or decision must not only be reached reasonably and intelligibly but it must be related to the purpose for which power is exercised. No one howsoever high can arrogate to himself or assume without any authorisation express or implied in law a discretion to ignore the rules and deviate from rationality by adopting a strained or distorted interpretation as it renders the action ultra virus and bad in law. No one howsoever high can arrogate to himself or assume without any authorisation express or implied in law a discretion to ignore the rules and deviate from rationality by adopting a strained or distorted interpretation as it renders the action ultra virus and bad in law. (v) In Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India and Others [ AIR 1997 SC 1483 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the discretionary power has to be exercised to advance the performance, to sub-serve for which the power exists. (vi) In Rakesh Kumar v. Sunil Kumar [ AIR 1999 SC 935 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that administrative action/quasi-judicial function is the duty of the authority to give reasons/record reasons/and it should be a speaking order. (vii) In A.P. Aggarwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [ AIR 2000 SC 205 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "The conferment of power together with a discretion which goes with it to enable proper exercise of the power and therefore it is coupled with a duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the object for which the power is conferred which undoubtedly is public interest and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual." (viii) In Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar [ AIR 2003 SC 1843 ], at paragraphs No. 13 to 15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the manner in which discretionary power has to be exercised, while discharging an administrative function. In the above judgment, the Supreme Court held that in matters relating to administrative functions, if a decision is tainted by any vulnerability as such illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety, Courts should not hesitate to interfere, if the action falls within any of the categories stated supra. "14. The present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the doctrine of immunity from judicial review to those class of cases which relate to deployment of troops, entering into international treaties etc. The distinctive features of some of these recent cases signify the willingness of the courts to assert their power to scrutinize the factual basis upon which discretionary powers have been exercised. One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is "illegality", the second "irrationality", and the third "procedural impropriety". One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is "illegality", the second "irrationality", and the third "procedural impropriety". These principles were highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (commonly known as CCSU case). If the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated. (See CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.) The effect of several decisions on the question of jurisdiction has been summed up by Grahame Aldous and John Alder in their book Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice thus: "There is a general presumption against ousting the jurisdiction of the courts so that statutory provisions which purport to exclude judicial review are construed restrictively. There are, however, certain areas of governmental activity, national security being the paradigm, which the courts regard themselves as incompetent to investigate, beyond an initial decision as to whether the Government's claim is bona fide. In this kind of non-justiciable area judicial review is not entirely excluded, but very limited. It has also been said that powers conferred by the Royal Prerogative are inherently unreviewable but since the speeches of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service this is doubtful. LORDS Diplock, Scarman and ROSKILL appeared to agree that there is no general distinction between powers, based upon whether their source is statutory or prerogative but that judicial review can be limited by the subject-matter of a particular power, in that case national security. Many prerogative powers are in fact concerned with sensitive, non-justiciable areas, for example, foreign affairs, but some are reviewable in principle, including the prerogatives relating to the civil service where national security is not involved. Another non-justiciable power is the Attorney-General's prerogative to decide whether to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the public interest." (Also see Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) 15. Another non-justiciable power is the Attorney-General's prerogative to decide whether to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the public interest." (Also see Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) 15. The court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above: like illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Whether the action falls within any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in that regard would not be sufficient. 17. Before summarizing the substance of the principles laid down therein we shall refer to the passage from the judgment of LORD GREENE in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. (KB at p. 229 : All ER pp. 682 H-683 A). It reads as follows: "It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could even dream that it lay within the powers of the authority.... In another, it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and in fact, all these things run into one another." Lord Greene also observed: (KB p. 230 : All ER p. 683 F-G) "... it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense that the court considers it to be a decision that no reasonable body can come to. It is not what the court considers unreasonable.... The effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over another." (Emphasis supplied) 18. it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense that the court considers it to be a decision that no reasonable body can come to. It is not what the court considers unreasonable.... The effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over another." (Emphasis supplied) 18. Therefore, to arrive at a decision on "reasonableness" the court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator must have been within the four corners of the law, and not one which no sensible person could have reasonably arrived at, having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the court to substitute its view.” (ix) In Union of India v. Kuldeep Singh [ AIR 2004 SC 827 : (2004) 2 SCC 590 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court while testing the correctness of the judgment rendered under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and the discretion to be exercised by the High Court, explained the principles governing the mode of exercise of the discretionary power for public functionaries as follows: "20. When anything is left to any person, judge or Magistrate to be done according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with sound discretion, and according to law. In its ordinary meaning, the word "discretion" signifies unrestrained exercise of choice or will; freedom to act according to one's own judgment; unrestrained exercise of will; the liberty or power of acting without control other than one's own judgment. But, when applied to public functionaries, it means a power or right conferred upon them by law, of acting officially in certain circumstances according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. Discretion is to discern between right and wrong; and therefore, whoever hath power to act at discretion, is bound by the rule of reason and law. 21. Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and proper. Discretion is to discern between right and wrong; and therefore, whoever hath power to act at discretion, is bound by the rule of reason and law. 21. Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and proper. It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which enables a person to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with caution; nice discernment, and judgment directed by circumspection; deliberate judgment; soundness of judgment; a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadow and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to the will and private affections of persons. 22. The word "discretion" standing single and unsupported by circumstances signifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as distinguished from folly, unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a discretion cannot be arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking. The word in itself implies vigilant circumspection and care; therefore, where the legislature concedes discretion it also imposes a heavy responsibility. "The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown. It is different in different men. It is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper and passion. In the best it is often times caprice; in the worst it is every vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is liable," said Lord Camden, L.C.J., in Hindson and Kersey (1680) 8 HOW St Tr. 57. 23. If a certain latitude or liberty is accorded by a statute or rules to a judge as distinguished from a ministerial or administrative official, in adjudicating on matters brought before him, it is judicial discretion. It limits and regulates the exercise of discretion, and prevents it from being wholly absolute, capricious, or exempt from review." (x) In State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjeev, [ AIR 2005 SC 2080 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court explaining the scope of judicial review of executive action has held as follows: "15. One of the points that falls for determination is the scope for judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to be referable to broad area of governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial nature. One of the points that falls for determination is the scope for judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to be referable to broad area of governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial nature. It is trite law that exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside, if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary (see State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co.). At one time, the traditional view in England was that the executive was not answerable where its action was attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor de Smith in his classical work Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn. at pp. 285-87 states the legal position in his own terse language that the relevant principles formulated by the courts may be broadly summarised as follows: “The authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. (xi) While testing the validity of Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Procedure, terms and conditions for grant of trading licence and other related matters) (Amendment) Regulations, 2006, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Global Energy Limited and Another v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, [ AIR 2009 SC 3194 : (2009) 15 SCC 570 ], started the judgment with an epilogue and it reads as follows: “Epilogue “71. The law sometimes can be written in such subjective manner that it affects efficiency and transparent function of the Government. If the statute provides for pointless discretion to agency, it is in essence demolishing the accountability strand within the administrative process as the agency is not under obligation from an objective norm, which can enforce accountability in decision-making process. All law-making, be it in the context of delegated legislation or primary legislation, have to conform to the fundamental tenets of transparency and openness on one hand and responsiveness and accountability on the other. These are fundamental tenets flowing from due process requirement under Article 21, equal protection clause embodied in Article 14 and fundamental freedoms clause ingrained under Article 19. A modern deliberative democracy cannot function without these attributes. 40. The power conferred on the authority without any guidelines may likely to be abused or arbitrarily exercised and in such circumstances, the guidance and control of exercise of such power has to be gathered from the object of conferment of power. Non-consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors renders the exercise of discretion manifestly erroneous, and it is cause for judicial interference.” 47. Examining the facts of the case on hand with the Airport entry Permit (AEP) Guidelines, 2019, and the decisions on judicial review and discretion, extracted above, we do not find any illegality in Exhibit-P7 order dated 28.04.2020 passed by the 2nd respondent. 48. On the facts and circumstances of the case, considering the aspect of security to be maintained in the airport, which is predominant vis-a-vis right of the appellants, the 1st respondent has rightly denied AEP to the appellants. Courts cannot substitute the wisdom of the authority and sit over the decision. 49. 48. On the facts and circumstances of the case, considering the aspect of security to be maintained in the airport, which is predominant vis-a-vis right of the appellants, the 1st respondent has rightly denied AEP to the appellants. Courts cannot substitute the wisdom of the authority and sit over the decision. 49. Pursuant to the order of respondent No.1, declining to issue AEP, the ED (Security), CHQ, New Delhi, has instructed deployment of the appellants in other departments, where there is no requirement for AEP. Contention of the appellants that if they are posted in other departments, their rights for continued training, career etc. would be affected, are nothing, but introduction of fresh facts in this Writ Appeal, which we are not inclined to accept. At this juncture, we may only observe that, if the authorities are competent to issue appropriate posting orders, they can do so. 50. Writ court has properly adverted to the issues raised and we do not find any error in the judgment impugned, warranting interference in appeal. In the light of the above discussion and decisions, the impugned judgment is sustained. Writ appeal is dismissed.