JUDGMENT Bibek Chaudhuri, J. - The State of West Bengal and its Officers under the Land and Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal have filed a second appeal being SAT No.482 of 2016 assailing the judgment and decree dated 29th June, 2013 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 13th Court at Alipore in Title Appeal No.235 of 2011 reversing the judgment and decree dated 30th June, 2011 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 4th Court at Alipore in Title Suit No.117 of 2005. 2. The appeal is filed after a long lapse of statutory period of limitation of 1051 days. 3. Can 10681 of 2016 is an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellants/petitioners. 4. At the outset, it is pertinent to mention that four other applications being CAN 10060 of 2018, CAN 10061 of 2018, CAN 10971 of 2019 and CAN 10972 of 2019 have also been filed by the appellants/petitioners and the said applications are also required to be disposed of by this Court. 5. Since the appeal is barred by limitation, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is required to be disposed of first lest delay is not condoned, there cannot be any appeal in the eye of law. Thus I propose to dispose of CAN 10681 of 2016 first. 6. By filing the instant application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is stated by the petitioners that the opposite parties as plaintiffs instituted Title Suit No.117 of 2005 in the 4th Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Alipore for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of a piece and parcel of land measuring more or less 2 bigha, 7 cottahs, 1 chittack and 35 sq. ft corresponding to RS Plot No.4219 appertaining to khatian No.378 and plot No.4218 under khatian No.1888 and plot No.1213 under khatian No.1888 and plot No.4268 under khatian No.797 and plot No.4267 under khatian No.378 and plot No.4163 under khatian No.2582 of mouza Kasba (hereinafter described as the suit property) against the petitioners and Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (K.M.D.A). The appellant No.3 and 4 contested the said suit by filing written statement. Defendant No.9 also contested the suit by filing a separate written statement. The appellant No.3 and 4 contested the said suit by filing written statement. Defendant No.9 also contested the suit by filing a separate written statement. It was contended by the petitioners that the suit property was vested to the State under the provision of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. The suit property was further requisitioned under Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 by the land acquisition, Collector, South 24 Parganas for the purpose of East Kolkata Development Project and for construction of EM Bypass project carried on by the K.M.D.A. The vacant possession of the requisition land were given to K.M.D.A on 11th May, 1978 by initiating a proceeding. Accordingly the plaintiffs had no possession over the suit property. 7. The learned trial court dismissed the suit on contest. 8. The opposite parties preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No.235 of 2011 before the learned District Judge, South 24 Parganas at Alipore. The said appeal came up for disposal before the learned Additional District Judge, 13th Court at Alipore and by his judgment dated 29th June, 2013 the learned lower appellate court allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of dismissal passed in the above numbered suit and passed decree of recovery of possession as well as permanent injunction. The petitioners obtained the certified copy of impugned judgment and decree on 3rd October, 2013. Then the Officers of petitioner No.1 took advice of the learned Government Pleader who suggested the petitioners to file a second appeal before this Court. Thereafter, on 24th January, 2014, a letter was issued by the learned Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) to the Joint Secretary, Land and Land Reforms Department suggesting filing of an appeal before this Court against the judgment and decree passed in the aforesaid first appeal. It is further stated by the petitioners that in the mean time intra departmental dispute between the Land Revenue Branch and the Land Acquisition branch of the Department cropped up on the question as to which branch would prefer the appeal before this Court. Finally it was decided on 17th October, 2014 that the State of West Bengal would be represented by the Officers of Land Acquisition branch of the Department in the appeal to be filed by the State. Finally it was decided on 17th October, 2014 that the State of West Bengal would be represented by the Officers of Land Acquisition branch of the Department in the appeal to be filed by the State. Then on 9th September, 2015, the matter was placed before the learned Legal Remembrancer to the Government of West Bengal for engagement of an Advocate on behalf of the State and ultimately on 29th September, 2015 an Advocate on record was engaged to prefer an appeal against the judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal No.235 of 2011. Ultimately the appeal was filed on 5th October, 2016 after a lapse of 1051 days. 9. The petitioners have filed a supplementary affidavit to the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 20th December, 2019 stating, inter alia, that in the year 2013, the Headquarters of Land and Land Reforms Department was shifted entirely from Writers' Building to another building, named, Nabanna, Howrah on a temporary basis for facilitating renovation of Writers' Building in the year 2013. The shifting work continued till 2016. During such shifting work ,all the files including the file of the instant case was sent to Nabanna from Writers' Building in bundles. The record of this case was untraceable for a substantial period of time and the file was traced out sometimes in 2015 and then only the Officers of the Land and Land Reforms Department took step to prefer an appeal before this Court challenging the judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal No.235 of 2011 thereafter on 5th October, 2016 the appeal was preferred. 10. Mr. Soumya Chakraborty, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the petitioners submits that though the State of West Bengal cannot claim to be a privileged litigant, yet the Court while disposing of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should bear in mind that certain administrative procedures are required to be maintained by the Government Department before taking decision in preferring the appeal. From the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is found that the concerned Officer averred on solemn affirmation that immediately after judgment and decree in first appeal having been passed, the State of West Bengal made an application for obtaining certified copy of the said judgment and decree. Subsequently the opinion of the Government Pleader was taken. From the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is found that the concerned Officer averred on solemn affirmation that immediately after judgment and decree in first appeal having been passed, the State of West Bengal made an application for obtaining certified copy of the said judgment and decree. Subsequently the opinion of the Government Pleader was taken. The Government Pleader opined that an appeal should be filed against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. There was some dispute cropped up in the department as to whether the Land Revenue Branch or Land Acquisition Branch of the Land and Land Reforms Department would prefer the appeal. Ultimately decision was taken at the Secretary level. Then the file was sent to the office of the learned Legal Remembrancer, Government of West Bengal for engagement of a Government Advocate. A Junior Advocate was engaged by the learned Legal Remembrancer on 12th May, 2016. The Officers of the State of West Bengal discussed the matter with learned Advocate on 5th August, 2016 and ultimately the appeal was preferred on 5th October, 2016. 11. It is pointed out by Mr. Chakrabarty that against the said application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the respondents did not file any affidavit-in-opposition. The respondents of course have filed affidavit-in-opposition against the supplementary affidavit to the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the petitioners. However, the statement made by the petitioners in respect of nonavailability of records of this case in the Land and Land Reforms Department due to shifting of the department from Writers' Building to Nabanna was not controvered by the respondents/opposite parties. Therefore the factual statement made by the petitioners on condonation of delay remains uncontroverted by the opposite parties. 12. It is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the petitioners that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the Court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the Legislature. The Limitation Act has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the Court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the Legislature. At the same time, the Courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. The expression "sufficient cause" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard and fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay. In support of his contention, Mr. Chakraborty refers to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) AIR SC 1629 . 13. Thus it is argued by Mr. Chakraborty that if the delay is not condoned and the petitioners are not allowed a chance to place their case before this Court they will not get the opportunity to prove that the suit property was already acquired by the State of West Bengal and possession of a substantial portion of the suit property was delivered to Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics for Public Purpose following acquisition proceeding initiated by the State of West Bengal. It is also submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that the suit was filed by the respondent on suppression of material facts and Court should not allow a litigant to establish his claim over the suit property on suppression of material fact. If delay is not condoned, the petitioners will not get any opportunity to atleast to place before the temple of Justice that the opposite parties claim was allowed on the basis of distortion of material facts and suppression of materials on record. 14. Mr. If delay is not condoned, the petitioners will not get any opportunity to atleast to place before the temple of Justice that the opposite parties claim was allowed on the basis of distortion of material facts and suppression of materials on record. 14. Mr. Malay Kumar Basu, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the opposite parties first draws my attention to a copy of the judgment passed in WP No.21429(W) of 2014 (Sanmohan Chatterjee vs. the State of West Bengal and Ors) delivered by the Hon'ble Ashok Kumar Dasadhikari, J. as his Lordship then was on 2nd June 2015. In the said writ petition, the respondents as petitioners alleged that they were deprived of their property by the State respondents without following due process of law and without payment of any compensation in spite of the fact that they are the lawful owners. In the said writ petition it was alleged by the respondents that one Sanmohan Chatterjee, predecessor-ininterest of the present respondents purchased the suit property on 29th July, 1942 on a sale by Government obtaining a certificate of sale as well as delivery of possession. The said property was duly mutated in the name of the said Sanmohan Chatterjee and during his life time he had been possessing the suit property on payment of land revenue to the Government. However, after his death his legal heirs wanted to pay Land Revenue but the Collector, 24 Parganas refused to accept the rent on the ground that the said property was acquired by Land Acquisition, Collector, South 24 Parganas. While disposing of the said writ petition vide order dated 2nd June 2015, the Hon'ble Judge duly considered the finding of the First Appellate Court in Title Appeal No.235 of 2011. The learned First Appellate Court came to the clear finding that the said respondents as well as K.M.D.A being respondent No.9 could not produce any evidence, either oral or documentary in support of their plea that the portion of the land mentioned in the plaint have been acquired by the Government. 15. Mr. Basu has pointed out page 37 of the aforesaid judgment wherein it was clearly stated that the records in connection with the suit property was produced by the State Authorities before the writ court. 15. Mr. Basu has pointed out page 37 of the aforesaid judgment wherein it was clearly stated that the records in connection with the suit property was produced by the State Authorities before the writ court. There is clear finding by the writ court on perusal of the records produced by the State Authorities that the plots constituting holding No.5K-333 was never acquired, no award passed and admittedly no notice was served upon the petitioners or any other parties. 16. Mr. Basu also submits that the K.M.D.A being a statutory authority under the State of West Bengal preferred second appeal against the judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal No.235 of 2011. In the said appeal, State of West Bengal was made a party respondents and the State of West Bengal was duly represented by its learned Advocate. The said appeal was admitted by the Division Bench vide order dated 4th August, 2015 and on the self same date the Division Bench was pleased to dispose of the appeal with the following modification of the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court:- "As such, for removing such confusion and for better identification of the suit property, we modify the decree of the learned First Appellate Court only to this extent that the report of the Investigating Commissioner including the map which was a part of the commissioner's report, will be a part of the decree." 17. Mr. Basu has also pointed out that after disposal of the above mentioned second appeal another round of litigation was started when K.M.D.A and State of West Bengal filed two separate appeals against the judgment and order passed in WP 21429(W) of 2014. The said appeals being FMA 4805 of 2015 and MAT 347 of 2016 were dismissed on contest. In both the appeals, judgment of the Additional District Judge, 13th Court at Alipore in Title Appeal No.235 of 2011 were extensively quoted. Against the judgment and order dated 27th October, 2017 passed in FMA 4805 of 2015 and MAT 347 of 2016 the State of West Bengal filed SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was summarily dismissed. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal gave an undertaking before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the suit would comply the order and for compliance of the order the State prayed for time. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal gave an undertaking before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the suit would comply the order and for compliance of the order the State prayed for time. The said prayer was allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court granting four months time to comply with the order. Ultimately on 11th May, 2018 the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued a notice for contempt for noncompliance of the order passed by it in the above mentioned Special Leave Petition. 18. The State of West Bengal further filed a review application on 28th June, 2018 seeking review of the judgment of the Division Bench passed in FMA 4805 of 2015 and MAT 347 of 2016 on 31st August, 2017. The Hon'ble Supreme Court finally directed the State Government to pass an order in accordance with law as per the directions of the High Court even within the period of four months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order and therefore the compensation should be paid in accordance with the order subject to the procedure of law. 19. It is seriously contended by Mr. Basu that the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court in Title Appeal No.235 of 2011 was merged first with the order passed in writ petition No.21429(W) of 2014. Secondly the said order was merged and upheld by the Division Bench in SAT No.482 of 2016 filed by K.M.D.A where the State of West Bengal was a party. Neither the State nor K.M.D.A moved before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgment passed in SAT 482 of 2016 by the Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, the said judgment has reached its finality and a party cannot challenge by filing another appeal as the instant one. It is also urged by Mr. Basu that the judgment of the First Appellate Court was again merged with the judgment passed in FMA 4805 of 2015 and MAT 347 of 2016. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also took cognizance of the judgment passed in Title Appeal No.235 of 2011 in SLP's filed by the K.M.D.A and the State of West Bengal and also in the contempt proceeding. At this stage, applying the rule of doctrine of merger, the petitioners have no right to prefer the instant appeal. It is seriously urged by Mr. At this stage, applying the rule of doctrine of merger, the petitioners have no right to prefer the instant appeal. It is seriously urged by Mr. Basu, learned Senior Counsel that even at the stage of hearing of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the respondents can urged the preliminary point of maintainability of the appeal on the basis of the doctrine of merger in view of the fact that the respondents can always raise dispute as to the maintainability of the appeal. 20. In reply, Mr. Soumya Chakraborty, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submits that in course of hearing of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the duty of the Court is confined only to see as to whether the petitioner has been able to establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay while adjudicating 'Sufficient Cause' in respect of an application for condonation of delay, court should take a liberal approach so as to advance substantial justice. The court cannot touch the matter on merits. In support of his contention, Mr. Chakraborti relies upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Ganesharaju (Dead) through L.RS and another -vs- Narasamma (Dead) through L.RS and others, (2013) 11 SCC 341 . 21. Having heard submission made by the learned Senior Counsels on behalf of the parties, I proposed to confine my discussion while adjudicating an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act only to consider as to whether the petitioners have been able to establish and prove sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. I have already stated that the instant appeal was filed after a lapse of 1051 days. I am not unmindful to note that the law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim "Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium" (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not mean to destroy rights of the parties, rather idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 22. Rules of limitation are not mean to destroy rights of the parties, rather idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 22. In K.P Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (1998) AIR SC 2276 the Supreme Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held as under :- "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." 23. It is true that the Court must take liberal approach so as to advice substantial justice unless the respondents are able to show mala fides in not approaching the Court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by. While considering a similar issue, this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors, (2013) 12 SCC 649 took the identical view. 24. In Brijesh Kumar & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors, (2014) AIR SC 1612 the Hon'ble Supreme Court succinctly observed as hereunder:- "11. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone." 25. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone." 25. Bearing the principles led down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as quoted above if the case of the petitioners for condonation of delay is considered, it is ex facie found that the petitioners have come up with two contradictory stories. In CAN 10681 of 2016, the petitioners mentioned series of dates and date wise activities taken by them with a view to preferring an appeal before this Court. The judgment of the First Appellate Court was delivered in 2013. Immediately thereafter, the petitioners filed application for obtaining certified copy. They obtained opinion of the learned Government Pleader. There was some dispute between two branches of Land and Land Reforms Department as to whether the Land Revenue Department or Land Acquisition Department would prefer the appeal. The said dispute was subsequently solved. Then they approached the legal remambrancer for appointment of an Advocate, the Advocate was appointed and in this process about two years were elapsed. Thus the petitioners in their application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act tried to prove that the state was always diligent to prefer the appeal however due to administrative reasons there was delay. In the supplementary affidavit to the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, absolutely a new ground was taken to the effect that the record of the case was shifted from Writers' Building to Nabanna and it was misplaced for three years. In view of two contradictory statements, this Court is not in a position to come to a conclusion which of the said two explanations is created and bona fide. If one explanation is held to be bona fide then the other approach for condonation of delay should be held to be mala fide and in such condition both the grounds for condonation of delay as canvassed by the petitioners are held to be mala fide. 26. In Maniben Devraj Shah (supra) which is heavily relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. The Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to condone the delay on the following grounds:- 21. 26. In Maniben Devraj Shah (supra) which is heavily relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. The Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to condone the delay on the following grounds:- 21. The applications filed for condonation of delay and the affidavits of Shri Sirsikar are conspicuously silent on the following important points: a) The name of the person who was having custody of the record has not been disclosed. b) The date, month and year when the papers required for filing the first appeals are said to have been misplaced have not been disclosed. c) The date on which the papers were traced out or recovered and name of the person who found the same have not been disclosed. d) No explanation whatsoever has been given as to why the applications for certified copies of the judgments of the trial Court were not filed till 23.8.2010 despite the fact that Shri Sirsikar had given intimation on 12.5.2003 about the judgments of the trial Court. e) Even though the Corporation has engaged battery of lawyers to conduct cases on its behalf, nothing has been said as to how the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar operated as an impediment in the making of applications for certified copies of the judgments sought to be appealed against. 27. In the instant case this Court also does not find any reason to condone delay of 1051 days in preferring the instant appeal on the following grounds:- (i) The statement of fact made in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and in the supplementary affidavit does not co-exist and they are contradictory in nature. (ii) The petitioners failed to explain the delay of preferring the instant appeal even after obtaining the certified copy of the judgment of the First Appellate Court within reasonable period after the disposal of the appeal. (iii) The petitioners never disclosed before the Division Bench at the time of hearing of SAT No.482 of 2016 that the files of the case were misplaced and if the files were found, they were able to prove that the suit property was actually acquired by the State. (iii) The petitioners never disclosed before the Division Bench at the time of hearing of SAT No.482 of 2016 that the files of the case were misplaced and if the files were found, they were able to prove that the suit property was actually acquired by the State. (iv) Even assuming that the record of the case was found in 2016, the petitioners cannot avail of the benefit of condonation of delay in view of the fact that the petitioners themselves promised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court to comply with the order on payment of award after initiating fresh proceeding in respect of acquisition of the suit property within specified period of time. (v) In view of what has been stated above, I do not find any merit in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. (vi) The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is thus rejected on contest, however without cost. 28. In view of rejection of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, I do not find any scope to deal and dispose of other applications filed by the petitioners in connection with the instant appeal. The said application being CAN 10060 of 2018, CAN 10061 of 2018, CAN 10971 of 2019 and CAN 10972 of 2019 are also rejected being not maintainable. 29. In view of the rejection of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the appeal filed by the petitioners is held to be nonest in the eye of law. Urgent certified website copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities