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2020 DIGILAW 905 (KER)

State Of Kerala v. Periyar Plywoods

2020-10-30

K.VINOD CHANDRAN, T.R.RAVI

body2020
ORDER : Vinod Chandran, J. Despite two Division Bench decisions of this Court, Sri.Mohamed Rafiq, learned Senior Government Pleader, seeks to re-agitate the cause of the State insofar as limitation for assessments under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and the Central Sales Tax (Kerala) Rules, 1957, respectively referred to as 'CST Act' and 'CST Rules'. The Division Bench decisions in Parisons Foods (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala [ 2017 (3) KLT 1 ] and CTO v. Fijo Joseph [(2019) 64 GSTR 248 (Kerala)] found that though there is no time frame provided for assessments under the CST Act to be completed as per Rule 6(5), there should be read in, a period of limitation depending upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities there under and other relevant factors. Though the assessees sought the limitation period to be limited to four years as has been prescribed under sub-rules (7) and (8) of Rule 6 of the CST Rules, the decisions thought it fit to refer to the General Sales Tax laws applicable in the State, thus enlarging the period of limitation from that available in the Rules. The two different Benches of this Court relied upon S.B.Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India [ (1976) 2 SCC 181 ] and State of Punjab v. Bhattinda District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union Ltd. [ (2007) 11 SCC 363 ] for the principle that even if no limitation is provided, the State has the duty to complete such assessment within a reasonable period. This is challenged relying on a Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and a three-Judge Bench decision clarifying what has been stated in S.B.Gurbaksh Singh. 2. Sri.Mohamed Rafiq first relies on a Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax [ 1964 (4) SCR 436 ]. It is specifically pointed out that the Bench unanimously and categorically held that when the statute provides for a return to be filed and does not provide a limitation insofar as completion of assessment, then “the proceedings would commence after the return was submitted and would continue till a final order of assessment was made in regard to the said return” (sic para 19). S.B.Gurbaksh Singh considered the issue of exercise of suo motu power of revision and in the facts of that case found that there is no undue delay since the suo motu power was exercised within a few months of the passing of the appellate order. A passing remark was made that “any unreasonable delay in exercise may affect its validity” (sic para 15). Another three-Judge Bench in The Indian Aluminium Cables Limited v. The Excise & Taxation Officer [ (1977) 1 SCC 120 ] clarified that S.B.Gurbaksh Singh does not lay down that the suo motu power cannot be exercised after a 'undue long delay'. Hence what is stated in Ghanshyamdas prevails and the two-Judge Bench in Bhattinda District Co-operative could not have held otherwise. The learned Senior Government Pleader would urge that this Court, the two different Benches, fell into an error in having relied upon S.B.Gurbaksh Singh and Bhattinda District Co-operative. We would first look at the law as has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above referred judgments covering a period of nearly half a century and a decade more. 3. Ghanshyamdas decided two Civil Appeals. In the first of these appeals, for the year 1949-50, comprising of the period between October, 1949 to November, 1950 the assessee filed a return only for one quarter and defaulted in the other three. In the other appeal, the assessee did not file a return for any of the quarters comprised in the year 1950-51. In the first case, the notice was issued on 13.08.1954 and in the second, on 15.10.1954. The assessees argued that the proceedings were barred by limitation under Section 11-A of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. Section 11-A spoke of escaped assessment, which could be proceeded with by the Commissioner at any time within three calender years from the expiry of the period in which the escapement was occasioned. We pause here to notice that insofar as one appeal, the notice was issued in the fourth year and in the other within three years. Section 11-A spoke of escaped assessment, which could be proceeded with by the Commissioner at any time within three calender years from the expiry of the period in which the escapement was occasioned. We pause here to notice that insofar as one appeal, the notice was issued in the fourth year and in the other within three years. The Department argued that since both the appellants were registered dealers with Certificates of Registration clearly indicating the dates on which the returns are to be filed, the statutory obligation deems the proceedings to be pending from the date on which such returns were to be filed and hence there was no scope for invoking the provisions of Section 11-A, which is to be invoked for covering escaped assessment. 4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed each of the sub-sections under Section 11, which was the provision regarding assessment. With respect to a registered dealer four variations were noticed, (i) the dealer submits a return properly and pays the amounts due, which is accepted by the Commissioner for the purpose of appropriation of the amounts paid to tax, (ii) the return is suspect and a notice is issued under Section 11(2); makes an enquiry but no assessment is finalized, (iii) no return is submitted and the Commissioner issues notice under Sections 10(3) and 11(4), without finalization and (iv) where no return is filed and the Commissioner also does not issue notice within three years. In the first instance when return is accepted and amounts paid appropriated to tax, there is a final assessment made. In the second instance of a notice having been issued after the return is filed, the assessment proceedings would be pending till the final assessment is made. This would be the position even in the case of a notice issued when there is no return filed. When an escapement is alleged, re-opening has to be under Section 11-A; which can only be after an assessment is completed. Here we pause again to notice that in the present revisions the assessees contend that the notices were issued after seven or eight years. 5. In Ghanshyamdas, the specific question considered was: “But where no return has been made and the Commissioner has not issued any notice under the Act; how can it be held that some proceedings are pending before the Commissioner when none existed as a matter of fact? 5. In Ghanshyamdas, the specific question considered was: “But where no return has been made and the Commissioner has not issued any notice under the Act; how can it be held that some proceedings are pending before the Commissioner when none existed as a matter of fact? We are concerned in this case with the last contingency”. It was held that the statutory obligations by itself does not deem the proceedings to be initiated, for then it would be invoking a fiction not sanctioned by the Act. We also have to notice that the Constitution Bench also held so in paragraph 19: “For the foregoing reasons we hold that a statutory obligation to make a return within a prescribed time does not proprio vigore initiate the assessment proceedings before the Commissioner; but the proceedings would commence after the return was submitted and would continue till a final order of assessment was made in regard to the said return”. Pertinently here the issuance or non-issuance of notice was not taken into account. Applying the above propositions, the facts in the first appeal indicated a return filed with respect to one quarter as on 05.10.1950. The notice issued on 13.08.1954 was found to be enabling a proper finalization of the assessment of that quarter alone and not the other quarters for which neither return was filed nor notice issued. However, with respect to the other appeal, the fourth quarter was found to end on 31.10.1951 and hence the notice on 15.10.1954 was held to be falling within the three year period as provided under Section 11-A. The question specifically raised and decided was as to whether the statutory obligation itself would result in initiation of proceedings on the due date for filing returns; even if no return is filed, which was answered in the negative. 6. Now we come to S.B.Gurbaksh Singh which considered the aspect of limitation insofar as a suo motu revision made. The assessment year was 1955-56 and the assessment was completed on 23.11.1959. In first appeal, the appellate authority held that the assessment for the first two quarters was invalid, having been made out of time. The Commissioner however revised the first appellate order invoking the suo motu powers on 29.07.1960. There was no limitation provided insofar as exercise of suo motu power. In first appeal, the appellate authority held that the assessment for the first two quarters was invalid, having been made out of time. The Commissioner however revised the first appellate order invoking the suo motu powers on 29.07.1960. There was no limitation provided insofar as exercise of suo motu power. It was argued for the assessee that (i) the appellate and revisional authorities should exercise their powers within the period provided for finalization of assessment, (ii) even the Commissioner exercising suo motu power is regulated by the limitation of three years provided under Section 11-A dealing with escapement of assessment and (iii) the revisional authority must exercise the power in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time. A three-Judge Bench rejected all the above contentions and on the last submission, it was found that there was no unduly long delay and in answer to the question it was held that “It may well be that for an exercise of the suo moto power of revision also, the revisional authority has to initiate the proceedings within a reasonable time. Any unreasonable delay in exercise may affect its validity” (sic para 15). The aspect of reasonableness in initiation of suo motu powers was first judicially recognized by the three-Judge Bench in S.B.Gurbaksh Singh. This principle was also followed in other decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of completion of assessments where no period of limitation was provided in the statute. 7. The reliance placed on Indian Aluminimum Cables Limited, another three-Judge Bench, by the learned Senior Government Pleader is to upset the declaration regarding reasonable time as propounded for the first time by another three-Judge Bench in S.B.Gurbaksh Singh. In this context we notice National Insurance Co. v. Pranay Sethi [ (2017) 16 SCC 680 ], a Constitution Bench decision which dilated upon per incuriam decisions based on a number of Constitution Bench decisions, some of which are referred to by us here under. 8. Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik [ (2002) 1 SCC 1 ] which dealt with a situation where a two-Judge Bench disagreed with a three-Judge Bench decision, directed the matter to be placed before a larger Bench of five Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 8. Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik [ (2002) 1 SCC 1 ] which dealt with a situation where a two-Judge Bench disagreed with a three-Judge Bench decision, directed the matter to be placed before a larger Bench of five Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Triveniben v. State of Gujarat [(1988) (4) SCC 574] a decision of a Division Bench of two judges refusing to follow a three-Judge Bench decision was held to be not good law. It was held in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [ (1989) 2 SCC 754 ], at page 778, following two Constitution Benches that "...a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of the same or a smaller number of Judges" (sic-para 28). We also make an extract from paragraph 27 of the said decision: "... This Court also laid down in Acharya Maharajshri Narandraprasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat (1975) 1 SCC 11 that even where the strength of two differing Division Benches consisted of the same number of Judges, it was not open to one Division Bench to decide the correctness or otherwise of the views of the other. The principle was reaffirmed in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (1985) 4 SCC 369 which noted that a Division Bench of two Judges of this Court in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana (1981) 1 SCC 11 had differed from the view taken by an earlier Division Bench of two Judges in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. (1979) 2 SCC 409 on the point whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel could be defeated by invoking the defence of executive necessity, and holding that to do so was wholly unacceptable reference was made to the well accepted and desirable practice of the later Bench referring the case to a larger Bench when the learned Judges found that the situation called for such reference". 9. From Pranay Sethi we cite the following paragraph: “28. 9. From Pranay Sethi we cite the following paragraph: “28. In this context, we may also refer to Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 623 ) which correctly lays down the principle that discipline demanded by a precedent or the disqualification or diminution of a decision on the application of the per incuriam rule is of great importance, since without it, certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts would become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the court. A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench. There can be no scintilla of doubt that an earlier decision of co-equal Bench binds the Bench of same strength. Though the judgment in Rajesh case (2013) 9 SCC 54 was delivered on a later date, it had not apprised itself of the law stated in Reshma Kumari (2013) 9 SCC 65 but had been guided by Santosh Devi (2012) 6 SCC 421 . We have no hesitation that it is not a binding precedent on the co-equal Bench". Going by the above referred Constitution Bench decisions, it cannot be said that the declaration of law made in S.B.Gurbaksh Singh has been unsettled by a co-ordinate Bench in Indian Aluminum Cables Limited. 10. In this context, we also notice the various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of co-equal strength dealing with the ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the Wakf Act. In Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf [ (2010) 8 SCC 726 ], a Division Bench of two Judges held that the Civil Court's jurisdiction is excluded only in cases where the matter in dispute is required under the Wakf Act to be determined by the Tribunal as is discernible from Section 85 of the Act. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to decide the question whether a property is wakf or not and whether it is a Shia wakf or Sunni wakf. Section 85 though wider, is not an absolute exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to decide the question whether a property is wakf or not and whether it is a Shia wakf or Sunni wakf. Section 85 though wider, is not an absolute exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Section 83 was categorically held to be not concerned with the exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. Later, a Bench of co-equal strength, in which one of the Judges in Ramesh Gobindram was also a member, distinguished Ramesh Gobindram in W.B.Wakf Board v. Anis Fatma Begum [ (2010) 14 SCC 588 ]. It was held relying on Section 83 that the Wakf Tribunal can decide all disputes, questions or other matters relating to wakf or wakf property. Another Division Bench, again comprised of two learned Judges, in Punjab Wakf Board v. Pritpal Singh & Another [2013 SCC OnLine SC 1345] following Anis Fatma Begum held that a suit for recovery of possession from a tenant is not one seeking relief for ejectment. Again the question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of co-equal strength in Punjab Wakf Board v. Sham Singh Harike [ (2019) 4 SCC 698 ]. The learned Judges found that both Anis Fatma Begum and Pritpal Singh sounds a different note from the earlier judgment of Ramesh Gobindram. Ramesh Gobindram was re-affirmed, which is the first of such decisions by a Division Bench comprised of two Judges. This is the exact situation in the present case where S.B.Gurbaksh Singh, a three-Judge Bench, was differed from in Indian Aluminium Cables Limited, which again was a Bench of co-equal strength. 11. Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. State of Haryana [ (1988) 3 SCC 478 ] was a case in which the assessment was allowed to be completed, since there was no specific limitation provided, within four months from the date of judgment. Therein, Ghanshyamdas was considered and the dictum was held to be so in paragraph 6: “6. On the basis of this authority, it would follow that notices under sub-section (2) of either Section 11 or Section 28 of the relevant Acts, having already issued and final orders of assessment having not been made, assessment proceedings are still pending”. Indian Aluminium Cables Limited was also referred and held so in paragraph 13: “13. On the basis of this authority, it would follow that notices under sub-section (2) of either Section 11 or Section 28 of the relevant Acts, having already issued and final orders of assessment having not been made, assessment proceedings are still pending”. Indian Aluminium Cables Limited was also referred and held so in paragraph 13: “13. In Indian Aluminium case this Court has approved the earlier decision in Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India. The ratio in Gurbaksh Singh case is that in the absence of a period provided by statute for completion of assessment, an order of assessment made with some delay would not be without jurisdiction. Even in Indian Aluminium case, where the statute requires assessment to be completed within a reasonable time, the court indicated that the argument of the learned counsel that the assessment had to be completed within a reasonable time in order to be sustainable was not acceptable as a sound one”. On facts, it was noticed in Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. that though the assessment was delayed, the materials placed before the Court reveal that the assessee had gone to different Courts seeking an injunction against completion of assessment which was ultimately obtained in a suit filed. The notice was found to be within a reasonable period from the filing of returns. It was reiterated that “in the absence of any prescribed period of limitation, the assessment has to be completed within a reasonable period. What such reasonable period would be, would depend upon facts of each case”(sic). The need for expedition in completing assessments was specifically noticed in paragraph 15. 12. In Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K.Suresh Reddy [ (2003) 7 SCC 667 ] the words used 'at any time', in a statute, was found to indicate that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised. However, it was held that such exercise was dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case and in cases of fraud, the power should be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. On the facts revealed in the above case, though no time limit was prescribed in the statute, the period of fifty years after which the suo motu power was exercised, was found to be bad. 13. On the facts revealed in the above case, though no time limit was prescribed in the statute, the period of fifty years after which the suo motu power was exercised, was found to be bad. 13. In this context we notice the decision in Bhattinda District Co-operative which held that even in the absence of any statutory period of limitation, the power of suo motu revision is exercisable only within a reasonable period. A two-Judge Bench relied on S.B.Gurbaksh Singh to hold so in paragraphs 18 and 19: “18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. 19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made herein before, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated herein before, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years”. It is this proposition of law with respect to the completion of assessments, invocation of suo motu powers, etc. within a reasonable period in the absence of a statutory prescription of limitation which was relied on by the two Division Benches of this Court in Parisons Foods (P) Ltd. and Fijo Joseph. We do not find any reason to differ from the same. 14. Collector v. D.Narsing Rao [ (2015) 3 SCC 695 ] was a case in which on the allegation of fraudulent entries, patta of certain lands were sought to be cancelled. Along with a number of other decisions, Bhattinda District Co-operative and Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham Ibrahim were cited with approval. Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav [ (2018) 12 SCC 527 ] again was concerned with the restoration of lands for which no limitation was prescribed. There an application for restoration of land was made 24 years after the right accrued, which was dismissed for default, the restoration of which was sought 16 years later. Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav [ (2018) 12 SCC 527 ] again was concerned with the restoration of lands for which no limitation was prescribed. There an application for restoration of land was made 24 years after the right accrued, which was dismissed for default, the restoration of which was sought 16 years later. The dictum laid down was as follows: “13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights”. 15. In our humble opinion Ghanshyamdas does not apply since there, in one of the appeals the notice was issued within four years and there was no limitation provided for completion. We noticed from paragraph 16 of that decision; the second and third instances referred, wherein notice was said to have been issued, when the return is filed or defaulted, in which event the assessments were found to be pending. The question of reasonable time as judicially recognized for the first time in S.B.Gurbaksh Singh never arose for consideration before the Constitution Bench. A later decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhattinda District Co-operative reiterated the aspect of reasonable time and provided guidelines as to how a reasonable period of limitation could be judicially brought in “looking at the nature of the statutes, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors”; an overall consideration of the “statutory scheme”. This view was consistently taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court over the years, as is clear from the decisions referred above. 16. We once again look at Section 9 of the CST Act and Rule 6(5) of the CST Rules. Section 9 enables the levy and collection of tax and penalties exercising all or any of the powers conferred on the Department under the General Sales Tax law of the State, which is subject to the other provisions of the CST Act and the Rules framed there under. Section 9 enables the levy and collection of tax and penalties exercising all or any of the powers conferred on the Department under the General Sales Tax law of the State, which is subject to the other provisions of the CST Act and the Rules framed there under. Under the KGST regime as was applicable till the year 2004-2005, there was a finalization of assessment contemplated after the return is filed. Under the KVAT regime, which came into force from 01.04.2005, on filing of return, there is a self assessment under Section 21, which deems the assessment to have been completed on the receipt of the return. It can be reopened inter alia under Section 25 with a notice issued within five years as has been interpreted by this Court in CTO v. Najeem [ 2018 (3) KLT 877 ]. 17. Rule 6 of the CST Rules provides for the procedure of assessment. Sub-rule (1) speaks of monthly returns and sub-rule (1A) of quarterly returns applicable to specified dealers. Sub-rule (2) provides for filing of return by a dealer who discontinues the business during the course of the year. Sub-rule (2A) enables any dealer to revise the returns filed under sub-rules (1), (1A) or (2) at any time before an assessment is finalized. The return of transactions, so made under Form-II under the relevant sub-rule; on its filing is provisionally accepted, subject only to sub-rule (4). Sub-rule (4) speaks of determination of turnover to the best of judgment of the assessing authority for provisionally assessing the tax or taxes payable for the month or quarter as the case may be. Such provisional assessment under sub-rule (4) is permissible only till the close of the year after which sub-rule (5) comes into play. Sub-rule (5), as we noticed, does not provide any period of limitation. It enables the assessing authority, after the close of the year, to scrutinize the accounts, conduct an enquiry to his satisfaction as to the returns filed being correct and complete; so as to finalize under a single order the taxes payable under the Act for the preceding year or to the year to which the return relates. This again is the acceptance of the order and appropriation of the amounts paid in accordance with the returns to the tax payable; which does not have any limitation since it does not prejudice the assessee at all. 18. This again is the acceptance of the order and appropriation of the amounts paid in accordance with the returns to the tax payable; which does not have any limitation since it does not prejudice the assessee at all. 18. The second limb of sub-rule (5) empowers the assessing authority to assess the dealer in the case of default in filing the return or in the case of an incorrect or incomplete return having been filed. This has to be done after making an enquiry, which also contemplates an opportunity to the dealer for proving the correctness or completeness of the return submitted. Of course, the turnover determined could be in the best of judgment of the assessing authority. Here we notice the scheme of the statutory rule. Clause (i) of sub-rule (7) speaks of determination of turnover to the best of judgment when there is detected an escaped assessment; for which a limitation of four years is prescribed. Similarly by sub-rule (8), any under-assessment made at too low a rate of tax, enables the assessment to be revised within four years from the year to which the tax relates. A rectification of a mistake apparent from the face of the record under sub-rule (9) can only be made within three years. Hence, when an assessment order is made and there is found an escapement under sub-rule (7) or an under-assessment under sub-rule (8), the re-opening and correct determination, of the turnover or the rate applicable, can be only within four years from the expiry of the year to which the tax relates. We emphasise that the limitation provided is not from the date of finalization of assessment, but from the closure of the year to which the tax relates. Even a rectification of mistake can only be within three years of the expiry of the year to which the tax relates. In that context, it would not have been the intention of the executive Government to enable an assessment at any time after the return is filed when the rules provide a limitation period of re-opening either for determination of turnover or for revising the rate of tax or even for rectification of a mistake. We would have in that context found the reasonable time to be four years. However, we are bound by the Division Bench decisions which adopted the limitation as provided under the General Sales Tax law. We would have in that context found the reasonable time to be four years. However, we are bound by the Division Bench decisions which adopted the limitation as provided under the General Sales Tax law. 19. As we saw from Section 9, the tax authorities are enabled to invoke the provisions of the General Sales Tax law if there is no contrary intention seen from the provisions of the CST Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Rule 6(5) does not provide for a period of limitation and when the General Sales Tax law provided a period of five years for re-opening an assessment which is deemed to be completed under Section 21, the same applies under the CST Act and the Rules. We cannot but observe that though Section 25 of the KVAT Act provides for re-opening of the completed assessment under Section 21, under the CST Rules the limitation provided for reopening of assessment on the ground of escaped assessment is four years. The Division Benches however having held the period provided under the KVAT Act to be applicable, we would not deviate from the same. 20. Applying the principle to the facts of the present cases, we find the assessments to be vitiated for reason of “unduly long delay” as found in S.B.Gurbaksh Singh. The year of assessment expires on the 31st of March. For the year 2005-06 and 2006-07, the notices issued under Section 6(5) were just prior to the close of the 8th year, i.e., respectively on 13.02.2014 and 19.03.2015. For the year 2007-08, notice was issued on 20.03.2015, just prior to the close of the 7th year. We also observe that since the period under Section 25 of the KVAT Act is adopted, the requirement therein is to proceed to determine within a period of five years from the expiry of the year. Hence, the notice itself has to be issued within five years which, in the above cases, have been issued long after the period provided and adopted as reasonable. We do not find any reason to differ from the earlier decisions of this Court and we reject the revisions, answering the question of law on limitation under Rule 6(5) again in favour of the assessee and against the Department. No costs.