JUDGMENT : S.N. Pathak, J. Heard the parties through video conferencing. 2. Petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 01.08.2016 whereby he has been reverted to the post of Constable from the post of A.S.I. for two years. Petitioner has further prayed for quashing the order dated 11.08.2016, passed in Departmental Appeal No.1606 of 2016, by the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Palamau Region, Daltonganj, affirming the order of punishment. It has also been prayed for quashing the order dated 12.06.2017, passed by the Director General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi, whereby revision filed by the petitioner has been rejected. 3. As per the factual matrix, while the petitioner was posted as Assistant Sub Inspector of Police at Manika Police Station, Latehar, he was given the charge of a case i.e. Manika P.S. Case No. 40 of 2016 dated 06.06.2016 registered under Section 263/266 of the I.P.C for investigation. It is apparent that the said case was registered for kidnapping of a minor girl, which was lodged by her father and upon receipt of the charge, petitioner started investigation of the said case. On 19.06.2016, news was published in the daily newspaper, Hindustan Times that a minor girl was subjected to inhumane torture tortured at Manika P.S. and as a result of which, she became unconscious. Thereafter, the Hon’ble High Court had taken cognizance of the matter and directed respondent-State to file affidavit mentioning therein that what steps were taken against the Officers responsible for the said incident. Consequently, the respondents vide memo No. 1357 dated 20.06.2016 issued show-cause to the petitioner for the charges that he has not properly investigated the case being Manika P.S. Case No. 40 of 2016. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 20.06.2016, whereby he has categorically denied the charges levelled against him. However, finding the reply of the petitioner being not satisfactory, the respondent started departmental proceeding against him by appointing Enquiry Officer vide memo dated 22.06.2016. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and submitted his report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. Upon receipt of the enquiry report, the respondents issued order of punishment dated 01.08.2016. Aggrieved by the same, petitioner preferred a Departmental Appeal No. 1606 of 2016 and the said appeal stood dismissed vide order dated 11.08.2016, confirming the order of punishment. Upon receipt of the enquiry report, the respondents issued order of punishment dated 01.08.2016. Aggrieved by the same, petitioner preferred a Departmental Appeal No. 1606 of 2016 and the said appeal stood dismissed vide order dated 11.08.2016, confirming the order of punishment. Thereafter, the petitioner has also exhausted the remedy of filing revision before the D.G.P., Jharkhand which has been summarily rejected by the D.G.P. vide order dated 12.06.2017. Hence, the petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court for redressal of his grievances. 4. Mr. Abhay Kumar Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner strenuously urges that the action of the respondent is whimsical, arbitrary and against the cardinal principle of natural justice and amounts to colourable exercise of power. Learned counsel submits that without issuing second show-cause notice or supply of the enquiry report, the order of punishment has been passed against the petitioner and as such, it amounts to violation of cardinal principle of natural justice. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner has investigated the matter after taking permission from the superior authority and during the interrogation, female constables and father of the minor girl was also present at the spot. Learned counsel further argues that from a bare perusal of the order passed by the Director General of Police, it is apparent that none of the points raised by the petitioner in the revision has been considered nor even any reasoning whatsoever has been assigned while dismissing the revision preferred by the petitioner and hence, the order passed by the appellate authority is wholly arbitrary and illegal and non-speaking order and not sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel further argues that during the departmental proceeding even the evidences were collected in favour of the petitioner but surprisingly the order of punishment has been passed against him. Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid facts and reasons, it is crystal clear that the petitioner has been made escape goat on the basis of false media news and consequently, he has been punished though he was innocent. 5. Learned counsel further submits that earlier he had filed W.P.(S). Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid facts and reasons, it is crystal clear that the petitioner has been made escape goat on the basis of false media news and consequently, he has been punished though he was innocent. 5. Learned counsel further submits that earlier he had filed W.P.(S). No. 7371 of 2016 praying therein for a direction to the respondents specially respondent no.2 to pass appropriate order on the revision application filed against the order passed in Appeal Case No.1606 of 2016 passed by the D.I.G, Palamau Region vide memo dated 11.08.2016 whereby the punishment against the petitioner has been confirmed in the appeal pertaining to reversion of the petitioner to the post of Constable for two years from the post of A.S.I. This Hon’ble Court vide order dated 13.02.2017, disposed of the said writ application with a direction to the respondent No. 2 to dispose of the revision application dated 29.08.2016, within a period of two months. 6. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Mr. Rahul Kamlesh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that while the petitioner was posted at Manika Police Station, he was given the charge of investigation of Manika P.S. Case No. 40 of 2016. During the course of investigation, petitioner called, one Nandani Kumari with her parents. However, when the said Nandani Kumari returned to her home she fell ill and was admitted in a Hospital at Satbarwa but due to her serious condition, she was referred to RIMS, Ranchi. Learned counsel submits that though Nandani Kumari was neither the informant of the said case nor an accused rather, she was only a witness, but the petitioner violating the provisions enshrined under Juvenile Justice Act and Juvenile Justice Rules and without taking due permission from his Superior Officers has called the said Nandani Kumari to the Manika Police Station where her condition became serious. Consequent thereto, the petitioner was suspended for being indiscipline, careless and incompetent Police Officer and further, after issuance of show-cause notice, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. In the departmental proceeding several witnesses were examined and petitioner was given opportunity to cross-examine them. Thereafter, the enquiry officer submitted his report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. In the departmental proceeding several witnesses were examined and petitioner was given opportunity to cross-examine them. Thereafter, the enquiry officer submitted his report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. Upon receipt of the enquiry report, the respondent-authorities demoted the petitioner from the post of A.S.I. to Constable for two years. Being aggrieved by his punishment order, the petitioner has filed memo of appeal and thereafter, the revision but both were rejected and as such, the order of punishment is justified. 7. So far as contention of the petitioner that without providing the copy of the enquiry report and without issuance of second show-cause notice, the order of punishment has been passed, learned counsel submits that from perusal of Annexure-D to the counter-affidavit it is clear that copy of the enquiry report was received by the petitioner and further, since the charges levelled against the petitioner were grave in nature which was also proved in the departmental proceeding, there was no need for issuance of second show-cause notice. Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid reasons, there is no merit in the instant writ application, the same is fit to be dismissed outrightly. 8. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of considered view that the main issue involved in this writ petition is whether a copy of enquiry report along with second show-cause notice was served upon the Petitioner or not, and whether it was an essential ingredient prior to infliction of major punishments and if the copy of enquiry report and second show-cause notice were not served upon the petitioner, what would have been the effect of that upon the fate of case? 9. Before dealing with the aforesaid issues, firstly we have to go through Rule 828 of the Police Mannual, which reads as under: “828. Infliction of major punishments. – (a) Of the punishments permitted by Rule 824, the items in serial (a) to (f) of that rule shall be regarded as major punishments, and shall be inflicted by an officer not below the rank of Superintendent. Infliction of major punishments. – (a) Of the punishments permitted by Rule 824, the items in serial (a) to (f) of that rule shall be regarded as major punishments, and shall be inflicted by an officer not below the rank of Superintendent. (b) Without prejudice to the provision of the Public Servants Enquiries Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction shall be passed on any police officer (other than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal court) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself." 10. As regards the issue as to whether the delinquent is entitled for copy of the enquiry report, the said issue fell for consideration before the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted herein below: “27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer’s report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee’s right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings. 28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him”. The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that “where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed”, it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee’s reply to the enquiry officer’s report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer’s report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges. 29. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges. 29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee’s right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice. 30. Hence the incidental questions raised above may be answered as follows: (i) Since the denial of the report of the Inquiry Officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject. (ii) Since the denial of the report of the enquiry officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject: "(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges." Thus the article makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. The article, however, cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing the employee. What is further, Article 311(2) applies only to members of the civil services of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or to the holders of the civil posts under the Union or a State. In the matter of all punishments both Government servants and others are governed by their service rules. Whenever, therefore, the service rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded and when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the enquiry officer’s report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment. (iii) Since it is the right of the employee to have the report to defend himself effectively and he would not know in advance whether the report is in his favour or against him, it will not be proper to construe his failure to ask for the report, as the waiver of his right. Whether, therefore, the employee asks for the report or not, the report has to be furnished to him. (iv) In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the enquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan case should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly. (v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.” 11. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents is also not well founded as in para-15 of the counter-affidavit it has been specifically stated that copy of enquiry report has already been received by the petitioner. It appears that learned counsel for the respondents tried its level best to misguide the Court. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents is also not well founded as in para-15 of the counter-affidavit it has been specifically stated that copy of enquiry report has already been received by the petitioner. It appears that learned counsel for the respondents tried its level best to misguide the Court. Admittedly, the enquiry report has been received/furnished to the delinquent on 19.08.2016, whereas, the order of punishment was passed on 01.08.2016 itself and the appellate authority affirmed the punishment order on 11.08.2016. Both the orders were based on the enquiry report, which was dated 26.07.2016. Perhaps the authorities were well aware of the settled law that delinquent is entitled for a copy of the enquiry report along with second show-cause notice before passing the order of punishment and as such, the copy of enquiry report was served to the petitioner after the appellate authority affirmed the order of punishment, to save their skin. As per the settled law, the delinquent was entitled for the copy of enquiry report along with 2nd show-cause notice after submission of enquiry report and before the disciplinary authority passed the order and not after the appellate order is passed. On this count, let it be made clear that the authorities have acted with malafide intention by serving the copy of the enquiry report after passing of the appellate order. It appears that entire disciplinary proceeding is full of irregularities and fallacy. 12. The second contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the delinquent was not entitled for second show-cause notice in view of 42nd amendment has also been elaborately dealt with by the Constitutional Bench in Karunakar’s case (supra). The said issue also fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment reproduced herein below: “15. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to the case of State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit decided by a Constitution Bench of this Court. A question arose regarding the contents of the second show-cause notice when the Government accepts, rejects or partly accepts or partly rejects the findings of the enquiry officer. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to the case of State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit decided by a Constitution Bench of this Court. A question arose regarding the contents of the second show-cause notice when the Government accepts, rejects or partly accepts or partly rejects the findings of the enquiry officer. Even though that case relates to Article 311(2) before its deletion by the 42nd Amendment, the principle laid down therein, at p. 10 of the Report, when read along with the decision of this Court in Karunakar case will clearly apply here. The Court observed at SCR pp. 10-11 as follows:- "We ought, however, to add that if the dismissing authority differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report, it is necessary that its provisional conclusions in that behalf should be specified in the second notice. It may be that the report makes findings in favour of the delinquent officer, but the dismissing authority disagrees with the said findings and proceeds to issue the notice under Article 311(2). In such a case, it would obviously be necessary that the dismissing authority should expressly state that it differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report and then indicate the nature of the action proposed to be taken against the delinquent officer. Without such an express statement in the notice, it would be impossible to issue the notice at all. There may also be cases in which the enquiry report may make findings in favour of the delinquent officer on some issues and against him on some other issues. That is precisely what has happened in the present case. If the dismissing authority accepts all the said findings in their entirety, it is another matter: but if the dismissing authority accepts the findings recorded against the delinquent officer and differs from some or all of those recorded in his favour and proceeds to specify the nature of the action proposed to be taken on its own conclusions, it would be necessary that the said conclusions should be briefly indicated in the notice. In this category of cases, the action proposed to be taken would be based not only on the findings recorded against the delinquent officer in the enquiry report, but also on the view of the dismissing authority that the other charges not held proved by the enquiring officer are, according to the dismissing authority, proved. In order to give the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under Article 311(2), it is essential that the conclusions provisionally reached by the dismissing authority must, in such cases, be specified in the notice. But where the dismissing authority purports to proceed to issue the notice against the delinquent officer after accepting the enquiry report in its entirety, it cannot be said that it is essential that the dismissing authority must say that it has so accepted the report. As we have already indicated, it is desirable that even in such cases a statement to that effect should be made. But we do not think that the words used in Article 311(2) justify the view that the failure to make such a statement amounts to contravention of Article 311(2). In dealing with this point, we must bear in mind the fact that a copy of the enquiry report had been enclosed with the notice, and so, reading the notice in common sense manner, the respondent would not have found any difficulty in realising that the action proposed to be taken against him proceeded on the basis that the appellants had accepted the conclusions of the enquiring officer in their entirety." 16. In Karunakar case the question arose whether after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, when the enquiry officer was other than a disciplinary authority, was the delinquent employee entitled to a copy of the enquiry report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority takes decision on the question of guilt of the delinquent. It was sought to be contended in that case that as the right to show cause against the penalty proposed to be levied had been taken away by the 42nd Amendment, therefore, there was no necessity to give to the delinquent a copy of the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority took the final decision as to whether to impose a penalty or not. Explaining the effect of the 42nd Amendment the Constitution Bench at p. 755 observed that ; "All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer’s report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges." The Court explained that the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, the enquiry officer’s report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. It is the second right which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment but the right of the charged officer to receive the report of the enquiry officer was an essential part of the first stage itself. This was expressed by the Court in the following words: "26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the enquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute an additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer’s findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it." 17. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case4 the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case4 the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority.” 13. Summing up, it can be comfortably said that the principle of natural justice would demand that disciplinary authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity to file representation before the disciplinary authority record its findings on the charges framed against the deliquent officer. 14. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. K.K. Verma, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 494 , considering all the judgments on the point of supply of enquiry report to the delinquent before passing the punishment order and also after the 42nd amendment, has observed as under: “32. Thus the right to represent against the findings in the inquiry report to prove one's innocence is distinct from the right to represent against the proposed penalty. It is only the second right to represent against the proposed penalty which is taken away by the 42nd Amendment. The right to represent against the findings in the report is not disturbed in any way. It is only the second right to represent against the proposed penalty which is taken away by the 42nd Amendment. The right to represent against the findings in the report is not disturbed in any way. In fact, any denial thereof will make the final order vulnerable.” 15. It appears that the order of punishment is in the nature of major punishment in terms of Rule 828 read with Rule 852 of Jharkhand Police Manual and, therefore, the requirement of issuance of second show-cause notice enclosing the copy of the enquiry report is also a sine qua non, as held by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Md. Ramzan Khan, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1074 , which has been constantly followed thereafter by the Courts. In view of the legal propositions enunciated in the aforesaid judgments, it can comfortably be said that the order of punishment has been passed without following the aforesaid procedure, which is in complete violation of the settled legal position in conduct of departmental proceeding in respect of a public servant as required under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 16. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, since none of the authorities have taken into consideration the aforesaid aspects and have decided the case of the petitioner mechanically, the impugned orders dated 01.08.2016 (punishment order), dated 11.08.2016 (appellate order) and dated 12.06.2017 (order passed in revision) are hereby quashed and set aside. The proper course after setting aside the aforesaid orders could have been to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority but since the petitioner has already completed the terms of punishment, it would be in the interest of justice if 25% of the difference of salary for the period of punishment is paid to the petitioner, instead of remanding the matter back for fresh enquiry. 17. Accordingly, I hereby direct the respondents to pay 25% of the difference of salary for the period of punishment to the petitioner, in accordance with law, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 18. Resultantly, the writ petition stands allowed. 19. No order as to cost.