JUDGMENT : 1. Since all these petitions involves common issue, the same were heard analogously and are disposed of by this common order. 2. For the sake of convenience, Special Civil Application No. 2767/2018 is treated as the lead matter. 3. Rule. Mr. Krutik Parikh waives service of rule on behalf of respondent no.1. Respondent no.2 who is the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Godhara, is a formal party and therefore, there is no need to serve notice of rule on respondent no.2. 4. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged judgment and award dated 13th October, 2017 passed by the Labour Court, Godhara at Panchmahals in Reference(T) No. 105/2005 qua denial of backwages is concerned. Respondent No.1 has also preferred cross petition challenging the said award. 5. Learned advocate for the petitioner workman submitted that the petitioner and similarly situated persons were employed by respondent no.1 Range Forest Officer with effect from 1st January, 1998 on the post of “Chowkidar” with monthly salary of Rs.1200/-. It is the case of the petitioner that the services of the petitioner were terminated by oral order dated 18th September, 2002 without issuing any notice, notice pay or payment of retrenchment compensation resulting into violation of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(for short “ID Act”). 6. According to the petitioner, respondent no.1 after termination of service of the petitioner employed other persons but did not call the petitioner for service. It was therefore, submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that there is breach of provisions of Section 25G and 25H of the ID Act. 7. The petitioner filed his statement of claim at Exh.3 stating the above facts whereas respondent no.1 filed written statement at Exh.6 contenting that the petitioner was employed for the project of forestation on the basis of the grant received from the State Government and such projects are not permanent. The petitioner was employed as a daily wager and was paid minimum wages as stipulated by the Government from time to time. The petitioner was paid daily wage for the days for which he worked with respondent no.1. It was contended that on completion of work, services of the petitioner were terminated and therefore, there is no breach of any of the provisions of the ID Act. 8. The petitioner was paid daily wage for the days for which he worked with respondent no.1. It was contended that on completion of work, services of the petitioner were terminated and therefore, there is no breach of any of the provisions of the ID Act. 8. The petitioner workman filed affidavit in lieu of examination in chief at Exh.8 and was cross examined by the advocate of respondent no.1. Respondent no.1 filed affidavit of one Prahladsinh Jasvantsinh Solanki as witness at Exh.16 but he was not cross examined by the petitioner. Along with the affidavit, the details containing the days of work done by the petitioner was also submitted which was exhibited at Exh.19. Respondent no.1 also filed affidavit of another witness Jasvantsinh Motisinh Rathod at Exh.20. 9. It appears that the petitioner filed an application Exh.21 stating that the respondent no.1 was not ready to take the petitioner on service on the regular pay scale but respondent no.1 was ready to ready to take the petitioner on service on piece rate basis. The petitioner was thereafter cross examined by the advocate of the respondent no.1. Labour Court has also considered the cross examination taken in reference (LCG) No. 89/2005 at Exh.25 while passing the impugned award. 10. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the Labour Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record and after considering the various judgments of the Supreme Court and High Court has arrived at finding of fact that the petitioner worked for more than 240 days as “Chowkidar” with the respondent no.1 and therefore, there was breach of provision of section 25F of the ID Act. It was also found by the Labour Court that the petitioner was neither paid any notice pay or retrenchment compensation while terminating his services and therefore, has passed the impugned order directing respondent no.1 to reinstate the petitioner with continuity without backwages on his original post with cost of Rs. 4,000/-. It was submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the Labour Court ought to have granted the full back wages to the petitioner as the petitioner is entitled for back wages in absence of any evidence with regard to gainful employment of the petitioner. 11. 4,000/-. It was submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the Labour Court ought to have granted the full back wages to the petitioner as the petitioner is entitled for back wages in absence of any evidence with regard to gainful employment of the petitioner. 11. It was submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the reasons given by the Labour Court for denying the backwages as the respondent no.1 is a State Government and public money is involved with the establishment and therefore, backwages cannot be granted, are contrary to the settled legal position as held by the Supreme Court in case of Deepali Gundusuruwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya and others reported in 2013 (139) SLR 541, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under : “i) In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. (ii) The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the Court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. (iii) Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the Court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averments about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments. (iv) The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and / or certified standing orders, if any, but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it will have the discretion not to award full back wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample justification for award of full back wages. (v) The cases in which the competent Court or Tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the employee or workman, then the concerned Court or Tribunal will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior Courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer’s obligation to pay the same. The Courts must always be kept in view that in the cases of wrongful / illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages. (vi) In a number of cases, the superior Courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalization of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. (vi) In a number of cases, the superior Courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalization of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement. The Courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position visàvis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer, i.e., the employee or workman, who can ill afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited (supra). (vii) The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal (supra) that on reinstatement the employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of right is contrary to the ratio of the judgments of three Judge Benches referred to hereinabove and cannot be treated as good law. This part of the judgment is also against the very concept of reinstatement of an employee/workman. 17. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter’s source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter’s source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi judicial body or Court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. Denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the concerned employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.” 12. Relying on the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court, it was submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that in case of illegal termination, reinstatement with back wages is the normal rule and that in case of violation of provisions of ID Act, Labour Court ought to have granted full backwages. It was therefore, submitted that denial of full back wages amounts to rewarding the employer against the legitimate claim of the petitioner workman. Learned advocate for the petitioner therefore, submitted that the Labour Court failed to consider the ratio of the Apex Court in case of Deepali Gundusuruwase(supra). 13. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that the services of the petitioner fall within the meaning of “continuous service” as contemplated under section 25B of the ID Act and therefore, the termination of the service of the petitioner is illegal and void ab initio. In such circumstances, it was prayed that the Labour Court ought to have granted full backwages to the petitioner. 14. In such circumstances, it was prayed that the Labour Court ought to have granted full backwages to the petitioner. 14. Learned advocate for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana and another reported in 2015 AIR (SCW) 869, wherein the Apex Court has held as under : “13. In view of the aforesaid statement of law the setting aside of the Award by the learned Single Judge which is affirmed by the Division Bench is vitiated in law as the same is contrary to the judgments of this Court referred to supra, upon which the learned counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance in support of the correctness of the finding recorded by the labour court on the various issues, particularly the finding of fact that the workman has worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year and termination order is void ab initio in law for noncompliance of Sections 25F (clauses (a) and (b)), 25G and 25H of the Act, therefore, the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has rightly set aside the order of termination of services of the workman and awarded the order of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages.” 15. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that respondent no.1 has not complied with the order passed by the Labour Court, inasmuch as by communication dated 6th November, 2017, work was allotted to the petitioner by respondent no.1 on the basis of percentage and piece rate contrary to the judgment and award of the Labour Court. This fact is also noticed by this Court in the order dated 3rd April, 2018 while issuing notice as under : “1. Learned advocate for the petitioner has tendered the draft amendment in each petition. Same is allowed. To be carried out within a period of 3 days from today. 2. This fact is also noticed by this Court in the order dated 3rd April, 2018 while issuing notice as under : “1. Learned advocate for the petitioner has tendered the draft amendment in each petition. Same is allowed. To be carried out within a period of 3 days from today. 2. Considering the said draft amendment, a grievance is raised that so far as the reinstatement is concerned, though the original order of reinstatement dated 13.10.2017 has become final and attained the finality, still the reinstatement is not being effected in true spirit and by way of communication 6.11.2017, an exception is carved out whereby the work was to be allotted on the basis of percentage and piece rate emoluments will be paid by way of wages and this is not the right spirit in which the original award was passed which has attained the finality. 3. Considering this submission, Notice returnable on 17.4.2018. 4. It is made clear that learned advocate for the petitioner, under the instructions, has specifically relinquished his claim with regard to back wages and this petition is restricted to the aspect of reinstatement pursuant to the original award. 5. Direct service is permitted.” 16. Referring to the above fact, it was submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that communication dated 6th November, 2017 issued by respondent no.1 is illegal and contrary to the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court. Learned advocate therefore, prayed that petition is required to be allowed by granting full backwages to the petitioner and by quashing and setting aside the communication dated 6th November, 2017 issued by respondent no.1 so as to show that the impugned judgment an award is implemented. 17. Learned advocate for the petitioner also relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in case of State of Gujarat and others v. PWD Union reported in 2013 (8) SCALE 579 to submit that the decision rendered by the Apex Court in case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Umadevi and others reported in 2006 (4) SCC 1 and A. Umarani are not applicable and the petitioner is also entitled to grant benefit of Government Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 as the petitioner discharged the duties from 1998 till 2002. 18. On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. 18. On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Krutik Parikh appearing for respondent no.1 vehemently opposed the petition filed by the workman and also assailed the impugned order passed by the Labour Court in the cross petition filed by the respondent no.1 employer. Mr. Parikh submitted that the Labour Court could not have passed the award of reinstatement with continuity of service on the original post as the petitioner and similarly situated persons were employed as daily wagers for a specific project of forestation by respondent no.1 and as and when such project was over the services of the petitioner were not required. 18.1) Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Parikh referred to averments made in the affidavit filed by Jasvantsinh Motisinh Rathod witness of respondent no.1 at Exh.20 wherein he has stated that the petitioner was employed without any due process of recruitment and was working as a daily wager during the four months of rainy season and on completion of rainy season every year, the petitioner never worked. It was therefore, submitted that the petitioner was a seasonal daily wager and therefore, no provision of ID Act was applicable for relieving the petitioner from the work. (18.2) Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Parikh relied upon the following decisions in support of his submission : (i) Ranjit Natvarlal Chauhan v. Morbi Nagarpalika reported in 2011 (2) GLR 1783 , wherein Division Bench of this Court has held as under : “9. Under the above circumstances, we find that the Labour Court has wrongly relied upon the aforesaid both the decisions and has wrongly added weekly holidays and public holidays for computing 240 days of service for the purpose of considering the question of breach of section 25F of the Act. It is true that the learned Single Judge in the impugned order could have considered the another decision of this Court in the case of Shihor Nagarpalika (supra), however, the learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show before this Court that the aforesaid decision was brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge at the time when the petition was heard. In any event, when we find that the view taken by this Court in the case of Shihor Nagarpalika (supra) is not by correct interpretation and the effect of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation (supra), nothing much would turn on the merits of the present appeal since the workman concerned in the present case was appointed on daily wages as a daily rated workman. 10. If the aforesaid period of weekly holidays and public holidays are excluded in counting 240 days of service, it appears that even as per the finding recorded by the Labour Court, it would come to 215 days, which will be less than 240 days. 11. Under the circumstances, it can be said that the findings recorded by the Labour Court that the workman had completed 240 days was perverse to the record and the same could not be sustained. 12. As regards the alleged breach of sections 25G and 25H of the Act is concerned, it appears that the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order that if the person has not completed 240 days of service, there will not be any question of following the procedure under section 25G and 25H of the Act is not supported by the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Harjinder Singh Versus Punjab State Warehousing Corporation reported at 2010(3) SCC 192 (equivalent AIR 2010 SC 1116 ), but the matter does not end there. Even if the contention of the learned counsel is considered for the sake of examination on the aspect of alleged breach of sections 25G and 25H of the Act, it appears that the Labour Court has not accepted the contention of the appellant for the alleged breach of section 25G of the Act and therefore, such finding not being in favour of the appellant, it would not be open to the appellant to take the benefit of the alleged breach of section 25G of the Act. Even otherwise also, the award shows that as per the Labour Court, the workman did not discharge the burden of giving details satisfactorily of the juniors who were retained in service to claim the benefit of section 25G of the Act. 13. Even otherwise also, the award shows that as per the Labour Court, the workman did not discharge the burden of giving details satisfactorily of the juniors who were retained in service to claim the benefit of section 25G of the Act. 13. Concerning to the finding recorded by the Labour Court for the alleged breach of section 25H of the Act, we find that the approach of the Labour Court cannot be countenanced. The examination of the facts of the present case further shows that there was no evidence on record before the Labour Court by giving the names of the person who were offered employment after termination of the workman in question. Mere allegation that the employer had made new recruitment, in our view cannot be said to be a sufficient discharge of burden by the workman. It is required for the workman to state on oath with the details of the persons who have been offered employment by way of fresh recruitment or juniors to him. It is only after that burden is discharged by the workman, the burden would shift to the employer to disprove the said fact. There was no evidence before the Labour Court except the bare statement of the workman that after his termination new recruitment was made. Under these circumstances, we find that when the workman had not discharged the burden, which was required to be proved by him for taking benefit of section 25H of the Act, the finding recorded by the Labour Court could be said as perverse to the record of the case. Under the circumstances, the said part of the award cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 14. In view of the aforesaid observations for the alleged breach of section 25H of the Act, we find that even if the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is considered and examined on merits, the same would not lead us to maintain the finding of the Labour Court of alleged breach of section 25H of the Act even if the matter is considered on the premise that for invoking the section 25H of the Act, it is not necessary that the workman concerned should have worked for 240 days in service. Hence we find that no useful purpose would be served in examining the said contention further on the aspects of approach of the learned Single Judge for the alleged breach of section 25H of the Act.” (ii) Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation and others v. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha and another reported in (2014) 16 Supreme Court Cases 130, wherein the Supreme Court while dealing with the termination of service of a casual labourer or daily wager or temporary employee, has held as under : “7. It is fairly well-settled that for an order of termination of the services of a workman to be held illegal on account of nonpayment of retrenchment compensation, it is essential for the workman to establish that he was in continuous service of the employer within the meaning of Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. For the respondent to succeed in that attempt he was required to show that he was in service for 240 days in terms of Section 25B(2)(a)(ii). The burden to prove that he was in actual and continuous service of the employer for the said period lay squarely on the workman. The decisions of this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani (2002) 3 SCC 25 , Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (2004) 8 SCC 195 , M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004) 8 SCC 246 , Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 161 , Surendra Nagar District Panchayat and Anr. v. Jethabhai Pitamberbhai (2005) 8 SCC 450 , R.M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive Engineer (2006) 1 SCC 106 unequivocally recognise the principle that the burden to prove that the workman had worked for 240 days is entirely upon him. So also the question whether an adverse inference could be drawn against the employer in case he did not produce the best evidence available with it, has been the subjectmatter of pronouncements of this Court in Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas (supra) and M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (supra), reiterated in Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore v. S. Mani (2005) 5 SCC 100 . This Court has held that only because some documents have not been produced by the management, an adverse inference cannot be drawn against it. 8. This Court has held that only because some documents have not been produced by the management, an adverse inference cannot be drawn against it. 8. The Labour Court has, in the case at hand, placed reliance upon a Xerox copy of a certificate allegedly issued by an officer of the appellant-Corporation stating that the respondent was in the employment of the appellant-Corporation as a Conductor between 3rd October, 1987 and 31st March, 1989. While it is true that the Xerox copy may not be evidence by itself specially when the respondent had stated that the original was with him, but had chosen not to produce the same yet the fact remains that the document was allowed to be marked at the trial and signature of the officer issuing the certificate by another officer who was examined by the appellant. Strict rules of evidence, it is fairly well-settled, are not applicable to the proceedings before the Labour Court. That being so the admission of the Xerox copy of the certificate, without any objection from the appellant-Corporation, cannot be faulted at this belated stage. When seen in the light of the assertion of the respondent, the certificate in question clearly supported the respondent's case that he was in the employment of the appellant-Corporation for the period mentioned above and had completed 240 days of continuous service. That being so, nonpayment of retrenchment compensation was sufficient to render the termination illegal. Inasmuch as the Labour Court declared that to be so it committed no mistake nor was there any room for the High Court to interfere with the said finding especially when the findings could not be described as perverse or without any evidence. The High Court was also justified in directing deletion of the back wages from the award made by the Labour Court against which deletion, the respondent did not agitate either before the Division Bench by filing an appeal or before us. 9. The only question that remains to be examined in the above backdrop is whether reinstatement of the respondent as a Conductor is imperative at this late stage. We say so because the appellant claims to have worked for a period of just about 18 months that too nearly three decades ago. The respondent today may be past fifty if not more. We say so because the appellant claims to have worked for a period of just about 18 months that too nearly three decades ago. The respondent today may be past fifty if not more. The Transport Department where he was working appears to have been wound up and transport work out sourced. That apart, this Court has in a series of decisions held that the illegality in an order of termination on account of nonpayment of retrenchment compensation does not necessarily result in the reinstatement of the workman in service. This Court has, in cases where such termination is found to be illegal, directed compensation in lieu of reinstatement. We may at this stage refer to some of those decisions: 10. In Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula and Anr. (2008) 1 SCC 575 , this Court held that since the appellant had worked only for a short period, interest of justice would be subserved if the direction for reinstatement was modified and compensatory payment of Rs.50,000/- in lieu thereof directed to be substituted. Similarly in Sita Ram and Ors. v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (2008) 5 SCC 75 , this Court took into consideration the period during which the services were rendered by the workman and instead of reinstatement directed a lump sum payment of Rs.1,00,000/in lieu thereof. 11. In Ghaziabad Development Authority and Anr. v. Ashok Kumar and Anr. (2008) 4 SCC 261 , this Court made a similar order as is evident from the following passage: "10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellant should be directed to pay compensation to the first respondent instead and in place of the relief of reinstatement in service. Keeping in view the fact that the respondent worked for about six years as also the amount of daily wages which he had been getting, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if the appellant is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/to the first respondent." [emphasis supplied] 12. To the same effect is decision of this Court in Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and Anr. (2009) 15 SCC 327 where this Court held that while awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement host of factors should be kept in mind. The Court said: 16. 50,000/to the first respondent." [emphasis supplied] 12. To the same effect is decision of this Court in Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and Anr. (2009) 15 SCC 327 where this Court held that while awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement host of factors should be kept in mind. The Court said: 16. While awarding compensation, the host of factors, interalia, manner and method of appointment, nature of employment and length of service are relevant. Of course, each case will depend upon its own facts and circumstances. In a case such as this where the total length of service rendered by the appellant was short and intermittent from September 1, 1995 to July 18, 1996 and that he was engaged as a daily wager, in our considered view, a compensation of Rs.50,000/-to the Appellant by Respondent No. 1 shall meet the ends of justice." [emphasis supplied] 13. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal v. Santosh Kumar Seal and Ors. (2010) 6 SCC 773 , where this Court referred to the previous decisions on the subject to declare that even when a retrenchment order passed in violation of Section 25(F) may be set aside, reinstatement need not necessarily follow as a matter of Court. The following passage from the decision is apposite: 14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee." [emphasis supplied] 14. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Incharge Officer and Anr. V. Shankar Shetty (2010) 9 SCC 126 , where this Court said: "5. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee." [emphasis supplied] 14. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Incharge Officer and Anr. V. Shankar Shetty (2010) 9 SCC 126 , where this Court said: "5. We think that if the principles stated in Jagbir Singh and the decisions of this Court referred to therein are kept in mind, it will be found that the High Court erred in granting relief of reinstatement to the respondent. The respondent was engaged as daily wager in 1978 and his engagement continued for about 7 years intermittently upto September 6, 1985 i.e. about 25 years back. In a case such as the present one, it appears to us that relief of reinstatement cannot be justified and instead monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice. In our considered opinion, the compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One lac) in lieu of reinstatement shall be appropriate, just and equitable." [emphasis supplied] 15. The case at hand, in our opinion, is one such case where reinstatement must give way to award of compensation. We say so because looking to the totality of the circumstances, the reinstatement of the respondent in service does not appear to be an acceptable option. Monetary compensation, keeping in view the length of service rendered by the respondent, the wages that he was receiving during that period which according to the evidence was around Rs.24.75 per day should sufficiently meet the ends of justice. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that award of a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-( Rupees Two Lacs Fifty Thousand only) should meet the ends of justice. 16. In the result, we allow these appeals but only in part and to the extent that the award made by the Labour Court and the orders of the High Court shall stand modified to the extent that the respondent shall be paid monetary compensation of Rs.2,50,000/-( Rupees Two Lacs Fifty Thousand only) in full and final settlement of his claim. In the result, we allow these appeals but only in part and to the extent that the award made by the Labour Court and the orders of the High Court shall stand modified to the extent that the respondent shall be paid monetary compensation of Rs.2,50,000/-( Rupees Two Lacs Fifty Thousand only) in full and final settlement of his claim. The amount shall be paid by the appellant-Corporation within a period of two months from today failing which the said amount shall start earning interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of this order till actual payment of the amount is made to the respondent.” Relying upon the aforesaid decision, learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that Labour Court ought to have granted monetary compensation instead of reinstatement of the petitioner in service with continuity on original post. (iii) Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh reported in (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 750, wherein Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of working of the workman for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination has held that it was necessary for the workman to produce relevant material. The Supreme Court has held as under : “18. In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no coworker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that workman who claimed to have worked with the appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. The Courts below have wrongly drawn an adverse inference for non production of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only 12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25B(1) of the Act. In the fact & situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the workman-respondent is not entitled for the protection or compliance of Section 25F of the Act before his service was terminated by the employer. As regards noncompliance of Sections 25G and 25H suffice is to say that Witness Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily wagers. In the absence of regular employment of the workman, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of the seniority list and his so called seniority no relief could be given to him for noncompliance of provisions of the Act. The courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the court. In order to entitle the court to draw inference unfavourable to the party, the court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have be proved.” (iv) Mohd Ali v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others reported in (2018) 15 Supreme Court Cases 641, wherein the Apex Court held that there has to be a factual finding by the Labour Court that the workman has actually worked under employer for not less than 240 days so as to attract the provisions of section 25F of the ID Act. (18.3) Relying upon the aforesaid decisions, it was submitted that the impugned judgment and award passed by the Labour Court requires to be quashed and set aside. 19. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the materials on record, Labour Court has arrived at following finding of fact on the basis of oral and documentary evidence produced before it : (i) That the petitioner was appointed as “Chowkidar” on 1st January, 1998 on a monthly salary of Rs. 1200/-. (ii) Service of the petitioner was terminated from 18th September, 2002. (iii) On the basis of details provided by respondent no.1 at Exh.19, wherein the number of days worked by the petitioner are mentioned in the presence register, Labour Court has found on perusal of such presence register that during the year 2001-2002, the petitioner worked for 12 months and not for the rainy season as stated by the witness of the respondent no.1. (iv) Labour Court has also found that respondent no. l is not declared as a seasonal institute by the Government and office of the Range Forest Officer works throughout the year. (v) Respondent no.1 has not produced any documentary evidence to show that any salary slip or voucher was provided to the petitioner workman. (vi) During the course of cross examination of the petitioner, respondent no.1 failed to get any information other than what is stated in the statement of claim that the petitioner worked for more than 240 days in each of the year of his service. 20. In view of the above findings of fact, Labour Court was justified in holding that there is a violation of provision of section 25F of the ID Act as no notice, notice pay or retrenchment compensation was paid to the petitioner. The Labour Court also arrived at findings of fact that respondent no.1 failed to produce any documentary evidence to show that there were recruitment rules for employing the daily wager. 21. The Labour Court has therefore, come to the conclusion that the services of the petitioner were illegally terminated by respondent no.1. 22. The Labour Court has also found that during the year 2014, the petitioner was reinstated in service by respondent no.1 during the pendency of the reference, but instead of payment of minimum wages to the petitioner, respondent no.1 paid wages on the basis of piece rate. 22. The Labour Court has also found that during the year 2014, the petitioner was reinstated in service by respondent no.1 during the pendency of the reference, but instead of payment of minimum wages to the petitioner, respondent no.1 paid wages on the basis of piece rate. This fact is also stated by the petitioner in his affidavit at Exh.21 stating that as the petitioner opposed the payment of wages on the basis of piece rate, his service was discontinued with effect from 6th January, 2015. Therefore, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that there was a requirement of service of the petitioner by respondent no.1. Labour Court therefore, came to the conclusion that there is a breach of section 25H of the ID Act. 23. Labour Court after considering the decisions rendered by this Court in Special Civil Application No.17770/2014 and in Special Civil Application No.18763/2014 and Government Resolution came to the conclusion that the petitioner was also entitled to be reinstated in view of Government Resolution dated 17th October, 1988. 24. With regard to denial to award of back wages, Labour Court relied upon the cross examination of the petitioner at Exh.8 wherein he has admitted that he was doing some labour work. Relying upon such evidence and in view of the following decisions, Labour Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to any backwages considering the fact that respondent no.1 is Government and there is public money involved for payment of back wages : (i) Decision of Supreme Court in case of M.P. State Electricity v. Smt. Zarina reported in 2003(98) FLR 595 . (ii) Decision of Supreme Court in case of Kendria Vidyalaya v. S.P. Sharma reported in 2005 LLR 275. (iii) Decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Sagar v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 2006 LLR 549. (iv) Decision of Supreme Court in case of General Manager Haryana Roadways v. Rudhansing reported in 2006 LLR 849. 25. Thus, the Labour Court has passed the impugned judgment and award on the findings of fact. (iii) Decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Sagar v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 2006 LLR 549. (iv) Decision of Supreme Court in case of General Manager Haryana Roadways v. Rudhansing reported in 2006 LLR 849. 25. Thus, the Labour Court has passed the impugned judgment and award on the findings of fact. In view of various judgments cited at bar on behalf of the petitioner as discussed here in above the petitioner was also entitled to the benefit of Government Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in case of State of Gujarat and others v. PWD Employees Union and others (supra), wherein the Apex Court has held as under : “18. The main questions which arise for our consideration in these appeals are : (1) Whether the daily wage workers of Forest and Environment Department working for 5 to 30 years for works other than building and maintenance and repairing work are entitled to derive benefits of the scheme contained in the Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 issued by the State from Road and Building Department; (2) If so, whether the members of the respondent-employees Union working on daily wages for more than 5 to 30 years in the Forest and Environment Department of the State will be entitled for similar benefits of the scheme contained in the Resolution dated 17th October, 1988. 19. From a bare reading of the Resolution dated 17th October, 1988, the following facts emerge: (a) Labour and other Unions made representation to the Government making demands and issues relating to daily wage workers of different departments of the Government. (b) The State Government constituted a committee under the Chairmanship, Minister of Road and Building Department. (c) The Committee was constituted for studying (i) the wages of daily wage workers; and (ii) work related services and facilities provided to the daily wage workers who are engaged in the building maintenance and repairing work in different departments of the State. (d) The recommendations of the Committee were accepted and accordingly the State Government resolved to provide the benefits of the scheme contained in the Resolution 17th October, 1988. 20. The daily wage workers who were engaged in building maintenance and repairing work in different departments were already entitled for their work related facilities. (d) The recommendations of the Committee were accepted and accordingly the State Government resolved to provide the benefits of the scheme contained in the Resolution 17th October, 1988. 20. The daily wage workers who were engaged in building maintenance and repairing work in different departments were already entitled for their work related facilities. Therefore, what we find is that the Committee has not limited the recommendation to the daily wage workers working in building maintenance and repairing work in different departments of the State. The State Government vide its Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 has not limited it to the daily wage workers working in building maintenance and repairing work. What we find is that the Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 is applicable to all the daily wage workers working in different departments of the State including Forest and Environment Department performing any nature of job including the work other than building maintenance and repairing work. The decision of the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Forest Producers, Gatherers and Forest Workers Union(supra and the subsequent Resolution dated 22nd December, 1999 issued from Forest and Environment Department of the State, in our opinion are not sustainable, as the intent of Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 was not properly explained therein and, therefore, the aforesaid decision of Full Bench and Resolution dated 22nd December, 1999 cannot be made applicable to the daily wage workers of the Forest and Environment Department of the State of Gujarat. 21. In view of the aforesaid observation, we find that the full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Forest Producers, Gatherers and Forest Workers Union (supra) proceeded on erroneous premises to hold that the Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 is applicable only to the daily wage workers of Forest Department engaged in building maintenance and repairing work. The conclusions in the said judgment are not sustainable otherwise also. We have already noticed that the Resolution of the State Government dated 17th October, 1988 is not limited to any particular department, it applies to all the departments including Road and Building, Forest and Environment Department, Water Resources Department, etc. The conclusions in the said judgment are not sustainable otherwise also. We have already noticed that the Resolution of the State Government dated 17th October, 1988 is not limited to any particular department, it applies to all the departments including Road and Building, Forest and Environment Department, Water Resources Department, etc. We have also noticed that the Committee headed by the Minister of Road and Building Department looked into the wages of daily wage workers and work related facilities provided to the daily wage workers engaged in building maintenance and repairing work in different departments, only for the purpose of its recommendations. The Committee has not limited the recommendations amongst the daily wage workers engaged in building maintenance and repairing work in different departments by its aforesaid Resolution. It is applicable to all daily wage workers including semiskilled workers performing any nature of job, working in different departments of the State including the daily wage workers of the Forest Department performing work other than building maintenance and repairing work. 22. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench arise out of the final order and judgment dated 29th October, 2010 passed in SCA No.8647/2008 and connected matters. The said order has reached finality in absence of any challenge before the higher Court and hence became binding between the parties i.e. the appellant-State of Gujarat and the respondents-Employees Union. Therefore, none of the parties including appellants-State of Gujarat can rely on Full Bench decision in Gujarat Forest Producers, Gatherers and Forest Workers Union(supra) to scuttle the decision and direction given by the Gujarat High Court in SCA No.8647/2008 and connected matters. 23. The decisions in Uma Devi (supra) and A. Umarani (supra) were regarding the question concerning regularization of employees entered by back door method or those who were illegally appointed encouraging a political set up, in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. We are of the opinion that both the aforesaid decisions are not applicable in the present case i.e. to the members of the respondent-Employees Union for the following reasons: (i) The Secretary, Forest and Environment Department of the State of Gujarat by his order dated 3rd May, 2008 held that initially the entry of the daily wagers do not suffer from any illegality or irregularity but is in consonance with the provisions of Minimum Wages Act. Therefore, the question of regularization by removing procedural defects does not arise. (ii) The Gujarat High Court by its judgment dated 29th October, 2010 passed in SCA No.8647 of 2008 while noticing the aforesaid stand taken by the State also held that the nature of work described in the order dated 3rd May, 2008 shows that the daily wageworkers are engaged in the work which is perennial in nature. (iii) The case of A.Uma Rani (supra) related to regularization of services of irregular appointees. In the said case this Court held that when appointments are made in contravention of mandatory provisions of the Act and statutory rules framed therein and in ignorance of essential qualifications, the same would be illegal and cannot be regularized by the State. 24. Thus, the principal question that falls to be considered in these appeals is whether in the facts and circumstances it will be desirable for the Court to direct the appellants to straightaway regularize the services of all the daily wage workers working for more than five years or the daily wage workers working for more than five years are entitled for some other relief. 25. As per scheme contained in Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 all the daily wage workers were not entitled for regularization or permanency in the services. As per the said Resolution the daily wagers are entitled to the following benefits: “(i) They are entitled to daily wages as per the prevailing Daily Wages. If there is presence of more than 240 days in first year, daily wagers are eligible for paid Sunday, medical allowance and national festival holidays. (ii) Daily wagers and semi skilled workers who has service of more than five years and less than 10 years are entitled for fixed monthly salary along with dearness allowance as per prevailing standard, for his working days. Such daily wagers will get two optional leave in addition to 14 misc. leave, Sunday leave and national festival holidays. Such daily wagers will also be eligible for getting medical allowance and deduction of provident fund. (iii) Daily wagers and semi skilled workers who has service of more than ten years but less than 15 years are entitled to get minimum pay scale at par with skilled worker along with dearness allowance as per prevailing standard, for his working days. Such daily wagers will also be eligible for getting medical allowance and deduction of provident fund. (iii) Daily wagers and semi skilled workers who has service of more than ten years but less than 15 years are entitled to get minimum pay scale at par with skilled worker along with dearness allowance as per prevailing standard, for his working days. Moreover, such daily wagers will get two optional leave in addition to 14 misc. leave, Sunday leave and national festival holidays. He/she will be eligible for getting medical allowance and deduction of provident fund. (iv) Daily wagers and semi skilled workers who has service of more than 15 years will be considered as permanent worker and such semi skilled workers will get current pay scale of skilled worker along with dearness allowance, local city allowance and house rent allowance. They will get benefit as per the prevailing rules of gratuity, retired salary, general provident fund. Moreover, they will get two optional leave in addition to 14 misc. leave, 30 days earned leave, 20 days half pay leave, Sunday leave and national festival holidays. The daily wage workers and semi skilled who have completed more than 15 years of their service will get one increment, two increments for 20 years service and three increments for 25 years in the current pay scale of skilled workers and their salary will be fixed accordingly.” 26. Considering, the facts and circumstances of the case, the finding of Gujarat High Court dated 29th October, 2010 in SCA No.8647/2008 and connected matters and the fact that the said judgment is binding between the parties, we are of the view that the appellants should be directed to grant the benefit of the scheme as contained in the Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 to all the daily wage workers of the Forest and Environment Department working for more than five years, providing them the benefits as per our finding at Paragraph 25 above. The appellants are directed accordingly. The judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 29th October, 2010 as affirmed by the Division Bench by its order dated 28th February, 2012 stands modified to the extent above. The appellants are directed accordingly. The judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 29th October, 2010 as affirmed by the Division Bench by its order dated 28th February, 2012 stands modified to the extent above. The benefit should be granted to the eligible daily wage workers of the Forest and Environment Department working for more than five years including those who are performing work other than building maintenance and repairing but they will be entitled for the consequential benefit w.e.f. 29th October, 2010 or subsequent date from which they are so eligible within four months from the date of receipt/production of the copy of this order. The appeals stand disposed of with the aforesaid observation and directions to the appellant-State and its authorities. There shall be no separate orders as to costs. 26. In view of the above conspectus of law, Labour Court has rightly passed the award of reinstatement of the petitioner with continuity of service to his original post without backwages and so far as communication dated 6th November, 2017 is concerned, the same is contrary to the impugned judgment and award passed by the Labour Court, therefore, such communication is also quashed and set aside directing respondent no.1 to reinstate the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of writ of this order so as to comply with the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court. 27. Decisions cited on behalf of the learned Assistant Government Pleader are not applicable to the facts of the case, as there is a categorical finding of fact arrived at by the Labour Court that the petitioner worked for more than 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding to the date of his termination from service as provided under section 25B of the ID Act in view of evidence produced at Exh.19 by respondent no.1 showing the working days of the petitioner with respondent no.1. 28. In view of the foregoing reasons, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and award passed by the Labour Court which requires interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, all the petitions fails and are accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.