JUDGMENT : Milind N. Jadhav, J. 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties. 2. By the present petition, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 16.03.2019 passed by the respondent no. 2-Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone 5, Nagpur City, Nagpur, under the provisions of Section 56(1)(a)(b) of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 (in short 'the Act of 1951'), inter alia, directing externment of the petitioner from city of Nagpur and Nagpur District for a period of 1 years. In the present case, in respect of action to be initiated under Section 56(1)(b) of the Act of 1951, respondent no. 1-State has delegated the powers to the Commissioner of Police, Nagpur City, Nagpur and further the Commissioner of Police, Nagpur City, Nagpur has delegated the powers to respondent no. 2 i.e. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-5, Nagpur City, Nagpur. The Assistant Commissioner of Police, Kamptee Division, Nagpur was entrusted with work of enquiry in the matter and to submit the proposal to extern the petitioner. Section 56(1)(b) of the Act of 1951 reads thus :- "56. Removal of persons about to commit offence. - (1) * * * * (a) * * * (b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapters XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or in the abetment of any such offence and when in the opinion of such officer witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property, or" 3. Accordingly, notice dated 15.12.2018 was issued under the provisions of Section 59 of the Act of 1951, calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation regarding the reasons stated in the said notice. The said notice discloses a list of offences registered against the petitioner, action initiated in the matters and pendency of cases against the petitioner in Court. In addition to the above, there was also reference made to the prohibitory orders and recording of in-camera statements of certain witnesses against the petitioner for initiating action of externment. The said notice discloses a list of offences registered against the petitioner, action initiated in the matters and pendency of cases against the petitioner in Court. In addition to the above, there was also reference made to the prohibitory orders and recording of in-camera statements of certain witnesses against the petitioner for initiating action of externment. In all, there were six offences registered against the petitioner under various Sections between 2013 and 2018 for criminal intimidation, stone pelting, damage to public property, causing hurt, possessing arms, trespass, rioting, arson etc. The petitioner filed his detailed reply dated 11.01.2019 to the said notice. 4. Respondent no. 2, on the basis of material placed before him, by impugned order dated 16.03.2019 directed externment of the petitioner from the jurisdiction of the Nagpur City Police Commissionerate for one year and six months. The petitioner has abided by the same and removed himself from the jurisdiction of the Nagpur City Police Commissionerate and presently residing in Katol. 5. The petitioner has approached this Court on multiple grounds viz. that respondent no. 2 did not accord reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to place his explanation and tender appropriate evidence in respect of the charges made in the notice. The petitioner has stated that references to the charges and incidents mentioned in the notice were of the years 2013 to 2018 and the last offence that had been registered against the petitioner was on 19.06.2018. He submitted that the order of externment came to be passed on 16.03.2019, while considering the incidents of the years 2013, 2015 and 2017 which itself goes to show that the impugned order was motivated because, there was no proximity between the acts/incidents referred to and relied upon in the notice and passing of the impugned order on 16.03.2019. The petitioner further submitted that the notice discloses isolated incidents which has resulted in registration of the offences against the petitioner and there was involvement of several other persons also. The petitioner submitted that in respect of the co-accused persons, who were involved in the various incidents with him, no action of externment has been contemplated/invoked and it is also not the case of prosecution that the petitioner was leader of several co-accused persons who were involved in the various offences. 6. The petitioner submitted that in respect of the co-accused persons, who were involved in the various incidents with him, no action of externment has been contemplated/invoked and it is also not the case of prosecution that the petitioner was leader of several co-accused persons who were involved in the various offences. 6. The petitioner has submitted that the show cause notice was not in conformity with the requirements of Section 59 of the Act of 1951, in as much as, nature of allegations were vague, insufficient and general and were was solely based upon in-camera statements of certain persons recorded by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Kamptee Division, Nagpur. The petitioner submitted that no opportunity for producing evidence was accorded to the petitioner to meet the case of the prosecution in respect of the said in-camera statements which form the basis of externment order. Further, it was the petitioner's case that if at all reliance had to be placed on incamera statements of certain persons, it was the duty of the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Kamptee Division, Nagpur to conduct investigation and enquiry for verification of the said statements, collect proper material and evidence against the petitioner and/or involving the petitioner and to record the substantive satisfaction of the Authority. The petitioner submitted that the impugned order dated 16.03.2019 makes a reference to the fact that the Assistant Commissioner of Police visited the spot of incidents and made enquiry with persons from nearby locality and had come to the substantive satisfaction that acts of the petitioner were creating terror in the minds of the people. However, such material did not form part and parcel of the notice issued to the petitioner, so as to enable the petitioner to respond to the same adequately. The petitioner concluded by submitting that extraneous material had been considered by respondent no. 2 for passing the impugned order and as such the impugned order deserved to be quashed and set aside. The petitioner submitted that there was no specific provision or requirement of law for recording of in-camera statements by the enquiry officer while considering the proposal of externment. 2 for passing the impugned order and as such the impugned order deserved to be quashed and set aside. The petitioner submitted that there was no specific provision or requirement of law for recording of in-camera statements by the enquiry officer while considering the proposal of externment. Further, it was the petitioner's case that in-camera statements do not reflect any incident or date of the incidents and therefore, to pass the impugned order on the basis of recording of such in-camera statements was an abuse of process of law as even the names of the persons who had given the statements did not find mention in the impugned order. The petitioner submitted that he was 34 years old and that his family was entirely dependent on the income earned by him. 7. Shri R. M. Patwardhan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner sought to place reliance upon the following judgments in support of his case :- (i) Sachin S/o. Mahesh Dubey Vs. The State of Maharashtra and another, (2013) AllMR(Cri) 2458. Paragraph no. 3 of the said judgment reads thus :- "3. There are only three criminal cases pending against the petitioner. He has been ordered to be externed out of the local limits of Nagpur Commissionarate and Nagpur Rural. The Magistrate passing the order has stated in his order that the witnesses are not coming forward to give evidence due to fear of the petitioner. This is the prime ground on which the petitioner has been externed. However, the order is absolutely vague inasmuch as even single incident of involvement of the petitioner in threatening the witnesses has not been stated in the order. No doubt, the orders passed under Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act are mainly based on subjective satisfaction of the authority empowered to pass such orders, still since the order adversely affects personal liberty of the individual, it is expected to the authority to concerned to indicate in brief as to what are the grounds on which such belief or satisfaction is based." (ii) Arun Narayanrao Mane Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2002) AllMR(Cri) 2418. Paragraph nos. 1, 2 and 5 of the said judgment reads thus :- "1. State of Maharashtra and others, (2002) AllMR(Cri) 2418. Paragraph nos. 1, 2 and 5 of the said judgment reads thus :- "1. The learned A.P.P. states that the Principal Secretary (Appeals and Security) to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the period of externment came to an end on 20.12.2000 and that the order of externment is no longer operating. It appears that the petition came to be filed because, according to the petitioner, the externee was not served with a copy of the appellate order. Had he been served with the copy of this order, probably the petitioner would not have filed this petition at all. Unfortunately the appellate order is also not annexed along with the reply, but is tendered across the bar. The same is taken on record and marked 'X' for identification. In view of this order, a decision in this petition has become academic. 2. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner states that nonetheless, he wishes to pursue the matter on merits because there is a stigma caused on the externee by the impugned order. * * * * 5. In my opinion, the argument of the applicant is well founded and the explanation on behalf of the respondent is not acceptable. A situation where a person assaults another on a suspicion that the person is a police informer is a completely different situation from one where a person assaults another and then informs him not to give a police report. In the former, the assault follows the suspicion of a person being a police informer whereas in the latter situation, threat follows the assault. This ground, which is made part of the basis for issuance of the externment order is thus not to be found in the show cause notice and in my opinion, this would vitiate the externment order. On this ground alone, the petition would succeed and it would not be necessary to refer to other contentions sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioner." (iii) Sumit S/o. Ramkrishna Maraskolhe Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Nagpur and another, (2019) AllMR(Cri) 1961 (F.B.). Paragraph nos. 3 (D), (E), 9, 19, 24 and 25 of the said judgment reads thus :- "3. . . . . . . Deputy Commissioner of Police, Nagpur and another, (2019) AllMR(Cri) 1961 (F.B.). Paragraph nos. 3 (D), (E), 9, 19, 24 and 25 of the said judgment reads thus :- "3. . . . . . . (D) The Division Bench found that the object of externment being to restrain a person from indulging in or continuing with his illegal activities for a certain period of time, it was necessary that the movements of such a person are restricted to such an area as would make it possible for authorities to keep a watch over his activities and if this is to be done effectively, the removal of such a person could possibly and reasonably be from a larger or additional area. The Division Bench held that the legislature itself had taken note of the improved or common means of transport and communication system reducing the impact of externment order and enabling the externee to easily flout the externment order and that is the reason why not only the Hon'ble Apex Court but also the legislature through amendment made to Section 56 by Maharashtra Act 33 of 1981 made a provision for authorizing the officer to extern a person even outside his area of illegal activities or the jurisdiction of the officer and such larger area need not be contigious to the actual area of his illegal activities. The Division Bench took the view that the order of externment from the larger or additional area can be justified on the basis of existence of material showing the nature of activities of the externee in a restricted area and it cannot be vitiated merely because no specific reference is made to the options available to deal with the situation. It also held that there could not be any insistence upon the existence of material to show that the larger or additional area so chosen or selected is intimately connected with the actual area of the activities of the externee due to improved or common means of transport and communication. (E) During the course of hearing, a further question arose as to whether or not details of the material allegations need be furnished to the person proposed to be externed. (E) During the course of hearing, a further question arose as to whether or not details of the material allegations need be furnished to the person proposed to be externed. The Division Bench, again referring to the cases decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court and this High Court found that what is required to be furnished to the proposed externee, as required under Section 59 of the Act 1951, is only general nature of material allegations and nothing more. * * * 9. The first question is about the need for an externment order being reflective of the existence of material on record justifying externment from a larger area much beyond the actual area of the illegal activities of a person and the externing authority being conscious of such material and being convinced at least subjectively about the necessity of banishing a person to a distant area. * * * * 19. These principles of law to be followed by the courts in undertaking a judicial review of the action of externment of a person, as we gather, have been moulded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the anvil of Wednesbury doctrine. This is seen from its observations in paragraphs 19 and 20, reproduced thus : "19. Before summarising the substance of the principles laid down therein we shall refer to the passage from the judgment of Lord Greene in Associated Provinicial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. (KB at p. 229 : ALL ER pp. 682 H-683 A). It reads as follows: "... It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could even dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. ... In another, it taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and in fact, all these things run into one another." Lord Greene also observed (KB p. 230: All ER p. 683 F-G) "... it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense that the court considers it to be a decision that no reasonable body can come to. It is not what the court considers unreasonable. ... The effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over another." (emphasis supplied) Therefore, to arrive at a decision on "reasonableness" the court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator must have been within the four corners of the law, and not one which no sensible person could have reasonably arrived at, having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not fore the court to substitute its view. * * * * 24. A combined reading of the principles of law laid down in all the aforesaid cases would show that ordinarily the externment order be restricted to the area of illegal activity of externee. In a given case, the order can be capacious which would include more area than the actual field of the illegal activities of the externee so as to shake the externee off his roots and this may be so necessary in a particular case for achieving the object of externment order. In a given case, the order can be capacious which would include more area than the actual field of the illegal activities of the externee so as to shake the externee off his roots and this may be so necessary in a particular case for achieving the object of externment order. While making such an expansive order, sufficient leeway has been granted to the officer and it includes the power conferred under amended provision of Section 56 of the Act, 1951 to remove a person from a much bigger area than the area of his actual activity and such a larger area may not necessarily be contiguous to the area of illegal activities or may not be falling within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the officer. But, this discretion is always subject to the limits drawn by the Wednesbury triad of unreasonableness, already elaborated upon in the previous paragraphs. 25. Thus, we can now reasonably say that although the officer is having the discretion to extern a person from a much larger area, the discretion is neither unfettered nor uncanalized nor unrestricted. The discretion is rather guided by the sound principles of judicial review of administrative action or statutory discretion which have now been called the Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness. That would mean that an externment order must be based upon some material, that it must refer to some material on record, and if that is done, the requirements of law are met and the judicial review would go no further to examine sufficiency or otherwise of such material. In a given case, it may also happen that the externment order does not refer to some material on record. Still, the externment order could be seen as unassailable. Such possibility would arise when the situation of surrounding areas is such as to give rise to an impression upon taking of judicial notice of the situation that these areas are contiguous or adjacent to each other or inter-connected with each other through the improved means of transport and communication warranting externment of a person from a larger area in order to sweep the person off his moorings, just to make the order of externment effective and practicable, as held in Pandharinath (supra). But, some time the facts and circumstances may not be so self-speaking and in such a case, no judicial notice could possibly be taken. But, some time the facts and circumstances may not be so self-speaking and in such a case, no judicial notice could possibly be taken. It is in such a case, there would be need for the externment order to refer to some material on record, though not eloquently, and if that is done, the externment order would clear the validity test of Wednesbury doctrine. Once such reference to some material on record is seen, the judicial review has to stop as no further enquiry into sufficiency or otherwise of the material to pass a spacious externment order is permissible. This is on account of the cardinal principle of judicial review that when exercise of discretion is questioned as being arbitrary, a secondary reviewing Court, a High Court examining the challenge on the ground of arbitrariness of administrative action or statutory discretion would be a secondary court of review unlike in a situation where it considers the challenge based on grounds of inequality and discrimination when it turns into a primary court of review, cannot substitute it's own view for the view taken by the authority whose decision is under review just because another view is possible, unless the view of the authority subject to review is shown to be illegal or perverse or illogical or impossible, or procedurally improper. These are all nothing but part of Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness." 8. Shri A. D. Sonak, learned A.P.P. for the respondents sought to defend the impugned order dated 16.03.2018 by submitting that the petitioner had committed many heinous offences and created a reign of terror in the minds of people residing in the locality and therefore, to prevent the petitioner from committing any further crime, preventive action had been initiated under the provisions of Section 110 of the the Criminal Procedure Code against the petitioner. He submitted that in 2015 and 2017, such preventive action was initiated against the petitioner and finally a bond of good behavior was taken from the petitioner initially for a period of two years and thereafter for a further period of 1 year. He submitted that the witnesses, who had recorded their statements in-camera were not coming forward to depose against the petitioner out of fear and therefore, date of incidents and their names, as such were not disclosed in the show cause notice as also in the impugned order. He submitted that the witnesses, who had recorded their statements in-camera were not coming forward to depose against the petitioner out of fear and therefore, date of incidents and their names, as such were not disclosed in the show cause notice as also in the impugned order. He submitted that considering that the petitioner had committed several criminal offences and involved in various criminal activities, the ingredients of Section 56 of the Act of 1951 were squarely attracted and the order of externment dated 16.03.2019 passed against the petitioner was proper and legal. 9. We have perused the show cause notice dated 15.12.2018, reply filed by the petitioner dated 11.01.2019 and impugned order dated 16.03.2019 which along with pleadings in the present case. At the outset, we wish to address the issue of delay in passing the impugned order dated 16.03.2019 is based on incidents which have occurred between 2013 and 2018 and the matters are sub-judice in Court. The petitioner has admittedly given bond of good behavior between 2015 and 2017. However, there is not a shred of evidence in the show cause notice as well as in the impugned order dated 16.03.2019 to show that the petitioner has involved himself in threatening the witnesses. The provisions of Section 56 of the Act of 1951 are mainly based on substantive satisfaction of the Authority empowered to pass such orders, since such orders adversely affect personal liberty of the individual and it is expected from the Authority concerned to indicate in brief, the grounds on which such beliefs of substantive satisfaction is based upon. 10. In the present case, the last incident involving the petitioner is Crime No. 3109/2018 registered with Ajni Police Station, Nagpur had allegedly occurred on 19.06.2018. However, show cause notice which has been issued to the petitioner is in respect of incidents beginning from 2013 onwards. In this regard, it may be noted that the externment order has been passed on 16.03.2019 i.e. all most after a period of six years after occurrence of the first incident involving the petitioner. It is also not understood as to why the petitioner was not issued any show cause notice under the provisions of the Act of 1951 prior to 2018. It is also not understood as to why the petitioner was not issued any show cause notice under the provisions of the Act of 1951 prior to 2018. The answer lies in the fact that in 2015 to 2017, the petitioner had given a final bond of good behavior initially for a period of 2 years and thereafter for a further period of one year. Therefore, prima facie, there appears gross delay in issuance of show cause notice in the year 2018 about an incident which had occurred in 2013 and which finds mention in the show cause notice issued to the petitioner. 11. The second most important ground which attracts our attention is reliance placed in the impugned order dated 16.03.2019 on extraneous material. Prima facie, it is clear without doubt on reading the show cause notice dated 15.12.2018, impugned order dated 16.03.2019 and the material with respect to the recording of in-camera statements of witnesses by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Kamptee Division, Nagpur, that reliance has been placed on extraneous material without disclosing the dates of incidents or identity of the witnesses. Therefore, the impugned order dated 16.03.2019, which has been passed by taking into account the statements of the witnesses recorded in-camera was the material, the the gist of which was never disclosed to the petitioner and it has resulted into denial of opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself properly. On this ground alone the externment order is liable to be set aside. We find that this ground which is the basis for issuance of the externment order vitiates the externment order. 12. In our opinion, we find that the order of externment is required to be passed on material providing objective criteria to the Authority for reaching subjective satisfaction. It would be enough that order of externment discloses that subjective satisfaction having been reached by considering the material on record and it would and should be a matter of legitimate inference that the Authority, while considering the material to satisfy itself about the need for and extent of externment to be ordered, have also considered all the above material available to it and in its wisdom, one which had thought to be most appropriate. The object of externment is to restrain a person from indulging with or continuing with his illegal activities for a certain period of time. The object of externment is to restrain a person from indulging with or continuing with his illegal activities for a certain period of time. Therefore, movements of such a person are required to be restricted to such an area, as it would make it possible for the Authority to watch his activities. However, while passing such an order, it is to be borne in mind that decision and action of externment should not be vitiated by arbitrariness or unfairness or illegality or irrelevant all together converging into the famous Wednesbury principle that there are well defined limits to the power of judicial review that a Writ Court can exercise over such an order passed as a part of administrative function of the Authority, because it affects freedom of the person. In the present case, we find that the order of externment dated 16.03.2019 is wholly unsustainable in view of our above observations and deserves to be set aside. 13. Accordingly, Criminal Writ Petition is allowed. The externment order dated 16.03.2019 is hereby quashed and set aside. 14. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No costs.