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2020 DIGILAW 899 (ALL)

Jasoda v. State of U. P.

2020-05-28

RAVI NATH TILHARI

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Shrawan Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 2. By means of the present petition, petitioner has challenged the order bearing No. 705 ft0iw0v0@ek0m0U;k0@2017 dated 5.12.2017 passed by the District Magistrate, Mahoba, District Mahoba (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) rejecting the petitioner’s application/representation dated 7.11.2017 for opening of an additional fair price shop in Gram Panchyat, Jaitpur, District Mahoba. Prayer has also been made to direct the respondents to pass fresh order after taking a fresh report from Block-Jaitpur regarding present population and the number of units with further direction to the respondents that if the population as well as number of units are more than 20,000 at present, to permit the petitioner to distribute the food grains after adjusting the number of units of all fair price shop keepers. 3. The facts of the present case are that initially one fair price shop in Gram Panchyat Jaitpur was granted to Pratap Kumar which was cancelled by order dated 07.01.2017 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kulpahar, District Mahoba. Thereafter the said fair price shop was allotted to the petitioner by order dated 4.5.2017 (Annexure No.2) after passing of the resolution dated 24.4.2017 in the open meeting in petitioner’s favour. The petitioner did not commit any irregularity in distribution of essential commodities and there were no complaints against her. 4. Pratap Kumar filed Writ C No. 32931 of 2017 (Pratap Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and another) against the order of cancellation dated 7.1.2017 which was allowed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 31.7.2017 (Annexure No.3) whereby the order dated 7.1.2017 was quashed and the respondents were directed to restore the licence of the petitioner therein/Pratap Kumar and to resume supply to his shop forthwith. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kulpahar by order dated 18.9.2017 restored the allotment of the fair price shop of Pratap Kumar in compliance of the order of this Court dated 31.7.2017 and by the same order the allotment which was made in favour of Smt. Jasoda Devi (present petitioner) on 15.5.2017 was also stayed till further orders. The present petitioner thereafter filed Writ C No. 49901 of 2017 (Smt. Jasoda Devi Vs. The present petitioner thereafter filed Writ C No. 49901 of 2017 (Smt. Jasoda Devi Vs. State of U.P. and 4 others) in which this Court passed the order dated 27.10.2017 (Annexure-5.), without entering into the merits of the order dated 18.9.2017, directing the District Magistrate to decide the representation of the petitioner filed against the order dated 18.9.2017. 5. The petitioner thereafter filed representation dated 7.11.2017 before the District-Magistrate, District-Mahoba, (Annexure No.6), for opening of an additional fair price shop (6th shop) and to restore the supply of the essential commodities to her after allocation of equal units to all the fair price shops. This representation of the petitioner was rejected by the District Magistrate-Mahoba by means of the order dated 5.12.2017 (Annexure No.7), under challenge in the present writ petition. 6. This petition was filed on 31.8.2018. This Court by order dated 5.9.2018 granted time to the learned Standing Counsel to file counter affidavit. The petitioner was granted time to file rejoinder affidavit. It was made clear that the question of laches shall remain open. 7. The learned Standing Counsel filed counter affidavit and raised a plea in paragraph 13 thereof that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay. However, at the time of hearing the learned Standing Counsel did not press the plea of laches and submitted that the matter may be heard on merits. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is some delay in filing writ petition but the same was caused as the petitioner was trying to collect some documents about the existing population of Gram Panchyat-Jaitpur and to ascertain at what ratio the population in the concerned gram panchyat increased. The petitioner obtained the letter dated 6.11.2008 (Annexure No.1) according to which the population of Gram Panchyat-Jaitpur in the year 2008 was about 22000/- and thereafter the petitioner approached this Court and in view thereof the bonafide delay deserve to be condoned. 9. Being satisfied with the explanation offered in the writ petition the Court hereby condones the latches in filing the present petition and proceeds to decide the matter on merits. 10. 9. Being satisfied with the explanation offered in the writ petition the Court hereby condones the latches in filing the present petition and proceeds to decide the matter on merits. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the order impugned is vitiated and deserves to be quashed as the population of Gram Panchyat Jaitpur is about 25000 as per the letter dated 6.11.2008 of the District Magistrate, sent to the Director, Local Bodies, Lucknow in which it is mentioned that as the population in Gram Panchyat Jaitpur was 15976 and in 2008 after increase @ 5% annually, the population is 21970. His submission is that in view of the letter dated 6.11.2008, taking the annual increase in the population @ 5%, the population of Gram Panchyat Jaitpur would be about 25,000 in 2017 but in the impugned order the population mentioned is 18783. He has submitted that the number of ration cards are about more than 4000 and the number of units are more than 21000. 11. The learned Standing Counsel has supported the order dated 5.12.2017 on the ground it has been passed. He has submitted that as per the last census of 2011 the population was 18783 which is verified from letter No. 4/398/2014-4/53/2014 sent by the Director, Panchyati Raj, U.P., Lucknow to all the District Magistrates of the State of U.P. (annexure No.CA-1). He has further submitted that as per the Government Order No. 2715/29-6-2002-162 Sa/2001 dated 17.8.2002 (Annexure No.CA2) if any Gram Panchyat has more than 4000 units then opening of more than one fair price shop can be considered. However, as in the concerned gram panchyat, as per the eligibility list of National Food Security Act (Annexure No.CA3) uptill 9.10.2018 there were total number of 3854 ration cards including of all the categories, comprising 15858 units and as 5 fair price shops were already existing and were operational, no additional fair price shop could be opened as per the government order on the subject under which unit is the criterion and not the population. He has next submitted that the petitioner is also not an aggrieved person to maintain the writ petition. 12. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Standing Counsel and have perused the records. 13. He has next submitted that the petitioner is also not an aggrieved person to maintain the writ petition. 12. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Standing Counsel and have perused the records. 13. The matter which requires first consideration is as to whether the petitioner is an aggrieved person to maintain the writ petition against the order dated 5.12.2017 and in this respect it would be appropriate to have a look at some judgments on the point as to who is the ‘person aggrieved’ to maintain the writ petition. 14. In the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others AIR 1976 SC 578 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. The relevant paragraph Nos. 27, 29, 33, 46 and 47 of the said report are being reproduced as under: “27. In Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar [1975] 2 SCC 703=( AIR 1975 SC 2092 ) a Bench of seven learned Judges of this Court considered the Question whether the Bar Council of a State was a 'person aggrieved' to maintain an appeal under Section of the Advocates' Act, 1961. Answering the question in the affirmative , this Court, speaking through Ray C.J. indicated how the expression "person aggrieved" is to be interpreted in the context of a statute, thus: The meaning of the words "a person, aggrieved" may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved". Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under the Advocates' Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words "person aggrieved" in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. 29. Typical of the cases in which a strict construction was put on the expression "person aggrieved", is Buxton v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt. . There, an appeal by a Company against the refusal of the Local Planning Authority of permission to develop land owned by the Company by digging chalk, was allowed by the Minister. Owners of adjacent property applied to the High Court under Section 31(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1959 to quash the decision of the Minister on the ground that the proposed operations by the company would injure their land and that they were 'persons aggrieved' by the action of the Minister. It was held that the expression 'person aggrieved' in a statute meant a person who had suffered a legal grievance; anyone given the right under Section 37 of the Act of 1959 to have his representation considered by the Minister was a person aggrieved, thus Section applied, If those rights were infringed; but the applicants had no right under the statute and no legal rights had been infringed and therefore they were not entitled to challenge the Minister's decision, Salmon J. quoted with approval these observations of James LJ in Re Sidebothem . “The words 'person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. “The words 'person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.” 33. This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 an applicant should ordinarily be one who has & personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter-(See State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, 1952 SCR 28 = ( AIR 1952 SC 12 ); Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, 1962 Supp 1 SCR 1= ( AIR 1962 SC 1044 ); Ram Umeshwari Suthoo v. Member, Board of Revenue Orissa (1967) 1 SCA 413; Gadda Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 ; State of Orissa Vs. Rajasaheb Chandanmall, AIR 1972 SC 2112 ; Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha v. S. Lal & Co. AIR 1973 SC 2720 . 46. Thus, in substance, the appellant's stand is that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town will adversely affect his monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition. Such harm or Loss is not wrongful in the eye of law, because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the business competition causing it being a lawful activity. Juridically, harm of this description is called demnum sine injuria, the term injuria being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law(1). The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large. 47. The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large. 47. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He 'has no legal peg for' a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a 'person aggrieved' and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the No-objection Certificate. 15. In the case of Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under in Paragraph Nos. 9 to 12 and 17 which are being reproduced as follows: 9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls within the category of the aggrieved persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the authorities. Therefore, there must be judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking a writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking a writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. Infact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. (Vide : State of Orissa Vs. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 ; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 728 ; Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd Vs. State of west Bengal & others, AIR 1962 SC 1044 ; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2736 ; and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar & Others, (2009) 2 SCC 784 ). 10. A “legal right”, means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719 ; and State of Rajasthan & Others v. Union of India & Others, AIR 1977 SC 1361 . 11. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka Vs. University of Mumbai, AIR 2008 SC 1289 , a similar view was taken by this Court, observing that, if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved regarding the election or the selection of other persons. 12. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of A.P., AIR 2011 SC 3031 , this Court held: “The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. 12. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of A.P., AIR 2011 SC 3031 , this Court held: “The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of complainant’s interest and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant.” 16. In the case of Delhi Development Authority (2015) 14 SCC 254 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under in Paragraph No. 19 which is being reproduced as follows: 19. In Director of Settlements, Andhra Pradesh and Ors. vs. M.R. Apparao and Anr., (2002) 4 SCC 638, while considering the scope of the power of High Court to issue a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court has held as under: “17. ….It is, therefore essentially, a power upon the High Court for issuance of high prerogative writs for enforcement of fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental or ordinary legal rights, which may come within the expression “for any other purpose”. The powers of the High Courts under Article 226 though are discretionary and no limits can be placed upon their discretion, they must be exercised along the recognised lines and subject to certain self-imposed limitations. The expression “for any other purpose” in Article 226, makes the jurisdiction of the High Courts more extensive but yet the Courts must exercise the same with certain restraints and within some parameters. One of the conditions for exercising power under Article 226 for issuance of a mandamus is that the Court must come to the conclusion that the aggrieved person has a legal right, which entitles him to any of the rights and that such right has been infringed...” 17. In view of the above, the law on the said point can be summarized to the effect that a person who raises a grievance, must show how he has suffered legal injury. Generally, a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, cannot be permitted to intervene in the affairs of others. 18. In view of the above, the law on the said point can be summarized to the effect that a person who raises a grievance, must show how he has suffered legal injury. Generally, a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, cannot be permitted to intervene in the affairs of others. 18. It has thus been settled that as a general rule inringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter. Existence of a legal right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of a fraction of such right. Legal right means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. If the person claiming relief is not eligible as per the requirement, he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved. Further, mere harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law unless it results in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest. 19. Now it requires consideration if the petitioner has any legal right or a legally protected interest to which any harm has been caused and for enforcement of such legal right the present writ petition can be maintained. 20. A person appointed to run the fair price shop is appointed by the Government for proper distribution of essential commodities at fair prices to the public at large. The objective is to make essential commodities, which are bare need of the public, available to the public at fair prices. The engagement of the agents is the means to achieve that goal. The object is not to benefit certain individuals who are engaged as agents nor such engagement creates any fundamental or legal right in such person to run the fair price shop. Such persons have no fundamental or legal right to deal with the essential commodities on behalf of the government for its distribution. 21. In the case of Gopi Vs. State of U.P. 2007 (6) ADJ 2001 (DB) this Court held as under: “25. Such persons have no fundamental or legal right to deal with the essential commodities on behalf of the government for its distribution. 21. In the case of Gopi Vs. State of U.P. 2007 (6) ADJ 2001 (DB) this Court held as under: “25. Realising the importance of the Public Distribution System, Parliament while bringing about the 73rd constitutional amendment included the Public Distribution System as one of the primary functions of the Gram Panchayat and it has been incorporated in Article 243-G of Part 9 of the Constitution. The Public Distribution System is obviously an avowed function of the State in order to ensure the distribution of essential commodities fairly. The object is clearly to provide benefit to the public at large in order to ensure supply of essential commodities which is necessary for the sustenance of daily life. The aforesaid object, therefore, has to be fulfilled keeping in view the intention of the legislature which is to promote public awareness and ensure distribution of essential commodities. In essence, the object is to provide benefit to the public at large. As a necessary corollary to the same, the object is not to set up any trade for the benefit of any individual. It may be that by virtue of this licensing system, an individual also gets the opportunity to benefit himself by setting up a fair price distribution unit. However, such a licence does not fall within the category of a fundamental right to carry on trade and business as understood under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The Government Order which has been issued under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, is to regulate the supply and distribution of essential commodities fairly.” 22. In the case of Kallu Khan Vs. State of U.P. and another [ 2008 (6) ADJ 453 (DB)] this Court held as under: “19. It would be appropriate to consider the basic idea of distribution of essential commodities under the 1955 Act and the system of appointment of agents in furtherance of discharge of the aforesaid function. It cannot be disputed that even before 73rd Amendment of the Constitution the Government has undertaken the responsibility of distribution of essential commodities to public at large at controlled or fair price. The purpose of the said responsibility is obvious. It cannot be disputed that even before 73rd Amendment of the Constitution the Government has undertaken the responsibility of distribution of essential commodities to public at large at controlled or fair price. The purpose of the said responsibility is obvious. The majority of the citizens in the country live either below poverty live or almost at par or little above thereof. They are not able to meet their two times meals by the meagre income they earn and, therefore, the market forces, if are allowed to operate freely without any protection to such persons, probably majority of such people would be forced to die of starvation and they may not be able to survive at all. This experience we had even before independence and immediately after independence when the hoarders created a situation of scarcity of food items causing virtual revolution in different parts of the country at times. Various social and welfare measure were taken by the then Government and one of the major decisions taken with the intervention of Parliament is enactment of 1955 Act conferring power upon the Government to control production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in certain commodities, namely, essential commodities as defined under Section 2(1) of 1955 Act. Therefore, the basic idea and intention of the legislature under the Act is to make available essential commodities to the public at large at fair price except of the cases where the availability and equitable distribution would be necessary for defence of India or for any efficient conduct of military operations. The Act intends to provide welfare measure for availability of essential commodities to public at large at fair price and rest of the machinery or mechanism is incidental for achieving the aforesaid goal. The appointment of fair price shop dealers, therefore, as such, is not the primary objective of 1955 Act but it is a channel by which the objective of making essential commodities available to public at large at fair price is to be achieved. It is always permissible and open to the Government to make the essential commodities available to public at large at fair price through the agencies or instrumentalities of its own namely, its own officers or officials or by creating a department or alike. It is always permissible and open to the Government to make the essential commodities available to public at large at fair price through the agencies or instrumentalities of its own namely, its own officers or officials or by creating a department or alike. Simultaneously, instead of undertaking the said job on its own it can discharge the aforesaid obligation through private persons or bodies by appointing them as its agents. Bereft of the authority conferred upon such agents by the Government for distribution of essential commodities at fair price, such persons had no fundamental or legal right of dealing with such essential commodities on behalf of the Government to distribute to public at large the essential commodities at fair prices, though on their own, in their private capacity, it is always open to them to make the commodities which are essential commodities under the Act available to public at large at fair price without having any corresponding burden upon the Government if there is no otherwise prohibition under any other law and the statutory provisions otherwise controlling the production, storage etc. of such essential commodities are observed by them.” 23. Indisputably, the petitioner was allotted fair price shop by order dated 4.5.2017 for the interregnum period i.e. in the vacancy caused due to cancellation of fair price shop allotted to Pratap Kumar. The order of the petitioner itself provided that it was subject to the orders passed by the competent court in the pending cases which shall be binding on the petitioner and, as such, the writ petition filed by Pratap Kumar having been allowed, the petitioner’s allotment came to an end for which the order dated 18.9.2017 was passed. 24. In the case of Smt. Uma Kumari Vs. Assistant Commissioner, Food & Civil Supply and others reported in 2011 (29) LCD 1319, in which an interregnum arrangement made in favour of the petitioner therein was brought to an end as the appeal of the original allottee was allowed, this Court held that such person (the subsequent allottee) was not an ‘aggrieved person’ as he was not deprived of any of his legal entitlement. Paragraph Nos. 5,6,7 and 8 are being reproduced as under: “5. Paragraph Nos. 5,6,7 and 8 are being reproduced as under: “5. While entertaining the writ petition, this Court vide order dated 27.5.2005 provided that fair price shop license of the petitioner would not be cancelled on the ground that license of opposite party No.4 has been restored. In this regard, it is mentioned that it is an interregnum arrangement and once the appeal has been decided in favour of the opposite party no.4, the petitioner has no locus to file the instant writ petition. Furthermore, the petitioner is not an aggrieved party. As the judicial proceedings have come to an end and the order passed by the Appellate Authority attains finality, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. 6. According to my opinion, a person aggrieved means a person who is wrongly deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. ‘Person aggrieved’ means a person who is injured or he is adversely affected in a legal sense. 7. It is settled law that a person who suffers from legal injury only can challenge the act/action/order etc. by filing a writ petition. Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing a statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint by the petitioner that there is a breach of the statutory duty on the part of the authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right for the enforcement of which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfied the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of the said right is the condition precedent to invoke the writ jurisdiction. [Utkal university etc. vs. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi and others. ( AIR 1999 SC 943 ) and Laxminarayan R. Bhattad and others v. State of Maharashtra and another (2003) 5 SCC 413 . 8. Legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. It is, in fact, an advantage or benefit conferred upon a person by a rule of law [Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. ( AIR 1999 SC 943 ) and Laxminarayan R. Bhattad and others v. State of Maharashtra and another (2003) 5 SCC 413 . 8. Legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. It is, in fact, an advantage or benefit conferred upon a person by a rule of law [Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, ( AIR 1974 SC 1719 ) and State of Rajasthan v. Union of India and others, ( AIR 1977 SC 1361 )].” 25. Similarly in the case of Sabbo Khatun Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2012 (30) LCD 1968 it was held as under in paragraph Nos 6 and 7 of the said judgment: 6. In support of his submission, learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the case reported in [2009 (74) ALR 61], Sri Pal Jatav vs. State of U.P. and others, in which the Division Bench of this Court has observed that on account of cancellation of licence of the Fair Price Shop of opposite party no.3, the petitioner was permitted to run the Fair Price Shop as a stop gap arrangement and since the licence of the opposite party no.3 has been restored, the petitioner evidently cannot be permitted to run the Fair Price Shop in question any longer and the same would now be run by the opposite party no.3. 7. This Court has also expressed the view in its judgment reported in 2011 (29) LCD 626, Sita Devi vs. Commissioner, Lucknow and others (W.P.No.1436 (M/S) of 2008) that a person appointed to run the Fair Price Shop, as an interim arrangement during pendency of appeal, has no locus standi. The relevant para-7 is being reproduced below:- "So far as the grievance of the opposite party no.3 is concerned, he has no locus, as he was appointed during the period interregnum, when the appeal of the petitioner was pending and will only be a temporary arrangement, whether such arrangement was made by following due process of making regular arrangement or otherwise on the discretion of the opposite party no.2 and, as such, the opposite party no.3 has no locus to defend the order passed by the authorities." Having considered the matter in all, its pros and cons, I am of the view that the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. As is evident from the narration of the facts given above, the licence was given to the opposite party no.4 for running the Fair Price Shop in question and on account of cancellation of licence of the Fair Price Shop of opposite party no.4, the petitioner was permitted to run the Fair Price Shop as a stop gap arrangement. As licence of the opposite party no.4 has been restored by the order dated 09.08.2012, the petitioner evidently cannot be permitted to run the Fair Price Shop in question any longer and the same is to be run by the opposite party no.4.” 26. Thus considered I find that the petitioner has no fundamental or legal right to be engaged as an agent nor any of her legal rights has been infringed by order dated 5.12.2007. The petitioner cannot be said to be a person aggrieved from the order dated 5.12.2017 as it does not infringe any of her legal or fundamental rights. Although, by the impugned order dated 5.12.2017 the petitioner’s representation has been rejected but the criteria to determine if a person is ‘aggrieved person’ is if the impugned order infringes or takes away any of the fundamental or legal rights or legally protected interests and not mere rejection of the representation. The order may be against the petitioner as his representation has been rejected but the order does not adversely affect any of her legal or fundamental rights. 27. So far as the submission of the petitioner’s counsel, based on the letter dated 6.11.2008 (Annexure No.1) is concerned, that in 2008 the population in Gram Panchyat Jaitpur was 15976 and taking the increase at the rate of 5% annually the population would be 21970 in the year 2011 and about 25000 in 2017 and consequently the number of units in the gram panchyat must have also increased, the same deserves to be rejected inasmuch as the criterion for opening of an additional fair price shop in the concerned Gram Panchyat, as per the Government Order bearing number 2715/29.6.2002-162/2002 dated 17.8.2002, is the number of units in the concerned Gram Panchyat and not the population. 28. The Government Order dated 17.8.2002 is being reproduced as under:- 29. 28. The Government Order dated 17.8.2002 is being reproduced as under:- 29. A perusal of paragraph 7 of the Government Order shows that, as far as possible, in rural areas every gram panchyat shall have at least one fair price shop and if in the concerned Gram Panchyat the number of units are more than 4000 then the opening of an additional shop may be considered by the committee constituted under the said government order. Reading of the government order makes it very clear that the criterion for opening an additional shop is the number of units in the Gram Panchyat i.e. if the units exceed 4000 then such consideration may be made. 30. The impugned order has been passed specifically stating that the total number of card holders in Gram Panchyat-Jaitpur is 3309 out of which there are 250 Antodaya Card Holders and 3059 Patragrasthi (eligible household card holders). The total number of units under the above schemes are 13990. There are already five fair price shops in operation and considering the number of units there is no requirement of 6th additional fair price shop, as for that purpose there should be more than 20000 units in the Gram Panchyats. 31. Petitioner’s counsel has drawn attention of this Court to paragraph 12 of the counter affidavit in which it is stated that the total units in the Gram Panchyat is 15858 and in view thereof he has submitted that there is difference in the number of units as mentioned in the counter affidavit and in the impugned order. 32. The Court finds that even if there is some difference in the number of units as mentioned in the counter affidavit and in the impugned order, still the number of units is less than 20000. There being already five fair price shops, on the ground of such difference as pointed out by the petitioner’s counsel, there would be no requirement of sixth shop as per the Government Order. 33. This Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction will not pass an order directing the respondents to make a roving inquiry for making fresh determination of number of units considering alleged increase of population for opening of a fair price shop for the petitioner who has no legal or fundamental right for engagement as an agent. 34. 33. This Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction will not pass an order directing the respondents to make a roving inquiry for making fresh determination of number of units considering alleged increase of population for opening of a fair price shop for the petitioner who has no legal or fundamental right for engagement as an agent. 34. Thus considered I do not find any merit in the writ petition which is hereby dismissed.