ORDER : 1. The order dated 08.05.2019 rendered by the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad below Exh.60 in P.S.R.P. No. 14 of 2017 dismissing the application under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882 (for short ‘the Act’) is sought to be assailed in this Revision Application. 2. The revisionist no. 1 is a public charitable trust having been registered as such under the Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 1950 (for short ‘the Trust Act’) and nos. 2 to 5 are its trustees. The opponent herein was an employee, who according to the Trust was allotted the quarter for his living, co-terminus on the determination of his service. Since he did not vacate the quarter post resignation, P.S.R.P. proceedings under Section 41 of the Act came to be initiated for possession. The said proceedings were resisted by the opponent principally on the plea that he was not a trespasser but had been declared as a tenant, by a judicial pronouncement rendered in H.R.P. Suit No. 2700 of 2008 on 05.03.2012. In the said proceedings, the trust was not made a party, but it's Managing Director and the Secretary of the Hall was made a party and no objection was taken against mis-joinder or non-joinder and the Managing Director/Secretary represented the Trust and the matter was proceeded accordingly. It appears that the proceedings from the said case were not taken any further and rested there and the factual and legal findings thus became final. 3. From the impugned order, it appears that the Court recorded its disinclination to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Act principally on the ground that the title of the opponent as a tenant was already determined, and therefore, he was not a trespasser. In such an eventuality, in the opinion of this Court there remained no scope of the application under Sections 46 and 47 of the Act and the learned counsel for the petitioner is not right when he contends to the contrary. Under any case, considering the settled legal position that the power under Section 41 of the Act can be exercised either on determination of the tenancy when the possession is retained or when the person occupying the premises is a trespasser. Under any case, considering the settled legal position that the power under Section 41 of the Act can be exercised either on determination of the tenancy when the possession is retained or when the person occupying the premises is a trespasser. In view of the finding by the Competent Court in the previous proceedings that the opponent was declared as a tenant, there remained no scope with the Court below to exercise the power under Section 41 of the Act. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, no jurisdictional error was committed. 4. As indicated above, the judgment declaring the character of the opponent as a tenant has been accepted. The only argument is that the trust not being the party therein, it was not binding upon it. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Trust ought to have been made a party by its name, since, the retention of the possession, after the determination of the tenancy affected the property of the trust. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon Sections 51 and 52 of the Trust Act with the submission that in absence of the joinder of the trust, the suit must fail, and therefore, the judgment and decree in the rent suit, not only is not binding upon the trust but is irrelevant, in absence of the adjudication between the opponent no. 1 and the trust. The above argument though in the first batch may appear to be substantive, but must fail on close scrutiny; firstly because the judgment and decree determining the character of the opponent as a tenant has became final, and the defendants therein by not objecting the mis-joinder, held out that they were authorized to represent the trust and, in fact, retained themselves as if they were representing the trust. Pertinently the Trust Act doesn't contemplate the Trust to be a body corporate; to be sued and to sue in its notified corporate name, therefore, it cannot be contended that it ought to have been joined in its corporate name. In fact, it did not possess any corporate name in absence of any provision to that effect under the Trust Act. The scheme, inter-alia, under the Act is to regulate and guard the trust property and the beneficial interest of the beneficiaries of the public trust. In fact, it did not possess any corporate name in absence of any provision to that effect under the Trust Act. The scheme, inter-alia, under the Act is to regulate and guard the trust property and the beneficial interest of the beneficiaries of the public trust. The remedies have been provided whenever the trust property and/or beneficial interest of the beneficiaries of the public trust is put to stake. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court have been regulated in such cases by appropriate provision like 50, 51 and 52 of the Trust Act. Such regulation would not apply where the dispute is not in relation to the trust property or the benefit of the beneficiary of the public trust is not involved. The trust property here would mean the corpus of the trust. If the dispute touches the corpus of the trust or benefit of the beneficiary of the public trust, the mandatory provision under the Trust Act including Section 50 to 52 regulating the litigation in this regard shall have to be adhered to and in other cases, in the opinion of this Court, the suits against the Trust can be filed without adhering to such provision. 5. In the instant case, the dispute is regarding retention of the quarter, post determination of the service of the opponent, no adjudication was sought under the rent suit as regards corpus of the trust itself or the benefits of the beneficiary of the public trust. Thus, having regard to the nature of the dispute, in the opinion of this Court, none of the provisions regulating the litigation under the Trust Act were attracted in the rent suit. 6. There is no provision in Civil Procedure Code contemplating frame of suit, by or against the trust, except Section 92 and Order 31 thereof. Even the said two provisions focus on the dispute in relation to the corpus of the trust/the benefits of the beneficiary of the public trust. Therefore, the submission on the strength of the said provision that the trust ought to have been made party in the rent suit, in absence whereof, the judgment is not binding, cannot be accepted. 7. Even the said two provisions focus on the dispute in relation to the corpus of the trust/the benefits of the beneficiary of the public trust. Therefore, the submission on the strength of the said provision that the trust ought to have been made party in the rent suit, in absence whereof, the judgment is not binding, cannot be accepted. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case discussed hereinabove, Sections 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act would not be attracted and the case of Hira Lal vs. Hari Narain, 1963 Law Suit (All) 68, which according to the learned counsel for the petitioner has the bearing on the said provision cannot be applied to the facts of the case. 8. In view of the above discussion, the case of Saiyad Jabbarhusain vs. Hasan Abubakar Malbari, 1997 (2) GLH 142 also cannot be applied to the facts of the case. 9. The observations in paragraph-9 of Mohmad Ahmed Vali Mohmad vs. Ranchhoddas Tribhovandas, 1963 GLR 279 , that the trust is a legal entity cannot stretched to an extent of saying that it is a body corporate. There may be cases where certain Associations may become an entity in its own name. If, illustration is required, partnership firm which under the Partnership Act which is not regarded as a body corporate; yet the frame of suit would be regulated by Section 69 thereof, if, other conditions of the provision are satisfied. Similarly, when it is stated that the Trust is an entity, what is sought to be conveyed is that it has a specific name other than a natural person. When entities other than body corporate are created under the statute with specific names, they are not human being and cannot be viewed as human being, but as entities only and must be dealt with as entities. One can not pierce through such entity name and reach an individual behind it, unless such individual has an authority to represent the entity. As indicated above, in the rent suit, the Managing Trustee and the Secretary did represent the trust without any objection and thus claimed that they had an authority to represent it. 10. For the foregoing reasons, as also considering the impugned order, this Court does not find any jurisdictional error therein, the Revision Application must fail and it is rejected.