JUDGMENT : 1. These two first appeals may be disposed of by a common judgment although they arise from two separate judgments dated 31.1.2003 in the Original Suits 6 and 7/1996 on the file of Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Hunsur. Both the suits are for specific performance of contract involving identical issues. The plaintiffs in O.S.6/1996 is the wife of the plaintiff in O.S.7/1996. For the sake of convenience, the plaintiff in O.S.6/1996 is referred to as the first plaintiff and the plaintiff in O.S.7/1996 is referred to as the second plaintiff. The defendants in both the suits are common and they are the appellants in these two appeals. 2. The substance of pleadings of both the suits is as follows : On 27.3.1995, the defendants executed two agreements of sale, one in favour of the first plaintiff and the other in favour of the second plaintiff. The defendants agreed to sell to the first plaintiff 38 guntas and 1.03 acres of lands in Sy. Nos. 133/8 and 133/9 respectively of Mookanahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Hunsur Taluk, for a consideration of Rs.1,12,000/-. Likewise, they agreed to sell to the second plaintiff 1.26 acres of land in S. No. 119 of Beejiganahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Hunsur Taluk, for a sale consideration of Rs.1,68,000/-. At the time of contract, the defendants received Rs.25,000/-from each of the plaintiffs towards earnest money and agreed to complete the sale transaction on or before 31.5.1995. It was agreed between the parties that each plaintiff should make further payment of Rs.25,000/-on 12.4.1995 and that the defendants should produce the original documents of the properties, clear the loans that they had obtained from the State Bank of Mysore and the Agricultural Development Bank, Hunsur, and produce the loan clearance certificates. But on 30.5.1995, the defendants met the plaintiffs, appraised them of their inability to obtain the documents and clear the bank loans and requested them to extend the time till 30.6.1995. The plaintiffs agreed for this, and each of them advanced another Rs.40,000/-to the defendants who then executed one more agreement in favour of each of the plaintiffs on 30.5.1995. As the plaintiffs have stated, the defendants showed no interest to produce the documents of the properties and the loan clearance certificates, and to complete the sale transactions by receiving the remaining sale consideration amount from them. As the plaintiffs have stated, the defendants showed no interest to produce the documents of the properties and the loan clearance certificates, and to complete the sale transactions by receiving the remaining sale consideration amount from them. Ultimately on 30.6.1995, the plaintiffs caused legal notices issued to the defendants demanding of them specific performance of the agreements and then filed the suits. 3. The defendants admit to have executed agreements on 27.3.1995 and 30.5.1995. Their specific defences are that when they entered into contract with the plaintiffs, they had brought to their notice that they were constrained to sell the properties to them as they had to discharge the debts and repurchase another property which they had sold conditionally. They suggested to the plaintiffs to withhold the money due by them to the banks and then obtain sale deeds from them. They were ready to incorporate an endorsement in the sale deeds about deductions made from the balance of sale consideration. They were ready to execute the sale deed on 30.6.1995 and for this purpose, they made certain payments to the banks. On 30.6.1995, they went to the office of Sub-Registrar for executing and registering the sale deed. Though they waited there from 10.30 AM to 5.30 PM, the plaintiffs did not turn up. They did not show any interest to obtain sale deeds from them though they were ready. Even when they replied to the plaintiffs’ notices, they made it clear that they were ready to execute the sale deeds and that the plaintiffs could get the sale deeds executed within three days. The plaintiffs did not respond. After lapse of a long time, seeing the land value in and around Hunsur Town having gone up, the plaintiffs instituted the suits to take unfair advantage. 4. The main issue that arose in both the suits was with regard to plaintiffs’ readiness and willingness. Having answered this issue in favour of plaintiffs, the trial court found that that the plaintiffs were entitled to decree of specific performance. The point that arises for discussion now is also on the same issue. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants Sri G.Papi Reddy, raised a main contention that the first agreement dated 27.3.1995 stipulated that the entire sale transaction should be completed on or before 31.5.1995, therefore time was essence of the contract. The point that arises for discussion now is also on the same issue. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants Sri G.Papi Reddy, raised a main contention that the first agreement dated 27.3.1995 stipulated that the entire sale transaction should be completed on or before 31.5.1995, therefore time was essence of the contract. The defendants wanted to clear the bank loans and repurchase their another property. This was the reason for their agreeing to sell the suit properties to the plaintiffs. They were ready with all the documents. It might be a fact that there came into existence another agreement on 30.5.1995, but this agreement did not extend time for completion of sale transaction beyond 30.6.1995. The defendants were ready to execute the sale deed and for this purpose they went to Sub-Registrar’s office on 30.6.1995 and were waiting there till 5.30 PM, but the plaintiffs did not come. Even when they replied to plaintiffs’ notices, they stated that they were ready to execute the sale deeds and that the plaintiffs’ could approach them within three days. Highlighting these points, Sri G.Papi Reddy argued that all these circumstances were clearly indicative of the fact that time was essence of the contract and that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing. 6. Sri G.Balakrishna Shastry for the respondents/plaintiffs argued that there did not exist any circumstance warranting to understand the contract to be performed within a time period. No doubt in the first agreement it was mentioned that sale was to be completed on or before 31.5.1995; but on 30.5.1995, another agreement came into existence at the instance of the defendants, which they also admitted. The oral evidence shows that the defendants were not ready with any document relating to property and failed to produce a document relating to clearance of bank loan. The defendants’ reply as per Ex.P4 contains certain assertions that are contrary to the agreements, and oral evidence of DW1 is also to the same effect, which is barred under section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. If really the defendants had cleared the bank loan, they should have produced a document as to on what date the loan was cleared. The document that they produced as per Ex.D2 does not indicate that loan was cleared before 30.6.1995. The trial court has rightly held that the defendants have come up with a false case. If really the defendants had cleared the bank loan, they should have produced a document as to on what date the loan was cleared. The document that they produced as per Ex.D2 does not indicate that loan was cleared before 30.6.1995. The trial court has rightly held that the defendants have come up with a false case. The plaintiffs had paid major part of sale consideration. They had capacity to pay the balance. They succeeded in proving that they were ready to perform their part of contract. 7. The trial court has held that in the first agreement dated 27.3.1995, i.e., Ex.P1 though it is mentioned that each plaintiff was obligated to pay Rs.25,000/-to the defendants on or before 12.4.1995, in view of execution of another agreement on 30.5.1995, and receipt of Rs.40,000/-from each plaintiff, there was waiver of condition to make that payment on 12.4.1995, and the second agreement resulted in renewal of contract. Having held so, the trial court appears to have proceeded to examine the defendants’ obligations as found in the agreements. It has held that because the defendants have failed to obtain necessary documents, the plaintiffs did not make payment of balance of sale consideration. But the plaintiffs have stated to be ready and willing to perform their part of contract, and that they caused a legal notice issued as per Ex.P3 and these circumstances prove that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of contract. 8. Before re-appreciating the evidence, if reference to section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act is made, it becomes very clear that the plaintiff has to prove that he has always been ready and willing to perform only the essential terms of the contract to be performed by him. He need not prove those terms the performance of which are prevented or waived by the defendants. Therefore, what is to be examined is as to what are the essential terms to be performed by the plaintiffs? To answer this, only agreements should be looked into, and the oral evidence of the witnesses only help assess their understanding of the terms of the agreement and their conduct. In Ex.P1, as already stated, there is a clause as to making payment of Rs.25,000/-on 12.4.1995. This payment was not made. To answer this, only agreements should be looked into, and the oral evidence of the witnesses only help assess their understanding of the terms of the agreement and their conduct. In Ex.P1, as already stated, there is a clause as to making payment of Rs.25,000/-on 12.4.1995. This payment was not made. The plaintiff No.2 who adduced evidence as PW1 in his suit might have answered in the cross-examination that he made payment of Rs.25,000/-on 12.4.1995, but this is not correct. The case of the plaintiffs is that on 30.5.1995, on the insistence of the defendants, another agreement as per Ex.P2 came into existence and on that day, they received Rs.25,000/-from each of the plaintiffs and this is not disputed by the defendants. Therefore, incorrect answer of second plaintiff may not be given so much of importance. As rightly held by the trial court, the plaintiffs’ readiness and willingness cannot be examined from the terms set out in Ex.P1 Only the terms and conditions found in Ex.P2 are to be considered. Ex.P2 stipulates that the plaintiffs were to pay the balance of sale consideration on the date when the sale deed was supposed to be executed and registered, i.e., 30.6.1995. That means all that the plaintiffs were required to prove was that they had capacity to pay the remaining consideration amount, and nothing more. Both the plaintiffs have pleaded about their readiness and willingness and they stated so in their affidavits filed in lieu of examination in chief. If their cross-examination is seen, it appears that they have not been seriously cross-examined on this aspect. The first plaintiff has answered that they (she and second plaintiff) had sufficient money to get the sale deed executed; that they were brick manufacturers and they were rotating the money in several transaction. The second plaintiff has also stated in the cross-examination that he had sufficient money with him as on 30.6.1995, 21.7.1995 and at the time of filing of the suits. He has also stated that he had sold a house for Rs.3,34,000/-and that he had kept that money in his house. He admits that he had no document to show that he has ready cash. He has also stated that he had sold a house for Rs.3,34,000/-and that he had kept that money in his house. He admits that he had no document to show that he has ready cash. Sri G.Papi Reddy, learned counsel for appellants, in this context has placed reliance on a judgment of Division Bench of this court in the case of Sri Punny Akat Philip Raju, since dead by L.Rs vs Sri Dinesh Reddy [ILR 2016 KAR 2252] and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji vs Shri Sita Ram Thapar [ AIR 1996 SC 2095 ]. The Division Bench of this court in Sri Punny Akat Philip Raju has held as below : - “34. Therefore, mere stepping into the witness box and saying on oath that he is ready with the balance sale consideration or that he is going to borrow money from any financial institution or that he has got sufficient funds in his Bank accounts or that he has kept money in Fixed Deposit, without that oral evidence is challenged in cross-examination or not. The plaintiff has to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he possessed the requisite funds. He has to produce such documentary evidence, which would enable the Court to come to the conclusion that plaintiff is ready with the requisite balance sale consideration to complete the sale transaction. If no evidence is adduced in this regard by way of documentary evidence, no prudent man would come to the conclusion that the person has proved the possession of funds. In the absence of any such documentary evidence being produced, it is a case of plaintiff's case being not proved. Plaintiff cannot expect the Court to pass a decree for specific performance of a contract of sale when the plaintiff has not proved his readiness to perform his part of the contract”. evidence being supported by documentary evidence will not prove the plaintiff's readiness to pay the balance sale consideration. It is immaterial whether such. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji (supra) has observed, “2. ……. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff’s part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. It is immaterial whether such. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji (supra) has observed, “2. ……. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff’s part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The Court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the petitioner/plaintiff was not ready nor capacity to perform his part of the contract as he had no financial capacity to pay the consideration in cash as contracted and intended to bite for the time which disentitles him as time is the essence of the contract”. (emphasis supplied) 10. No doubt, as has been held in Sri Punny Akat Philip Raju (supra), production of a document evidencing the availability of money strengthens the case of plaintiff. But it is to be noted here that necessity to produce a document arises when the plaintiff asserts to have kept the money in deposit or in some other form of security. In a circumstance where the plaintiffs state that he is capable of making payment and his financial capacity is not doubted, non-production of a document itself cannot be unfavourably considered against the plaintiff. That is the reason why in His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji (supra), it is held by the Supreme Court that the attending circumstances and the plaintiff’s conduct are the factors that decide whether plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Now in this case, the argument of G.Papi Reddy is that the plaintiffs have not produced a document to show that they had money, but the defendants do not dispute the plaintiffs’ financial capacity. The first plaintiff has stated that they are brick manufacturers, and the second plaintiff has stated that he had sold a house, and in that connection, had received Rs.3,34,000/-and he had kept that money in his house. There is no further suggestion to him that he had not sold any house; he was not asked to produce a copy of the sale deed in proof of having sold the house. There is no further suggestion to him that he had not sold any house; he was not asked to produce a copy of the sale deed in proof of having sold the house. Moreover, explanation (i) to section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act states that the plaintiff need not deposit any money before the court and he may deposit when the court directs him to deposit. Section 28 also envisages that the plaintiff has to deposit the money within the given time after the decree. The plaintiffs caused a legal notice issued to the defendants as per Ex.P3 on 30.6.1995 itself. They said that they were ready to make payment of the balance and obtain sale deed from them. To this notice the defendants replied as per Ex.P4 stating that actually they were waiting for the plaintiffs at the Sub-Registrar’s office till 5.30 PM, for the purpose of executing the sale deed and that the plaintiffs did not go there. They also further stated in Ex.P4 that the plaintiffs could obtain the sale deed within three days from the date of receipt of their reply. Referring to Ex.P3, Sri G.Papi Reddy argued that the plaintiffs got issued notice on 30.6.1995 itself; it is the date mentioned in Ex.P2 for execution of sale deed. This appears to be somewhat unnatural, they should have issued the notice after 30.6.1995. This argument is plausible; but nothing adverse against the plaintiffs can be drawn for issuing the notice on the last date fixed for execution of sale deed, rather it shows earnestness of the plaintiff, which is another circumstance indicating their readiness and willingness. 11. The next aspect to be examined is as to when the plaintiffs should have paid the balance amount? Exs.P1 and P2 clearly indicate that it was at the time of registration of the sale deed. And before registration, the defendants were to procure the revenue documents of the properties and clear the bank loans. In regard to their obligation, as rightly observed by the trial court, the oral evidence of DW1 is nothing but falsehood. He has stated in his examination-in-chief that he had repaid Rs.45,000/-to the bank by borrowing money from the relatives of his children, and that he also repurchased his another property as evidenced by Ex.D1. In regard to their obligation, as rightly observed by the trial court, the oral evidence of DW1 is nothing but falsehood. He has stated in his examination-in-chief that he had repaid Rs.45,000/-to the bank by borrowing money from the relatives of his children, and that he also repurchased his another property as evidenced by Ex.D1. When questioned in this regard in the course of his cross-examination, he failed to give details of total payment made to the banks and the names of the persons from whom he had borrowed money. He stated that he had obtained encumbrance certificates and revenue documents; if this was true, that could have been mentioned in his reply as per Ex.P4, but it is not mentioned. He also stated that he had a document to show the date of repayment of loan, but did not produce it although he stated that there was no impediment for producing it. The fact that the defendants had not cleared the loan before 30.6.1995 becomes very evident from Ex.P4 itself, the defendants have clearly stated there that they are ready to execute the sale deed if the plaintiffs pay to them the money payable to the bank. Ex.P4 falsifies oral testimony of DW1. 12. The defendants have taken up a plea in the written statement that they wanted to sell the properties to discharge the debts and to repurchase the property sold by them conditionally and that they suggested to the plaintiffs more than once to withhold the amounts due to the bank out of the sale consideration amount. They have stated that they entered into agreement with the plaintiffs with this understanding. The first plaintiff, while under cross-examination, was questioned whether there was any impediment for her to make payment to the bank, and to this question she answered that the defendants had told her that they themselves would clear the loan. This answer is acceptable, the aforementioned contention of the defendants cannot be accepted, because such a condition is not there in Ex.P2, and what is stated is that the defendants would receive the balance of sale consideration at the time of execution and registration of sale deed. In order to rebut the plaintiffs’ evidence regarding their readiness and willingness, if the defendants wanted to prove what is not stated in the agreement, it cannot be considered. 13. In order to rebut the plaintiffs’ evidence regarding their readiness and willingness, if the defendants wanted to prove what is not stated in the agreement, it cannot be considered. 13. Sri G.Papi Reddy referred to section 55(5)(6) of the Transfer of Property Act and argued that the defendants could have deducted the amount payable towards bank loans from the consideration amount and paid the same to the banks directly if at all they were really ready and willing to perform their part of contract. Again this argument cannot be accepted because, even to make payment directly to the banks, there must be a stipulation to that effect in the agreement. Neither Ex.P1 nor Ex.P2 discloses such a condition as to invoke section 55(5)(6) of the Transfer of Property Act. 14. The defendants have also pleaded that on 30.6.1995, they went to the office of Sub-Registrar and waited there from 10.30 AM to 5.30 PM for arrival of the plaintiffs as they were ready to execute the sale deed. In Ex.P4 also, they have stated so, DW1 has given oral evidence accordingly. The trial court has not discussed this aspect, but Sri G.Papi Reddy argued that if really the plaintiffs were interested, they ought to have gone to the office of Sub-Registrar on 30.6.1995 and this circumstance must be considered for drawing an inference that they were not ready and willing. The first plaintiff has stated whilst under cross-examination that she and her husband waited for defendants at Sub-Registrar’s office on 30.6.1995. Even if this answer can be considered to be self-serving, it is not possible to believe what the defendants have stated about waiting for plaintiffs on 30.6.1995 from 10.30 AM till 5.30 PM. The reason being that there is no evidence indicating that they had given prior intimation to the plaintiffs that they would come to Sub-Registrar’s office on 30.6.1995. Secondly, if really they had gone there and waited for the plaintiffs, nothing prevented them from issuing a notice to the plaintiffs on the very next day or as early as possible stating that they waited for them till 5.30 PM at Sub-Registrar’s office. Instead, they would mention this when they replied to plaintiffs notice on 20.7.1995. This conduct of the defendants in keeping quite till 20.7.1995 itself is enough to infer falsehood in their contention. 15. There is yet another reason which falsifies the defendants’ contention. Instead, they would mention this when they replied to plaintiffs notice on 20.7.1995. This conduct of the defendants in keeping quite till 20.7.1995 itself is enough to infer falsehood in their contention. 15. There is yet another reason which falsifies the defendants’ contention. The reason for execution of Ex.P2 on 30.5.1995, as it can be made out from its contents, is that the defendants could not obtain the revenue documents and discharge loan within 31.5.1995. Therefore, the time was extended till 30.6.1995 for completion of sale transaction. The defendants do not deny to have entered into second agreement on 30.5.1995, and obviously they admit the contents of Ex.P2. It is not their case that they were not aware of its contents, yet DW1 in the examination has stated that the plaintiffs approached and told him that they had no money and requested for execution of another agreement. In this regard, there is no plea in the written statement and in the cross-examination, he admits the actual reason for coming into being of Ex.P2. 16. Therefore, looked from any angle, it may be stated unhesitatingly that in spite of there being some discrepancies in the evidence of plaintiffs, which are trivial, it can be stated that there is probability in the case of plaintiffs that they were ready and willing to perform their part of contract. I do not find any infirmity in the findings of the trial court. 17. Another point argued by Sri G.Papi Reddy was that time was the essence of the contract. The purpose for which the defendants wanted to sell the properties to the plaintiffs was to repay the bank loans and to repurchase their another property which had been sold conditionally to one Venkata Reddy. The terms of the agreement would make it clear that entire payment should be made on or before 30.6.1995. The defendants purchased the property from Venkata Reddy by borrowing money from others. Ex.D1 is the sale deed. Actually he put forth a contention that the repurchase of the property from Venkata Reddy would show that necessity to sell the suit properties no longer survived, and this aspect should be considered for examining the discretionary power of the court as envisaged under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Ex.D1 is the sale deed. Actually he put forth a contention that the repurchase of the property from Venkata Reddy would show that necessity to sell the suit properties no longer survived, and this aspect should be considered for examining the discretionary power of the court as envisaged under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. To garner support for his argument as to time being the essence of the contract, he has placed reliance on the judgment of Division Bench of this court in the case of Saraswati Ammal vs V.C.Lingam [ILR 1993 KAR 427]. Sri G.Balakrishna Shastry countered his argument by submitting that the defendants failed to perform their part of contract by not producing the revenue documents and bank loan clearance certificate. Repurchase of land from Venkatareddy is not pleaded in written statement. Conduct of the defendants is sufficient enough to hold against the defendants. He has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Chand Rani (dead) by LRs vs Kamal Rani (dead) by LRs [ 1993 (1) SCC 519 ]. 18. In the case of Saraswati Ammal (supra) what is held is that, whether time is the essence of contract or not is a matter of intention of the parties to the contract. The stipulations in the contract and the circumstances must be sufficiently strong to displace the ordinary presumption that in a contract for sale of landed properties, time is not the essence. It is also held that one of the parties may notify to the other about time being the essential factor. 19. In the case of Chand Rani (supra), it is held by the Supreme Court as under : - “24. From an analysis of the above case law it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are: 1. from the express terms of the contract; 2. from the nature of the property; and 3. from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract.” 20. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are: 1. from the express terms of the contract; 2. from the nature of the property; and 3. from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract.” 20. In the background of the principles enunciated in the aforementioned decisions, if the case on hand is examined, what appears is that though in the two agreements, dates are fixed for completion of sale transactions and the purpose for which the defendants wanted to sell the suit properties to the plaintiffs is also stated, it may be stated that the defendants cannot harp on the time factor. As discussed above, they should have made available the revenue documents and loan clearance certificates to the plaintiffs within time. When they failed to discharge their obligation, they cannot attribute the delay to the plaintiffs. In fact, what is forthcoming is plaintiffs adherence to time factor before institution of the suits. Therefore, the argument of Sri G.Papi Reddy on this point fails. 21. As to exercise of discretion in granting the relief of specific performance, it appears that the trial court has rightly exercised its discretion. Sri G.Papi Reddy argued that this case is a clear example of plaintiffs’ taking unfair advantage over the defendants seeing the escalation in market value of the property. The suits were filed in the year 1996, and it has come in evidence that lands surrounding the suit properties had been acquired by the Housing Board. Moreover the defendants had repurchased their another property, there was no need to sell the suit properties. The defendants will suffer loss in case they are directed to execute the sale deeds in favour of plaintiffs. In this connection, he has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K.Narendra vs Riviera Apartments (P) Limited [ (1999) 5 SCC 77 ]. 22. On the contrary, Sri G.Balakrishna Shastry submitted that the trial court has given cogent reasons for decreeing the suit; discretion has been properly exercised and there are no grounds to take another view. He has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Chandra vs. Angadlal [ AIR 1979 SC 1241 ]. 23. 22. On the contrary, Sri G.Balakrishna Shastry submitted that the trial court has given cogent reasons for decreeing the suit; discretion has been properly exercised and there are no grounds to take another view. He has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Chandra vs. Angadlal [ AIR 1979 SC 1241 ]. 23. The conspectus of the decisions cited by either side counsel is that the court should weigh the circumstances either to grant or deny the relief of specific performance. The main contention taken by the defendants is that the market value of the land has gone up. It was suggested to plaintiffs in the cross-examination that the Housing Board acquired the lands surrounding the villages where suit properties are situated and that the plaintiffs wanted to take undue advantage of it. The trial court has recorded findings that the defendants have not produced any evidence to show escalation in market value of the lands after they executed the agreements. If really there was increase in the land value, the defendants could have brought it to the notice of the plaintiffs and sale consideration could have been revived. The defendants have given false evidence about borrowing money on higher rate of interest for discharging bank loans and purchasing a property under Ex.D1. Therefore, according to the trial court, the plaintiffs were entitled to decree of specific performance. The reasons ascribed by the trial court are cogent. If according to the defendants, there was increase in land value, it was not difficult for them to have proved it. It was also not difficult to produce documents relating to acquisition of land by the Housing Board. Moreover what is the time gap between the dates of agreements and the date of institution of suit. Ex.P1 was executed on 27.3.1995, and Ex.P2 on 30.5.1995. The suits were filed on 15.2.1996. How much escalation in the land value can be expected within a year? The defence appears to be improbable. Hence, the trial court has rightly exercised discretion. 24. The last point argued by Sri G.Papi Reddy was that the properties agreed to be sold were ancestral, all the children of first defendant were not parties to the agreements. He referred to section 17 of the Specific Relief Act. This argument must fail. The defence appears to be improbable. Hence, the trial court has rightly exercised discretion. 24. The last point argued by Sri G.Papi Reddy was that the properties agreed to be sold were ancestral, all the children of first defendant were not parties to the agreements. He referred to section 17 of the Specific Relief Act. This argument must fail. First defendant, i.e., DW1, has clearly admitted that he was the manager of the joint family. The agreements disclose the necessity to sell the suit properties. Not only the first defendant executed the agreements, some of his sons are also executants and some others are consenting witnesses. The trial court has discussed this point. Moreover, the defendants cannot take shelter under section 17 of the Specific Relief Act. Whenever a sellor or lessor files a suit for specific performance against a lessee or purchaser, the latter can take shelter under section 17 to go back upon the contract finding lessor’s or sellor’s title being defective, but a lessor or sellor cannot contend defective title in him when a lessee or purchaser enforces specific performance. If a purchaser is ready to purchase a property from a person with a defective title, i.e., the purchaser takes the risk. Therefore, section 17 is not helpful to the defendants. 25. From the above discussion, it is to be concluded that the appeals fail. Both the appeals are dismissed with costs. The judgments and decrees of the trial court in both the suits are confirmed.