ORDER : 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Bhavin S. Raiyani for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Rohan Shah for the respondent-State through video conference. 2. The following order was passed on 21st October, 2020 in Civil Application No. 1 of 2020 for fixing the date of early hearing: “This civil application is filed for fixing the date of hearing of Special Civil application. Learned AGP Mr. Shah states that he has received instructions from the competent authority that the averments made in the civil application that daughter of the petitioner is suffering from heart ailment is true and correct. Considering the averments made in the civil application for fixing the early date of hearing as the daughter of the petitioner is suffering from heart ailment, in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, main matter is fixed for final hearing on 4th November, 2020. Civil Application stands disposed of accordingly.” 3. In view of the above order, the Special Civil Application No. 12674 of 2020 is listed for hearing today in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the same may not be treated as precedence for hearing of the Special Civil Application out of turn. 4. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges the legality and validity of the order of detention dated 11th August, 2020 passed by the respondent No. 1 in purported exercise of powers under Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short the ‘Act’) at pre-detention stage. 5. Brief facts as arising from the petition are that an F.I.R. being C.R. No. 11191065200539 of 2020 came to be registered with Narol Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 65(e), 66(b) of the Prohibition Act on 11th July, 2020. 6. Upon serious apprehension that the order of detention has already been passed against the petitioner, the present petition is preferred. 7. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the order of detention impugned in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside on the ground of registration of solitary offence being FIR C.R. No. 11191065200539 of 2020 registered with Narol Police Station under Sections 65(e), 66(b) of the Prohibition Act by itself cannot bring the case of the detenue within the purview of definition under section 2(b) of the Act. Further, learned advocate for the detenue submits that illegal activity likely to be carried out or alleged to have been carried out, as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of public order and at the most, it can be said to be breach of law and order. Further, except statement of witnesses, registration of above FIR's and Panchnama drawn in pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting alleged antisocial activity of the detenue with breach of public order. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submits that it is not possible to hold on the basis of the facts of the present case that activity of the detenue with respect to the criminal cases had affected even tempo of the society causing threat to the very existence of normal and routine life of people at large or that on the basis of criminal cases, the detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for whole system to exist as a system governed by rule of law by disturbing public order. Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that petitioner has been involved in the alleged offence on the basis of statement of co-detenue whereas detention order against the co-detenu is already revoked. 8. Learned AGP for the respondent State supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that sufficient material and evidence was found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detenue indicate that detenue is in habit of indulging into the activity as defined under section 2(b) of the Act and considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and detention order deserves to be upheld by this Court. 9. 9. Before the petition is taken on merits, it is necessary to keep in mind the law as reiterated by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mahendrasinh Mangalsinh Jadeja vs. State of Gujarat and Others delivered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1495 of 2013 on 24.12.2013, in the matter of petitions challenging the detention order at pre-execution stage and, more particularly, para-11 thereof, which reads as under: “11 The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant without perusing the order of detention and the grounds of detention solely on the premise that as per the prevailing position of law the writ petition to challenge the order at pre-execution stage-stage is not maintainable and that the authorities cannot be directed to produce the detention order and the grounds on the record of the petition. It is bounden duty of the Court to call for the order of detention for its own perusal to satisfy itself as to the validity of the detention order. Unless the Court directs the authorities to produce the detention order for its perusal, it would not be possible for the Court to test the detention order and come to the conclusion whether the detention order stands scrutiny of the norms and the guiding principles enunciated in the case of Alka Subhash Gadia (supra) and Subhash Poptalal Dave (supra). In this premise, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. The matter needs to be remanded to the learned Single Judge to decide the petition afresh after calling for the detention order and grounds for detention for its own perusal and to independently decide whether it is a fit case to quash the detention order at a pre-detention stage or not. The appeal, therefore, succeeds to the aforesaid extent. Interim relief granted in the writ petition by the learned Single Judge shall continue till final disposal of the main writ petition by the learned Single Judge. In view of the disposal of main appeal, no order is required to be passed on the Civil Application and the same stands disposed of accordingly. Direct Service is permitted.” 10. Interim relief granted in the writ petition by the learned Single Judge shall continue till final disposal of the main writ petition by the learned Single Judge. In view of the disposal of main appeal, no order is required to be passed on the Civil Application and the same stands disposed of accordingly. Direct Service is permitted.” 10. The order of detention is passed on the basis of what has come to be known as the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority such subjective satisfaction has to be arrived at on two points. Firstly, on the veracity of facts imputed to the person to be detained and secondly, on the prognostication of the detaining authority that the person concerned is likely to indulge again in the same kind of notorious activities. Whereas, normal laws are primarily concerned with the act of commission of the offence, the detention laws are concerned with character of the person who has committed or is likely to commit an offence. The detaining authority has, therefore, to be satisfied that the person sought to be detained is of such a type that he will continue to violate the laws of the land if he is not preventively detained. So, the commission of infraction of law, not done in an organized or systematic manner, may not be sufficient for the detaining authority to justifiably come to the conclusion that there is no alternate but to preventively detain the petitioner. 11. No doubt, neither the possibility of launching of a criminal proceedings nor pendency of any criminal proceedings is an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. But, failure of the detaining authority to consider the possibility of either launching or pendency of criminal proceedings may, in the circumstances of a case, lead to the conclusions that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the vital question whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention. Since there is an allegation that the order of detention is issued in a mechanical manner without keeping in mind whether it was necessary to make such an order when an ordinary criminal proceedings could well serve the purpose. The detaining authority must satisfy the court that the question too was borne in mind before the order of detention was made. The detaining authority must satisfy the court that the question too was borne in mind before the order of detention was made. In the case on hand, the detaining authority failed to satisfy the court that the detaining authority so bore the question in mind and, therefore, the court is justified in drawing the inference that there was non application of mind by detaining authority to the vital question whether it was necessary to preventively detain the detenue. It is also fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Government and Another, (2011) 5 SCC 244 wherein, it is observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried for a criminal offence but the ordinary criminal law will not be able to deal with the situation, then and only then, preventive detention be taken recourse to. 12. In light of the abovementioned decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and as discussed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mahendrasinh Mangalsinh Jadeja (supra), now, it is right time to examine whether in the facts of this case, the Court should interfere with the preventive detention order at the pre-execution stage. It is true that this petition is filed at a pre-execution stage. However, from the grounds of detention, produced for Court’s perusal, it appears that the single offence as aforesaid under the Act has been registered against the petitioner. This fact has not been controverted by the detaining authority. It also appears that on the basis of the said case under the Prohibition Act, the respondent authority has come to the subjective satisfaction that the activities of the petitioner as “bootlegger” have disturbed the public order. 13. This fact has not been controverted by the detaining authority. It also appears that on the basis of the said case under the Prohibition Act, the respondent authority has come to the subjective satisfaction that the activities of the petitioner as “bootlegger” have disturbed the public order. 13. It appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR cannot have any bearing on the public order since the laws of the land are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenu within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act and unless and until the material is there to make out a case that the person concerned has become a threat and a menace to the society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that the whole social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person. In view of the allegations alleged in the aforesaid F.I.R. the Court is of the opinion that the activities of the detenue cannot be said to be dangerous to the maintenance of public order and at the most fall under the maintenance of “law and order.” In this connection, it will be fruitful to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 852 , where the distinction between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ has been clearly laid down. The Court observed as follows: “Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 14. In the instant case, it is stated at the bar that the detention orders qua co-detenu have been revoked by the PASA Board. Under the circumstances, once the Government has revoked the detention order against the co-detenu, in that eventuality, the same treatment ought to be given to the present petitioner. This is one more reason which has appealed to this Court to accept the petition at pre-execution stage and to quash the detention order. Suffice it to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Alpesh Navinchandra Shah vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2007) 2 SCC 777 . Reference can also be made to judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Dilipbhai Keshavbhai Patel vs. Commissioner of Police in Special Civil Application No. 296/2001 and allied matters wherein vide order dated 4th May, 2001 this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.K. Keshote) set aside the orders of detention on the ground that codetenue has been released. In the present case, except the aforesaid incident registered against the petitioner, there is no other material which weighed to detain the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that for the aforesaid offence registered against the petitioner, the petitioner could be considered to be a “bootlegger” whose preventive detention is must for maintenance of public order. In the present case, except the aforesaid incident registered against the petitioner, there is no other material which weighed to detain the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that for the aforesaid offence registered against the petitioner, the petitioner could be considered to be a “bootlegger” whose preventive detention is must for maintenance of public order. So, the Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not a “bootlegger” and his act, as alleged in the detention order cannot disturb maintenance of public order and, therefore, the instant case would fall within 3rd and 4th grounds namely it is passed for wrong purpose or it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds mentioned in the case of Alka Gadia (supra) and, therefore, order of preventive detention at pre-execution stage calls for interference of this Court. As the order of detention has been passed by the detaining authority without having adequate grounds for passing the said order, it cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 15. In the result, the petition is hereby allowed. Impugned order of detention dated 11th August, 2020 passed by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City against the petitioner is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. 16. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the concerned Court/authority by Fax or Email.