JUDGMENT : 1. This is a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 (herein after referred as Act, 1887) by the tenant challenging the judgment and decree dated 16.12.2008 passed by the SCC Court in SCC Suit no. 2 of 2006. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that a suit was filed by the respondent landlord before the SCC Court bearing no. 2 of 2006 for arrears of rent, damages and eviction after determining the tenancy. The suit in question was decreed ex-parte on 18.08.2006. The revisionist herein who was the defendant in the suit filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree on 04.09.2006 which was registered as Miscellaneous Case no. 12 of 2006. On 30.11.2006 an application bearing no. 16(g) was filed for passing the tender for deposit of Rs. 15,775/-which was the decretal amount as per ex-parte decree dated 18.08.2006, under Section 17 of the Act, 1887 which requires the deposit of such amount. The said application was allowed on 08.12.2006 by the Court with the observation that deposit may be made by the applicant tenant at his own risk. Accordingly, on the said date itself the aforesaid deposit was made. Subsequently on 06.10.2007 another application bearing no. 29(g) was filed and was allowed for depositing additional amount of Rs. 3570/-under Section 17 of the Act, 1887. The application under Order IX Rule 13 was allowed by the SCC Court on 13.11.2007 and the ex-parte decree dated 18.08.2006 was set aside. After the decree being set aside, the amount deposited under Section 17 of the Act, 1887 was available to the revisionist tenant for being withdrawn but he did not do so and this fact is not in dispute. 3. It is not out of place to mention that the aforesaid amount under Section 17 of the Act, 1887 is in the nature of security for the decreetal amount as per the ex-parte decree, meaning thereby, in the event the application under Order IX Rule 13 is rejected then the said deposit can be utilised for satisfying the ex-parte decree. It is not out of place to mention that the aforesaid amount under Section 17 of the Act, 1887 is in the nature of security for the decreetal amount as per the ex-parte decree, meaning thereby, in the event the application under Order IX Rule 13 is rejected then the said deposit can be utilised for satisfying the ex-parte decree. However, if the decree is set aside then there is no question of its satisfaction and the tenant can withdraw the same unless he has filed an application or otherwise requested that that the said amount be treated as a deposit under Section 20(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (herein after referred as Act, 1972) if the said provision applies, in a given case. 4. After the setting aside of the decree, 20.12.2007 was fixed as the date for filing of written statement which was further extended to 09.01.2008, 16.01.2008 and then to 23.01.2008 when the written statement was filed by the revisionist. 5. It is not out of place to mention that in an SCC Suit issues are not required to be framed and every date is a date of hearing as the procedure to be followed is summary in nature. 6. Thereafter, the matter was proceeded by the SCC Court and the suit was again decreed after hearing the parties on 16.12.2008. The SCC Court found the landlord tenant relationship to be established and it also found that tenancy had been determined by a valid notice. On the question of rate of rent as there was a dispute, the Court recorded a finding that the rent was Rs. 100/-per month and not Rs. 375/-per month as was being claimed by the landlord. It needs to be mentioned that the landlord has not challenged this finding. The SCC Court also recorded a finding about the tenant being in arrears of rent. 100/-per month and not Rs. 375/-per month as was being claimed by the landlord. It needs to be mentioned that the landlord has not challenged this finding. The SCC Court also recorded a finding about the tenant being in arrears of rent. However, on the question of application of Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972, as the said Act was applicable to the facts of the case a plea was raised on behalf of the tenant that the deposit already made under Section 17 of the Act, 1887 should be treated as a deposit under Section 20(4) along with the deposits made under Section 30 of the said Act and the rent paid during pendency of the suit, which, according to him satisfied the requirements of Sub-Section 4 of Section 20. The SCC Court did not accept this plea on the ground that in view of the decision of a Single Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Bhragu Dutt Singh Vs. Shyam Kishore, 1980 LLJ Page 62 it was impermissible to treat or adjust the deposit made under Section 17 of the Act, 1887 as a deposit under Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972. It needs to be mentioned that the Court below did not reject the plea on the ground that no such application for treating the deposit under Section 17 of the Act, 1887 as a deposit under Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972 was made by the tenant on the first date of hearing or thereafter but it was rejected on merits as being impermissible. 7. Accordingly, the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and it was ordered that the defendant would pay to the plaintiff rent of 3 years @ Rs. 100/-per month i.e. Rs. 3600/-, arrears of water tax of 3 years i.e. Rs. 1350/-and damages for illegal use and occupation of the premises for 3 years @ Rs. 100/-i.e. Rs. 3600/-and Rs. 550/-as cost of the notice along with 6% simple interest thereon and shall hand over vacant possession of the tenanted premises to the plaintiff decree holder. If the aforesaid order was not complied by 12.02.2009 then the plaintiff would have a right to get the judgment and decree executed through the Court. 8. 100/-i.e. Rs. 3600/-and Rs. 550/-as cost of the notice along with 6% simple interest thereon and shall hand over vacant possession of the tenanted premises to the plaintiff decree holder. If the aforesaid order was not complied by 12.02.2009 then the plaintiff would have a right to get the judgment and decree executed through the Court. 8. Shri B.K. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner confined his argument only on the question of permissibility of the deposit made under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 being adjusted or treated as a deposit under Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972 he contended that the Court below erred in holding that it was impermissible. It was also his argument that the Court did not even determine the ‘first date of hearing’. In this regard, he relied upon Single Judge Bench decisions of this Court reported in (1982) 1 ARC 16, Sunt Ram Gupta Vs. Ratan Prakash; (1984) 1 ARC 4, Lacchi Ram Vs. Ist ADJ; (1987) (1) AWC 354, Badi Uzzaman Vs. DJ, Kanpur, (1990) 1 ARC 293, Mahadeo Singh Vs. Sheshnarayan Pathak, (2006) 63 ALR 269 (All.), Satish Kumar Dutta Vs. Additional District Judge, Kanpur and judgment dated 14.08.2012, Ravi Shankar Kansal Vs. District Judge, Aligarh, Writ A no. 53074 of 1999. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent, Shri Mohd. Sayeed contended that revisionist having not made the deposit under Section 20 (4) at any point of time it was not necessary for the Court below to determine the first date of hearing for the purposes of Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972. He submitted that the said provision was discretionary in the sense that the tenant could, if he so chose, make the said deposit to avoid eviction, therefore, it was necessary for the revisionist to have filed an application evincing his intent to avail the benefit of the said provision with the request for treating the amount deposited under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 as a deposit under Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972, which was never done, therefore, the plea was not liable to be accepted and has rightly been rejected by the Court. However, on being asked as to whether it is permissible in law to treat a deposit made under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 as a deposit under Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972 and to adjust it accordingly, the learned counsel fairly stated that it was permissible but an application was necessarily required to be filed in this regard. He also contended that there was no compliance of Order XV Rule 5 CPC in response to which Shri B.K. Saxena submitted that this was not the ground of rejection by the SCC Court and in any case the amount had already been deposited under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887. He has relied upon the decisions reported in 2003 (1) SCC, E. Palanisamy Vs. Palanisamy; 2003 SCC 433 , Balwant Singh and others Vs. Anand Kumar Sharma and others; 2016 (3) ARC 459 , Moinuddin alias Mamo and 2 others Vs. State of U.P. and others; 2004 (57) ALR 776, Krishna Kumar Gupta Vs. Additional District Judge 14th, Allahabad and others. 9. The only question which this Court is required to consider in this revision is as to whether the Court below was right in rejecting the plea of the revisionist-tenant regarding permissibility of adjustment of the deposit made under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 as a deposit under Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972 by placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Bhragu Dutt Singh (Supra) and whether it was right in not deciding thereafter, as to whether after such adjustment the requirements of Section 20 (4) were satisfied so as to enable the tenant to avoid eviction or not. 10. The findings of the SCC Court with regard to other issues have not been challenged and no arguments were advanced by Shri Saxena on these findings, therefore, the said findings have attained finality between the parties including the finding as to the rate of rent being Rs. 100/-as claimed by the tenant and not Rs. 375/- as claimed by the landlord. 11. 100/-as claimed by the tenant and not Rs. 375/- as claimed by the landlord. 11. On a perusal of the decision of this Court in Bhragu Dutt Singh (Supra), which has been relied upon by the Court below, it is found that the said decision nowhere says that the amount deposited under proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 cannot be adjusted or treated as an amount deposited under Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972. In fact, in the said case the question before the Court below was as to whether such deposit under the proviso to Section 17 could be adjusted or treated as a deposit contemplated under Order XV Rule 5 CPC. The Courts below rejected the plea that it was permissible for treating the said amount as a deposit under Order XV Rule 5 CPC. The High Court discussed the nature of the deposit under the proviso to Section 17 and held that the said amount stands as security only against the ex-parte decree. Once the ex-parte decree is set aside, the defendant is entitled to take back that amount. The amount is not to remain in deposit until the satisfaction of the decree that may ultimately be passed thereafter on contest. It is, however, undisputed that it was not open to the plaintiff-opposite party to have withdrawn that amount. Until a specific order of the Court was passed, the amount lying in deposit could not be treated as available for payment of rent or damages for use and occupation which the defendant is liable to pay under Order XV Rule 5 CPC. Now these observations by this Court nowhere say that the amount deposited under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 cannot be treated as available for payment under Order XV Rule 5 CPC. In fact, these observation clearly state that if a specific order of the Court is passed then it can be so treated. Furthermore, the Court set aside the order of the Court below in the said case on the ground that the provisions of Order XV Rule 5 CPC which are penal in nature should be liberally construed in as much as the defendant is being shut out from pleading even true facts in his defence and that in the said case the Courts below had not approached the matter from this angle. It observed that it was incumbent on the Courts below to have considered the question of Condonation of the default. The money was lying in custodia legis. Furthermore, the High Court referred to its decision in Lakhveer Singh vs. Sarla Devi, (Civil Miscellaneous Case no. 4 of 1975) decided on 02.08.1979 to record that it had opined in the said case that while Section 20 (4) was to be construed strictly against the tenant, in as much as the tenant, who had become liable to eviction under Section 20 (2) (a), is seeking relief against the liability, the provisions of Order XV Rule 5 CPC, which are penal in nature should be liberally construed in as much as a defendant is being shut out from pleading even true facts in his defence. It observed that in the instant case the Courts below had not approached the matter from this angle and that it was incumbent on the Courts below to have considered the question of condonation of the default as the money was lying in custodia legis. It also observed that it is true that until 01.01.1977, the landlord did not have a right to withdraw the amount without an order of the Court but in these circumstances there was no substantial prejudice to the landlord. It referred to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Duli Chand Vs. Moman Chand, AIR 1979 SC 1307 ; wherein it was held by their Lordships that it was open to the Court to order payment of the money which was in custodia legis to the landlord. 12. The High Court further observed that although provision construed in that case by the Supreme Court was different the fact that requisite money was lying in custodia legis was a relevant consideration which had been wrongly ignored by the Courts below, and on this ground the revision was allowed by the High Court and the orders of the Courts below rejecting the plea were set aside. In this view of the matter except for the passing observations regarding strict construction of Section 20 (4), there is nothing in the said judgment which could persuade the Court below to arrive at the conclusion that a deposit under Section 17 of the Act, 1887 could not be adjusted or treated as a deposit under Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972. The Court below has clearly misconstrued the said judgment. In fact, the reliance placed in the said judgment upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Duli Chand, wherein it has been held that it was open to the Court to order payment of the money which was in custodia legis to the landlord, far from going against the tenant was in his favour in the facts of the present case also. The question as to whether such deposit could be treated as one under Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972 was, strictly speaking, not directly involved in Bhragu Dutt Singh. 13. In fact, there are other decisions of this Court wherein it has been held that a liberal interpretation of Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972 should be given for protecting the object of the said provision which is in favour of the tenant. In the decision of this Court in the case of Lacchi Ram (Supra) the issues specifically considered by the Court were firstly, whether deposit under Section 17 of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 for setting aside ex-parte decree could be taken into account for relieving the tenant from liability of eviction under Sub-section 4 of Section 20 of the Act, 1972. Secondly, whether deposit made prior to the date of first hearing, within meaning of aforesaid Sub-section could be deemed to have discharged the tenant of his application only if an application was made to that effect on or before the said date. The Court in the said judgment held as under on Paragraph 2, 4 and 7. “2. …...Sub-section (4) manifests Legislature’s anxiety to save the tenant from ejectment. By very nature of the objective sought to be achieved by this sub-section it has to be construed liberally……….” 4. Unconditional, payment or deposit by the tenant of arrears interest and cost is the other requirement. The sub-section does not provide the manner of deposit. Nor does it require filing of an application. In fact it could not because unconditional governs not only deposit in Court but also to tendering of amount or payment to landlord. Whether deposit or payment was unconditional, therefore, shall depend on facts and circumstances of each case. It cannot depend on filing or non-filing of application. Nor does it require filing of an application. In fact it could not because unconditional governs not only deposit in Court but also to tendering of amount or payment to landlord. Whether deposit or payment was unconditional, therefore, shall depend on facts and circumstances of each case. It cannot depend on filing or non-filing of application. In a case where deposit is made in Court what is of prima importance is if the amount as required has been deposited before first date of hearing. If it has been, then it does not become conditional merely because no application had been filed. Nor any oral or written request by way of application filed after date of hearing can be ignored as it was not made on or first date of hearing. If deposit is made with no string attached to it then it can be clarified, if necessary by subsequent application which should relate back to the relevant time that is first date of hearing. Moreover, if deposit as required, is made then the last part of the section that is relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction comes into operation automatically Although word is ‘may’ but in the context in which it has been used and the purpose it seeks to achieve it has to be read as ‘shall’. A decree for eviction in a suit filed under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act where the tenant has deposited the arrears, interest, and costs of the suit at the first date of hearing shall be illegal. Therefore, it is the duty of Court under this sub-section to see it deposit made with it after deducting deposit under Section 30 of the Act is sufficient to relieve the tenant from his liability of eviction or not. It is not the making of application, but deposit as contemplated at the first date of hearing which is material. 5. So far facts of the case are concerned, the Courts below appear to have committed manifest error of law in refusing to extend the benefit of sub-section (4) of Section 20 to petitioner either because no application was filed or the one filed did not indicate that deposit was unconditional. It has already been seen that no application is necessary Manifestation of unconditional deposit could be written or oral either by tenant of his own or at the instance of the Court. It has already been seen that no application is necessary Manifestation of unconditional deposit could be written or oral either by tenant of his own or at the instance of the Court. In the application filed on 24th April, 1975 it was mentioned, ‘arrears of rent have been deposited up-to-date in the Court of City Munsif, Meerut under Section 30 is admitted to the plaintiffs also. Now the disputed rent along with costs of the suit have also been deposited in Court of Judge Small Causes by the defendants. If the Court also came to the conclusion that defendant had not paid the disputed arrears of rent to the plaintiff then for the purposes of default benefit of Section 20 (4) be given to the defendant as he has already deposited the disputed rent again, plus costs of the suit. Otherwise so extra deposited rent be returned to the defendant. It clearly mentioned about the deposit of rent and cost of the suit etc. Benefit was claimed under Section 20 (4). Refund was claimed of excess. This could not be construed as rendering deposit conditional. Nor the prayer that if Court finds that petitioner had not paid rent it may be taken as deposit under Section 20(4). What is required to be deposited is the arrears fo rent, interest and costs. If it had been paid and petitioner by way of abundant caution deposited the amount again claiming that if it was found that he was in arrears the amount deposited may be adjusted, it could not be held to be conditional deposit. 6. Now comes the most crucial controversy namely if deposit of Rs. 736.75/-made under Section 17 of S.C.C. Act could be treated as deposit under Section 20(4). The suit was decreed ex parte. Petitioner applied for setting aside of ex parte decree under Section 17 of Small Cause Courts Act, and deposited Rs. 736.75/-, the entire decretal amount, the condition precedent for moving the application. The decree was set aside and order decreeing suit ex parte was recalled. Although under law the amount could have been withdrawn by petitioner but he did not do so and it continued to remain in deposit with Court at the first date of hearing What would be nature of this deposit. It could not continue to be deposit under Section 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act. Although under law the amount could have been withdrawn by petitioner but he did not do so and it continued to remain in deposit with Court at the first date of hearing What would be nature of this deposit. It could not continue to be deposit under Section 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act. At the same time it cannot be disputed that it comprised of arrears of rent found due till then, costs of suit etc. What is urged is that once decree was set aside ownership reverted to petitioner. It did not vest in Court. Not could the opposite party appropriate it under Sub-section (6) of the Act And that being one of the incidents of the deposit under Subsection (4), the deposit under Section 17 could not be taken into account. The argument proceeds on misapprehension. The amount deposited by tenant for setting aside of ex parte decree is in custody of Court. It continues to be so even after the application was allowed and the deree was set aside. Even in respect of deposit under Sub-section (4) the landlord does not get any right. The amount becomes available and it can be withdrawn by landlord only after filing of application. Therefore, there is no charm or magic whether deposit was made in once capacity or the other so long it is deposited with Court before first date of hearing. If from circumstances it appears that the tenant in order to save himself from misery or eviction was a bona fide depositing or had deposited and complied with stringent and harsh conditions provided in Subsection (4), then he should not be denied the benefit on one or the other pretext by finding loophole due to mistake in not making the application or not withdrawing the deposit under Section 17 and then redepositing it under Sub-section (4). The word deposit should not be construed in pedantic manner. It should be understood and interpreted so as to advance the object of the provision. The amount deposited under Section 17 exhausted its purpose one ex parte decree was set aside and it became deposit with Court. 7. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for opposite party on Prem Pal Gupta Vs. It should be understood and interpreted so as to advance the object of the provision. The amount deposited under Section 17 exhausted its purpose one ex parte decree was set aside and it became deposit with Court. 7. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for opposite party on Prem Pal Gupta Vs. Baboo Ram Garg, 1978(1) All India Rent Control Journal 446, and it was urged that the amount deposited under Section 17 does not become ipso facto available for purposes of Sub-section(4). In that case no application was made for treating the deposit under Section 17 of Small Cause Court as deposit under Sub-section (4). In this case, however, the petitioner moved an application on 24th May 1975 stating that now he had deposited costs of suit etc. Although it was not said that deposit under Section 17 may be treated as deposit under Sub-section (4) but apart from deposit under Section 7C of Act III of 1947 and Section 30 of the Act the only other deposit was under Section 17. The averment in the application that cost etc. had now been deposited could not refer to any other deposit except the deposit which had been made under Section 17. Claiming of benefit under Sub-section (4) for deposit made before Judge Small Cause Court left no room for doubt that petitioner had prayed that earlier deposit may be treated as deposit for purpose of granting immunity from eviction. The application may be vague or there may be some technical flaw. Yet there being no misgiving about its content and petitioner’s anxiety to save himself from eviction he could not be refused relief because of bad drafting of the application for which petitioner may not have been responsible.” 14. The Court categorically held that Sub-section 4 of the Section 20 manifests legislatures anxiety to save the tenant from ejectment. By very nature of the objective sought to be achieved by this Sub-section it has to be construed liberally. It went on to hold that Sub-section 4 of the Section 20 does not require filing of an application Sine qua non of Section 20 (4) is whether the amount as required has been deposited in the Court before the first date of hearing or not? It went on to hold that Sub-section 4 of the Section 20 does not require filing of an application Sine qua non of Section 20 (4) is whether the amount as required has been deposited in the Court before the first date of hearing or not? It was also held that any oral or written request after the first date of hearing cannot be ignored in this regard on the ground that it was not made on or before first date of hearing. If deposit is made on or before the first date of hearing without any strings attached then it could be clarified, if necessary, by subsequent application which should relate back to the relevant time i.e. first date of hearing. It is not the making of application but deposit as contemplated at the first date of hearing which is material. Thus, what follows, from the said decision is that if a deposit has been made under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 on or before the first date of hearing as referred in Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972, then, when on the first date of hearing or even thereafter an oral or written request is made for creating such deposit under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887, as one under Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972, then firstly it is permissible to do so and the fact that such request had been made subsequent to the date of first hearing would be immaterial if the deposit has been made prior to it, Secondly, in such eventuality it would be for the Court to see if the deposit made with it is sufficient to relieve the tenant from liability of eviction or not? 15. In the said case an application was filed on date of first hearing and the same was treated to be good enough for the purpose of Section 20 (4). 16. It has also been held in the aforesaid decision that once the decree was set aside under law although the amount deposited under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 could have been withdrawn by the petitioner(tenant) in the said case but he did not do so and it continued to remain in deposit with Court at the first date of hearing. It then considered the position as to What would be the nature of such deposit? It held that the nature of this deposit could not continue to be a deposit under Section 17 of the Act, 1887 as the decree has been set aside, but at the same time, it could not be disputed that it comprised of arrears of rent found due till then cost of suit etc. The Court repelled the argument that once the decree was set aside ownership of the amount deposited reverted to the petitioner and it did not vest in the Court nor could the opposite party appropriate it under Sub-section 6 of the Section 2 of the Act, 1972 and that it being one of the incidents of the deposit under Sub-section (4), the deposit under Section 17 could not be taken into account. The Court held that the amount deposited by the tenant for setting aside of ex-parte decree is in custody of the Court and it continues to be so. It is not out of place to once again refer to the reliance placed by the High Court in Bhragu Dutt Singh case upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Phool Chand (Supra) wherein it was held that it was open to the Court to order payment of the money which was in custodia legis, to the landlord. In Lacchhi Ram case, the same reasoning has been followed. The High Court in Lacchhi Ram further held the amount to be in the custody of the Court even after the application was allowed and the decree was set aside. Even in respect of the deposit in Sub-section 4 of the Section 20 landlord does not get any right. The amount becomes available and it can be withdrawn by the landlord only after filing of application by him, which is obviously a reference to Subsection 6 of Section 20 which requires an application to be filed by the landlord for withdrawal of the amount deposited under Sub-section 4, therefore, the Court observed that there was no charm or magic whether deposit was made in one capacity or the other so long as it is deposited with Court before first date of hearing. Most importantly, it went on to observe that if from circumstances it appears that the tenant in order to save himself from misery or eviction was bonafide depositing or had deposited and complied with stringent and harsh conditions provided in Sub-section (4), then he should not be denied the benefit on one or the other pretext by finding loopholes due to mistake in making the application or not withdrawing the deposit under Section 17 and then redeposit it under sub-section (4). The word deposit should not be construed in pedantic manner. It should be understood and interpreted so as to advance the object of the provision. The amount deposited under Sub-section 17 exhausted its purpose once ex-parte decree was set aside and it became deposit with Court. The Court thus held that it was permissible to treat such deposit as one under Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972. Reference may also be made in this regard to other decisions rendered in the case of Badi Uzzaman (Supra) wherein a deposit made under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 was held to be liable for consideration as a deposit under Section 39 of the Act, 1972. Likewise is the decision of this Court in the case of Mahadeo Singh(Supra) wherein it was held that an amount deposited under Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972 could be taken into consideration for the purpose of satisfaction of the requirement of proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 and vice versa. Paragraph 7 to 12 of this decision are quoted herein below. “7. To appreciate the point raised, it may first be seen what is the purpose for which the decretal amount or security in lieu thereof is required to be deposited as condition precedent to entertain an application for setting aside the ex parte decree passed by Judge, Small Cause Court. Clearly, the purpose is that so long the application for setting aside ex parte decree is not disposed of, the decretal amount or the security should be at the disposal of the Court, so that in case the application for setting aside ex parte decree is dismissed, the decree may be satisfied from the amount deposited or form the security furnished by the judgment debtor. In this connection, observations made in a case reported in 1981 ALJ 989, Smt. Krishna devi Vs. In this connection, observations made in a case reported in 1981 ALJ 989, Smt. Krishna devi Vs. Shobha Chandra, can be beneficially noted. 8. The trial Court has attached mush importance to the fact that the amount in deposit was not an unconditional deposit as the same was deposited under Section 20(4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 under protest, challenging the rate of rent. As a matter of fact, it is here that the trial Court has misdirected itself. The question of conditional deposit under Section 20 (4) of Act No. 13 of 1972 has no relevance for the purposes of consideration of question whether the deposit could be accepted as security, if so offered, under proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Without recording any finding, whether the deposit made was conditional or unconditional, it may be observed that so far the prayer for taking this deposit as security is concerned, there was no condition attached to it for the purposes of treating it as security under Section 17 (1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It cannot be said that any condition was attached for that purpose. The question whether it was a conditional deposit or not, under Section 20(4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972, would be a matter for consideration while disposing of the case on merits as well as the effect of such a deposit. The amount in deposit in the court is more than the amount as decreed under ex parte decree. In case the application for setting aside the ex parte decree is dismissed, the decretal amount can very well be realised from the deposit for which a request was made to take it as security under proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. No doubt it has been mentioned in the application, moved for accepting the amount in deposit as security, that the said amount was deposited under Section 20(4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972, under protest, but no condition has been attached for accepting it as security; rather the prayer is that the amount of Rs. 7,349.70/-which the applicant had deposited, may be treated as security. 7,349.70/-which the applicant had deposited, may be treated as security. In this connection, it may also be observed that as soon as the decree has been passed and so long it subsits the dispute as regards rate of rent will also be taken to have been decided by the ex parte decree, decreeing the rent at the rate of Rs. 100/-per month as claimed by the plaintiff opposite party. After a decree had been passed accepting the rate of rent as claimed by the plaintiff, it could not be said that out of the deposit made, only an amount at the rate of Rs 40/-per month as claimed by the defendant revisionist, could only be realised. The amount in deposit is also more than the amount decreed at the rate of Rs. 100/-per month as rent. In the above circumstances, the trial Court manifestly erred when it thought that the security of the amount deposited could not be accepted as it was a conditional deposit. 9. The trial Court has observed that the defendant can take back the amount once ex parte decree is set aside, but such amount cannot be withdrawn by the plaintiff under Order XV, Rule 5, CPC unless specific order is passed. No specific order for amount in question can be passed because still it is said to be a deposit under protest. The above ground given by the trial Court for not accepting the request for taking the said amount as security is not sustainable. It has already been observed that once a decree has been passed at the rate of rent as claimed by the plaintiff, the question of dispute about the rate of rent ceased to exist. Whole amount under the decree can be realised from the security offered by the defendant-revisionist. In case ex parte decree is set aside, the character of the deposit as security will also cease and it would again be treated as amount deposited under Section 20(4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 and under Order XV, Rules 5, CPC, if any amount has been deposited under that provision. In case ex parte decree is set aside, the character of the deposit as security will also cease and it would again be treated as amount deposited under Section 20(4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 and under Order XV, Rules 5, CPC, if any amount has been deposited under that provision. If under the law, the defendant is entitled to withdraw such a amount, he will certainly be liable to face the consequences which may flow in view of the provisions contained under Section 20(4) of Act No. 13 of 1972 and Order XV, Rule 5, CPC, Consideration of such a situation or condition at this stage, as a matter of fact does not arise. 10. I find no merit in the submission made by the opposite party that the revisionist could withdraw the amount and re-deposit the same under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Such an exercise would be holly unnecessary Once the amount was still in deposit with the Court, it could easily be adjusted for satisfying the ex parte decree in case it was not set aside. In this connection, a case reported in 1984 ALJ 189; 1984 (1) ARC 4 Lachhi Ram Vs. First Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, may be referred. In that case, the deposits were made under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. On setting aside the ex parte decree, it was applied on the first date of hearing that the deposits already made under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act may be considered for extending the benefit of Section 20(4) of Act No. 13 of 1972. It was held that if the conditions of Section 20(4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 are fulfilled, the deposit made under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act can be taken into account for extending benefit under Section 20(4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972. It was further held that so long the amount was in deposit and was available, it is immaterial whether it was made in one capacity or the other. The relevant passage may be quoted as follows: “Therefore, there is no charm or magic whether deposit was made in one capacity or the other so long it is deposited with Court before first date of hearing. The relevant passage may be quoted as follows: “Therefore, there is no charm or magic whether deposit was made in one capacity or the other so long it is deposited with Court before first date of hearing. If from circumstances it appears the tenant in order to save himself from misery of eviction was bona fide depositing or had deposited and complied with stringent and harsh conditions provided in subsection (4) then he should not be denied the benefit on one or the other pretext by finding loopholes due to mistake in not making the application or not withdrawing the deposit under Section 17 and then redepositing it under sub-section 4. The word deposit should not be construed in pedantic manner. It should be understood and interpreted so as to advance the object of the provision. The amount deposited under Section 17 exhausted its purpose once ex parte decree was set aside.” 11. Though the above case was in relation to a situation where the amount deposited under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was to be taken into account as payments made under the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972, but what is clear is that even though the amount may have been deposited under some other provisions and it was available with the Court for the purposes of satisfying decretal amount under the ex parte decree, the same could very well be accepted as security under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 12. It is thus clear that the prayer of the applicant for treating the amount already deposited in Court, as security under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was not at all conditional. In case the ex parte decree is not set aside, the decretal amount can very well be satisfied from the said deposit. It was not at all necessary to deposit the amount twice. The question whether the deposit under Section 20(4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 was conditional or not and what would be the effect of conditional deposit under the said provision, was not at all relevant at the present stage. In this view of the matter, the order passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside. The question whether the deposit under Section 20(4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 was conditional or not and what would be the effect of conditional deposit under the said provision, was not at all relevant at the present stage. In this view of the matter, the order passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside. “On the same lines is the decision of this Court in the case of Satish Kumar Dutta (Supra) wherein also the decision in the case of Lacchi Ram has been relied upon. Paragraph 3 and 4 of the said decision read as under: “3. The only point involved in this writ petition and argued by learned counsel for both the parties is as to whether tenant had deposited complete amount under Seciton 39 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for getting benefit of the said section and consequently of section 20 of the Act or not. Revisional Court has recorded the finding that building would be deemed to have been constructed on 01.04.1978. The Revisional Court found that within one month from the said date i.e. by 30.04.1978 tenant had deposited the amount of Rs. 15,600/-which was more than required by Section 39 of the Act however an amount of Rs. 7015/-out of the total amount of Rs. 15,600/-could not be taken into consideration as it was deposited under Section 17 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (P.S.C.C. Act in short). An authority of this Court in Lachchi Ram Vs. A.D.J 1 was cited before the Revisional Court. The Revisional Court distinguished the said authority on the ground that in the said authority on the ground that in the said authority it was held that amount deposited under Section 17 of the PSCC Act, could be taken into consideration while granting benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. In my opinion same principle will apply while considering as to whether tenant is entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act or not. Learned counsel for the landlord respondent has argued that unless an application is made by the tenant to the effect that amount deposited under Section 17 of PSCC Act, may be treated to have been deposited under Section 39 also, it cannot be taken into consideration. Learned counsel for the landlord respondent has argued that unless an application is made by the tenant to the effect that amount deposited under Section 17 of PSCC Act, may be treated to have been deposited under Section 39 also, it cannot be taken into consideration. In this regard learned Counsel has placed reliance upon the authorities mentioned in the aforesaid authority of Lachhi Ram. It is undisputed that the amount deposited by the tenant under Section 17 of the PSCC Act, was never withdrawn by him. Tenant since beginning is asserting that he is entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act. In view of this I am of the opinion that the amount deposited under Section 17 PSCC Act can very will be taken into consideration while granting benefit of any of the aforesaid sections to the tenant. I cannot approve too technical approach in this regard. 4. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that tenant was entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act.” 17. In the said case benefit of the deposit under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 was held to be available in law to the deposit referred in Section 39 of the Act, 1972. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the Court below erred in relying upon the decision in Bhragu Dutt Singh(Supra) to reject the plea of the revisionist for treating the amount deposited by him under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 as a deposit referred in Section 20(4) of the Act, 1972. The legal position is settled that it was permissible to treat such deposit as one under Section 20 (4). After treating it to be so, how far the requirements of Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972 were satisfied was another aspect which was required to be considered by the Court below but it has not done so. As regards the contention of learned Counsel Mohd. Sayeed that no application had been filed by the revisionist for treating the aforesaid amount as one under Section 20 (4), in view of the decision in Lacchhi Ram, such request could be oral or written. The essence of the matter is as to whether there was a deposit with the Court (custodia legis) on or prior to the date of hearing or not. The essence of the matter is as to whether there was a deposit with the Court (custodia legis) on or prior to the date of hearing or not. If it was, then intimation of such deposit with a request to treat it as a deposit under Section 20 (4) and adjust it accordingly is sufficient. This intimation and request could be made in writing or orally. In fact, it would be better if it is made in writing as it would avoid unnecessary disputes on this issue, but even if an oral request is made as was done in this case at the time of arguments as has been mentioned in the judgment itself, then, in such an event, once cognizance of such request has been taken by the Court below, as has been done in this case, then, there was no way this plea could be rejected as impermissible. 18. As regards the case of Prem Pal Gupta Vs. Baboo Ram Garg (Supra) same has already been considered in the decision of Lacchi Ram (Supra). 19. Reference may also be made to another decision of this Court in the case of Sunt Ram Gupta Vs. Ratan Prakash Garg (Supra) wherein adjustment of the amount deposited under the proviso to Section 17 as a deposit under Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972 was approved however, with the observation that the only flaw in the decision of the Court below was that it did not say in the operative portion of this judgment clearly that the plaintiff is entitled to withdraw that amount and adjust it towards arrears of rent demanded by him. As regards, reliance placed by the learned counsel for the opposite party upon the decision of this Court in Moinuddin Mammo and others (Supra), the said decision dwells barely on facts before the Court and there is no discussion supported by any reasoning nor is there any binding precedent laid down therein that an application has necessarily to be filed for claiming the benefit under Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972, whereas, this aspect of the matter has been specifically considered in a detailed and reasoned manner and has been accordingly decided in Lacchi Ram case which has further been explained as above. 20. 20. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the conclusion and the finding of the Court below on this issue cannot be said to be in accordance with law. Whether after treating the said amount as one under Section 20 (4), the requirements of the said provisions were satisfied or not for avoiding liability of eviction, would depend upon an inquiry into the nature and breakup of the deposits made in the light of the provisions contained in Sub-section 4 of Section 20 and this would be a different aspect, meaning thereby, even after treating such amount as one under Section 20 (4), in a given case, if the amount falls short of the amount referred in Section 20 (4) or it is found that it was not deposited on or before the first date of hearing then the benefit of the said provision may not be available to the tenant, but, in this case the Court below rejected the plea as being impermissible in the first place and has not ventured into the consequential inquiry as to the satisfaction of the Section 20 (4) referred herein above. 21. In view of the above while sustaining the finding recorded by the Court below on other issues, the conclusion and finding recorded by it on the applicability of Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1887 and the impermissibility of the deposit made by the tenant under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887, as a deposit under Section 20 (4) of the Act, 1972, as also, the operative portion of the judgment, is hereby set aside. Consequent to this, SCC suit no. 2 of 2006 shall stand restored before the SCC Court which shall now proceed to consider the issue of applicability of Section 20 (4) after treating the deposit made by the petitioner under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887, as one made under Sub-section 4 of Section 20 of the Act, 1972. Consequences shall follow accordingly as per law. 22. The revision is allowed in aforesaid terms. 23. The Lower Court Record which are available shall be returned to the District Court concerned for further proceedings as aforesaid. 24. Considering the fact that this revision has remained pending for almost 10 years, the parties, who are represented before this Court, are directed to appear before the Court below on 01.07.2020 for further proceedings. 23. The Lower Court Record which are available shall be returned to the District Court concerned for further proceedings as aforesaid. 24. Considering the fact that this revision has remained pending for almost 10 years, the parties, who are represented before this Court, are directed to appear before the Court below on 01.07.2020 for further proceedings. The SCC Court is directed to conclude the proceedings as aforesaid within a period of 3 months subject to regular Court proceedings resuming which are at present affected by COVID-19 pandemic, if need be by conducting the proceedings on day to day basis. The issues which have already attained finality as observed hereinabove, shall not be open for reconsideration.