JUDGMENT : R. NARAYANA PISHARADI, J. 1. Whether the notification dated 17.01.2020 issued by the Central Government, declaring United Arab Emirates to be a reciprocating territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘the Code’) is retrospective in operation? This is the core issue which falls for consideration in the instant case. 2. The petitioner is one of the judgment-debtors and the respondent is the decree-holder in Lawsuit No. 1280/2011 on the file of the Preliminary Court at Dubai. On 16.09.2014, the Preliminary Court at Dubai passed a decree for realisation of money against the petitioner and the other defendants in the above suit. Appeal No. 1486/2014 filed against the decree was dismissed on 24.12.2014 by the Appeal Court at Dubai. The further appeal filed as Appeal No. 25/2015 was dismissed by the Supreme Court at Dubai on 06.12.2015. 3. In March, 2018, the respondent filed an application as E.P. No. 815/2018 in the District Court, Ernakulam for execution of the above decree by attachment and sale of the properties of the petitioner. On 18.08.2018, the petitioner filed objection to the execution petition, raising various contentions. One among the contentions raised by him is that the decree is not executable in India under Section 44A of the Code since it is not a decree passed by a superior court of a reciprocating territory. 4. Meanwhile, the Central Government issued and published the notification dated 17.01.2020 in the official Gazette declaring United Arab Emirates to be a reciprocating territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code. 5. On 05.03.2020, the petitioner filed an application as E.A. No. 349/2020 in the court below, praying that the question of maintainability of the execution petition may be heard and decided by the court. The respondent filed counter affidavit in that application, raising his contentions with regard to the executability of the decree in India. 6. As per Ext.P7 order dated 18.05.2020, the Additional District Court, Ernakulam found that the decree is executable by that court. Learned Additional District Judge found that, the agreement dated 25.10.1999 between India and U.A.E. contained provisions for execution of decrees of both countries and therefore, U.A.E. is a reciprocating territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code and the execution petition filed by the respondent is maintainable. 7. Learned Additional District Judge found that, the agreement dated 25.10.1999 between India and U.A.E. contained provisions for execution of decrees of both countries and therefore, U.A.E. is a reciprocating territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code and the execution petition filed by the respondent is maintainable. 7. The respondent in E.P. No. 815/2018 has filed this original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality and propriety of Ext.P7 order. 8. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and also the respondent. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions: The decree, which is sought to be executed by the respondent, is a foreign decree. A foreign decree can be executed in India only if it is a decree of any of the superior courts of a reciprocating territory. As per Explanation-I to Section 44A of the Code, ‘reciprocating territory’ means any country or territory outside India which the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be a reciprocating territory for the purposes of that section and superior court, with reference to any such territory, means such a court specified in the said notification. The decree, which is sought to be executed by the respondent, was passed by the Preliminary Court at Dubai on 16.09.2014 and it was ultimately confirmed in second appeal by the Supreme Court at Dubai on 06.12.2015. On those dates, U.A.E. or Dubai was not a reciprocating country or territory. It is only as per the notification dated 17.01.2020 that the Central Government declared U.A.E. as a reciprocating territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code. Only when the Central Government makes a declaration to that effect, a country or territory outside India shall become a reciprocating country or territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code. The notification dated 17.01.2020 issued by the Central Government is not retrospective in operation. It can have only prospective effect. Therefore, the execution petition filed by the respondent is not maintainable. The court below failed to advert to these aspects in entering a finding that the foreign decree is executable by it. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent made the following submissions. Section 44A of the Code enables execution of a foreign decree in India. Therefore, the execution petition filed by the respondent is not maintainable. The court below failed to advert to these aspects in entering a finding that the foreign decree is executable by it. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent made the following submissions. Section 44A of the Code enables execution of a foreign decree in India. The agreement between India and U.A.E. for judicial co-operation was entered into on 25.10.1999 and it was published also. Therefore, U.A.E. was a reciprocating territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code on the date of passing the decree. Section 44A of the Code does not envisage any specific form of publication. In procedural matters, what is necessary is only substantial compliance. Section 44A of the Code is a provision which is procedural and not substantive in nature. The notification dated 17.01.2020 issued by the Central Government for the purposes of that section does not create or take away any substantive or vested right of any party and therefore, it is retrospective in operation. Further, the date relevant for determining the executability or enforceability of the decree in India is not the date of the decree but the date on which it is being executed in India. The respondent filed the execution petition in the court below after complying with all formalities under Section 44A of the Code. The court below has considered the question in the correct perspective and it rightly found that the execution petition is maintainable. 11. Section 44A of the Code is extracted below for reference: “44A. Execution of decrees passed by Courts in reciprocating territory:- (1) Where a certified copy of decree of any of the superior Courts of any reciprocating territory has been filed in a District Court, the decree may be executed in India as if it had been passed by the District Court. (2) Together with the certified copy of the decree shall be filed a certificate from such superior Court stating the extent, if any, to which the decree has been satisfied or adjusted and such certificate shall, for the purposes of proceedings under this section, be conclusive proof of the extent of such satisfaction or adjustment. (2) Together with the certified copy of the decree shall be filed a certificate from such superior Court stating the extent, if any, to which the decree has been satisfied or adjusted and such certificate shall, for the purposes of proceedings under this section, be conclusive proof of the extent of such satisfaction or adjustment. (3) The provisions of Section 47 shall as from the filing of the certified copy of the decree apply to the proceedings of a District Court executing a decree under this section, and the District Court shall refuse execution of any such decree, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that decree falls within any of the exceptions specified in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 13. Explanation I - ‘Reciprocating territory’ means any country or territory outside India which the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be a reciprocating territory for the purposes of this section and ‘Superior Courts’ with reference to any such territory, means such Courts as may be specified in the said notification. Explanation II - ‘Decree’ with reference to a superior Court, means any decree or judgment of such Court under which a sum of money is payable, not being a sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect of a fine or other penalty, but shall in no case include an arbitration award, even if such an award is enforceable as a decree or judgment.” 12. A close scrutiny of the provisions contained in Section 44A of the Code would show that a decree passed by any superior court of a reciprocating territory can be executed in India as if it had been passed by the District Court before whom it is filed. An application for execution of such a decree shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the decree and a certificate from the superior court which passed the decree stating the extent, if any, to which the decree has been satisfied or adjusted. The provisions of Section 47 of the Code shall apply to the proceedings before the District Court from the date of filing of certified copy of the decree. The second Explanation to Section 44A of the Code would indicate that the provision is applicable only to a decree under which money is payable. 13. The provisions of Section 47 of the Code shall apply to the proceedings before the District Court from the date of filing of certified copy of the decree. The second Explanation to Section 44A of the Code would indicate that the provision is applicable only to a decree under which money is payable. 13. Executability or enforceability of a foreign decree in India under Section 44A of the Code would depend upon the question whether the decree is passed by any superior court of a reciprocating territory. The first Explanation to Section 44A of the Code states that, ‘reciprocating territory’ means, any country or territory outside India which the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be a reciprocating territory for the purposes of the section. Only the decree of a superior court of a country or territory declared by the Central Government as ‘reciprocating territory’ can be executed in India by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 44A of the Code. 14. Section 13 of the Code provides that, a foreign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title except when it was rendered under circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) thereof. Section 13 of the Code lays down the statutory principles for the institution of an action founded on a foreign judgment. It enunciates the well-established principle of private international law that a court will not enforce a foreign judgment that is not of a competent court. Section 14 of the Code states that, the Court shall presume upon the production of any document purporting to be a certified copy of a foreign judgment that such judgment was pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears on the record; but such presumption may be displaced by proving want of jurisdiction. 15. Section 13 of the Code makes no distinction between judgment of a court in a reciprocating territory and judgment of a court in a non-reciprocating territory. The option of a person who has obtained a decree of a court in a non-reciprocating foreign territory is to file, in a domestic Indian court of competent jurisdiction, a suit on that foreign decree. He cannot straightaway execute such a decree in India. The option of a person who has obtained a decree of a court in a non-reciprocating foreign territory is to file, in a domestic Indian court of competent jurisdiction, a suit on that foreign decree. He cannot straightaway execute such a decree in India. He can only execute the resultant domestic decree. To obtain that decree, he must show that the foreign decree, if he sues on it, satisfies the tests under Section 13 of the Code. If the decree is, on the other hand, of a court in a reciprocating territory, he can straightaway execute it by following the procedure under Section 44A of the Code. At that time, the judgment-debtor can resist the execution of the decree by raising any of the grounds under clauses (a) to (f) of Section 13 of the Code. 16. The agreement between India and U.A.E. had been entered as early as on 25.10.1999. Learned counsel for the respondent has produced a copy of this agreement and submitted that it was published on 10.07.2012. This date shown in the copy of the agreement produced by him is only the date on which it was posted in the website concerned. 17. Even if it is accepted that the agreement between the two countries was in public domain immediately after the date 25.10.1999, it is not sufficient for the application of the provisions contained in Section 44A of the Code. The agreement between the two countries and its mere publication are not sufficient. What is required under the first Explanation to Section 44A of the Code is the declaration of a country or territory by the Central Government as ‘reciprocating territory’. Such declaration shall be made by a notification in the official Gazette. 18. The above view gets support from the decision of this Court in Super General Company vs. Suresh, 2017 (2) KHC 195 , in which it has been held as follows: “Explanation 1 mandates a notification by the Central Government in the official Gazette declaring a ‘reciprocating territory’ for the purposes of Section 44A and also to specify ‘Superior Courts’ with reference to any such territory. In order to bring the matter within the sweep of Section 44A CPC, at least two conditions should be satisfied. In order to bring the matter within the sweep of Section 44A CPC, at least two conditions should be satisfied. That the decree or the judgment put in execution along with the certificate are issued by any ‘Superior Court’ of any ‘reciprocating territory’ as notified under Section 44A by the Central Government in its official Gazette. The mandate under Section 44A is to satisfy with respect to existence of a notification by the Central Government in its official Gazette declaring two things, namely, (1) a reciprocating territory for the purpose of Section 44A and (2) the Superior Court in reference to that reciprocating territory for the purpose of Section 44A CPC. Without satisfaction of these two mandates, no decree or judgment or certificate, if any, issued by any foreign country can be executed within the territory of India under Section 44A CPC, which is the only enabling provision in the Code for executing a foreign judgment/decree for money.” It has been further held by this Court as follows: “When the matter came up for hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner produced a copy of the agreement dated 25.10.1999 entered into between the Republic of India and the United Arab Emirates on juridical and judicial co- operation in civil and commercial matters, for the service of summons, judicial documents, commissions, execution of judgments and arbitral awards.......In short, the agreement which was entered by the Republic of India with the United Arab Emirates cannot be substituted in the place of a notification as mandated under Section 44A CPC.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the existence of the agreement between the two countries and its availability in public domain are sufficient to invite the application of Section 44A of the Code cannot be accepted for more than one reason. In the first place, what is contemplated under the first Explanation to Section 44A of the Code is not an agreement between the two countries or publication of the agreement. What is contemplated is declaration of a country or territory by the Central Government as reciprocating territory. In the second place, such declaration shall be by publishing of the notification to that effect in the official Gazette. In the third place, decree of any court in a reciprocating territory cannot be executed in India. What is contemplated is declaration of a country or territory by the Central Government as reciprocating territory. In the second place, such declaration shall be by publishing of the notification to that effect in the official Gazette. In the third place, decree of any court in a reciprocating territory cannot be executed in India. Only decrees of those superior courts specified in the notification could be executed in India. It indicates that a notification by the Central Government declaring a country or territory as a reciprocating territory and specifying any court/courts there as superior court/courts for the purpose of Section 44A of the Code is essential. 20. A notification issued by the Government under a statute may be conditional legislation or delegated legislation. The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation is that, in the former the delegate’s power is that of determining when a legislative declared rule of conduct shall become effective and the latter involves delegation of rule making power which constitutionally may be exercised by the administrative agent. By delegated legislation the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute and in the case of conditional legislation the power of legislation is exercised by the legislature conditionally leaving to the discretion of an external authority the time and manner of carrying its legislation into effect as also the determination of the area to which it is to extend. When the legislation is complete in itself and the legislature has itself made the law and the only function left to the delegate is to apply the law to an area or to determine the time and manner of carrying it into effect, it is conditional legislation (Hamdard Dawakhana vs. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554 ). 21. Section 44A of the Code gives power to the Central Government to determine the country or territory to be declared as a reciprocating territory. The Central Government has to specify in such notification which courts in such country or territory shall be the superior courts for the purpose of Section 44A of the Code. 22. Where the parent statute prescribes the mode of publication or promulgation, the mode specified has to be followed. Such a requirement is imperative and cannot be dispensed with. The Central Government has to specify in such notification which courts in such country or territory shall be the superior courts for the purpose of Section 44A of the Code. 22. Where the parent statute prescribes the mode of publication or promulgation, the mode specified has to be followed. Such a requirement is imperative and cannot be dispensed with. Where the parent statute is silent, but the subordinate legislation itself prescribes the manner of publication, such a mode of publication may be sufficient, if reasonable. If the subordinate legislation does not prescribe the mode of publication or if the subordinate legislation prescribes a plainly unreasonable mode of publication, it will take effect only when it is published through the customarily recognised official channel, namely, the Official Gazette or some other reasonable mode of publication. There may be subordinate legislation which is concerned with a few individuals or is confined to small local areas. In such cases publication or promulgation by other means may be sufficient (B.K. Sreenivasan vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1987 SC 1059 ). 23. Declaration of any country or territory outside India as reciprocating territory by the Central Government by notification in the official Gazette is the essence of the first Explanation to Section 44A of the Code. Therefore, the theory of substantial compliance put forward by the learned counsel for the respondent, does not merit acceptance. 24. Existence of a reciprocating agreement between the two countries and its availability in public domain are not sufficient to attract Section 44A of the Code. A country or territory would become a reciprocating territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code only if a declaration to that effect is made by the Central Government by a notification in the official Gazette. It is essential that the Central Government shall declare a country or territory as reciprocating territory and notify it in the official Gazette. The decree of the court of a foreign country shall become executable in India under Section 44A of the Code only on making such declaration by notification in the official Gazette. 25. In view of the above conclusion, the contention of the respondent that existence of the agreement between India and U.A.E. is sufficient for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code is liable to be rejected. 25. In view of the above conclusion, the contention of the respondent that existence of the agreement between India and U.A.E. is sufficient for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code is liable to be rejected. The decree, which is sought to be executed by the respondent, was passed by the Preliminary Court at Dubai on 16.09.2014 and it was ultimately confirmed in second appeal by the Supreme Court at Dubai on 06.12.2015. The execution petition under Section 44A of the Code was filed in the court below in March, 2018. On those dates, U.A.E. or Dubai was not a reciprocating territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code because no notification issued by the Central Government declaring U.A.E. or Dubai as a reciprocating territory was then in existence. 26. The question now arises whether the notification dated 17.01.2020 issued by the Central Government, declaring United Arab Emirates as a reciprocating territory, has got retrospective effect. 27. At the outset it is to be noted that the notification dated 17.01.2020 issued by the Central Government does not state that it would be effective from a specific date. Normally, a notification cannot be retrospective. The notification dated 17.01.2020 issued by the Central Government does not indicate that it is intended to be retrospective. 28. The legislature has the authority to pass a law both retrospectively and prospectively within the constitutional parameters. But, where any rule or regulation is made by any person or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the legislature it may or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provision which may in express terms or by necessary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But, where no such language is to be found in the statutory provision, the person or authority exercising subordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye law which can operate with retrospective effect (I.T.O. vs. Ponnoose, AIR 1970 SC 385 ). 29. But, where no such language is to be found in the statutory provision, the person or authority exercising subordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye law which can operate with retrospective effect (I.T.O. vs. Ponnoose, AIR 1970 SC 385 ). 29. In Hukam Chand vs. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 2427 , it has been held as follows: “Likewise, it there was nothing in the language of Section 40 to empower the Central Government either expressly or by necessary implication, to make a rule retroactively, the Central Government would be acting in excess of its power if it gave retrospective effect to any rule. The underlying principle is that unlike Sovereign Legislature which has power to enact laws with retrospective operation, authority vested with the power of making subordinate legislation has to act within the limits of its power and cannot transgress the same. The initial difference between subordinate legislation and the statute laws lies in the fact that a subordinate law making body is bound by the terms of its delegated or derived authority.” 30. In Regional Transport Officer, Chittoor vs. Associated Transport, Madras, AIR 1980 SC 1872 , it has been held as follows: “The legislature has no doubt a plenary power in the matter of enactment of statutes and can itself make retrospective laws subject, of course, to the constitutional limitations. But it is trite law that a delegate cannot exercise the same power unless there is special conferment thereof to be spelled out from the express words of the delegation or by compelling implication.” 31. In Federation of Indian Minerals Industries vs. Union of India, (2017) 16 SCC 186 , it has been observed as follows: “The power to give retrospective effect to subordinate legislation whether in the form of rules or regulations or notifications has been the subject matter of discussion in several decisions rendered by this Court and it is not necessary to deal with all of them - indeed it may not even be possible to do so. It would suffice if the principles laid down by some of these decisions cited before us and relevant to our discussion are culled out. These are obviously relatable to the present set of cases and are not intended to lay down the law for all cases of retrospective operation of statutes or subordinate legislation. It would suffice if the principles laid down by some of these decisions cited before us and relevant to our discussion are culled out. These are obviously relatable to the present set of cases and are not intended to lay down the law for all cases of retrospective operation of statutes or subordinate legislation. The relevant principles are: (i) The Central Government or the State Government (or any other authority) cannot make a subordinate legislation having retrospective effect unless the parent statute, expressly or by necessary implication, authorizes it to do so. Hukum Chand vs. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 601 and Mahabir Vegetable Oils (P) Ltd. vs. State of Haryana, (2006) 3 SCC 620 . (ii) Delegated legislation is ordinarily prospective in nature and a right or a liability created for the first time cannot be given retrospective effect. (Panchi Devi vs. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 589 ) (iii) As regards a subordinate legislation concerning a fiscal statute, it would not be proper to hold that in the absence of an express provision a delegated authority can impose a tax or a fee. There is no scope or any room for intendment in respect of a compulsory exaction from a citizen. (Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority vs. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla, (1992) 3 SCC 285 and State of Rajashtan vs. Basant Agrotech (India) Limited, (2013) 15 SCC 1 ).” 32. The Parliament and the State legislatures possess the plenary power to enact legislation, with prospective and retrospective effect, subject to due observance of constitutional requirements. It is beyond any cavil that a subordinate legislation can be given retrospective effect and retroactive operation, if any power in this behalf is given by the parent statute. But, unless a statute confers on the Government an express power to make an order with retrospective effect, it cannot exercise such a power. Where the executive acts as a delegate of a legislative authority, it has no power to provide for retrospective operation unless and until that power is expressly conferred by the parent enactment. An authority which has the power to make subordinate legislation cannot make it with retrospective effect unless it is so authorised by the legislature which has conferred that power on it. An authority which has the power to make subordinate legislation cannot make it with retrospective effect unless it is so authorised by the legislature which has conferred that power on it. A delegated or subordinate legislation can only be prospective and not retrospective, unless rule making authority has been vested with power under a statute to make rules with retrospective effect. 33. A notification issued by the government pursuant to the conferment of statutory power is distinct from an act of the legislature. A notification issued by the Central Government by the delegate of the legislature does not have retrospective effect unless the statutory provision under which it is issued allows retrospectivity either by the use of specific words to that effect or by necessary implication. As already stated, the legislature has the authority to pass a law both retrospectively and prospectively within the constitutional parameters. In the case at hand, what is being tested is not the retrospective applicability of a law made by the legislature but a notification issued by the Central Government. There is a sea of difference between the two. In case of a notification, retrospective operation is not taken to be intended unless that intention is manifested by express words or necessary implication. 34. The first Explanation to Section 44A of the Code does not contain language indicative of a legislative intent to authorize the Central Government to issue a notification of declaration regarding reciprocating territory with retrospective effect. The entrustment of the power to issue the notification is not accompanied by statutory entrustment of authority to the Central Government to exercise it with retrospective effect. 35. Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that Section 44A of the Code is merely procedural law and when notification is issued by the Central Government in respect of a procedural matter, it takes effect retrospectively. 36. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights in contrast to what is called adjective or remedial law which provides the method of enforcing rights. Substantive law refers to a body of rules that creates, defines and regulates rights and liabilities. Procedural law establishes a mechanism for determining those rights and liabilities and a machinery for enforcing them. Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law. Substantive law refers to a body of rules that creates, defines and regulates rights and liabilities. Procedural law establishes a mechanism for determining those rights and liabilities and a machinery for enforcing them. Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law. Therefore, unless the language used plainly manifests in express terms or by necessary implication a contrary intention a statute divesting vested rights is to be construed as prospective, a statute merely procedural is to be construed as retrospective and a statute which while procedural in its character, affects vested rights adversely is to be construed as prospective (Thirumalai Chemicals Limited vs. Union of India, AIR 2011 SC 1725 ). 37. Section 44A of the Code cannot be construed as merely procedural in nature. It is procedural in its character but it affects vested rights of a litigant. It is a provision which deals with the right of a person to execute a foreign decree in India. It is a provision which deals with the enforceability of a foreign decree in India. When a notification regarding reciprocating territory is issued by the Central Government, it affects the executability and enforceability of a money decree passed by a court specified in that notification. Section 44A of the Code indicates an independent right conferred on to a decree-holder of a foreign decree for enforcement of the decree in India. It is a fresh cause of action and has no correlation with jurisdictional issues (M.V.A.L. Quamar vs. Tsavliris Salvage International Limited, AIR 2000 SC 2826 ). A law relating to right of action, though remedial, is substantive in nature. The question whether the decree-holder of a foreign decree can enforce his rights under the decree by execution as also by suit or only by a suit under Section 13 of the Code is not a pure question of procedure but is a question of substantive law. 38. In the ultimate analysis, I am of the view that the notification dated 17.01.2020 issued by the Central Government, declaring U.A.E. as a reciprocating territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code, is prospective in operation and it has no retrospective effect. 39. 38. In the ultimate analysis, I am of the view that the notification dated 17.01.2020 issued by the Central Government, declaring U.A.E. as a reciprocating territory for the purposes of Section 44A of the Code, is prospective in operation and it has no retrospective effect. 39. Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the respondent had complied with all the formalities under Section 44A(1) of the Code and therefore, the application for execution of the decree filed by him is maintainable. A decree-holder who seeks execution of the decree under Section 44A of the Code shall file certified copy of a decree. What is contemplated under Section 44A(1) of the Code is the filing of a certified copy of the decree of the superior court of a reciprocating territory. It cannot be found that the copy of the decree filed by the respondent, along with the application for execution of the decree, is a copy of the decree of a superior court of a reciprocating territory as envisaged under Section 44A of the Code. The reason is that, on the date of filing the execution petition, the decree sought to be executed by the respondent was not a decree of any superior court of a reciprocating territory. A decree-holder who seeks execution under Section 44A of the Code must be armed with a money decree passed by any of the superior court of any reciprocating territory, being any foreign country or territory which the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, has declared to be a reciprocating territory for the purpose of the section (M.V.A.L. Quamar vs. Tsavliris Salvage International Limited, AIR 2000 SC 2826 ). 40. The discussion above leads to the conclusion that the execution petition filed by the respondent is not maintainable. 41. The question whether a fresh execution petition, that is, an execution petition filed after the date of the notification issued by the Central Government, would be maintainable or not, does not really arise for consideration in the instant case. That question is left open for determination in appropriate case. 42. Consequently, the original petition is allowed and Ext.P7 order is set aside. It is found that the execution petition (Ext.P1) filed by the respondent is not maintainable and accordingly, it will stand dismissed.