JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Ms. Mahima Maurya, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant and Sri. L.D. Rajbhar, Prem Shankar Mishra, learned A.G.A. for the State respondent. 2. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 18.5.1996 passed by the IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Jhansi in Sessions Trial No. 144 of 1991, State vs. Mohan @ Mohan Singh, under Sections 307 and 302 IPC, P.S. Kotwali, District-Jhansi, whereby appellant Mohan @ Mohan Singh has been convicted for the offences under section 302 and sentenced for life imprisonment and under section 307 I.P.C. sentenced for seven years rigorous imprisonment. Both the punishments are to run concurrently. 3. The prosecution story as unfolded with the First Information Report, dated 10.6.1991 registered at about 5.30 a.m. at P.S. Kotwali, District-Jhansi that on 10.6.1991 at about 4.30 a.m. when deceased Jamna (wife of the first informant) and his aunt Rajabeti, wife of Nathhu were going to get drinking water from the Public (Sarkari) Tap and the first informant was accompanying them to attend the call of nature, Mohan (appellant) son of Kallu Kachhi and two other young boys met them at a place inside the outer gate of the village. Seeing them standing, on their way, his aunt Rajabeti stopped them, Mohan then said ^^rw vkxs c<** and attacked Jamna by knife in her chest while his two accomplices caught hold of Jamuna (deceased). The first informant Parikshit (husband of deceased) challenged them in the torch light and his aunt Rajabeti hit them by the metal pot (Kasedi) which she was carrying to fill water. Mohan also hit back Rajabeti by knife causing injury in her left hand. The deceased fell down and died. Amidst the chaos, on the challenge raised by the first informant, three assailants ran away towards the grove. Some people took deceased Jamna and injured Rajabeti to the District Hospital. The motive to commit the crime as stated in the report is that around five days prior to the occurrence, an alteration took place between wife of first informant Parikshit and his neighbour Mohan S/o Kallu Kushwaha also his mother Rama. In the said altercation, Mohan had threatened the deceased with dire consequences. Since it was a normal dispute and hence no report was lodged by the first informant. In the said altercation, Mohan had threatened the deceased with dire consequences. Since it was a normal dispute and hence no report was lodged by the first informant. It was stated that the first informant and his aunt Rajabeti had seen the assailants Mohan and his two accomplices clearly in the torch light and they knew accused Mohan by name whereas his two other accomplices were not known to them. They, however, could recognize them, if the assailants were brought before them. The report is scribed by one Kalicharan S/o Narayan Das. 4. The record indicates that the police swung into action and recoveries were made, site plan prepared and accused Mohan was arrested. The recovery memo of the torch which the first informant was carrying, had been prepared, marked as Exhibit Ka-2. Three Kaseria (metal pots for filling water) carried by deceased and injured Rajabeti recovered from the spot of the crime on 10.6.1991, were sealed in a recovery memo, which was proved and exhibited as Exhibit Ka-6. Blood-stained clothes of injured Rajabeti recovered on 12.6.1991 were kept in Exhibit Ka-7. Recovery memo of blood stained earth and plain earth collected from the spot of crime dated 10.6.1991 has been proved as Exhibit Ka-8. 5. The injury report of Rajabeti wife of Nathhoo aged about 70 years is dated 10.6.1991 which records that she was brought to the district hospital Jhansi on 10.6.1991 at about 5 a.m. by one Laxmi Narayan S/o Ram Charan resident of the same village. The injuries found on the person of Rajabeti are as under:- (1) A punctured wound on the medial surface of Right upper arm. Size 3 c.m. x 1 c.m. x 2 c.m. and is 13 c.m. above elbow joint. Rt. side wound is severly bleeding, margins are sharply cut regular. (2) An Incised wound 2.5 c.m. x 1 c.m. x muscle deep on the ventral surface of Right fore arm. 9 c.m. above wrist joint sever fresh bleeding present along with some dust particles. (3) An incised wound 3 c.m. x 0.5 c.m. x muscle deep on the dorsal surface of Rt. fore arm 10 c.m. above wrist joint. Fresh bleeding present. 6. It was opined by the doctor that injury nos. 1 and 2 (kept under observation) were caused by sharp edged weapon and their duration was fresh. X-ray was advised. 7. (3) An incised wound 3 c.m. x 0.5 c.m. x muscle deep on the dorsal surface of Rt. fore arm 10 c.m. above wrist joint. Fresh bleeding present. 6. It was opined by the doctor that injury nos. 1 and 2 (kept under observation) were caused by sharp edged weapon and their duration was fresh. X-ray was advised. 7. The post mortem of deceased Jamna was conducted on 10.6.1991 at about 3.00 p.m. Clean cut wound of 2 and 1/2 c.m. x 1 c.m. was found on the left chest so deep that it punctured the heart of deceased, which was found filled with blood. It was opined by the doctor that death was caused due to the said injury resulting in asphyxia and shock. 8. The inquest was done at the mortuary of the district hospital, Jhansi, which commenced at 9.15 a.m. and ended at 11.15 a.m. The person who gave first information to the police, as mentioned in the inquest report, is Parikshit husband of deceased. Cause of death is shown as injury caused by knife. The inquest report records that body was taken out from the mortuary of the District Hospital, lock of which was opened in the presence of the inquest witnesses and other people after police came to the hospital. 9. It is pertinent to note here that the Investigating Officer, who submitted the charge-sheet in the Court, had died before his deposition could be recorded in the trial. However, the site plan, charge sheet and other papers prepared by the Investigating officer had been proved to be in his handwriting and signature, by PW-5 Constable, Dhani Ram Tiwari P.S. Kotwali, District-Jhansi and marked as Exhibit Ka-6 to Ka-10 (site plan as Exhibit Ka-9 and chargesheet as Exhibit Ka-10). 10. Amongst the witnesses produced by the prosecution, the first informant (PW-1) and injured Rajabeti (PW-2) gave eye-witness account of the incident. PW-3, Doctor R.N. Sharma who conducted post mortem had proved his report. PW-4, S.I. Ram Bharose Kushwaha is the Head Constable who prepared Chik F.I.R. (proved as Exhibit Ka-4) on the written report (proved as Exhibit Ka-1). He stated that the Chik F.I.R. was prepared by him at about 5.30 a.m. on 10.6.1991 and entered in the G.D. No. 9, which was proved from the original G.D. and marked as Exhibit Ka-5 being in his own handwriting and signature. 11. He stated that the Chik F.I.R. was prepared by him at about 5.30 a.m. on 10.6.1991 and entered in the G.D. No. 9, which was proved from the original G.D. and marked as Exhibit Ka-5 being in his own handwriting and signature. 11. Thus, according to the prosecution, deceased was accompanied by PW-1 the first informant and injured witness PW-2 at the time of the incident. The trial court discarded the presence of the first informant on the spot of crime noticing that his deposition indicates that he was supposed to be on duty at the time of the incident. The statement of the first informant in the cross-examination that he was an employee in railway and his duty was changing in three shifts, and from 7th June to 15th June his shift duty was from 12:00 midnight to 8:00 a.m. was noted by the trial court to hold that the presence of the first informant on the spot was improbable. We may note, at the outset, that the prosecution could not demonstrate that this part of the finding recorded by the trial court is either perfunctory or against the evidence on record. 12. This apart, having carefully read the evidence of PW-1, we further find that his deposition is full of contradictions and clearly reveal that his presence on the spot was not possible. The first informant states that he was ten steps behind his wife and the injured witness when they were attacked by accused Mohan. As per his version, accused Mohan was intercepted by his aunt Rajabeti when he attacked deceased Jamuna and during the course of occurrence Rajabeti was also hit by knife in her right arm. It is astonishing that the first informant being husband of deceased did nothing but witnessed the entire sequence of events in the torch light. Further, in his deposition before the Court, though PW-1 states that he alongwith others brought deceased Jamuna and injured Rajabeti to the district hospital, but in the written report it is averred that other people took the injured and deceased to the district hospital. Further, in his deposition before the Court, though PW-1 states that he alongwith others brought deceased Jamuna and injured Rajabeti to the district hospital, but in the written report it is averred that other people took the injured and deceased to the district hospital. When confronted in cross-examination, PW-1 gave an explanation that since his brother and sister-in-law also accompanied him to the hospital he dictated so in the F.I.R. A suggestion was also given to him that someone else brought deceased and injured to the hospital and he reached the hospital directly on hearing the news. In reply PW-1 states that he remained at the site after the incident for about 10-15 minutes, then took deceased and the injured to the Hospital where he reached within 10-15 minutes. He remained in the hospital for about 2-3 hrs. In the meantime, police reached the hospital. One hour later, the police took him to the police station to lodge the report. The inquest was done in the hospital. He then states that by the time he reached the police station, sun had risen. His brother Laxmi Narayan and a neighbour namely Kali Charan also accompanied him to the police station. He then states that the entire sequence of events was narrated by him to the Station House Officer (Daroga Ji) who dictated it to Kali Charan who wrote the report, and it was then signed by him as the first informant. 13. Analysing the above naration of the PW-1, this much is evident that the written report scribed by Kali Charan was not dictated by the first informant rather it was scribed on the dictation of the police officer and PW-1 merely endorsed it. PW-1 admitted that he was a railway employee and his duties were changing weekly in three shifts, i.e. 8.00 am to 4.00 p.m. and 4 p.m. to 12.00 mid night and 12:00 mid night to 8.00 a.m. In the month of June 1991, from 1st June to 7th June, his duty shift was 8.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. and from 7th June to 15th June, it was 12.00 midnight to 8.00 a.m. Thus, in the cross-examination, he had admitted that on the fateful day, at the time of incident, he was supposed to be on duty. There is no whisper nor any indication in the entire evidence as to how he could be present at his home to accompany the deceased at about 4.00 a.m. when she went to get drinking water from the public tap. The prosecution has not explained this circumstance by bringing any cogent evidence on record rather it is completely silent on the issue. This, in our opinion, is a clear dent in the prosecution story. 14. Further, as far as motive narrated by PW-1 in the First Information Report is concerned, in cross-examination PW-1 admitted that he was neither present during the altercation which took place around 5 days back between accused Mohan and his wife nor was told by his wife that Mohan had threatened her. The narration of motive by PW-1 in the First Information Report, therefore, seems to be his own creation. When confronted as to why he did not make any effort to save his wife, PW-1 states that he hit the assailants from the “Dibba” which he was carrying and challenged them by showing the torch light, but no such “Dibba” was recovered. 15. He further admitted that he did not make any effort to release deceased from the clutches of the assailants, nor he thought of hitting them from the metal pots carried by his wife. He did not touch the dead body of his wife on the spot. We find it difficult to believe that PW-1 though was present on the spot but he did not even lift the body of his wife to take her to the hospital. For the above statement and admission of PW-1 about his duty time on the fateful day which clashed with the time of the incident, we find that the trial court has rightly concluded that PW-1 was not accompanying the deceased. The prosecution version of PW-1 being the eye witness has been rightly discarded. 16. Presence of PW-1 on the spot is also belied from the statement of PW-2 who states in the examination-in-chief that apart from her no one else had seen the assault. The prosecution version of PW-1 being the eye witness has been rightly discarded. 16. Presence of PW-1 on the spot is also belied from the statement of PW-2 who states in the examination-in-chief that apart from her no one else had seen the assault. The relevant part of the statement of PW-2 is to be noted as under:- ^^ekSds ij tc eksgu us esjh cgw o eq>s pkdw ekjk Fkk ml le; vksj fdlh us ugha ns[kk FkkA ogka ij iMksl esa IysVQkeZ ij dkQh yksx lks jgs FksA tks fd okd;k gksus ds ckn vius&vius ?kjksa esa pys x;s Fks o viuh&viuh [kfV;k Hkh ys x;s FksA** 17. PW-2 further states that first one to reach the spot was a neighbour Jamna wife of Param, who in turn called Laxmi Narayan, she then states that her nephew Parikshit (first informant) was present about 50 paces behind them, but in the very next sentence she stated that she could only remember that wife of Param and Laxmi Narayan reached the spot and who else came, she could not recollect. This part of statement of PW-2 (in her examination-in-chief) is also relevant to be noted hereunder:- ^^lcls igys eqgYys ds ,d cgw ije dh chch tequk gekjs ikl vk;h Fkh ogha y{eh ukjk;.k dks cqykdj yk;h FkhA esjk nwljk Hkrhtk ikjh{kr ?kVuk ds le; djhc 50 dne nwjh ij Fkk cjxn ds isM ds vkSj vkxs FkkA fQj dgk fd eSa csgks'k gks x;h Fkh eq>s ugha ekywe fd dkSu vk;k] dkSu ugha vk;kA eq>s dsoy cgw ije dh chch o y{eh ukjk;.k ds vkus dk /;ku gS ckn esa dkSu vk;k] dkSu ugha vk;kA eq>s ugha ekyweA ikjh{kr us dgk Fkk fd eSa ySfVªu tk jgk gwaA ;g ckr mlus ?kj ij gh dgh FkhA ekSds ij vU/ksjk Fkk eSaus eksgu ;k mlds lkFkh dk psgjk ns[kdj ugha ifgpkuk Fkk cfYd mldh vkokt lqudj ifgpkuk Fkk fd og eksgu FkkA vU/ksjs ds dkj.k eSa ;g ugha ns[k ldh fd mls eksgu us ekjk Fkk ;k lcus feydj ekjk FkkA eSus njksxk th dks Hkh ;gh crk;k Fkk fd tc eksgu us vkokt nh rc eSaus mls vkokt ls ifgpkuk FkkA ;fn eksgu vkokt u nsrk vkSj dksbZ ckr u djrk rks eq>s irk Hkh ugha pyrk fd gesa dkSu ekj x;kA eq>s 2 fnu ckn gks'k vk;k FkkA** 18. PW-2 further states that she could not see whether Mohan hit them or any of the other assailants as there was dark. There is no whisper in the statement of PW-2 about the presence of any source of light, especially the torch light wherein they could have seen the assailants. PW-2 rather categorically stated that she could recognize Mohan accused, only from his voice. As per PW-2, had Mohan not spoken a few words she could not have known as to who had assaulted them. This part of extracted statements of PW-2 belied the whole version of PW-1 and also makes the recovery of torch wholly farce. 19. Having noticed the contradictions in the statement of PW-1 as also material contradictions in the statement of both the witnesses of fact (PW-1 and PW-2), there remains no doubt that the testimony of PW-1 (projected as eye witness) is liable to be discarded as a whole. PW-1 is proved to be a liar. It seems to us that PW-1 was on duty and he came to know about the incident only after he returned from duty in the morning and that could be only after 8:00 a.m. Apart from the above, further record indicates that police was intimated about the incident through the letter of the hospital authorities which was entered in G.D. Rapat No. 9, time 5.30 a.m. As per the entries therein, deceased was admitted in the hospital at about 4.50 a.m. The district hospital was located at a very short distance (less than one furlong) from the police station. The G.D. entry shows that the first information (chik report) was also registered at 5.30 a.m. But PW-1 states that police reached the hospital on its own and one hour later they took him to the police station to lodge the report. The first informant thus admits that he did not go immediately to the Police Station to lodge the report. The inquest commenced at about 9.15 a.m. and in the meantime body was locked in the Mortuary. There is no explanation by the prosecution as to when and on whose information police had reached the hospital. The first informant thus admits that he did not go immediately to the Police Station to lodge the report. The inquest commenced at about 9.15 a.m. and in the meantime body was locked in the Mortuary. There is no explanation by the prosecution as to when and on whose information police had reached the hospital. It is also not explained as to when the hospital authorities had reported murder at 5.30 a.m. what action was taken by the police authorities, i.e. what was done between 5.30 a.m. to 9.15 a.m. Why the police took 2 and 1/2 hours to reach the hospital? The inquest indicates that it commenced after lodging of the F.I.R. as the time and date of the F.I.R. and the name of the first informant has been mentioned therein. PW-1 has admitted that F.I.R. was scribed by Kalicharan not on his dictation rather it was written on the dictation of the police officer (Daroga Ji) to whom he narrated the whole story. From the above conspectus of facts, it is unbelievable that the First Information Report came into picture at 5.30 a.m. It seems to us clearly that the first informant was on duty when the incident had occurred. He reached the hospital after 8.00 a.m. when his duty was over or may be sometime before that on hearing the news of the murder of his wife and, thereafter, he went to the police station to lodge the report. But by that time, police were already intimated about the murder through the letter sent by the hospital. In any eventuality, the time of lodging of Chik F.I.R. could not be same as the time when letter of the hospital was received in the police station and both could not be entered at G.D. No. 9, 5.30 a.m. In other words, it seems impossible from the above circumstances culled out from the record that the first information report was lodged at 5.30 a.m. The whole gamut of evidence on record clearly prove the F.I.R. being an Ante-timed report having been lodged after deliberations of the police officer (Station house Officer) with the first informant. The first informant has been proved to be a liar considering all surrounding circumstances as his testimony being full of concoctions and contradictions seems a cooked up story. The first informant has been proved to be a liar considering all surrounding circumstances as his testimony being full of concoctions and contradictions seems a cooked up story. It seems to us that PW-1 was projected as an eye witness by the Investigating Officer in an overzealous effort to solve the crime. Had the Investigating Officer entered in the witness box, some light could have been thrown on all these aspects bothering the Court. But unfortunately, that could not happen. We are, however, of the opinion that the effort of the prosecution to prove its case by producing a liar in the witness box creates not only a scar but a deep dent in its story. It is always the duty of the prosecution to prove its case by producing truthful and trustworthy witnesses may be only one. The quality and not the quantity of witnesses is important. Any effort of the prosecution to prove its case by producing untrustworthy or untruthful witnesses has to be viewed seriously. In the instant case, the prosecution is guilty of bringing false evidence before a court of law and this act of it makes its story untrue from the beginning. The residue, that is the testimony of PW-2, therefore, has to be sifted very carefully and with greater circumspection by the Court to assess as to whether the conviction can be based solely on the same. 20. It is argued before us on behalf of the appellant that the decision of the trial court to base the conviction on the sole testimony of PW-2 is faulty, in as much as, PW-2 cannot but be said to be a tutored witness. A clear suggestion was given by the defence to PW-2 during the course of examination that she was a tutored witness which could not be overruled from her reply. Once it is established that PW-1, the creator of the whole story, was telling a lie and the F.I.R. is a result of deliberation, it cannot be ruled out by all means that PW-2 was tutored to take the name of the assailant being accused Mohan. Placing the above-noted statement of PW-2, it is contended that she was tutored to take the name of Mohan as the main assailant. Placing the above-noted statement of PW-2, it is contended that she was tutored to take the name of Mohan as the main assailant. Further, as per the prosecution, there were three persons who were involved in the assault, looking to the version of PW-2, it is not possible for the prosecution to fix the liability for murder on accused Mohan and to prove that other two assailants only caught hold of deceased. It was, thus, not justifiable for the trial court to base the conviction on the testimony of solitary residue witness PW-2 who categorically admitted that she did not see the real assailant. 21. It is further urged that, the trial court has rested the conviction on the only evidence against the appellant which is voice recognizition by PW-2, a weak piece of evidence. Reliance is placed on judgment of the Kerala High court in Sainudeen vs. State of Kerala, (1992) Cri. L.J. 1644 and of the Supreme Court in Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar vs. State of Maharastra in Criminal Appeal No. 537 of 2009 decided on 9th March 2011 as also of M.P. High Court in Pratap Singh vs. State of M.P. in Criminal Appeal No. 601 of 2004 decided on 17.5.2017 to urge that identification of persons by voice is a risky proposition and it is not safe to base the conviction on identification of voice alone as there is always possibility of mistakes in identifying persons by voice. Accurate Voice identification is much more difficult than visual identification. The Courts have to be extremely cautious in basing conviction purely on the evidence of Voice identification. The ability of the individual to identify voice in general and the familiarity of the listener with the known voice; and even a confident recognition of a familiar voice by a listener, must be established beyond all reasonable doubts by cogent, positive, affirmative and assertive evidence. Voice can also be identified by means of voice identification parade. 22. It is vehemently contended by the learned Amicus Curiae that the court below has not taken due care while basing conviction solely on the identification of voice of assailant by PW-2 who was an old lady of about 70 years at the time of incident. No voice identification parade was done by the trial court to satisfy itself that she was able to identify voice of her neighbour. No voice identification parade was done by the trial court to satisfy itself that she was able to identify voice of her neighbour. Submission is that casual approach adopted by the trial court in treating the PW-2 as a truthful and reliable witness ignoring inconsistencies in her deposition has resulted in conviction of the appellant in absence of any cogent evidence. In fact the prosecution evidence as a whole is to be discarded and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 23. Learned A.G.A, on the other hand, relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Kripal Singh vs. State of U.P. 1965 AIR 712 vehemently urged that identification of the assailant by the injured witness Rajabeti PW-2 by voice was possible, in as much as, the appellant was her neighbour and she was well acquainted with his voice. It is contended that in the similar facts and circumstances, the Apex Court had upheld conviction on the testimony of witness who asserted that he was able to recognize the assailant and his other accomplices from their gait and voice. It was held therein that even in pitch dark night, it is possible to identify a person through the shape of his body, clothes, gait, manner of walking etc., and identification is possible by voice too. Submission is that the position of law in this regard is well settled with a long line of decisions by the Apex Court, one of them being Kedar Singh and Others vs. State of Bihar, 1998 SCC (Cri) 907. 24. Learned A.G.A further urged that PW-2, Rajabeti is an injured witness and for this reason her testimony on its own has efficacy and relevancy. The logic is that the witness who sustained injuries on her body would prove that she was present at the place of occurrence and had seen the occurrence by herself. Convincing evidence would be required to discredit an injured witness. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage being a stamped witness as his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable as it is unlikely that he spares the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate some-one else. The testimony of an injured witness is accorded special status in law. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage being a stamped witness as his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable as it is unlikely that he spares the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate some-one else. The testimony of an injured witness is accorded special status in law. Moreover, every discrepancy in the statement of witness cannot be treated as fatal as a discrepancy which does not affect the prosecution case materially cannot create an infirmity. Unless there are grounds for rejection of evidence of an injured witness on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein, it should be normally relied upon. 25. Considering the above, we may note at the outset, that there is no dispute about the legal principle with regard to the identification of the assailant being possible by voice only and that the evidence of an injured witness acquired special status in law has to be given due weightage. That, it is not possible for the Court to discard the testimony of an injured witness ordinarily. However, at the same time there cannot be a quarrel to the proposition that identification by voice is a weak piece of evidence. Court has to be extremely cautious in basing the conviction purely on the evidence of Voice identification. The evidence led by the prosecution must be cogent, positive, affirmative and assertive and must establish beyond all reasonable doubts that the witness had ability to identify voice and additionally there was sufficient opportunity for the witness to identify the assailant by voice only. There cannot be quarrel also to the proposition that conviction based on the identification of voice alone is somewhat risky and it will always depend on the facts of a case as to what weight has to be attached to a particular piece of evidence. If the Court is satisfied about the identification of persons by evidence of identification of voice alone, no rule of law prevents its acceptance as the sole basis for conviction. In any case, the assessment of prosecution evidence based on voice identification has to be made in the surrounding circumstances of an individual case. 26. If the Court is satisfied about the identification of persons by evidence of identification of voice alone, no rule of law prevents its acceptance as the sole basis for conviction. In any case, the assessment of prosecution evidence based on voice identification has to be made in the surrounding circumstances of an individual case. 26. It is settled law that the duty of the Court is to find out truth from the statement of witnesses as the whole body of the testimony cannot be rejected because witnesses were evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect. Minor discrepancies occurring in the statements of witness due to normal error of observation, normal error of memory, due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence cannot be given much importance. It is often seen that the witnesses tend to decorate their testimony so as to make it more acceptable for the fear of being rejected in a Court of law. An attempt has, thus, to be made to separate grain from chaff, truth from falsehood. Reference Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2008) 11 SCC 425 . 27. The Apex Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Kalki and Another, (1981) 2 SCC 752 , has held that normal discrepancies in evidence are always there even in the testimony of most honest and truthful witness. The Courts have to label the category to which discrepancies may be categorised. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not expected of a normal person. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of party's case, material discrepancies do so. That it is to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient or is sceptical on placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that such evidence must be discarded in all respects as well. It is held that the doctrine “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments. It is held that the doctrine “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments. Reference Sohrab S/o Belinayata and Another vs. State of M.P. (1972) 3 SCC 751 and Ugar Ahir vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277 . 28. Coming to the applicability of the principle of “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” it was held in Nisar Ali vs. State of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 366 that even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused. It is the duty of the Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars taking aid of the said doctrine. The maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” (false in one thing, false in everything) has not received general acceptance in different jurisdiction in India, nor has this maxim came to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called a mandatory rule of evidence.” 29. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called a mandatory rule of evidence.” 29. However, it was enunciated by the Apex Court in Zwinglee Ariel vs. State of M.P. AIR 1954 SC 15 and followed in Balaka Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 511 that in the process of sifting or assessment of weight of evidence, where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is discard the evidence in toto. The same is true from the observations in Sohrab also. This principle has further been noted with approval in a recent decision of the Apex Court in Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana (supra) wherein on acquittal of other accused persons, it was urged that the evidence was partisan, lacks cogency and credibility and could not be made basis to convict the appellant therein. In that case, the trial court had directed the acquittal of the co-accused whereas the appellant was convicted on the basis of identification of his voice. The High court and the Apex Court had held therein that identification was possible, particularly when the accused was the grandson of the witness. Further, reliance was placed therein on the decision in Anwar Hussain vs. State of U.P. (1982) 1 SCC 491 , to hold that in a dark night, ocular identification may be difficult in some cases but if a person is acquainted and closely related to another, from the manner of speech, gait and voice, identification is possible. 30. In light of the above legal position, coming to the facts of the instant case, once we have held that the First Information Report is an Ante-timed report and the prosecution has deliberately presented a false evidence by projecting husband of deceased as an eye witness we cannot rule out the possibility of false implication of the appellant. 30. In light of the above legal position, coming to the facts of the instant case, once we have held that the First Information Report is an Ante-timed report and the prosecution has deliberately presented a false evidence by projecting husband of deceased as an eye witness we cannot rule out the possibility of false implication of the appellant. The F.I.R. which is entire edifice and fabric of the prosecution case has been demolished as it lost its authenticity. In our opinion, if the prosecution could go to the extent of producing a false evidence by projecting the husband of deceased as an eye witness, though he was not, it could have added the name of the appellant also falsely. We may also note that though there is no evidence of animosity between the prosecution party and the appellant, but being neighbour or having fought over a dispute relating to a common drain, false implication of appellant by the prosecution witness, (husband of the deceased), creator of the story, cannot be said to be a remote possibility. 31. Sole remaining witness PW-2 though is an injured witness but she admitted that she did not see the faces of assailants as it was pitch dark. In her examination-in-chief, PW-2 made contradictory statements as to the presence of first informant PW-1. In her examination-in-chief, in the first sentence she stated that no one had seen the incident and in the very next sentence she states that PW-1 was behind them at a distance of about 50 paces. In third sentence, she denied the presence of PW-1 on the spot by saying that she did not remember that apart from Laxmi Narayan and Jamuna, wife of Param, who else came on the spot. Her deposition in examination-in-chief itself shows that she was not stating the presence of PW-1 on the spot of crime on her own volition. Further, in the cross-examination, PW-2 admitted that there was pitch dark and she did not see the faces of three assailants including accused Mohan. 32. The injuries on the person of PW-2 were simple in nature, but she stated that she remained unconscious for two days. The discrepancies in the statement of PW-2 in her examination-in-chief extracted in the foregoing paragraphs cannot be said to be normal discrepancies which occurred due to normal error of observance or memory due to lapse of time. 32. The injuries on the person of PW-2 were simple in nature, but she stated that she remained unconscious for two days. The discrepancies in the statement of PW-2 in her examination-in-chief extracted in the foregoing paragraphs cannot be said to be normal discrepancies which occurred due to normal error of observance or memory due to lapse of time. The statement of PW-2 was recorded after four years of the incident, it, therefore, cannot also be accepted that discrepancy in her evidence had occurred due to mental disposition of the witness due to shock and horror she suffered at the time of occurrence. It seems to us that PW-2 gave a parrot-like version of the entire case in her statement in examination-in-chief while describing the assault on the deceased and herself. 33. Moreover, though in the cross-examination, she accepted that she had not seen the assailant being the appellant as it was pitch dark but deposed to have recognized him by three words ^^rqe tkvksa cgw** (spoken by the appellant). To us, the sentence spoken by assailant is so short that it cannot be accepted that PW-2 was confident enough to recognize the assailant being the appellant by his voice. When confronted, in the cross-examination, PW-2 admitted that had Mohan not spoken those words, she could not know as to who had assaulted them. 34. It is not understandable why the prosecution introduced PW-1 when there was another eye-witness. The effort of the prosecution to prove the presence of PW-1 at the place of occurrence through the inconsistent statement of PW-2, (the injured witness) is a material embellishment and inherent discrepancy in the prosecution story. 35. Having read the whole testimony of both prosecution witnesses, namely PW-1 and PW-2, we find that the ocular evidence of prosecution witnesses is so inextricably mixed up that it is not possible to sever one from the other. Having discarded the testimony of PW-1 being full of falsity, it would be dangerous to accept the statement of PW-2 to base the conviction of the appellant. We make it clear that we can not and we are not doubting the presence of PW-2 at the place of occurrence but we have a serious doubt about her ability to identify the main assailant being the appellant and her creditworthiness too. We make it clear that we can not and we are not doubting the presence of PW-2 at the place of occurrence but we have a serious doubt about her ability to identify the main assailant being the appellant and her creditworthiness too. Additionally, the statement of PW-1 about the enmity between his family and the appellant in the first information report also raises a doubt in the mind of the Court with regard to the possibility of false implication of appellant in the crime. In totality of facts and circumstances of the present case, we find it difficult to separate grain of truth from the chaff of falsehood, the only course open before us, therefore, is to discard the evidence in toto. We are afraid to base the conviction on the building of prosecution evidence, edifice of which is a blatant lie. 36. It appears to us that the trial court was swayed away by the only fact that PW-2 was an injured witness and as such her presence at the scene of occurrence was proved and, thus, giving undue weightage to her testimony, ignoring all material contradictions therein, she was treated as a truthful witness. According to us, the trial court has not taken proper care and due precaution to ascertain the truthfulness of the prosecution witnesses. Further, there were three assailants and no effort was made by the trial court to ascertain as to whether PW-2 (a 70 years old lady) was able to recognize voice of the appellant. No voice identification parade was conducted. 37. It is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts and in case of any doubt, (reasonable one), benefit must go in favour of the accused. 38. Taking into consideration the entire sequence of events, the ocular evidence and the surrounding circumstances, we find that the prosecution has failed to prove its story by producing truthful witnesses. The benefit of doubt which arose in the minds of the Court regarding truthfulness of the case of the prosecution has to go in favour of the accused. And as such, giving benefit of doubt to the appellant, we set aside the conviction of the appellant for the offences under Sections 302 and 307 IPC. 39. The benefit of doubt which arose in the minds of the Court regarding truthfulness of the case of the prosecution has to go in favour of the accused. And as such, giving benefit of doubt to the appellant, we set aside the conviction of the appellant for the offences under Sections 302 and 307 IPC. 39. Accordingly, the judgment and order dated 18.5.1996 passed by the IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Jhansi in Sessions Trial No. 144 of 1991, State vs. Mohan @ Mohan Singh, arising out of Case Crime No. 253 of 1991, Police Station- Kotwali, District-Jhansi, convicting and sentencing the accused-appellant Mohan @ Mohan Singh, under Sections 307, 302 IPC is set aside. The accused-appellant Mohan @ Mohan Singh is acquitted of all the offences/charges. 40. The appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. 41. The accused-appellant Mohan @ Mohan Singh is on bail. His whereabouts are not known. Necessary steps shall be taken by the court below to notify this judgment to all concerned. 42. Certify this judgment to the court below for information and necessary compliance. 43. The compliance report be furnished to this Court through the Registrar General, High Court, Allahabad within one month. 44. Ms. Mahima Maurya, learned Advocate rendered valuable assistance to the Court. The Court quantifies Rs. 15,000/- to be paid to Ms. Mahima Maurya, Advocate towards fee for the able assistance provided by her in hearing of this Criminal Appeal. The said payment shall be made to Ms. Mahima Maurya, Advocate by the Registry of the Court within the shortest possible time.