ORDER : 1. By way of present petition, the petitioners seek direction against the respondent Bank to accept the remaining sale consideration from the purchaser and issue the sale certificate under Rule 9(6) of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules of 2002”) for the property in question. He has further prayed that the respondent Bank may be directed to handover the original title documents of the property with peaceful and vacant possession to the petitioners. 2. The short facts leading to this petition are as under. 2.1 The respondent Bank had issued the sale notice dated 20.12.2019 for the residential house on Plot No. A/16, Raj Laxmi bungalows, opposite Rajhans Cinema, Surat Dumas Road, Surat for public auction with a reserved price of Rs. 110.81 Lacs and earnest money deposit of Rs. 11.08 Lacs towards EMD amount with the Bank. The Bank had written letter to the petitioners to further deposit Rs. 5,64,750/- on 21.01.2020, but the said amount was not deposited by the petitioners and thereafter, they had written a letter to the Bank Manager of the respondent Bank and stated that their bank account was inactive and the same cannot be activated for 2 days. They had stated that because of their mistake, they had made payment through another account. Thus, initial deposit of Rs. 5,64,750/- was not paid by the present petitioners. 3. At the time of arguments, the learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are ready and willing to deposit the additional amount to the Bank, but the Bank has not considered the case of the petitioners and wrongly not accepting the remaining amount from the petitioners. A pointed question was asked to the learned advocate for the petitioners that as to how this petition is maintainable. 3.1 In reply, the learned advocate for the petitioners has relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court rendered in the case of Umang Sugars Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No. 6331 of 2013. In the said case, the petitioner had deposited 25% of the amount asked by the Bank and thereafter, the petitioner communicated the Bank seeking some documents so as to enable the petitioner to approach the Financial Institutions for aid in order to generate funds and deposit rest of the 75% amount. In the said case, the petitioner had deposited 25% of the amount asked by the Bank and thereafter, the petitioner communicated the Bank seeking some documents so as to enable the petitioner to approach the Financial Institutions for aid in order to generate funds and deposit rest of the 75% amount. Then, the petitioner made an application to the Debt Recovery Tribunal by way of an interim application but the respondent Bank had not filed the reply and the matter was prolonged for a long period of time, wherein the High Court was of the view that the petitioner cannot be waited indefinitely and in the process, suffer and loose on all fronts. So the challenge before the Bombay High Court was inaction on the part of the respondent Bank and the petitioner had already approached the Tribunal. 4. While in the present case, when the petitioners were asked that when there was an alternative remedy available under Rule 9 of the Rules of 2002, the same was not satisfactorily replied by the petitioners that why they had not opted for the alternative remedy. 4.1 In this context, it would be fruitful to refer the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore, 2018 (3) SCC 85 , wherein, Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that:- “10. Even prior to the SARFAESI Act, considering the alternate remedy available under the DRT Act it was held in Punjab National Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan and Others, (2001) 6 SCC 569 , that:- “6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.” 11. In Satyawati Tandon (supra) the High Court had restrained further proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of the statutory scheme under the SARFAESI Act, the availability of remedy to the aggrieved under Section 17 before the Tribunal and the appellate remedy under Section 18 before the Appellate Tribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it was observed that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the alternate statutory remedy available holding:- “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. *** *** *** 55. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. *** *** *** 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.” 12. In Union Bank of India and Another vs. Panchanan Subudhi, 2010 (15) SCC 552 , further proceedings under Section 13(4) were stayed in the writ jurisdiction subject to deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- leading this Court to observe as follows: “7. In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court was clearly erroneous. When the respondent failed to abide by the terms of one-time settlement, there was no justification for the High Court to entertain the writ petition and that too by ignoring the fact that a statutory alternative remedy was available to the respondent under Section 17 of the Act.” 13. The same view was reiterated in Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (2) SCC 782 observing: “23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (Sadhana Lodh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and SBI vs. Allied Chemical Laboratories)” 14. In Ikbal (supra), it was observed that the action of the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act available to challenge by the aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tandon (Supra), observing: “27. In Ikbal (supra), it was observed that the action of the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act available to challenge by the aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tandon (Supra), observing: “27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. *** *** *** 28........In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the learned Single Judge to allow the borrower to bypass the efficacious remedy provided to him under Section 17 and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when he had disentitled himself for such relief by his conduct. The Single Judge was clearly in error in invoking his extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 in light of the peculiar facts indicated above. The Division Bench also erred in affirming the erroneous order of the Single Judge.” 15. A similar view was taken in Punjab National Bank and Another vs. Imperial Gift House and Others, (2013) 14 SCC 622 , observing:- “3. Upon receipt of notice, the respondents filed representation under Section 13(3-A) of the Act, which was rejected. Thereafter, before any further action could be taken under Section 13(4) of the Act by the Bank, the writ petition was filed before the High Court. 4. In our view, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition against the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act and quashing the proceedings initiated by the Bank.” 16. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference. 18. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Another, 1997 (6) SCC 450 , observing:- “32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops.” 19. The impugned orders are therefore contrary to the law laid down by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and unsustainable. They are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed. 5. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case, the present petitioners can avail alternative remedy before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Rule 9 of the Rules of 2002 and the petitioners cannot directly rush to the High Court. This question is squarely covered in the above referred judgment of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore (supra) of Apex Court. 6. Under the circumstances, I am of the view that this petition is not maintainable and is required to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.