JUDGMENT : Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. 1. Heard Shri H.N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners in this writ petition, which arises out of proceedings under the provisions of the Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act and seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 20.12.2019 passed by the second respondent, the Commissioner, Aligarh Division, Aligarh, whereby he has rejected an impleadment application filed by the petitioners. 2. The facts of the case briefly stated are that ceiling proceedings were drawn against the tenure holder, one Raudan Singh and by order dated 8.6.1976 about 15 bigha of land are stated to have been declared as surplus in his hands. Raudhan Singh is alleged to have executed a Will on 28.12.1981 in favour of his son Karmveer Singh and his three daughters, namely, Meenu Chaudhary, Archana Chaudhary and Vinesh Bala. Raudan Singh died on 13.2.1982 and on his death, only his son Karmveer Singh was ordered to be mutated in his place by means of PA-11 entry. 3. Since, the land in the hands of Karmveer Singh was more than the ceiling limit, a notice under section 10(2) of the Act was issued to him. 4. In the meantime, the widow of Raudan Singh filed a mutation case claiming on the basis of the Will dated 28.12.1981. This mutation case was dismissed vide order dated 29.6.1982, against which order, an appeal was preferred. This appeal was allowed by order dated 20.7.1983 directing mutation on the basis of the Will executed by Raudan Singh. 5. Against the order dated 20.7.1983, the Nayab Tehsildar, Ceiling, filed a review application, which was allowed on 25.1.1984 and the order dated 20.7.1983 was set aside. This order has admittedly attained finality. As a consequence, the Will, allegedly executed by Raudhan Singh, stands discarded. 6. Relying upon the mutation order passed on 20.7.1983 in appeal, the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 16.5.2012 dropped the ceiling proceeding against Karmveer Singh, despite the fact that the order dated 20.7.1983 had been set aside in review and the mutation case stood dismissed. 7. It appears that against the order dated 16.5.2012 of the Prescribed Authority dropping the ceiling proceedings, the State preferred belated appeal on 3.7.2019. The delay in filing this appeal was condoned. 8. Against the order condoning the delay, a writ petition came to be filed before this Court.
7. It appears that against the order dated 16.5.2012 of the Prescribed Authority dropping the ceiling proceedings, the State preferred belated appeal on 3.7.2019. The delay in filing this appeal was condoned. 8. Against the order condoning the delay, a writ petition came to be filed before this Court. The said writ petition No. 24954 of 2019 was allowed and the matter was remanded back for a decision afresh, on the delay condonation application, finding that the delay had been condoned without issuing any notice to the opposite parties in the appeal. 9. The writ petition aforesaid was filed also by the petitioner in this instant writ petition, although, it appears that they were not arrayed as respondents in the appeal nor was required to be so arrayed in view of the fact that they claim on the basis of a registered sale-deed executed by Meenu Chaudhary, Archana Chaudhary and Vinesh Bala dated 24.5.2012. 10. In pursuance of the order of remand dated 6.8.2019 passed in Writ-C No. 24954 of 2019, the section 5 application of the State has again been allowed and the delay in filing of the appeal has been condoned. 11. It is in the aforenoted ceiling appeal that the impleadment application filed by the petitioner has been rejected. 12. Contention of Counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order dated 20.12.2019 is arbitrary and has been passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and that the petitioners were necessarily required to be heard in the matter. 13. It is also sought to be contended that the delay in filing the appeal has been condoned, relying upon an order passed in summary mutation proceedings, which is not binding upon the parties or the Courts in regular proceedings. 14. Counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon the following judgments in support of his contentions- 1. P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another, 1998 (89) RD 18 (SC) 2. Amalendu Kumar Bera and others v. State of West Bengal, 2013 (120) RD 254 (SC) 3. Kanpur Development Authority v. Arjun Dev Kehar 2008 (70) ALR 4 (Sum.). 15. In the judgments cited, it has been held that the delay in filing an appeal etc. should not be condoned, unless and until a reasonable and satisfactory explanation has been furnished and the same is accepted, while condoning the delay. 16.
Kanpur Development Authority v. Arjun Dev Kehar 2008 (70) ALR 4 (Sum.). 15. In the judgments cited, it has been held that the delay in filing an appeal etc. should not be condoned, unless and until a reasonable and satisfactory explanation has been furnished and the same is accepted, while condoning the delay. 16. I have considered the submissions made by Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 17. It would be relevant to note that the order impugned has been passed in ceiling proceedings, which had been drawn against Karmveer Singh. These ceiling proceedings were dropped because a mutation order had been passed relying upon a Will executed by the father of Karmveer Singh prior to his death and ignoring the said Will Karmveer Singh alone, had been recorded over the land in the name of his father. 18. Admittedly, the appellate authority had prima facie accepted the Will and remanded the matter back for fresh consideration. However, the order of remand was set aside, which order has attained finality. Net result is that the mutation order made in favour of the Karmveer Singh by means of PA-11 entry stands untouched. Therefore, the very basis of the order dropping ceiling proceedings vanishes because it has been observed in the impugned order that the order, whereby their review application of the Nayab Tehsildar ceiling was allowed and the order of remand set aside was never brought to the notice of the ceiling authorities when the ceiling proceedings against Karamveer Singh were dropped in the year 2012. 19. In so far as the question of condonation of delay is concerned, the same is within the discretion of the Court, seized of the matter. 20. The Commissioner while condoning the delay has referred to and taken note of the various circumstances. He has also noted that although the Nayab Tehsildar (Ceiling) was aware of the order, setting aside the mutation order passed by the appellate authority on the basis of the alleged Will executed by Raudan Singh in favour of his daughters etc, but the said order was not filed by him in the ceiling proceedings. He has also observed that it is the interest of the State, which is involved in the matter that if a particular officer has been negligent, the State cannot be made to suffer on account of such negligence. 21.
He has also observed that it is the interest of the State, which is involved in the matter that if a particular officer has been negligent, the State cannot be made to suffer on account of such negligence. 21. In my considered opinion, the reasoning given for condoning the delay in filing of the appeal by the State of U.P. is sound and the same does not call for any interference. 22. Apart from the above, the order impugned does not call for any interference at the instance of the petitioners because they are subsequent transferees, who arrived on the scene after the order dated 16.5.2012, dropping the ceiling proceedings was passed. The petitioners therefore, are not necessary parties in the matter and therefore, have no right to be impleaded in the ceiling proceedings which are between the State and the tenure holders. Admittedly, the petitioners' transferors are parties in the appeal and it is their rights which are to be determined, therein. It will also be determined whether they had any valid right, title or interest, which could have been transferred in favour of the petitioner. Rights, if any, of the petitioners are wholly contingent upon the rights of the transferors. 23. For the foregoing reason, this Court refuses to entertain this writ petition. 24. It is accordingly, dismissed.