ORDER : 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Shrikar H. Bhatt for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Rohan Shah for the respondent – State through video conference. 2. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned AGP Mr. Shah waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the respondents – State. 3. Having regard to the controversy involved in this matter in very narrow compass, with the consent of the learned advocates for the parties, the same is takenup for hearing. 4. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for C/SCA/10211/2020 ORDER the following reliefs: “A. To admit and allow this petition. B. To issue a writ of mandamus and/or certiorari and/or any other writ, direction or order quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 01/08/2016 (vide annexD) passed by respondent2 for termination of services of petitioner for his post. C. To direct the respondent2 that to reinstate the petitioner on original post Clerk classIII with continuous service and back wages. D. To pass any other and further orders as may be deemed fit and proper in favour of petitioner” 5. The brief facts of the case are as under : 5.1 The petitioner was appointed as a clerk vide order dated 31.12.2012 on a fix salary of RS.5300/for five years. The petitioner was posted at District Rajkot, Department of Mines and Geology. The petitioner joined duty on 1.1.2013. The petitioner was thereafter, transferred from Rajkot to Patan on 15th November, 2014. The petitioner joined his duty at Geology and Mines office, District Office at Patan. 5.2 It is the case of the petitioner that one person, Jigneshbhai Manilal Patel has registered complaint before the ACB Police Station, Patan on 23rd July 2016 and alleged that the petitioner demanded bribe of Rs.1,50,000/for monthly installment from his friend Rakesh Patel for granting lease. The ACB Police registered the same as F.I.R. being IC. R. No.3 of 2016, ACB Station, Patan. Thereafter, the police filed chargesheet and the case was committed before the Sessions Judge (ACB Court) and registered as ACB Sessions Case No.4 of 2019. The ACB case is pending before the learned Trial Judge from 3rd August, 2019 for framing of charge. 5.3 The petitioner was arrested by ACB police on 22nd July, 2016 and petitioner was in custody for more than 48 hours. The ACB case is pending before the learned Trial Judge from 3rd August, 2019 for framing of charge. 5.3 The petitioner was arrested by ACB police on 22nd July, 2016 and petitioner was in custody for more than 48 hours. Therefore, the respondent no.2, Commissioner of Geology and Mines Department, Gandhinagar terminated his service without initiating any departmental enquiry on 1st August, 2016. 5.4 The petitioner therefore, preferred revision application before the appellate authority which was rejected on 9th February, 2017. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has preferred the present petition. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Bhatt submitted that the petitioner was arrested in connection with F.I.R. and thereafter, he was released and the Special LCB Case no.4 of 2019 is pending before the learned Special (LCB) Judge, Patan. It was submitted that the respondent no.2 without issuing any show cause notice to the petitioner, terminated the services by impugned order dated 1st August, 2016, which was confirmed by the Appellate Authority by order dated 9th February, 2017. Mr. Bhatt, therefore, submits that without giving any opportunity of hearing, the impugned orders are passed in violation of principles of natural justice. 7. In support of his submission, Mr.Bhatt relied upon the decision of this Court in case of State of Gujarat Vs. Chetan Jayantilal Rajgor in Letters Patent Appeal no.1596 of 2019 wherein the Division Bench confirmed the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application no.4439 of 2017. It was therefore, prayed that the case of the petitioner also should be considered in light of the observations made by the Division Bench by giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 8. On the other hand, learned AGP Mr. Shah submitted that the petitioner was appointed on contractual basis and one of the term of the contract was to terminate his service without assigning any reason. 9. Mr. Shah in support of his above submissions, relied upon the following averments made in affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent. 6. At the outset, it is humbly submitted that the present petition is preferred after inordinate and unexplained delay of approximately 4 years and 2 months challenging order dated 01.08.2016 and therefore, the present petition may kindly be dismissed on the grounds of delay itself. 7. 6. At the outset, it is humbly submitted that the present petition is preferred after inordinate and unexplained delay of approximately 4 years and 2 months challenging order dated 01.08.2016 and therefore, the present petition may kindly be dismissed on the grounds of delay itself. 7. It is submitted that the petitioner came to be appointed on contractual basis vide order dated 31.12.2012 as Clerk, Class – III on fixed salary basis for 5 years on certain terms and conditions mentioned in the appointment letter/order and as per the policy of the State Government. Copy of letter/order of appointment dated 31.12.2012 is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURER1. 8. Thereafter, an F.I.R being ICR No. 03/2016 dated 23.07.2016 came to be registered with ACB Police Station, Patan against the petitioner under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act alleging commission of corruption. 9. It is submitted that pursuant to the F.I.R, the petitioner came to be arrested by the ACB Police and the petitioner was kept in custody for more than 48 hours. 10. Pursuant to the F.I.R, and custody of the petitioner, the services of the petitioner came to be terminated vide order dated 01.08.2016 on the grounds of misconduct and for breach of conditions of the appointment letter/order dated 31.12.2012 and provisions of G.R dated, 16.02.2006, 04.06.2009 and 20.10.2015.Copy of termination letter/order dated 01.08.2016, G.R. dated16.02.2006, 04.06.2009 and 20.10.2015 are annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURER2 “Collectively”. 11. It is submitted that thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the competent authority challenging letter/order of termination dated 01.08.2016. Further, the said appeal came to be rejected vide order dated 09.02.2017 confirming letter/order of termination dated 01.08.2016. Copy of order dated 09.02.2017 is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURER3. 12. It is submitted that in the captioned petition, the petitioner has not challenged the order dated 09.02.2017 passed by the appellate authority confirming letter/ order of termination dated 01.08.2016 and therefore, it is presumed that the same is accepted by the petitioner. 13. It is submitted that pursuant to the registration of F.I.R, after through investigation, even chargesheet has also been submitted prima facie finding out a case against the petitioner, 14. 13. It is submitted that pursuant to the registration of F.I.R, after through investigation, even chargesheet has also been submitted prima facie finding out a case against the petitioner, 14. It is submitted that the petitioner was appointed on purely contractual basis and as per the terms and conditions of the appointment letter/order dated 31.12.2012, the services of petitioner can be discontinued on grounds of misconduct upon registration of F.I.R and custody of petitioner for more than 48 hours. 15. It is submitted that the terms and conditions of appointment letter/order dated 31.12.2012 explicitly makes its clear that the contractual employees are not subjected to any departmental inquiry contemplated under the relevant rules meant for regularly appointed employee. 16. It is submitted that as per condition no. 38 of appointment letter/order dated 31.12.2012, a specific undertaking was also given by the petitioner that their services are bound by terms and conditions of appointment/letter dated 31.12.2012 and the said undertaking was as per the G.R. dated 01.08.2006. Copy of G.R. dated 01.08.2006 and undertaking given by the petition are annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURER4 “Collectively”. 17. It is submitted that the terms and conditions of appointment letter/order dated 31.12.2012 makes abundantly clear about the status of employment of the petitioner as contractual employee. 18. It is submitted that the petitioner is bound by the terms and conditions of appointment letter/order dated 31.12.2012 and policies of the state government as to their appointment on contractual basis and not as a regular employee. 19. It is submitted that fullfledged departmental inquiry is not required to be conducted in a contractual employment, as the contractual employment will be strictly governed as per the terms and conditions of appointment letter/order, policies of state government for contractual employment and that the petitioner being a contractual employee is bound by the same as per the undertaking given by the petitioner. 10. Relying upon the aforesaid averments, it was submitted that as the petitioner has approached this Court after delay of four years and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the decision of the Division Bench would not be applicable in the facts of the case. 11. In rejoinder, learned advocate Mr. 10. Relying upon the aforesaid averments, it was submitted that as the petitioner has approached this Court after delay of four years and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the decision of the Division Bench would not be applicable in the facts of the case. 11. In rejoinder, learned advocate Mr. Bhatt submitted that the petitioner has approached this Court in view of the decision passed by the Division Bench confirming the order passed by the Single Judge and therefore, the delay should not be considered to deny the justice to the petitioner. 12. Having considered the rival submissions and having gone through the materials on record, it is not in dispute that the petitioner was not given any show cause notice nor any departmental inquiry was held by the respondent before terminating the services of the petitioner on the ground of his involvement in the criminal case. 13. The Division Bench of this Court in case of State of Gujarat Vs. Chetan Jayantilal Rajgor (supra) in such circumstances, has held as under :“ 5. During the course of hearing of both these appeals, on behalf of the State Authority, Ms.Manisha Lavkumar Shah, learned Government Pleader, has vehemently contended that these respective respondents were undisputedly appointed purely on a contractual basis for a period of 5 years on a fixed salary and, therefore, cannot be equated with the employees, who are regularly appointed on the post. It has been submitted that in a trap which was carried out at Amirgadh Check Post, it has been categorically found that these respondents have aided and abetted the commission of crime which has resulted into filing of First Information Report before the Palanpur Police Station under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Since there is ample material found against the respondents with regard to their involvement, the authority had to initiate appropriate step against the respondent as the said episode took place within a very brief period of their contractual service. 5.1 Ms.Manisha Lavkumar Shah, learned Government Pleader, has further vehemently contended that while discontinuing their employment, adequate opportunities have been extended to them and hence, the action cannot be said to be in violation of principles of natural justice. 5.1 Ms.Manisha Lavkumar Shah, learned Government Pleader, has further vehemently contended that while discontinuing their employment, adequate opportunities have been extended to them and hence, the action cannot be said to be in violation of principles of natural justice. It has been contended further that in a criminal case, after thorough investigation, even the chargesheet has also been submitted prima facie finding out a case against the respondents and the said case is pending. It has been submitted that the employment on which the respondents were engaged, was purely on contractual basis and the terms of appointment were clearly indicating the manner in which the respondents are to be discontinued. Apart from this, even these respondents have assigned their duties to their subordinate staff and have not acted with full responsibility. 5.2 To substantiate the above contention, learned Government Pleader has invited the attention to the office order dated 17.5.2013 with respect to one employee, namely, Shri Chetan Jayantilal Rajgor and similar order with respect to another respondent and has pointed out that the terms of employment explicitly make it clear that contract employees are not subjected to any regular departmental inquiry contemplated under the separate Rules meant for the regularly appointed confirmed employee. It has been submitted that in the office order it has been specifically observed in Paras.3 and 4 reflecting on Page30 in compliance of Letter Patent Appeal No.1596 of 2019 that their appointment is purely on contractual basis at a fixed monthly salary for a period of 5 years and also subject to pending SLP before the Apex Court. With open eyes, these employees have accepted terms of their appointment and as such, now they cannot ask for compliance of the Rules which are otherwise meant for regular confirmed employees. 5.3 It has further been pointed out that in Para.9 of the appointment order, it has been specifically observed that the terms of the appointment would be applicable to them which are specifically observed in the Government Resolution dated 4.6.2009 which is already attached with respective appointment letters. It has been further contended that while abiding by the terms of the appointment, a specific undertaking was also given by these respondents and as such, their services are bound by the terms of the resolution. It has been further contended that while abiding by the terms of the appointment, a specific undertaking was also given by these respondents and as such, their services are bound by the terms of the resolution. It has been pointed out that Condition Nos.2, 5, 7, 9 and 10 are also to be taken note of and these terms are specifically acknowledged by these respondents to be abided by and are undisputedly applicable to them. Condition Nos.12 and 13 also sufficiently make it clear about the status of their employment. 5.4 Learned Government Pleader has pinpointed specifically the Condition No.13(3) which clarifies that the Rules which are applicable to Government employees will be made applicable to them only after they are given regular appointment on completion of the tenure. Condition No.14 also clearly spells out that in case of misconduct as well, as a part of principles of natural justice, one month s notice or the pay in lieu thereof would suffice to put an end to the contractual appointment. 5.5 Ms.Manisha Lavkumar Shah, learned Government Pleader, then submitted that the show cause notice was given by the Commissioner of Transport, State of Gujarat on 22.7.2014 in case of one Chetan Jayantilal Rajgor, one of the respondents and in similar way, it was issued in respect of other employee. The show cause notice has specifically pointed out as to why their services shall not be discontinued in terms of Government Resolution dated 4.6.2009 which is applicable to their case. The show cause notice has been served upon both the employees and in response thereto, the replies have been submitted by these two employees and after considering their detailed replies, the Authority has even thought it fit to give personal hearing and complied with principles of natural justice. It is only after such detailed compliance, a decision is taken by the Authority to put an end to the contractual employment and as such, the action cannot be said to be dehors the principles of natural justice. In terms of their appointment, according to learned Government Pleader, they are estopped from contending that they are required to be dealt with as if they are confirmed Government employees. 5.6 Ms.Manisha Lavkumar Shah, learned Government Pleader, has further contended vehemently that fullfledged departmental inquiry is not to be conducted in a contractual employment where the terms are governed by the different resolution. 5.6 Ms.Manisha Lavkumar Shah, learned Government Pleader, has further contended vehemently that fullfledged departmental inquiry is not to be conducted in a contractual employment where the terms are governed by the different resolution. According to learned Government Pleader, the terms of the employment cannot be substituted or tinkered with in extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Single Judge has committed a gross error in construing the contractual employment in a different manner and equated with the regular employment and thus, has observed that since fullfledged inquiry has not been conducted, the action is not just and proper. 5.7 To strengthen the submission, learned Government Pleader has drawn our attention to several documents in addition to the show cause notices and the relevant statements of the persons connected with the incident in question and after referring to those statements and the material, ultimately it has been suggested that this is not a fit case in which full scale departmental inquiry will have to be conducted when they are under the contract of employment on a fixed salary. It has been submitted that even the appointment itself is made subject to outcome of the SLP before the Apex Court and so long as that decision is not taken, these respondents cannot claim anything beyond their terms of employment which have been accepted with open eyes. When there is sufficient compliance of principles of natural justice, the termination reflects no perversity or arbitrariness in exercise of power in dealing with the respondents and when there is sufficient material about the involvement of the respondents, there is hardly any case made out by the respondents to seek the relief which is otherwise not permissible. The relevant Rules have been observed clearly by the Authority and as such, no case is made out by the original petitioners. As a result of this, the error which has been committed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be corrected by quashing and setting aside the impugned orders. It has further been submitted that the judgments which have been relied upon are on a different contextual background of facts and hence, cannot be applied as a straitjacket formula. These employees i.e. respondents cannot be equated with the regular Government employees so long as they are employed on contract basis and, therefore, there is hardly any necessity of conducting a regular full scale departmental inquiry. These employees i.e. respondents cannot be equated with the regular Government employees so long as they are employed on contract basis and, therefore, there is hardly any necessity of conducting a regular full scale departmental inquiry. Resultantly, the appeals are requested to be allowed by quashing and setting aside impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge and dismiss the writ petitions. 6. To meet with the stand taken by State Appellant, initially Shri Yatin Oza, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri Gaurav Mehta, learned counsel for respondent No.1, has vehemently contended that there is no error committed by the learned Single Judge in passing the orders. On the contrary, it has been submitted that whenever any action is based upon a misconduct, a detailed full scale inquiry will have to be undertaken while taking action even if an employee is on a contractual basis. Learned Senior Counsel has reiterated that this is nothing but a free hand and a licence is given to the Authority to sack the contractual appointment at any point of time at the sweet will of the Authority, if such powers are allowed to be executed. According to Shri Oza, this contractual employment itself is an exploitation on the part of State Authority and as such, no error is committed by the learned Single Judge. 6.1 Shri Yatin Oza, learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that these respondents are appointed by way of regular recruitment mode on the posts which were vacant and sanctioned and as such, simply because they are appointed on a fixed salary on the contract basis, they cannot be branded as mere contractual employees. On the contrary, this contractual appointment itself is dehors the public policy and no public employment can be given by way of contract and this is nothing but a sheer act on the part of Authority to exploit the respondents. According to Shri Oza, if the recruitment is made under the policy and if that policy is contrary to the relevant Recruitment Rules then, such employment itself is nothing but a dishonest exercise of power by the Authority and as such, simply because these respondents have been employed on contractual basis, they cannot be deprived of the benefit of relevant Rules which are usually made applicable to the Government employees. It has been submitted that it is not the case of the Authority that the respondents are not appointed through the regular mode of employment. Their selection is through the Public Service Commission and regular process. As a result of this, when the Recruitment Rules do not provide such kind of contractual appointment, there is hardly any case made out by the appellant State Authority to assail the orders. 6.2 Shri Yatin Oza, learned Senior Counsel, has further submitted that here is a case in which there is a clear instance of misconduct serious in nature alleged against the respondents and as such, they cannot be summarily dealt with without conducting any full scale departmental inquiry. On the contrary, there is a mechanism provided under the Gujarat State Civil Services Classification and Recruitment (General) Rules, 1967 to deal with an employee whenever any misconduct is alleged. Here, the action taken is dehors The Rules. As a result of this, the appeals lack merits and the same deserve to be dismissed. 6.3 According to Shri Yatin Oza, Article 311 of the Constitution of India requires to be appropriately interpreted while dealing with the present issue. As a result of this, since summary inquiry is foreign to constitutional mandate, the discontinuance of the respondents has rightly been dealt with by the learned Single Judge. The reliance which has been placed by the learned Single Judge on the decision delivered by the Apex Court has a clear applicability, which has rightly been appreciated. Several decisions have been relied upon by learned Senior Counsel to strengthen the submissions and has vehemently contended that this is a clear case in which the Authority has arbitrarily dealt with and merely on the basis of inferences, the service tenure has been curtailed as it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Simply issuance of show cause notice and the examination of explanation in summary form is not recognized in law. Hence, since the foundation of the action is alleged misconduct, full scale departmental inquiry ought to have been conducted. Simply because in the ACB case, a chargesheet has been submitted, the same would not be a ground for the Authority to deviate from the regular mode of departmental inquiry. According to Shri Oza, there is no distinguishing feature in regular Government employee and the respondents. Simply because in the ACB case, a chargesheet has been submitted, the same would not be a ground for the Authority to deviate from the regular mode of departmental inquiry. According to Shri Oza, there is no distinguishing feature in regular Government employee and the respondents. Noncompliance of the Rules and the procedure related to departmental inquiry are the basis on which the impugned action is not sustainable in the eye of law. The learned Single Judge has rightly appreciated the overall view of the matter and upon thorough examination, has found that the action is not sustainable in the eye of law. Accordingly, there is no error committed which calls for any interference. 6.4 Shri Oza, learned Senior Counsel, in support of his case, has placed reliance upon following decisions: (1) A decision rendered in Special Civil Application No.10928 of 2014, decided on 29.9.2014. (2) A decision rendered in Civil Appeal No.18510 of 2017, decided on 13.11.2017. (3) A decision rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.1349 of 2015, decided on 22.3.2016. (4) A decision rendered in Civil Appeal No.10956 of 2016, decided on 14.11.2018. (5) A decision rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.189 of 2018, decided on 20.2.2018. (6) A decision rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.841 of 2019, decided on 15.4.2019. 7. In addition to this, Shri Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri Jit Patel, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in Letters Patent Appeal No.1597 of 2019, has reiterated that these respondents have been recruited through the public advertisement and the process is conducted by Public Service Commission and their selection is based on similar line in which any other regular employee is selected. The only distinguishing feature is that their terms of appointment are sightly different. But that would not deprive these respondents from being treated equally from those regular employees and as such, the Authority was under an obligation to comply with Discipline Rules framed by the Government. Shri Shalin Mehta has further submitted that looking to the regular nature of appointment of these respondents, since the procedure is similar, though they are appointed on a contractual basis, they will have to be treated either as probationers or regular employees, especially while dealing with them on the issue of misconduct. By citing some of the decisions of the Apex Court, a contention is tried to be substantiated. By citing some of the decisions of the Apex Court, a contention is tried to be substantiated. It has been submitted that whenever employees are to be dealt with on account of their alleged misconduct, there is no difference whether they are recruited either under the contractual basis or on the regular recruitment. The scheme of recruitment is framed under the Government Resolution and as such, so long as the final verdict is not delivered by the Apex Court, these employees cannot be singled out. By drawing attention to relevant provisions of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeals) Rules, 1971, Shri Mehta has submitted that Section 1(c) does not make any difference in clarifying the status of employees either as probationer, temporary or other kind of employee. So long as these Rules are operative by way of Government Resolution, no different mode of recruitment can be found out and no Government Resolution can have the effect of truncating the statutory provision. That being so, depriving the respondents from full scale departmental inquiry itself is an arbitrary act on the part of Authority which has been rightly dealt with by the learned Single Judge. As a result of this, the appeals lack merits and deserve to be dismissed. 7.1 Shri Shalin Mehta, has reiterated and substantially adopted the submissions made by Shri Yatin Oza, learned Senior Counsel and submitted that since action is dehors the Rules, not on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and also not in close conformity with the principles of natural justice, there is hardly any scope for State Authority to agitate against the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 8. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the submissions made by them and in view of analysis of relevant record, we have found that the order passed by the learned Single Judge appears to be exhaustive dealing with not only the status of the present respondents and whether the order passed against them is a stigmatic or not. The reasons reflecting from Para.5 onwards are based upon analysis of the relevant decisions in the context of present background of facts. Hence, we deem it proper to reproduce the same hereby : "5. The reasons reflecting from Para.5 onwards are based upon analysis of the relevant decisions in the context of present background of facts. Hence, we deem it proper to reproduce the same hereby : "5. The question arises is whether the order was punitive and amounted to stigma which ought to have preceded by a regular inquiry against the petitioner in respect of the allegations levelled against the petitioner employee eventhough petitioner was appointed for a fixed term of five years. 5.1 In judging whether termination is simpliciter or punitive, a trite distinction is made between motive of the order and foundation of the order. In Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 5 SCC 152 ], the Supreme Court explained the concept of motive and foundation in respect of probationer as under: "Motive is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? It if was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the act would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were to be true in the preliminary inquiry." (para 29) (emphasis supplied) 5.2 The Supreme Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [ (1980) 2 SCC 593 ] stated and observed thus, "53. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological coverups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and noninjurious terminology is used." (Emphasis supplied)(Para 9) 5.4 The principle stated was that even the form of the order may be merely a camouflage for order of dismissal actually passed on the basis of misconduct. In such circumstances, the Apex Court stated, it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged, to go beyond the form and ascertain the true character of the order. The Supreme Court held, "If .... .... .... the court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground where the aggrieved officer is not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2). It is wrong to assume that it is only when there is a full scale departmental enquiry any termination made thereafter will attract the operation of Article 311(2)." (Paras 11 and 13) 5.8 It is the foundation of the order which really matters. It is wrong to assume that it is only when there is a full scale departmental enquiry any termination made thereafter will attract the operation of Article 311(2)." (Paras 11 and 13) 5.8 It is the foundation of the order which really matters. The Supreme Court in Anoop Jaiswal (supra) stated that if from the record and the attendant circumstances of the present case it becomes clear that the real foundation for the order of discharge of the appellant probationer was the alleged act of misconduct, the impugned order would amount to termination of service by way of punishment and in absence of any enquiry held in accordance with Article 311(2), it was liable to be struck down. The Supreme Court thereafter directed reinstatement of the appellant of the said case in service with the same rank of seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order passed as if it had not been passed at all. 5.5 In Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) also the Supreme Court considered its own various decisions on the aspect and after referring to the decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. [ (1999) 2 SCC 21 ] observed that the proposition of law operating two ways. In certain cases of temporary servants and probationers if the inquiry undertaken about the very conduct forms the motive of termination order, then the termination could not be said to be punitive merely because principles of natural justice have not been followed. In such circumstances, without becoming stigmatic, the employer can exercise its right to terminate service of the employee concerned. In the other line of decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that if the facts revealed in the inquiry or from the narration of the order itself that the inquiry into the conduct was not the motive but it was a foundation and the allegation of misconduct considered against employee becomes foundation of termination of service of temporary servant or probationer, such action would become punitive and it would make the order legally unsound. The Supreme Court in Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) thereafter referred to the above quoted observations from Gujarat Still Tubes Limited (supra) terming them as instructive. 5.6 In Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod v. Vadodara Municipal Corporation [ 2018(2) GLR 1636 ] the petitioner was Assistant Station Officer and was appointed for a fixed term. The Supreme Court in Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) thereafter referred to the above quoted observations from Gujarat Still Tubes Limited (supra) terming them as instructive. 5.6 In Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod v. Vadodara Municipal Corporation [ 2018(2) GLR 1636 ] the petitioner was Assistant Station Officer and was appointed for a fixed term. It was alleged against him that while serving in the Fire Brigade Branch of the Vadodara Municipal Corporation on the post of Assistant Station Officer, petitioner misbehaved with the Telephone Operator and tried to injured Telephone Operator physically. In the impugned order it was mentioned that while being on the sensitive post petitioner acted with negligency and carelessness in discharge of duties. Show cause notice was issued against the petitioner and his reply was solicited. Thereafter his services put to an end, this Court referred all the aforesaid decisions to come to the conclusion that the order was founded on the allegations of misconduct and that it was punitive in nature casting stigma. It was held that, "Such an action could not have been taken, even though the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a fullfledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry.". 5.7 Decision in Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod (supra) was challenged by way of Letters Patent Appeal No.189 of 2018, which came to be dismissed. The Division Bench, confirming the decision in Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod (supra), observed as under. "4.1 ... ... ... The above act on part of the competent authority of appellant Corporation was not only stigmatic, but contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court to which reference is made by learned Single Judge and distinguishing the facts of the present case it was found that termination was punitive. As a necessary corollary, when there is a breach of procedure of instituting fullfledged departmental inquiry, particularly, when termination order referred to following of Gujarat Civil Services [Discipline & Appeal] Rules, 1971, the issuance of show cause notice, receiving reply and then to take final decision to terminate services of an employee was unjust, unreasonable, arbitrary, in breach of the Rules, 1971, violative of principles of natural justice and Article 14 of the Constitution as it would not make any difference whether the employee was appointed temporarily for a fixed term on a fixed salary incorporating various conditions." 1. In another decision in Sandip Ajitsinh Vaghela v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.12071 of 2018 decided on 26th February, 2019 the same question had arisen where also the petitioner was Junior Clerk employed on temporary basis. In Rahul Aydanbhai Vank v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.889 of 2018 decided on 05th September, 2018, the petitioner was a contractual employee who was dismissed on the ground of insubordination. The order was found to have been passed on the allegation of misconduct. Same principles were applied and held that services could not have been terminated without undergoing the inquiry. 5.9 The aforesaid decision in Rahul Aydanbhai Vank (supra) was also confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No.841 of 2019. In the following paragraph, the Letters Patent Bench referred to Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod (supra) and other decisions to come to the following conclusion to clearly observe that fullscale formal inquiry was requirement of law before the services could have been terminated. "8. Even decision relied by learned Assistant Government Pleader in the case of Chaitanya Prakash and Another v. H. Omlarappa reported in (2010) 2 SCC 623 quotes decision in the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences [ (2002) 1 SCC 520 ] where three tests are enumerated to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive or not. We find in the present case all above tests namely a full scale formal inquiry, allegation involving moral turpitude or misconduct and culminating into guilt stands satisfied and therefore we have no hesitation to hold that the learned Single Judge committed no error of fact or law or jurisdiction warranting interference in this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent." When the impugned order is considered in light of the above principles and the position of law, it could be well discerned that the event of filing of F.I.R. against the petitioner was treated as base and it was concluded readily by the respondents that the petitioner had committed misconduct for accepting the bribe. Upon this foundation, the termination was effected. It was on the ground of misconduct and therefore the stigmatic order, which could not have been passed without a full scale inquiry. Upon this foundation, the termination was effected. It was on the ground of misconduct and therefore the stigmatic order, which could not have been passed without a full scale inquiry. 6.1 An attempt was made in vain by learned advocate for the respondents that there was compliance of natural justice as the notice was issued to the petitioner. A mere notice would not suffice. No inquiry was held, no charge was framed against the petitioner. Without issuing the charge and without putting the petitioner to knowledge of the allegation which he was to precisely answer, the principles of natural justice could not be said to be followed when the order was founded on misconduct. As held by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment above, it necessitated a full scale inquiry against the petitioner after issuing show cause notice and by framing appropriate charge, conducting it in accordance with the natural justice. 6.2 The petitioner was a fixed term employee who was appointed as Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector, Class III as per appointment order dated 17th May, 2013 for a period of five years. The impugned order came to be passed on 22nd April, 2015. Therefore, the relief which would ensue for the petitioner shall be upto making up good the total period of five years of employment. 7. As a consequence of above discussion and reasons, the impugned order dated 30th March, 2015 passed by respondent No.2 Commissioner of Transport is hereby set aside. Respondents are further directed to reinstate the petitioner on original post of Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector, ClassIII with continuity of service and with payment of salary/wages for the interregnum as well as the consequential benefits which may arise, as if the order of termination was never passed. The reinstatement of the petitioner directed as above shall be for the period upto making of the total original period fixed for his employment as per order of appointment. The resultant monetary benefits to be paid to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the present order." 9. In the cognate matter also, almost similar observations are visible and as such, we do not propose to over burden the present order. These observations if to be examined in the background of present fact situation, the same are found to be just and proper. In the cognate matter also, almost similar observations are visible and as such, we do not propose to over burden the present order. These observations if to be examined in the background of present fact situation, the same are found to be just and proper. It appears here that the original petitioners were dealt with by issuance of show cause notice with respect to serious charges levelled against them and the notice was given stating as to why in terms of their appointment, they may not be dismissed from the services. Now, this show cause notice appears to have been replied at length by the original petitioners and subsequently, by giving a brief opportunity, without conducting fullscale departmental inquiry, an order of dismissal came to be passed. This procedure which has been adopted by the department against both the original petitioners and undisputedly, no departmental inquiry having been conducted against them, the learned Single Judge, on the basis of relevant proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court, was justified in his view that in the absence of fullscale departmental inquiry, the services of the writ petitioners cannot be terminated in the manner in which it has been put to an end. We see no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge, particularly having gone through the relevant record made available to us. 10. This view which has been taken by the learned Single Judge, to which we are also in agreement, stands fortified by few decisions by the Division Bench of this Court which have already been relied upon by the learned Single Judge. 11. The bone of contention of appellants State authorities is that since the original petitioners are employed on a contract basis and fixed pay, the Department is not under an obligation to conduct a detailed fullscale departmental inquiry. Now, this contention has been the subject matter of scrutiny on earlier occasion before a Coordinate Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No.189 of 2018 between Vadodara Municipal Corporation v. Manishbhai Nayanbhai Modh, decided on 20.2.2018. The relevant observations contained in the said decision are reflecting in Para.4.1 which are also based upon the decision of the Apex Court and in consonance with the provision of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. The said observations have also been considered at length by the learned Single Judge which are reflecting in Para. The relevant observations contained in the said decision are reflecting in Para.4.1 which are also based upon the decision of the Apex Court and in consonance with the provision of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. The said observations have also been considered at length by the learned Single Judge which are reflecting in Para. 5.7 of the impugned order. 12. Yet in another decision again by the Division Bench of this Court rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.841 of 2019 between Rahul Aydanbhai Vak v. State of Gujarat, decided on 15.4.2019, in which the same issue has been considered. The relevant discussion of the Division Bench in the said case is contained in Para.7, 8 and 9, in which in no uncertain terms, almost in similar set of circumstance, the Division Bench has clearly opined that fullscale departmental inquiry will have to be undertaken, if initiation of action on the basis of unsatisfactory work, gross negligence or indiscipline or any act which may tantamount to be stigmatic and as such, consistently this view has been clearly opined by the Division Bench. 13. Yet in further decision which is brought to our notice rendered in Special Civil Application No.10928 of 2014, decided on 29.9.2014, in which also the Division Bench has examined even the status of contractual employment. But since we are not called upon nor concerned with the said issue to be dealt with in the present case, we refrain ourselves from commenting anything and leaving the said issue as it is. 14. From the overall material on record and in consideration of aforesaid observations, we see no distinguishable material to take a different view or deviate from the same. Since almost in similar issue, the proposition is to the effect that whenever any charge is levelled and action is found to be stigmatic, a fullscale departmental inquiry deserves to be undertaken irrespective of whether the delinquent was a regular employee or contractual employee on a fixed salary. As a result of this, we are of the considered opinion that since undisputedly by a brief procedure, an action is initiated against the respondents herein while dismissing their services, said action itself is found to be not on the touchstone of aforesaid proposition of law. As a result of this, no error is committed by the learned Single Judge. As a result of this, we are of the considered opinion that since undisputedly by a brief procedure, an action is initiated against the respondents herein while dismissing their services, said action itself is found to be not on the touchstone of aforesaid proposition of law. As a result of this, no error is committed by the learned Single Judge. Having perused these material, we are not satisfied with the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants in both these appeals. 15. Additionally, we are also of the opinion that these Letters Patent Appeals have arisen out of the learned Single Judges decision. The scope of Letters Patent Appeal is well defined by the Apex Court in the case of Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company, reported in 2016 Law Suit (SC) 94. Relevant Para.5 of the said decision is reproduced hereinafter : "Once the learned Single Judge having seen the records and come to the conclusion that the industry was not functioning after January, 1995, there is no justification in entering a different finding without any further material before the Division Bench. The appellate bench ought to have noticed that the statement of MW3 is itself part of the evidence before the Labour Court. Be that as it may, in an intracourt appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no interference with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief." Hence, we see no other distinguishing circumstance pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants and as such, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. 16. However, we make it clear that since the learned Single Judge has clearly observed that present appellants are not precluded from proceeding against the respondents in accordance with law, without disturbing said observations, we dismiss both these Letters Patent Appeals. 17. Consequently, connected Civil Applications also stand dismissed. 14. 16. However, we make it clear that since the learned Single Judge has clearly observed that present appellants are not precluded from proceeding against the respondents in accordance with law, without disturbing said observations, we dismiss both these Letters Patent Appeals. 17. Consequently, connected Civil Applications also stand dismissed. 14. In view of the above dictum of law, the impugned order passed by both the authorities are required to be quashed and set aside and the matter is required to be remanded back to the authority so as to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by initiating the proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law. 15. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is accordingly partly allowed. The impugned order dated 1st August, 2016 is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the respondent no.2 to initiate fresh proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law. After giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, such exercise shall be completed within the period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. 16. As a consequence of above discussion and reasons, the respondents are further directed to reinstate the petitioner on original post of Clerk with continuity of service and with payment of salary/wages for the interregnum, as well as, the consequential benefits which may arise, as if the order of termination was never passed. The resultant monetary benefits to be paid to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the present order. At the same time, it is provided that the reinstatement of the petitioner directed as above shall be for the period up to making of the total original period fixed for his employment as per order of appointment. 17. It is observed and clarified that the respondents are not precluded from proceeding against the petitioner in accordance with law. 18. The petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Direct service is permitted.